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What happen to Bipartisanship
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I think I can conclude my ‘investigation’ into the recent online sale of US state voter registry and voter history databases. Below is a ‘final report’ of sorts.
I found this quite enjoyable to investigate with the assistance of Natasha Bertrand at The Atlantic.

Introduction:
Throughout last month, a user on a blackhat hacking forum listed voter data for sale from 20 states, which mostly overlapped with the 19 states that were targeted by alleged Russian efforts to penetrate their voter data systems. The seller boasted about backdoor access to certain state databases, as well as providing voter history data for all listed states. Prices ranged from as low as $250 to $10k+ depending on the state.

On October 20th, the seller made a comment on his sales thread and offered what he referred to as a "masterfile" of all 50 states, containing over 200 million voter records.
Three days prior to making that comment, the seller received 2 substantial Bitcoin payments. I obtained the seller's transaction records and shared them with a US reporter.
The first received payment on October 17th totalled roughly $61000 in Bitcoin. Exactly 15 minutes later, a second payment of around $1100 was received from a different address.
Given the seller's previously mentioned public comment on October 20th, it's reasonable to assume that this suspicious $61000 transaction is linked to said "masterfile" of data from all 50 states.
I was previously under the assumption that the two payments were not linked to eachother based on the two different addresses, however a closer inspection revealed that the money originated from the same source that made the $61000 payment.

The money trail:
The seller's transaction records:
The address ending in crk3j6 is the seller's bitcoin address. As you can see from the seller's transaction records, the two payments were received from different sources.
Now let's take a closer look at the second payment.
df665be0d18c82732a1f5a7414c6ccb9.png


Here are the transaction records for the bitcoin address that made the second payment.
If you look at the bottom, you will see that this address received roughly $90k from the same address that made the initial $61000 payment to the seller.
15 minutes later, this address then sent that second $1100 payment to the seller, while at the same time transfering $89000 to what appears to be an unrelated bitcoin address.
e2d0b327a866449d2f99c2daae0efdd0.png


Now that it has been established that both payments to the seller originated from the same source, let's take a closer look at that source.
Here we can see that this address first received $151k from an unknown address. We can then see that this address made 2 payments at the same time.
$90k was sent the bitcoin address that sent the second $1100 payment to the voter data seller. The other payment is the $61000 payment made to the seller.
4e84a97136ca3dcb43aad16f8b448131.png


If you then look into the transaction records of the address that placed $150k in this account, a pattern emerges. It appears that someone went to some lengths to obscure the money trail.

For example, if you look into the transaction records of the address ending in Vd61mVk that sent the above address $150k, you'll find that that address only has 2 transactions.
First it received $150k from yet another address and then it transfered the full $150k amount to the account seen in the image above.
When you go through the same process and look into the address that sent $150k to the Vd61mVk address, the same pattern emerges. That address also had just 2 transactions, receiving the $150k and then forwarding it.
This pattern continues on and on. I tried to retrace the $150k payment but after well over a dozen addresses all showing the exact same pattern of first receiving $150k and then forwarding the full $150k to a different address, over and over again, I just gave up. At least for the time being.

Either way whoever made those $61000 and $1100 payments to the voter data seller went through a lot of effort to obscure the money trail.
There’s a lot of money moving around here.


What’s also odd is that on the same day of receiving those 2 large payments, the seller’s bitcoin address transferred that money in small increments to a host of different addresses. The 61k was split later day across more than a dozen different addresses. All those smaller transfers were conducted at the same time. Later that day, the seller did the same with the second $1100 payment.


The voter data:
There’s also the matter of the voter data itself of course. The seller made some bold claims, including claiming backdoor access to some states’ voter registry databases so he could ensure “the most recent data” possible.
Voter history was also supposedly included, however I can confirm that the seller misrepresented the content of voter history data, at least in the case of Maryland. The seller claimed that voting choices were included, however that is not the case.
The seller stated that he just makes sure the data is legitimate and organized in a user friendly format, suggesting he isn’t entirely familiar with the specific terminology associated with voter data and elections. The comment also suggested to me that he isn’t working alone but I have no proof to support that.
The $61000 and subsequent $1100 payments the seller received in non-refundable bitcoin transactions suggest that the mystery buyer was confident enough in the seller to go through great lengths to obscure his payments. The second payment suggests the buyer was satisfied with his initial $61000 purchase.

