GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
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Zobrist to oakland. Make it happen billy. Give them rights to the rivercats.
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
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elpablo21
Supporter
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Ya'll greedy as hell
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
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I'm surprised Fernando Rodney is allowed to wear his hat in the way that he does. I know CC did it first but this guy is not even subtle with it. You would think given the purity of baseball they would shut him down quick for that.
Last edited:
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lightweight champion
Banned
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I thought the Rivercats weren't going to be affiliated with the A's anymore?
How Trading for David Price Changes the Odds.
Prospect Watch: Archie Bradley, Nepotism and the Rule 5 Draft.
The All Star Game’s Fast Fastballs and Slow Curves.
Tyler Flowers on Framing and Umpires.
Whom The All-Stars Are Looking Forward to Seeing.
The American League’s Still the Superior League.
The Most Unlikely All Star of All.
Prospect Watch: ’14 Draftee Arms in the Appy.
The Orioles Don’t Care About Our Expectations.
The Aftermath of the Carlos Santana Experiment.
Looking Back at the 2013 Trade Value List.
2014 Trade Value Series: Intro and Runner-Ups.
Top 25 Prospects: A Midseason Update.
2014 Trade Value: #50 – #41.
2014 Trade Value: #40 – #31.
2014 Trade Value: #30 – #21.
Something I assume the Rays understand: From here on out, they project to be perhaps the best team in the American League East. Something else I assume the Rays understand: They’ve dug themselves into too deep a hole, so this year the playoffs presumably aren’t in the cards. And that’s why we’re probably going to see the Rays trade David Price within the next couple weeks. He can help them only so much in 2014, he’ll be difficult for them to afford in 2015 and pieces received in return could replenish what’s become an emptier system than usual. This is how the Rays do the Rays. Price’s status is no kind of secret.
Given how good Price is — and given how many teams consider themselves to be in the playoff hunt — the lefty has a number of potential suitors. Price is the premier impact player available, so no one out there can shift the balance like he can. He might be worth 2 WAR in the final two-and-a-half months; then there’s the playoff bonus, to say nothing of 2015. It’s pretty easy to plug in numbers and see how Price could improve any rotation. But how do those improvements translate to changes in the odds?
Another way of asking the same question: Who might stand to benefit the most — in 2014 — from acquiring a guy like David Price?
Everything you’re going to see here is an estimate. In college, in analytical chemistry, we were instructed to count up all the various potential sources of error in an experiment and measurement. There are very real sources of error here. We don’t know how confident we can be about Price’s rest-of-season projection. We don’t know how confident we can be about the rest of the projections. We don’t know how confident we can be about the rest-of-season simulator. We don’t know how confident we can be about the Price improvement in each given staff. Every additional source of error makes the error bars a little bit wider, so I implore you to see these as less like numbers and more like ideas.
Now then, a chart is going to follow, featuring a dozen contenders. I’ve included each team that’s so much as been whispered as a possible Price destination, and then one or two others just for my own enlightenment. Some of these teams are far more likely to end up with Price than others, as, for example, the Angels almost certainly aren’t going to get anything like this completed. I figure it’s better to have too much information than not enough.
The chart shows differences in odds, by percentage points. The starting points are the current odds. The other points are those odds with a fresh, new David Price in the rotation, starting this week. So what you’re seeing are Price odds — current odds. I had to call on David Appelman for help, since he runs the simulator, and in order to set him up, I needed to make some guesses about how Price would fit in with each staff. To make room for Price, I had to take innings away from other guys, and this is another one of those potential sources of error. I also had to estimate Price projections in various ballparks and leagues, so there’s more potential error. Again: error. These numbers are very far from perfect, but they should at least convey more or less the right ideas. So, let’s get into this.
In blue, we’ve got gains in playoff odds (by percentage points). In red, we’ve got gains in division-series odds, which means odds of getting past a one-game playoff. And in black, we’ve got gains in odds of winning it all. Every single team, of course, would be improved by adding David Price, because David Price is one of the best pitchers in baseball. But all those teams would improve differently.
By regular playoff odds, no one would stand to benefit more than the Blue Jays, which we’ve got gaining about +16%. I shouldn’t need to remind you of all the potential sources of error, but that seems sensible enough to me, as the Jays are in a tight race for the AL East lead and for the Wild Card. Unsurprisingly, the Jays are said to be in the market for front-level starters, even though lately they’ve been more damaged by injuries to the position players.
It’s the same with getting to a full series. No one would stand to benefit more than the Blue Jays, which we’ve got gaining about +15%. For Toronto, the bulk of the improvement comes from improved odds of winning the division. It’s the Mariners who’d have the biggest gain in terms of winning the Wild Card, and the Wild Card leads to the next round half the time. But there’s a belief out there that it’s not worth selling out if you think your season is going to come down to one game.
And then there’s the matter of championship odds. We’re dealing with smaller magnitudes here, because the playoffs are hard and all the teams are good. In terms of winning the World Series, though, no one would stand to benefit more than the Dodgers, which we’ve got gaining almost +5%. Price wouldn’t do a ton to adjust the Dodgers’ odds of making the playoffs, since they’re already heavily favored to move on, but then you get to thinking about a playoff rotation that starts with Price, Clayton Kershaw and Zack Greinke. By these numbers, Price would most help the Blue Jays, in terms of advancing. But in terms of finishing the job, he’d most help the Dodgers. The Dodgers, too, are unsurprisingly interested in Price’s services, and they have the pieces to get him if they want.
The Angels don’t seem like they’re genuine suitors. Neither do the Yankees, who are kind of screwed without Masahiro Tanaka. The Braves, the Brewers, the Giants, the Orioles and the Pirates would all be better with Price, but those are extremely unlikely landing spots. It seems like this might come down to the Jays, the Dodgers, the Mariners and the Cardinals, with the Indians as a dark horse. By playoff odds, the Jays would improve the most, the Dodgers would improve the least, and the other three teams are around the same place. By division-series odds, it’s the Jays, then the Cardinals, then the rest, with the Mariners bringing up the rear. Finally, in terms of the World Series, it’s the Dodgers, then the Jays and Cardinals, then the Indians and Mariners. Much of this feels intuitive, as it seems like the Indians and Mariners are more than one big piece away from having strong title hopes. The others are more like teams that could get over the top.
About the Blue Jays’ pursuit: It’s unsurprising, but it might cost them an in-division premium. Maybe that’s worth it, or maybe Toronto’s better off chasing Cole Hamels, or someone else. This is an opportunity for Toronto, but Price isn’t the only player on the market.
And that’s something to consider. This is about David Price. This doesn’t consider other, smaller improvements from other, smaller acquisitions. Nor does it consider that other teams in the race would be trying to make their own roster tweaks. So even if the Jays were to add Price, who’s to say the Orioles don’t do something, and the Mariners don’t do something, and the Indians don’t do something? The Price trade won’t actually be made in isolation, but it’s likely to be the biggest trade.
The last thing to keep in mind: These are the numbers right now, during the All-Star break. Once baseball resumes, situations change and the numbers begin to get a more obsolete. They won’t change that much over the course of a day or a series, but the sooner a team acts to acquire Price, the sooner it can have Price and put him in ballgames. Something like 10% playoff odds hang in the balance, on average. Price doesn’t make anybody a shoo-in, but that’s less about Price and more about the nature of baseball, a game that requires contributions from several players every single day if you’re a team looking to go anywhere.
