***Official Political Discussion Thread***

8,843
11,335
Joined Aug 20, 2001
The decision to make the warning light for the MCAS sensors optional is an example of Boeing cutting corners.
The 737 max was sold as an old plane that didn't require full blown pilot training, when in fact it had features that made it significantly different from the previous versions of 737.


The decision to make the warning light for the MCAS sensors optional is an example of Boeing cutting corners.
The 737 max was sold as an old plane that didn't require full blown pilot training, when in fact it had features that made it significantly different from the previous versions of 737.

The other aspect of the scandal to note is that the FAA didn't do its due diligence. They essentially let Boeing run the validation process of their planes on the assumption that no company would think about selling planes that are unsafe to fly. The reason why you need a second set of eyes to examine engineering work is because you can never trust the engineer to think about all the ways their product is going to malfunction (In fact, they never think that their product is imperfect until it fails :emoji_laughing: ). I don't think (or know how) nationalization by itself addresses inadequate regulatory work.
I think you mean that MCAS previously used one sensor as opposed to two in the latest version that will be available later this year. I don't think one sensor being used was cutting corners, it would be better classified as a lack of understanding by parties within Boeing and the FAA. Similar to Boeing, the FAA's understanding that the software change was at worst benign. Letting Boeing do the validation aside, I think what you have issue with is the type certification process which allowed Boeing to certify the MAX as an amendment to the certification of an airplane that was built built in 1964. The only "significant" difference from the previous versions and this is the new engines which changed the aerodynamics. This is the reason MCAS was created in the first place because per Type Cert requirements the new plane must handle the same as the same as the original plane. All other changes were not deemed significant enough to warrant an entirely new certification.
 
314
1,119
Joined Jul 19, 2017
8,843
11,335
Joined Aug 20, 2001
ya'll
Boeing asking the the Federal Government for a no strings attached bailout is like when Zel asked Big Mama to pay his back child support or else they gonna suspend his license.

And Zel says Big Mama has to do it because Zel is her ride to church and Bingo.

To get the money Zel refuses to go to AA, refuses to go to anger management, refuses to go get a job at the factory with Lester, refuses to stop any of his previous bad behavior.

He won't even accept letting her hold onto the keys, or selling the car to Big Mama; so he can have the funds.

Welp Zel and Boeing, take yo *** to Moneytree and if things don't work out we will cop your 2003 Altima and Defense Department at the local auction on the low low

So for the time being...
:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Hey man, either Big Mama's coming off that money or she better not expect any handouts after she peeps him on the cover of Forbes.

And while we are talking about the 737. What about the Dreamliner. Poland’s airline Lot’s entire international fleet was Dreamliners. They’ve been leasing planes and crew from air Italia and Belgium airlines because their multi billion dollar contract has been grounded for over a year now.

Lets keep it real, Boeing is a shade of the company it once was. People became to focused on streamlined cost cutting and profit maximization.
The 787 Production was a total mess and yes that's what happens as a result of cost cutting and profit maximization. It also the result of bringing in an American business executive to run an aerospace manufacturing company. That's exactly why Dennis Muilenburg was his successor - Iowa farm boy, engineer by trade, been at the company since he was an intern. He had to fall on the sword so it's a cycle. I'm not yet sure what they'll do with Calhoun since the Board has a retirement age of 65. The plane was clearly to have Dennis ride it out until 65 or a major gaffe. Greg Smith makes the sense internally since he's in his early 50s and has been the CFO for damn near a decade. Either way,I believe the LOT issue you are talking about is engine related but without inquiring, I wouldn't be able to say off the top.

Pointing that it is a shade of what it used to be goes hand-in-hand with what I am saying about the culture.

The decision to make the warning light for the MCAS sensors optional is an example of Boeing cutting corners.
The 737 max was sold as an old plane that didn't require full blown pilot training, when in fact it had features that made it significantly different from the previous versions of 737.

The other aspect of the scandal to note is that the FAA didn't do its due diligence. They essentially let Boeing run the validation process of their planes on the assumption that no company would think about selling planes that are unsafe to fly. The reason why you need a second set of eyes to examine engineering work is because you can never trust the engineer to think about all the ways their product is going to malfunction (In fact, they never think that their product is imperfect until it fails :emoji_laughing: ). I don't think (or know how) nationalization by itself addresses inadequate regulatory work.
 
5,409
7,496
Joined Dec 12, 2012
I'd be interested to see Bay Area vs. LA in terms of growth. We starting our shelter-in-place before Newsom mandated it statewide.
 