In this ‘investigation’ I was only able to assess the data from Maryland’s state voter registry and voter history. I contacted a US national security/intelligence reporter regarding the voter data sale and later provided her with transaction records, context linking the payments to public comments made by the seller, and a large batch of other data. Much to my surprise I received a swift response even before I obtained the transaction records etc. We both examined the data, shared our findings and updates and eventually came to the same conclusion.
The data appeared to be authentic, however it also appeared to be public data. That being said, the reporter concluded that while some states can and do make this kind of data available to some individuals or groups, it's a process with strict authorization. Some degree of a breach had to have occured at some point to get this kind of data and organize it so neatly.
The specific quote she gave me was
"This isn't information you could just collect easily. This guy put it all in one place, and he had to have breached the system somehow.

Below is an example of how the data was organized and what type of data it contained.
VTR_ID ---
LastName --- String(30)
FirstName --- String(30)
MiddleName --- String(30)
Suffix --- String(30)
HouseNumber --- String(12)
HouseSuffix --- String(10)
StreetPreDirection --- String(10)
StreetName --- String(50)
StreetType --- String(10)
StreetPostDirection --- String(10)
UnitType --- String(10)
UnitNumber --- String(20)
NonStandardAddress --- String(8000)
ResidentialCity --- String(256)
ResidentialState --- String(2)
ResidentialZip --- String(5)
ResidentialZipPlus --- String(4)
MAILINGADDRESS --- String(8000)
MAILINGCITY --- String(256)
MAILINGSTATE --- String(2)
MAILINGZIP --- String(5)
MAILINGZIPPLUS --- String(4)
StatusCode --- String(10)
Party --- String(5)
Gender --- String(6)
Congressional --- String(10)
Legislative --- String(10)
Councilmanic --- String(10)
Ward --- String(10)
Municipal --- String(10)
School --- String(10)
Precinct --- String(10)
Split --- String(10)
CountyRegistrationDate --- Date(3)
StateRegistrationDate --- Date(3)
11/06/2012-PG --- String(1024)
11/08/2016-PG --- String(1024)
11/04/2008-PG --- String(1024)
County --- String(1218 )
VoterId ---
ElectionDate --- Date(6)
ElectionDescription --- String(1024)
ElectionType --- String(256)
PoliticalParty --- String(256)
ElectionCode --- String(30)
VotingMethod --- String(256)
Date of Voting --- String(2147483647)
Precinct --- String(1218 )
EarlyVotingLocation --- String(256)
JurisdictionCode --- String(10)
CountyName --- String(1218 )
 
Excerpt:
Mr. Stone said, the “threatening messages he sent to me are as bad and worse. Our entire exchange is blunt vulgar and vicious but I never urged him to do anything other than tell the truth.”

In March, when Mr. Credico worried he was in the crosshairs of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Stone assured him Democrats couldn’t act against him and the Republicans would not. “The Minority has no authority,” Mr. Stone wrote, in a message reviewed by the Journal.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mueller-probes-possible-witness-intimidation-by-roger-stone-1542222284
Mueller Probes Possible Witness Intimidation by Roger Stone
Former Trump adviser angry that radio personality Randy Credico denies being WikiLeaks conduit
Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s office is exploring whether longtime Trump adviser Roger Stone tried to intimidate and discredit a witness who is contradicting Mr. Stone’s version of events about his contacts with WikiLeaks, according to people who have spoken to Mr. Mueller’s investigators.

In grand jury sessions and interviews, prosecutors have repeatedly asked about emails, text messages and online posts involving Mr. Stone and his former friend, New York radio personality Randy Credico, the people said. Mr. Stone has asserted that Mr. Credico was his backchannel to WikiLeaks, a controversial transparency group, an assertion Mr. Credico denies.
Mr. Mueller’s investigators are probing whether Mr. Stone had direct contact with WikiLeaks and knew ahead of time about its release of stolen Democratic emails, as he claimed during the campaign and now denies. Mr. Stone says he is angry at Mr. Credico because his ex-friend has “refused to tell the truth” about being his conduit to WikiLeaks.

Filmmaker David Lugo, who knows both men, said in an interview he has testified before Mr. Mueller’s grand jury about a blog post Mr. Stone helped him draft that was harshly critical of Mr. Credico. Another witness, businessman Bill Samuels, said he was questioned by Mr. Mueller’s team about Mr. Credico’s reaction to allegedly threatening messages sent by Mr. Stone.

Prosecutors also are examining messages between Messrs. Stone and Credico that involve the radio personality’s decision to assert his Fifth Amendment before Congress, according to a person familiar with the probe.

WikiLeaks released thousands of emails from and to John Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman, before the 2016 election. Mr. Mueller’s office has alleged that the emails were illegally hacked by Russian intelligence operatives, then released through WikiLeaks and fake online personas to influence the election.

President Trump has repeatedly denied colluding with Russia, and Moscow has rejected assertions that it interfered in American politics. WikiLeaks didn’t respond to a request for comment.