David Price is almost certainly going to change his uniform in the weeks ahead. He’ll land with some contender that’s paid a sky-high tax, and the idea will be that Price will help the team drive to the playoffs and steamroll through them. There’s not a team out there that Price wouldn’t make a good deal better. But there are teams that would benefit more, and teams that would benefit less. It’s only one more thing to think about, as if navigating the trade deadline weren’t already complicated enough.
Given how good Price is — and given how many teams consider themselves to be in the playoff hunt — the lefty has a number of potential suitors. Price is the premier impact player available, so no one out there can shift the balance like he can. He might be worth 2 WAR in the final two-and-a-half months; then there’s the playoff bonus, to say nothing of 2015. It’s pretty easy to plug in numbers and see how Price could improve any rotation. But how do those improvements translate to changes in the odds?
Another way of asking the same question: Who might stand to benefit the most — in 2014 — from acquiring a guy like David Price?
Everything you’re going to see here is an estimate. In college, in analytical chemistry, we were instructed to count up all the various potential sources of error in an experiment and measurement. There are very real sources of error here. We don’t know how confident we can be about Price’s rest-of-season projection. We don’t know how confident we can be about the rest of the projections. We don’t know how confident we can be about the rest-of-season simulator. We don’t know how confident we can be about the Price improvement in each given staff. Every additional source of error makes the error bars a little bit wider, so I implore you to see these as less like numbers and more like ideas.
Now then, a chart is going to follow, featuring a dozen contenders. I’ve included each team that’s so much as been whispered as a possible Price destination, and then one or two others just for my own enlightenment. Some of these teams are far more likely to end up with Price than others, as, for example, the Angels almost certainly aren’t going to get anything like this completed. I figure it’s better to have too much information than not enough.
The chart shows differences in odds, by percentage points. The starting points are the current odds. The other points are those odds with a fresh, new David Price in the rotation, starting this week. So what you’re seeing are Price odds — current odds. I had to call on David Appelman for help, since he runs the simulator, and in order to set him up, I needed to make some guesses about how Price would fit in with each staff. To make room for Price, I had to take innings away from other guys, and this is another one of those potential sources of error. I also had to estimate Price projections in various ballparks and leagues, so there’s more potential error. Again: error. These numbers are very far from perfect, but they should at least convey more or less the right ideas. So, let’s get into this.
In blue, we’ve got gains in playoff odds (by percentage points). In red, we’ve got gains in division-series odds, which means odds of getting past a one-game playoff. And in black, we’ve got gains in odds of winning it all. Every single team, of course, would be improved by adding David Price, because David Price is one of the best pitchers in baseball. But all those teams would improve differently.
By regular playoff odds, no one would stand to benefit more than the Blue Jays, which we’ve got gaining about +16%. I shouldn’t need to remind you of all the potential sources of error, but that seems sensible enough to me, as the Jays are in a tight race for the AL East lead and for the Wild Card. Unsurprisingly, the Jays are said to be in the market for front-level starters, even though lately they’ve been more damaged by injuries to the position players.
It’s the same with getting to a full series. No one would stand to benefit more than the Blue Jays, which we’ve got gaining about +15%. For Toronto, the bulk of the improvement comes from improved odds of winning the division. It’s the Mariners who’d have the biggest gain in terms of winning the Wild Card, and the Wild Card leads to the next round half the time. But there’s a belief out there that it’s not worth selling out if you think your season is going to come down to one game.
And then there’s the matter of championship odds. We’re dealing with smaller magnitudes here, because the playoffs are hard and all the teams are good. In terms of winning the World Series, though, no one would stand to benefit more than the Dodgers, which we’ve got gaining almost +5%. Price wouldn’t do a ton to adjust the Dodgers’ odds of making the playoffs, since they’re already heavily favored to move on, but then you get to thinking about a playoff rotation that starts with Price, Clayton Kershaw and Zack Greinke. By these numbers, Price would most help the Blue Jays, in terms of advancing. But in terms of finishing the job, he’d most help the Dodgers. The Dodgers, too, are unsurprisingly interested in Price’s services, and they have the pieces to get him if they want.
The Angels don’t seem like they’re genuine suitors. Neither do the Yankees, who are kind of screwed without Masahiro Tanaka. The Braves, the Brewers, the Giants, the Orioles and the Pirates would all be better with Price, but those are extremely unlikely landing spots. It seems like this might come down to the Jays, the Dodgers, the Mariners and the Cardinals, with the Indians as a dark horse. By playoff odds, the Jays would improve the most, the Dodgers would improve the least, and the other three teams are around the same place. By division-series odds, it’s the Jays, then the Cardinals, then the rest, with the Mariners bringing up the rear. Finally, in terms of the World Series, it’s the Dodgers, then the Jays and Cardinals, then the Indians and Mariners. Much of this feels intuitive, as it seems like the Indians and Mariners are more than one big piece away from having strong title hopes. The others are more like teams that could get over the top.
About the Blue Jays’ pursuit: It’s unsurprising, but it might cost them an in-division premium. Maybe that’s worth it, or maybe Toronto’s better off chasing Cole Hamels, or someone else. This is an opportunity for Toronto, but Price isn’t the only player on the market.
And that’s something to consider. This is about David Price. This doesn’t consider other, smaller improvements from other, smaller acquisitions. Nor does it consider that other teams in the race would be trying to make their own roster tweaks. So even if the Jays were to add Price, who’s to say the Orioles don’t do something, and the Mariners don’t do something, and the Indians don’t do something? The Price trade won’t actually be made in isolation, but it’s likely to be the biggest trade.
The last thing to keep in mind: These are the numbers right now, during the All-Star break. Once baseball resumes, situations change and the numbers begin to get a more obsolete. They won’t change that much over the course of a day or a series, but the sooner a team acts to acquire Price, the sooner it can have Price and put him in ballgames. Something like 10% playoff odds hang in the balance, on average. Price doesn’t make anybody a shoo-in, but that’s less about Price and more about the nature of baseball, a game that requires contributions from several players every single day if you’re a team looking to go anywhere.
David Price is almost certainly going to change his uniform in the weeks ahead. He’ll land with some contender that’s paid a sky-high tax, and the idea will be that Price will help the team drive to the playoffs and steamroll through them. There’s not a team out there that Price wouldn’t make a good deal better. But there are teams that would benefit more, and teams that would benefit less. It’s only one more thing to think about, as if navigating the trade deadline weren’t already complicated enough.
Prospect Watch: Archie Bradley, Nepotism and the Rule 5 Draft.
Archie Bradley, RHP, Arizona Diamondbacks (Profile)
Level: Triple-A/Double-A Age: 21 Top-15: 1st Top-100: 5th
Line: 46.2 IP, 38 K, 26 BB, 45 H, 3.66 ERA
Bradley is talented pitcher.
The 21-year-old hurler entered the season as the No. 1 ranked pitcher on FanGraphs Top 100 Prospects list. He recently placed second amongst pitchers behind Seattle’s Taijuan Walker on the mid-season update. Keep in mind that he missed significant time during the first half due to a shoulder injury and you have a good idea of just how talented this Oklahoma native truly is.