9,237
3,624
Joined Oct 14, 2008
ya'll

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Hey man, either Big Mama's coming off that money or she better not expect any handouts after she peeps him on the cover of Forbes.



The 787 Production was a total mess and yes that's what happens as a result of cost cutting and profit maximization. It also the result of bringing in an American business executive to run an aerospace manufacturing company. That's exactly why Dennis Muilenburg was his successor - Iowa farm boy, engineer by trade, been at the company since he was an intern. He had to fall on the sword so it's a cycle. I'm not yet sure what they'll do with Calhoun since the Board has a retirement age of 65. The plane was clearly to have Dennis ride it out until 65 or a major gaffe. Greg Smith makes the sense internally since he's in his early 50s and has been the CFO for damn near a decade. Either way,I believe the LOT issue you are talking about is engine related but without inquiring, I wouldn't be able to say off the top.

Pointing that it is a shade of what it used to be goes hand-in-hand with what I am saying about the culture.
The Dreamliner has had issues since inception. New issues come about each time the plane is released back into the air. From the engines, to the barriers getting on fire, etc.
 
58,324
41,031
Joined May 23, 2005
Ain’t no nurse making $15k in one week. Dude steady trippin.
of course not
a nurse made it in 2 weeks
and why would i be trippin
u apparently dont know how much nurses make
From our jobs union website
U can view our wages for different positions
Now imagine once overtime hits after their 8th hr or
or double time after their 12th hr
And OT after 40 hrs and 6th day
And double time on their 7th straight day
4A5D6CEF-7E99-4047-94E9-6268BF01C9E5.jpeg
 
8,843
11,335
Joined Aug 20, 2001
The Dreamliner has had issues since inception. New issues come about each time the plane is released back into the air. From the engines, to the barriers getting on fire, etc.
Every time it’s released back into the air? It was grounded once for about 3-4 months in early 2013 so it was barely a year old. Yes there are flaws. None of them have compromised passenger safety. Airlines are accommodated for inconveniences and incurred costs.
 
8,389
15,463
Joined Jan 16, 2011
I think you mean that MCAS previously used one sensor as opposed to two in the latest version that will be available later this year. I don't think one sensor being used was cutting corners, it would be better classified as a lack of understanding by parties within Boeing and the FAA. Similar to Boeing, the FAA's understanding that the software change was at worst benign. Letting Boeing do the validation aside, I think what you have issue with is the type certification process which allowed Boeing to certify the MAX as an amendment to the certification of an airplane that was built built in 1964. The only "significant" difference from the previous versions and this is the new engines which changed the aerodynamics. This is the reason MCAS was created in the first place because per Type Cert requirements the new plane must handle the same as the same as the original plane. All other changes were not deemed significant enough to warrant an entirely new certification.
In the case of the singular sensor for the MCAS, the lack of redundancy is a design no no because the failure of the sensor has a direct impact on the safety of the entire plane. I can't think of a machine destined for public use that has been certified without a redundant safety system. Two sensors should have been standard from the get-go.

Then, there is the lack of communication between the machine and the operator - pilot - when something goes wrong (the warning light that would signal when the two sensors - if available - disagreed was optional), which increases the risk of the pilot not knowing what is happening when an error occurs and how to address it. Should have been standard from the get-go.

Finally, we have pilots who don't fully understand a feature that was fundamental in helping them operate the plane (if we go by the reports made by those who flew the 737 max), which indicates that the amount of training recommended by Boeing was insufficient.

From a validation perspective, any change made to a certified equipment triggers a need for re-validating the equipment. In some industries, you can't even move a machine a few centimeters from its validated position without triggering the need for a whole bunch of paperwork and tests. The level of scrutiny varies depending on the impact of the changes, so not everything gets examined if there is no need to.

What I do not understand is how, given the upgrades made to the original design (which had a severe impact on the design of the plane), nobody at Boeing thought about how these changes would affect the overall safety of the 737 max. After all, if you change the aerodynamics of the plane, you are changing the way the plane was originally meant to fly (which means that you are creating a new plane). To me, it seems likely that some liberties were taken because Boeing had control of the re-certification process. The 737 max didn't fly like the old 737, but Boeing had the ability to manipulate the paperwork to make it look like it did. That's were I see the systemic failure.
 
Top Bottom
  AdBlock Detected

Sure, ad-blocking software does a great job at blocking ads, but it also blocks some useful and important features of our website. For the best possible site experience please take a moment to disable your AdBlocker or head over to our upgrade page to donate for an ad-free experience Upgrade now