In an email to The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Stone categorically denied any effort to intimidate Mr. Credico. An attorney for Mr. Stone said he hasn’t been contacted by Mr. Mueller’s office. A spokesman for Mr. Mueller’s office declined to comment.

For the past few months, Mr. Credico has expressed concern about public attacks from Mr. Stone and his associates. “He’s getting his friends out there to slime me,” Mr. Credico said in a message to the Journal earlier this month. Mr. Credico appeared before the grand jury in September.

Mr. Mueller’s team is examining whether Mr. Stone, along with several other pro-Trump activists, knew in advance about WikiLeaks’ release of Democrats’ emails in the 2016 campaign, according to people familiar with the matter. At the heart of Mr. Mueller’s inquiry is the question of whether anyone in Mr. Trump’s orbit participated in Russia’s efforts to hack and release the materials.

During the campaign, Mr. Stone said repeatedly that he was in communication with WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange and predicted Mr. Assange would release batches of emails damaging to Mrs. Clinton, a prediction that proved accurate.

Since then, he has said his statements were exaggerated and that his knowledge of WikiLeaks’ plans came from Mr. Credico, who had interviewed Mr. Assange on his radio program in August 2016. WikiLeaks has said it was not in touch with Mr. Stone at the time he was publicly claiming contact with the group.

Mr. Stone first cited Mr. Credico as a backchannel last fall before the House Intelligence Committee, and since then has attacked Mr. Credico directly and through associates. Mr. Credico has also publicly criticized Mr. Stone.

In emails sent to Mr. Credico and reviewed by the Journal, Mr. Stone threatened to “sue the f—” out of him, called him “a loser a liar and a rat” and told him to “prepare to die c— sucker.”

Mr. Stone was also involved in drafting a May blog post harshly criticizing Mr. Credico, which he gave to Mr. Lugo, the filmmaker.

Mr. Lugo published a version of the article for ArtVoice, a website Mr. Stone writes for, with the headline "Phony Russia Gate, Roger Stone & the lies of Randy Credico.” The piece asserted that Mr. Credico had said on multiple occasions that he was Mr. Stone’s conduit to WikiLeaks.

“They were looking into the intimidation stuff at first,” said Mr. Lugo in a text message to the Journal, referring to his talks with Mr. Mueller’s team. “They were following up on ‘conspiring’ ” to intimidate a witness, he said.

Mr. Lugo said that while it was his idea to write the blog piece, the first draft came from Mr. Stone, and he softened some of the language so it wasn’t “too personal.” “I gave them the entire email chain showing them how it was created, so we will see what happens,” said Mr. Lugo, who said the emails show he didn’t attempt to intimidate a witness.

Mr. Stone said he suggested Mr. Lugo write an op-ed because he and Mr. Lugo were frustrated with Mr. Credico’s “many lies in the press.” A writer who works for Mr. Stone helped with the draft, he said, because Mr. Lugo “is not an experienced writer.”

Mr. Lugo said he stands by his claim in the article that Mr. Credico told him he was Mr. Stone’s back channel to WikiLeaks in May of 2017. He also says he turned over to prosecutors a chain of combative messages that Mr. Credico sent to him after the story was published.

Mr. Credico has said his previous statements to Mr. Lugo and others about being Mr. Stone’s “back channel” were made in jest and at Mr. Stone’s urging.

Separately, Mr. Mueller’s investigators in September questioned Mr. Samuels, a businessman friend of Mr. Credico, about Mr. Credico’s reaction to the allegedly threatening messages from Mr. Stone. In some of those messages, Mr. Stone threatened to sue Mr. Credico and accused him of wearing a wire for Mr. Mueller, the Journal has reported.

Mr. Samuels told the Journal that Mr. Credico was intimidated almost to the point of a nervous breakdown. Mr. Samuels’ involvement in the Mueller probe was reported earlier this month by the New York Times.

Mr. Stone said, the “threatening messages he sent to me are as bad and worse. Our entire exchange is blunt vulgar and vicious but I never urged him to do anything other than tell the truth.”

In March, when Mr. Credico worried he was in the crosshairs of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Stone assured him Democrats couldn’t act against him and the Republicans would not. “The Minority has no authority,” Mr. Stone wrote, in a message reviewed by the Journal.

Mr. Stone said that while he discussed with Mr. Credico whether to assert his Fifth Amendment rights, “text messages in my possession prove he did so on the advice of his attorney.”

The messages, which were reviewed by the Journal, show Mr. Credico telling Mr. Stone that his lawyers wanted him to take the Fifth.
 
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