With that said, the past few weeks since returning from the disabled list have not been a walk in the park. Some of his superficial numbers look OK — including a 1.47 ERA in four Double-A starts — but he’s walked 13 batters in 18.1 innings. And he’s struck out just nine batters. Something is amiss.
Bradley still comes right after hitters and challenges them, but his command has been off. His feel for his pitches — both the fastball and the curveball — is off; in his most recent start he was fighting his arm slot and appeared to be guiding the ball at times. These issues should not have a long-term effect on Bradley — assuming he’s not altering his arm action to compensate for continued shoulder soreness or weaknesses. What it does do, at the very least, is slow down his big league timetable. Prior to the season, Bradley appeared to be a near lock to appear in the Majors in 2014.
That is no longer the foregone conclusion, and he’s taken a step backward from Triple-A — which is where he opened the season. That might not be such a bad thing for the Diamondbacks. They’re most likely not going to compete for a playoff spot in 2014, so there’s little motivation to start Bradley’s arbitration countdown. He doesn’t have to be added to the 40-man roster (to protect from the Rule 5 draft) until after the 2015 season. Keeping him in the minors will allow him to take his time and work through his mechanical issues in the near obscurity of Double-A Mobile and/or Triple-A Reno.
If I’m the Diamondbacks, I would also have the young pitcher look at loosening up his frame a bit too — he appears thicker than last year and needs to keep an eye on his conditioning. A lack of flexibility on the mound could lead to a stiffer delivery, which could lead to more strain on his shoulder. As well, his changeup needs further polish. When he struggles to command the curveball, he needs another go-to pitch to keep hitters honest. This was evident even at the Double-A level and we all know big league hitters are far more dangerous.
* * *
Kyle Wren, CF, Atlanta Braves (Profile)
Level: High-A/Double-A Age: 23 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 398 PA, .295/.359/.353, 0 HR, 39 SB, 35-45 BB-K
Nepotism can be a dangerous thing in baseball (just ask Kenny Williams). However, being Frank Wren’s son — the general manager of the Atlanta Braves — may have worked against Kyle. It’s quite possible that scouts overlooked him. He appears to be a steal as an eighth-round pick out of Georgia Tech.
Wren, 23, is a prototypical top-of-the-order hitter. He hits from the left side and is athletic with long legs despite his 5-10 frame. At the plate, he spreads out to produce good balance, which, in turn, allows him to make consistent contact. He clearly understands his strengths and his swing is geared to making contact and driving the ball into the gaps. Wren has a solid eye at the plate, which keeps his strikeout rate low but the consistent contact keeps his walk rate down as well and creates a reliance on his batting average.
On the base paths, he shows above-average speed and is a smart base runner. He has the skill set to steal 30 bases in the Majors even if his speed grades out in the 65 range rather than a Billy Hamilton-like 80. In the field, he’s made improvements and should stick in center field.
Wren will likely be MLB ready in less than a year; he’s hit everywhere that he’s played and he’s currently at the Double-A level. The biggest roadblock to his big league career appears to be the deadweight contract that B.J. Upton is enjoying. It’s possible, though, that Wren could ease into his big league career as a fourth outfielder capable of handling all three outfield gigs. Based on current projections, no other prospect is close to threatening for the future center field gig in Atlanta.
* * *
Tom Belza, OF/1B/2B, Arizona Diamondbacks (Profile)
Level: Double-A Age: 24 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 300 PA, .307/.389/.381, 0 HR, 6 SB, 31-50 BB-K
Belza’s name won’t be found on Top 100 or even Top 10 lists. He’s a fifth-year pro who was originally drafted in the 43rd round of the 2010 amateur draft out of Oklahoma State University. The simple facts that he’s still playing and has also reached Double-A are impressive.
He’s a career .290 hitter with a .361 on-base percentage. He receives additional value because swings from the left side of the plate and doesn’t embarrass himself against southpaws. At the plate, he spreads out and shows good balance. His swing is clearly geared to a line-drive approach and is more about making contact than hitting for power. He incorporates a patient approach that appears well-suited to hitting at the top of an order, either in the No. 1 or 2 slot.
The problem with Belza, though — and why he doesn’t get more ink — is that his best positions are the corner outfield slots and first base. With his career high home run total coming in at 10, power is not his game. His best defensive positions are traditionally power spots on the field. He does have a little experience at second base and third base in the past couple of seasons but he really needs to polish his infield repertoire to be taken seriously for the 24th or 25th slot on a big league roster.
Given his potential at the plate, I believe Belza — soon to turn 25 — could spend five to 10 years in the Majors as a big league bench player — especially if he can prove himself competent at second base and/or third base. As a college product with five years experience under his belt, the Kentucky native is eligible for the Rule 5 draft in December of this year if he’s not added to the 40-man roster by the November deadline. He’s not flashy, but Belza is worth consideration as a low-risk, low-cost bench contributor.
Level: Triple-A/Double-A Age: 21 Top-15: 1st Top-100: 5th
Line: 46.2 IP, 38 K, 26 BB, 45 H, 3.66 ERA
Bradley is talented pitcher.
The 21-year-old hurler entered the season as the No. 1 ranked pitcher on FanGraphs Top 100 Prospects list. He recently placed second amongst pitchers behind Seattle’s Taijuan Walker on the mid-season update. Keep in mind that he missed significant time during the first half due to a shoulder injury and you have a good idea of just how talented this Oklahoma native truly is.
With that said, the past few weeks since returning from the disabled list have not been a walk in the park. Some of his superficial numbers look OK — including a 1.47 ERA in four Double-A starts — but he’s walked 13 batters in 18.1 innings. And he’s struck out just nine batters. Something is amiss.
Bradley still comes right after hitters and challenges them, but his command has been off. His feel for his pitches — both the fastball and the curveball — is off; in his most recent start he was fighting his arm slot and appeared to be guiding the ball at times. These issues should not have a long-term effect on Bradley — assuming he’s not altering his arm action to compensate for continued shoulder soreness or weaknesses. What it does do, at the very least, is slow down his big league timetable. Prior to the season, Bradley appeared to be a near lock to appear in the Majors in 2014.
That is no longer the foregone conclusion, and he’s taken a step backward from Triple-A — which is where he opened the season. That might not be such a bad thing for the Diamondbacks. They’re most likely not going to compete for a playoff spot in 2014, so there’s little motivation to start Bradley’s arbitration countdown. He doesn’t have to be added to the 40-man roster (to protect from the Rule 5 draft) until after the 2015 season. Keeping him in the minors will allow him to take his time and work through his mechanical issues in the near obscurity of Double-A Mobile and/or Triple-A Reno.
If I’m the Diamondbacks, I would also have the young pitcher look at loosening up his frame a bit too — he appears thicker than last year and needs to keep an eye on his conditioning. A lack of flexibility on the mound could lead to a stiffer delivery, which could lead to more strain on his shoulder. As well, his changeup needs further polish. When he struggles to command the curveball, he needs another go-to pitch to keep hitters honest. This was evident even at the Double-A level and we all know big league hitters are far more dangerous.
* * *
Kyle Wren, CF, Atlanta Braves (Profile)
Level: High-A/Double-A Age: 23 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 398 PA, .295/.359/.353, 0 HR, 39 SB, 35-45 BB-K
Nepotism can be a dangerous thing in baseball (just ask Kenny Williams). However, being Frank Wren’s son — the general manager of the Atlanta Braves — may have worked against Kyle. It’s quite possible that scouts overlooked him. He appears to be a steal as an eighth-round pick out of Georgia Tech.
Wren, 23, is a prototypical top-of-the-order hitter. He hits from the left side and is athletic with long legs despite his 5-10 frame. At the plate, he spreads out to produce good balance, which, in turn, allows him to make consistent contact. He clearly understands his strengths and his swing is geared to making contact and driving the ball into the gaps. Wren has a solid eye at the plate, which keeps his strikeout rate low but the consistent contact keeps his walk rate down as well and creates a reliance on his batting average.
On the base paths, he shows above-average speed and is a smart base runner. He has the skill set to steal 30 bases in the Majors even if his speed grades out in the 65 range rather than a Billy Hamilton-like 80. In the field, he’s made improvements and should stick in center field.
Wren will likely be MLB ready in less than a year; he’s hit everywhere that he’s played and he’s currently at the Double-A level. The biggest roadblock to his big league career appears to be the deadweight contract that B.J. Upton is enjoying. It’s possible, though, that Wren could ease into his big league career as a fourth outfielder capable of handling all three outfield gigs. Based on current projections, no other prospect is close to threatening for the future center field gig in Atlanta.
* * *
Tom Belza, OF/1B/2B, Arizona Diamondbacks (Profile)
Level: Double-A Age: 24 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 300 PA, .307/.389/.381, 0 HR, 6 SB, 31-50 BB-K
Belza’s name won’t be found on Top 100 or even Top 10 lists. He’s a fifth-year pro who was originally drafted in the 43rd round of the 2010 amateur draft out of Oklahoma State University. The simple facts that he’s still playing and has also reached Double-A are impressive.
He’s a career .290 hitter with a .361 on-base percentage. He receives additional value because swings from the left side of the plate and doesn’t embarrass himself against southpaws. At the plate, he spreads out and shows good balance. His swing is clearly geared to a line-drive approach and is more about making contact than hitting for power. He incorporates a patient approach that appears well-suited to hitting at the top of an order, either in the No. 1 or 2 slot.
The problem with Belza, though — and why he doesn’t get more ink — is that his best positions are the corner outfield slots and first base. With his career high home run total coming in at 10, power is not his game. His best defensive positions are traditionally power spots on the field. He does have a little experience at second base and third base in the past couple of seasons but he really needs to polish his infield repertoire to be taken seriously for the 24th or 25th slot on a big league roster.
Given his potential at the plate, I believe Belza — soon to turn 25 — could spend five to 10 years in the Majors as a big league bench player — especially if he can prove himself competent at second base and/or third base. As a college product with five years experience under his belt, the Kentucky native is eligible for the Rule 5 draft in December of this year if he’s not added to the 40-man roster by the November deadline. He’s not flashy, but Belza is worth consideration as a low-risk, low-cost bench contributor.
The All Star Game’s Fast Fastballs and Slow Curves.
As a starting pitcher, you get to the All Star Game by dominating with a full array of pitches. You’re built to go deep into games and see lineups multiple times. You scout the opposing hitters and it’s all a lot of work. Then you get to the All Star Game, you break from your routine, you have to come in for a short stint, and you can air it out.
It’s a situation ripe for fastballs.
At least one catcher knew it going in. “For the majority of the guys, too, they’re not going to be setting out their whole repertoire — they’re probably going to have a couple pitches they fiddle around with,” Oakland’s catcher Derek Norris said. “And try to blow a lot of guys away, that’s the All Star game.”
The game started out with a few infamous 90 mph fastballs ‘down the pipe,’ and continued to be dominated by number one. All Star starting pitchers threw 57% fastballs in this game after averaging about 52% during the season.
But they’re also coming in a short stint, able to air it out. Turns out, a few of the starters took more advantage of that luxury than the others.
Starter ASG FB velo Season velo ASG FB% Season FB%
Chris Sale 96.0 93.3 68.8% 50.6%
Max Scherzer 95.5 92.6 64.7% 52.9%
Clayton Kershaw 94.0 93.0 72.7% 54.5%
Alfredo Simon 93.8 93.7 36.4% 56.8%
Scott Kazmir 93.3 91.1 30.0% 53.6%
Zack Greinke 93.2 91.4 41.7% 52.3%
Felix Hernandez 92.8 92.4 26.7% 46.6%
Yu Darvish 92.4 92.3 50.0% 55.5%
Jon Lester 91.2 92.0 85.0% 53.8%
Adam Wainwright 90.3 90.2 71.4% 42.4%
Average 94.5 92.7 57.0% 53.7%
Scott Kazmir, Chris Sale, and Max Scherzer all gained two miles per hour on their fastballs. Sale and Scherzer, along with Clayton Kershaw, threw more fastballs than you might expect out of a regular season, too. So, to some extent, what was anticipated came true. More, faster fastballs.
But then there was this:
What a beautiful non-fastball. What beautiful slow curve. That curveball from Yu went 57 mph according to PITCHf/x. He’s only thrown two slower curves in his career. Everyone sat up and took notice. Listen to Yu tell it like it is as he did after the game: “That pitch is a strength of mine, so I wanted to throw at least one.”
That sounds a bit like what Jon Lester had to say about throwing to Salvador Perez. “He knows what my strength is, so we went to that. Fastball, cutter — threw a couple curves in there.” Lester threw a lot of fastballs, but his catcher knew what he wanted to see and made sure to call some curves.
That’s probably why Felix Hernandez threw so many change-ups (half of his 14) — that’s the pitch the other batters wanted to see. Joey Votto once told me it was the filthiest pitch he’s seen. The All Stars might agree, they whiffed on the pitch a whopping four out of seven times. And Hernandez and Zack Greinke led the battle of the whiffs among the starting pitchers:
Starter whiffs pitches whiff%
Zack Greinke 5 12 41.7%
Felix Hernandez 4 14 28.6%
Max Scherzer 5 18 27.8%
Scott Kazmir 3 12 25.0%
Alfredo Simon 5 21 23.8%
Adam Wainwright 4 21 19.0%
Clayton Kershaw 2 11 18.2%
Jon Lester 4 22 18.2%
Chris Sale 2 16 12.5%
Yu Darvish 14 0.0%
Sum 34 161 21.1%
And so, despite the fact that fastballs are great and fastballs light up the radar and fastballs are easy for catchers to catch… these guys came to put on a show. “You go out there, it’s a national stage right now, it’s as good as it gets,” said Mark Buehrle. “You want to show what you’re capable of against the best,” said Ian Kinsler.
Sometimes that means throwing good ole number one as hard as you can. And sometimes that means making sure to bust out the eephus as slow as possible so everyone can enjoy it.
Thanks to MLB Memes for the Yu Darvish eephus gif.
It’s a situation ripe for fastballs.
At least one catcher knew it going in. “For the majority of the guys, too, they’re not going to be setting out their whole repertoire — they’re probably going to have a couple pitches they fiddle around with,” Oakland’s catcher Derek Norris said. “And try to blow a lot of guys away, that’s the All Star game.”
The game started out with a few infamous 90 mph fastballs ‘down the pipe,’ and continued to be dominated by number one. All Star starting pitchers threw 57% fastballs in this game after averaging about 52% during the season.
But they’re also coming in a short stint, able to air it out. Turns out, a few of the starters took more advantage of that luxury than the others.
Starter ASG FB velo Season velo ASG FB% Season FB%
Chris Sale 96.0 93.3 68.8% 50.6%
Max Scherzer 95.5 92.6 64.7% 52.9%
Clayton Kershaw 94.0 93.0 72.7% 54.5%
Alfredo Simon 93.8 93.7 36.4% 56.8%
Scott Kazmir 93.3 91.1 30.0% 53.6%
Zack Greinke 93.2 91.4 41.7% 52.3%
Felix Hernandez 92.8 92.4 26.7% 46.6%
Yu Darvish 92.4 92.3 50.0% 55.5%
Jon Lester 91.2 92.0 85.0% 53.8%
Adam Wainwright 90.3 90.2 71.4% 42.4%
Average 94.5 92.7 57.0% 53.7%
Scott Kazmir, Chris Sale, and Max Scherzer all gained two miles per hour on their fastballs. Sale and Scherzer, along with Clayton Kershaw, threw more fastballs than you might expect out of a regular season, too. So, to some extent, what was anticipated came true. More, faster fastballs.
But then there was this:
What a beautiful non-fastball. What beautiful slow curve. That curveball from Yu went 57 mph according to PITCHf/x. He’s only thrown two slower curves in his career. Everyone sat up and took notice. Listen to Yu tell it like it is as he did after the game: “That pitch is a strength of mine, so I wanted to throw at least one.”
That sounds a bit like what Jon Lester had to say about throwing to Salvador Perez. “He knows what my strength is, so we went to that. Fastball, cutter — threw a couple curves in there.” Lester threw a lot of fastballs, but his catcher knew what he wanted to see and made sure to call some curves.
That’s probably why Felix Hernandez threw so many change-ups (half of his 14) — that’s the pitch the other batters wanted to see. Joey Votto once told me it was the filthiest pitch he’s seen. The All Stars might agree, they whiffed on the pitch a whopping four out of seven times. And Hernandez and Zack Greinke led the battle of the whiffs among the starting pitchers:
Starter whiffs pitches whiff%
Zack Greinke 5 12 41.7%
Felix Hernandez 4 14 28.6%
Max Scherzer 5 18 27.8%
Scott Kazmir 3 12 25.0%
Alfredo Simon 5 21 23.8%
Adam Wainwright 4 21 19.0%
Clayton Kershaw 2 11 18.2%
Jon Lester 4 22 18.2%
Chris Sale 2 16 12.5%
Yu Darvish 14 0.0%
Sum 34 161 21.1%
And so, despite the fact that fastballs are great and fastballs light up the radar and fastballs are easy for catchers to catch… these guys came to put on a show. “You go out there, it’s a national stage right now, it’s as good as it gets,” said Mark Buehrle. “You want to show what you’re capable of against the best,” said Ian Kinsler.
Sometimes that means throwing good ole number one as hard as you can. And sometimes that means making sure to bust out the eephus as slow as possible so everyone can enjoy it.
Thanks to MLB Memes for the Yu Darvish eephus gif.
Tyler Flowers on Framing and Umpires.
Much has been written about pitch framing, and Tyler Flowers knows the subject well. The Chicago White Sox backstop has caught 255 big league games and another 362 at the minor-league level. He’s no grizzled veteran, but at the age of 28 he’s far from a neophyte behind the dish.
Flowers is 6-foot-4, which makes receiving low pitches a challenge. It’s a facet of his game he’s working to improve, and he’s doing so fully aware that not all framing nuance is of a purely physical nature. Flowers shared his thoughts on selling strikes — and related matters — when the White Sox visited Fenway Park last week.
——
Flowers on getting the low strike: “When the situation permits – nobody on base – I’ve been putting one knee down. I’ve been lowering my center of gravity probably another three-four inches, which strengthens my ability to handle a pitch at the bottom of the zone. Before, it was 10 inches high, now all of a sudden you’ve lowered yourself so the bottom of your zone is six inches high. You can handle that pitch and not have it carry out of the zone; you can be in a strong position to kind of hold that pitch and kind of massage it back up into the zone to keep it looking like a good pitch.
“I think smaller guys have an advantage in that department. Take a Jonathan Lucroy. He’s a little smaller — a little more wiry and limber – and is able to sit extremely low. He’s known as a really good receiver and pitch framer. He can handle that low pitch. He’s changed his position of strength to be lower in the zone. I’ve noticed that when you do that, it seems like you sacrifice some pitches at the top of the zone. Not necessarily fastballs or cutters, but breaking balls or something with a little bit more change of speed. I’ve noticed that those seem a little more difficult to get.
“I definitely want to get those low strikes with a sinker-ball guy, because I want to encourage him to keep it down in the zone. Sinkers, when they’re up, get hit hard. Scott Carroll threw the first game here and did a great job of [keeping the ball down]. I feel like I helped contribute to that, because we were able to get some borderline low pitches called in our favor. That kept him confident throwing the ball down in the zone. It also made the other team aware, ‘Alright, this guy is throwing down in the zone and this umpire is calling [strikes], so we’ve got to try and jump on one that’s not quite that low.’ Then you get some early contact and early outs.
“With more of a straightforward power guy, you might be inclined to not worry about the low pitch. It might be a little more enticing to try to secure the top of the strike zone. One example that comes to mind – he’s not active right now – is Nate Jones. He throws 96-100, so we elevate a lot of fastballs. In his situation, it’s kind of the opposite. We want to establish the top of the strike zone to force hitters to have to try and cover 99 at the belt. What kind of pitcher you have on the mound might change your style and what you’re going for.”
On flexibility and framing, and staying quiet: “For me, [getting low] is not that easy. I think you have to kind of go by body type and such. If you asked me to do what Jonathan Lucroy does, I’d probably only be able to play for a week, and I’d be icing all sorts of joints and parts.
“[Lucroy] is more limber than most, and I guess you can attribute that to his frame and years of doing what he’s done. I came up against him in the minors and he’s always kind of been that way. He’s able to tuck his knees in. He’s got extreme flexibility in his hips to where he can basically almost sit with his butt on the ground, yet he’s flexible enough to keep his knees out of the way. He’s able to kick his knees in — kick them down low – and still maneuver his glove in front of him. Physically, I think there are only a handful of guys that can actually do that.
“Then you get other guys, like a [Yadier Molina] who have adapted to a one-knee-down sometimes, Jose Molina, a bigger guy, goes one-knee-down a majority of the time. I’m sure he would say the same thing, that he feels it puts him in a stronger position to handle that low pitch.
“Another thing is the ability to keep your body a little bit more quiet. You’re fixed on the ground, so you’re not going to be able to sway much left and right. From an umpire’s perspective, if everything’s pretty quiet – if you’re not moving much – it gives the illusion of pitches being a lot closer than maybe they are. The fewer distractions –the fewer movements – the easier it is for that umpire to trust the ball is close to where that target was.”
On knowing an umpire’s tendencies: “Some umpires have a tendency to be a little more generous in certain locations, whether it’s off the plate away to a righty or in to a lefty. You see a mix of all sorts. Some have a tendency to call the low pitch or the high pitch. That’s information we know going into most games. There are all sorts of statistics on that for the umpires. I can look at that and kind of cater to their tendencies.
“But, in most situations, you’re going more on what the pitcher is doing and what the count and situation dictates. Maybe you’re going to set up 6-8 inches off the plate, in, to a left-handed hitter. Maybe he’s a guy that has a tendency to chase, or maybe he likes the inside pitch. So we’ll throw a cutter 6-8 inches off the plate and try to tie him up. More often than not, that’s when you’ll see a catcher setting up that far off the plate. If you see a catcher setting up 1-2 inches off the plate, then it’s probably more the umpire. He knows that maybe he can get an extra inch or two here or there. Some umpires are really strict and really tight. They’re real by-the-book as far as, ‘This pitch has to touch that artificial surface called home plate,’ but majority of them will give a little bit.
“You also need to have an understanding of an umpire’s point of view. If I’m setting up away to a right-handed hitter, the umpire is over my left shoulder. He’s on the inner part of the plate, so he’s not getting the best look of the outside corner. I think that’s why you see a tendency for umpires to be a little bit less consistent on the outside corner, which typically ends up being a little more generous. Rarely do you get a pitch off the inside corner, because they’re looking straight down over your shoulder at the inside corner. It’s hard to get that called in your favor if it’s off the plate.”
On veteran presence and catcher-umpire relationships: “A veteran like David Ross might get more pitches called in his favor throughout the course of a game. The reason I say that is because he’s been around. He has a relationship with some of these umpires and can talk to them in a fashion where they’re not feeling belittled by him questioning a call or giving his opinion on a pitch. I assume the advantage would go to a guy like Ross in that situation, as opposed to a Christian Vasquez, who is on Day 2 of his career up here in the big leagues. He has no relationships with any of the umpires, so he might be a little more hesitant to question a call.
“That said, I don’t think it’s the same as how a veteran pitcher will get the benefit of a doubt on a pitch just off the corner. I don’t think that really applies to catchers. There are too many other elements. I find it hard to believe an umpire would be able to digest and diagnose, ‘I’ve got a rookie pitcher, a rookie hitting, and a veteran catching” and be like, ‘Veteran catcher here, looked good, I’ll give him to him,’ I don’t see that happening.
“Again, with that said, in addition to the relationship he might have with umpires, the veteran catcher might be a little better receiving pitches in general. There’s a reason a guy like David Ross has played this game as long as he has and been successful. He’s good at things like that. He’s a good receiver, he’s good at communicating, he’s good at calling a game. So he might have a bit of an edge, as far as physically understanding what is more appealing to umpires to call a pitch a strike, or what will have him calling a borderline pitch a ball. It goes back to how you set up, the amount of movement you have, and how you receive a pitch. I’m a big fan of Rossy, because he does a great job of being quiet, and letting breaking balls and high pitches get deep to give the illusion they’re lower than they are. He does a good job with the low pitch, catching it out in front – catching it at a higher point.”
On Christian Vazquez: “He didn’t have too many pitches in the dirt today, so I didn’t see any blocks. But I saw a pretty compact kind of guy. It looked like he had a good, low set up. I did notice there were a number of low pitches, and he seemed to do a really good job of not letting them take him out of the zone – he didn’t let the momentum carry his glove down. He did a good job counter-acting that force to catch it where it was, or even kind of massage it back up in the zone a little bit. What I saw from [the dugout] as far as up and down, I thought he looked pretty good, pretty sharp. He was kind of effortless, too, which is always a plus.”
On A.J. Pierzynski getting ejected this year for asking for a new ball, one the umpire could see: “At times, you kind of have to be a jerk [to umpires] because you can only take so much. You’re the spokesman for your pitcher, your staff, and your team. You’re back there and have one-on-one communication with the umpires. I have a number of great relationships with umpires and they’ll take what I say and work with it. There are also a couple of umpires out there I don’t get along with very well. I’ve had a couple of situations where I’ve been forced to maybe be a little more harsh, or rude, than I would prefer to be. It’s just another part of the job behind the plate.
“[What Pierzynski said] doesn’t surprise me. I know how much of a competitor he is. Contrary to what people might think, I know how much he enjoys catching and how much he has a passion for it. So when you see something like that – something that’s unjust or unfair – that’s just his way of communicating with them. He knows he’s kind of antagonizing the umpire, but like I said in regard to myself, sometimes you have to be rude and basically disrespectful to make some of these guys take you seriously. Umpires have their own personalities, their own confidence that they carry about, and I think that’s a good thing in most instances. But some of them maybe take it too far. You have to make sure you grab their attention, and I think that was A.J.’s way of making sure he grabbed that umpire’s attention. He obviously did, and unfortunately he got ejected for it. But I’d be interested to see how the rest of that game went – if that pitch started going in their favor – because part of your job is to stand up for your guys back there.”
On Manny Machado hitting Derek Norris with his backswing: “Probably 99 percent of hitters are going to say something. Every time, with the exception of once, I’ve has them turn around. The majority of them turn around rather quickly and say, ‘Hey, are you OK?’ I’m not going to name names, but the one time someone didn’t say anything, the guy was going through a rough stretch. He was obviously frustrated, and I can relate to that. It really wasn’t a bad shot – it wasn’t in a bad spot and didn’t hurt too much — and I could really relate to what the guy was going through. He wasn’t hitting well and wasn’t feeling good. He’s already had a tough day. I understood the situation and let it slide.
‘So the majority of guys will say something. If they don’t, they might have a good reason,whether it’s their performance, personal issues, or whatever. But if it’s something significant, everybody is going to say something at some point. It may not be right away; — it might be after the [trainer] examines you. Who knows, Manny Machado might have sent him a text later on, once he realized what he did, and that he wasn’t proud of what he did. I’m sure he rectified the situation. He’s a good, young player and I’m sure he did the right thing eventually.”
Flowers is 6-foot-4, which makes receiving low pitches a challenge. It’s a facet of his game he’s working to improve, and he’s doing so fully aware that not all framing nuance is of a purely physical nature. Flowers shared his thoughts on selling strikes — and related matters — when the White Sox visited Fenway Park last week.
——
Flowers on getting the low strike: “When the situation permits – nobody on base – I’ve been putting one knee down. I’ve been lowering my center of gravity probably another three-four inches, which strengthens my ability to handle a pitch at the bottom of the zone. Before, it was 10 inches high, now all of a sudden you’ve lowered yourself so the bottom of your zone is six inches high. You can handle that pitch and not have it carry out of the zone; you can be in a strong position to kind of hold that pitch and kind of massage it back up into the zone to keep it looking like a good pitch.
“I think smaller guys have an advantage in that department. Take a Jonathan Lucroy. He’s a little smaller — a little more wiry and limber – and is able to sit extremely low. He’s known as a really good receiver and pitch framer. He can handle that low pitch. He’s changed his position of strength to be lower in the zone. I’ve noticed that when you do that, it seems like you sacrifice some pitches at the top of the zone. Not necessarily fastballs or cutters, but breaking balls or something with a little bit more change of speed. I’ve noticed that those seem a little more difficult to get.
“I definitely want to get those low strikes with a sinker-ball guy, because I want to encourage him to keep it down in the zone. Sinkers, when they’re up, get hit hard. Scott Carroll threw the first game here and did a great job of [keeping the ball down]. I feel like I helped contribute to that, because we were able to get some borderline low pitches called in our favor. That kept him confident throwing the ball down in the zone. It also made the other team aware, ‘Alright, this guy is throwing down in the zone and this umpire is calling [strikes], so we’ve got to try and jump on one that’s not quite that low.’ Then you get some early contact and early outs.
“With more of a straightforward power guy, you might be inclined to not worry about the low pitch. It might be a little more enticing to try to secure the top of the strike zone. One example that comes to mind – he’s not active right now – is Nate Jones. He throws 96-100, so we elevate a lot of fastballs. In his situation, it’s kind of the opposite. We want to establish the top of the strike zone to force hitters to have to try and cover 99 at the belt. What kind of pitcher you have on the mound might change your style and what you’re going for.”
On flexibility and framing, and staying quiet: “For me, [getting low] is not that easy. I think you have to kind of go by body type and such. If you asked me to do what Jonathan Lucroy does, I’d probably only be able to play for a week, and I’d be icing all sorts of joints and parts.
“[Lucroy] is more limber than most, and I guess you can attribute that to his frame and years of doing what he’s done. I came up against him in the minors and he’s always kind of been that way. He’s able to tuck his knees in. He’s got extreme flexibility in his hips to where he can basically almost sit with his butt on the ground, yet he’s flexible enough to keep his knees out of the way. He’s able to kick his knees in — kick them down low – and still maneuver his glove in front of him. Physically, I think there are only a handful of guys that can actually do that.
“Then you get other guys, like a [Yadier Molina] who have adapted to a one-knee-down sometimes, Jose Molina, a bigger guy, goes one-knee-down a majority of the time. I’m sure he would say the same thing, that he feels it puts him in a stronger position to handle that low pitch.
“Another thing is the ability to keep your body a little bit more quiet. You’re fixed on the ground, so you’re not going to be able to sway much left and right. From an umpire’s perspective, if everything’s pretty quiet – if you’re not moving much – it gives the illusion of pitches being a lot closer than maybe they are. The fewer distractions –the fewer movements – the easier it is for that umpire to trust the ball is close to where that target was.”
On knowing an umpire’s tendencies: “Some umpires have a tendency to be a little more generous in certain locations, whether it’s off the plate away to a righty or in to a lefty. You see a mix of all sorts. Some have a tendency to call the low pitch or the high pitch. That’s information we know going into most games. There are all sorts of statistics on that for the umpires. I can look at that and kind of cater to their tendencies.
“But, in most situations, you’re going more on what the pitcher is doing and what the count and situation dictates. Maybe you’re going to set up 6-8 inches off the plate, in, to a left-handed hitter. Maybe he’s a guy that has a tendency to chase, or maybe he likes the inside pitch. So we’ll throw a cutter 6-8 inches off the plate and try to tie him up. More often than not, that’s when you’ll see a catcher setting up that far off the plate. If you see a catcher setting up 1-2 inches off the plate, then it’s probably more the umpire. He knows that maybe he can get an extra inch or two here or there. Some umpires are really strict and really tight. They’re real by-the-book as far as, ‘This pitch has to touch that artificial surface called home plate,’ but majority of them will give a little bit.
“You also need to have an understanding of an umpire’s point of view. If I’m setting up away to a right-handed hitter, the umpire is over my left shoulder. He’s on the inner part of the plate, so he’s not getting the best look of the outside corner. I think that’s why you see a tendency for umpires to be a little bit less consistent on the outside corner, which typically ends up being a little more generous. Rarely do you get a pitch off the inside corner, because they’re looking straight down over your shoulder at the inside corner. It’s hard to get that called in your favor if it’s off the plate.”
On veteran presence and catcher-umpire relationships: “A veteran like David Ross might get more pitches called in his favor throughout the course of a game. The reason I say that is because he’s been around. He has a relationship with some of these umpires and can talk to them in a fashion where they’re not feeling belittled by him questioning a call or giving his opinion on a pitch. I assume the advantage would go to a guy like Ross in that situation, as opposed to a Christian Vasquez, who is on Day 2 of his career up here in the big leagues. He has no relationships with any of the umpires, so he might be a little more hesitant to question a call.
“That said, I don’t think it’s the same as how a veteran pitcher will get the benefit of a doubt on a pitch just off the corner. I don’t think that really applies to catchers. There are too many other elements. I find it hard to believe an umpire would be able to digest and diagnose, ‘I’ve got a rookie pitcher, a rookie hitting, and a veteran catching” and be like, ‘Veteran catcher here, looked good, I’ll give him to him,’ I don’t see that happening.
“Again, with that said, in addition to the relationship he might have with umpires, the veteran catcher might be a little better receiving pitches in general. There’s a reason a guy like David Ross has played this game as long as he has and been successful. He’s good at things like that. He’s a good receiver, he’s good at communicating, he’s good at calling a game. So he might have a bit of an edge, as far as physically understanding what is more appealing to umpires to call a pitch a strike, or what will have him calling a borderline pitch a ball. It goes back to how you set up, the amount of movement you have, and how you receive a pitch. I’m a big fan of Rossy, because he does a great job of being quiet, and letting breaking balls and high pitches get deep to give the illusion they’re lower than they are. He does a good job with the low pitch, catching it out in front – catching it at a higher point.”
On Christian Vazquez: “He didn’t have too many pitches in the dirt today, so I didn’t see any blocks. But I saw a pretty compact kind of guy. It looked like he had a good, low set up. I did notice there were a number of low pitches, and he seemed to do a really good job of not letting them take him out of the zone – he didn’t let the momentum carry his glove down. He did a good job counter-acting that force to catch it where it was, or even kind of massage it back up in the zone a little bit. What I saw from [the dugout] as far as up and down, I thought he looked pretty good, pretty sharp. He was kind of effortless, too, which is always a plus.”
On A.J. Pierzynski getting ejected this year for asking for a new ball, one the umpire could see: “At times, you kind of have to be a jerk [to umpires] because you can only take so much. You’re the spokesman for your pitcher, your staff, and your team. You’re back there and have one-on-one communication with the umpires. I have a number of great relationships with umpires and they’ll take what I say and work with it. There are also a couple of umpires out there I don’t get along with very well. I’ve had a couple of situations where I’ve been forced to maybe be a little more harsh, or rude, than I would prefer to be. It’s just another part of the job behind the plate.
“[What Pierzynski said] doesn’t surprise me. I know how much of a competitor he is. Contrary to what people might think, I know how much he enjoys catching and how much he has a passion for it. So when you see something like that – something that’s unjust or unfair – that’s just his way of communicating with them. He knows he’s kind of antagonizing the umpire, but like I said in regard to myself, sometimes you have to be rude and basically disrespectful to make some of these guys take you seriously. Umpires have their own personalities, their own confidence that they carry about, and I think that’s a good thing in most instances. But some of them maybe take it too far. You have to make sure you grab their attention, and I think that was A.J.’s way of making sure he grabbed that umpire’s attention. He obviously did, and unfortunately he got ejected for it. But I’d be interested to see how the rest of that game went – if that pitch started going in their favor – because part of your job is to stand up for your guys back there.”
On Manny Machado hitting Derek Norris with his backswing: “Probably 99 percent of hitters are going to say something. Every time, with the exception of once, I’ve has them turn around. The majority of them turn around rather quickly and say, ‘Hey, are you OK?’ I’m not going to name names, but the one time someone didn’t say anything, the guy was going through a rough stretch. He was obviously frustrated, and I can relate to that. It really wasn’t a bad shot – it wasn’t in a bad spot and didn’t hurt too much — and I could really relate to what the guy was going through. He wasn’t hitting well and wasn’t feeling good. He’s already had a tough day. I understood the situation and let it slide.
‘So the majority of guys will say something. If they don’t, they might have a good reason,whether it’s their performance, personal issues, or whatever. But if it’s something significant, everybody is going to say something at some point. It may not be right away; — it might be after the [trainer] examines you. Who knows, Manny Machado might have sent him a text later on, once he realized what he did, and that he wasn’t proud of what he did. I’m sure he rectified the situation. He’s a good, young player and I’m sure he did the right thing eventually.”
Whom The All-Stars Are Looking Forward to Seeing.
Because of interleague play, many of this season’s All-Stars have already seen who’s on the other side. But there’s a unique opportunity to see the best of the other league on one field in Minnesota. So I asked some All-Stars if they were looking forward to a particular matchup today.
Ian Kinsler: You don’t really look forward to matching up against All-Star pitchers. Is Aroldis Chapman here? I don’t even know who’s on their team.
Daniel Murphy: I just hope I don’t get Chris Sale in the seventh or eighth when I get in. The American League side can feel free to use him early. I got a day off against him two years ago and was not upset.
Kyle Seager: You’re talking about the best of the best. I don’t think there’s anyone here you want to face. It’s overwhelming. I haven’t thought about the potential matchups. In the National League, you have guys like Chapman, who are throwing so hard. That will be interesting. You got guys like Craig Kimbrel, so many guys; your Clayton Kershaws. I faced Kershaw before… it didn’t necessarily go well for me.
Michael Brantley: Looking forward to it? I don’t want to say I’m looking forward to it. They’re all great pitchers. It’s a really exciting battle, no matter who I face. I faced Kershaw in the minor leagues and obviously he’s getting better, just like I am. But I’ve seen him before, and it’s a great pitch, and he’s a great pitcher, just like all of these guys.
Derek Norris: I’ve heard so many great things about Yasiel Puig and how he plays. I’m looking forward to seeing it with my own eyes and seeing his highlights all over the place. That’s the one guy who’s obviously one of the more exciting guys in baseball. Realistically, I’ll only get one, maybe two at bats, so I’m just looking to seeing everyone play on the same field.
Devin Mesoraco: I think I’ll be more excited to be catching some of the guys on our side, like Clayton and Adam Wainwright. You get to see what it’s all about. I think it’ll be more interesting to me to catch those guys to see how everything moves. Really see what makes them so successful.
Aroldis Chapman: There’s no particular player to go up against. This is a show. I’m here to enjoy the show. I just wanna play whatever I have to play. Whoever comes to hit against me today, I’m ready.
Charlie Blackmon: I don’t know a lot of those guys. Not enough interleague play in my career so far to know who those guys are. There’s nobody in particular, and if there was, I can’t let them know who they are.
Hunter Pence: I don’t even know the whole roster. I should probably look that up. You have no idea who you’re going to face.
Tim Hudson: I don’t even know who’s going to be in the lineup by the time I get there. It won’t be scrubs. Whoever it is, it ain’t going to be a walk in the park.
Tyson Ross: Probably Josh Donaldson. He was actually my catcher in Double- and Triple-A. That would be a fun matchup. He’d definitely have the advantage because he’s seen everything I’ve got. That would be a pretty cool experience.
Giancarlo Stanton: None of these guys you want to see.
Ian Kinsler: You don’t really look forward to matching up against All-Star pitchers. Is Aroldis Chapman here? I don’t even know who’s on their team.
Daniel Murphy: I just hope I don’t get Chris Sale in the seventh or eighth when I get in. The American League side can feel free to use him early. I got a day off against him two years ago and was not upset.
Kyle Seager: You’re talking about the best of the best. I don’t think there’s anyone here you want to face. It’s overwhelming. I haven’t thought about the potential matchups. In the National League, you have guys like Chapman, who are throwing so hard. That will be interesting. You got guys like Craig Kimbrel, so many guys; your Clayton Kershaws. I faced Kershaw before… it didn’t necessarily go well for me.
Michael Brantley: Looking forward to it? I don’t want to say I’m looking forward to it. They’re all great pitchers. It’s a really exciting battle, no matter who I face. I faced Kershaw in the minor leagues and obviously he’s getting better, just like I am. But I’ve seen him before, and it’s a great pitch, and he’s a great pitcher, just like all of these guys.
Derek Norris: I’ve heard so many great things about Yasiel Puig and how he plays. I’m looking forward to seeing it with my own eyes and seeing his highlights all over the place. That’s the one guy who’s obviously one of the more exciting guys in baseball. Realistically, I’ll only get one, maybe two at bats, so I’m just looking to seeing everyone play on the same field.
Devin Mesoraco: I think I’ll be more excited to be catching some of the guys on our side, like Clayton and Adam Wainwright. You get to see what it’s all about. I think it’ll be more interesting to me to catch those guys to see how everything moves. Really see what makes them so successful.
Aroldis Chapman: There’s no particular player to go up against. This is a show. I’m here to enjoy the show. I just wanna play whatever I have to play. Whoever comes to hit against me today, I’m ready.
Charlie Blackmon: I don’t know a lot of those guys. Not enough interleague play in my career so far to know who those guys are. There’s nobody in particular, and if there was, I can’t let them know who they are.
Hunter Pence: I don’t even know the whole roster. I should probably look that up. You have no idea who you’re going to face.
Tim Hudson: I don’t even know who’s going to be in the lineup by the time I get there. It won’t be scrubs. Whoever it is, it ain’t going to be a walk in the park.
Tyson Ross: Probably Josh Donaldson. He was actually my catcher in Double- and Triple-A. That would be a fun matchup. He’d definitely have the advantage because he’s seen everything I’ve got. That would be a pretty cool experience.
Giancarlo Stanton: None of these guys you want to see.
The American League’s Still the Superior League.
As I see it, there are three ways to determine which is better, between the American League and the National League. Those ways:
The hard way
The easy way
The easiest way
The easiest way is to just pick one and stand by it. Think the National League’s better? Declare as much and refuse to give any ground, no matter the evidence. You have made your determination!
That leaves two ways to do this with actual math. The more complicated way is to look at the performances of players who’ve switched leagues, and compare those performances to expected performances. That’ll get you somewhere, but that’ll also cost you a good amount of time, most probably. Thankfully, there’s an easier way that works just fine. Want to know which league is better? Look at how each league has performed against the other league! This is the 18th year of interleague play. It’s as old as Brady Aiken. It’s not new anymore — it’s old enough to join the army — and we can make use of the data it provides.
Of course, the season isn’t over. Of course, not every team in each league plays every team in the other league. So of course, any information you get out of this is going to come with its attendant uncertainties, but when life provides an easy way to get at the answer to a question, you seize it without looking back. In 2014, we’re 190 games into the slate of interleague play. AL teams have won 102 games and lost 88. They’ve outscored NL teams 845 – 799. The AL leads in OPS differential by 14 points. Based on the evidence we have, the AL is the superior league, and I think many of us have gotten used to this.
The NL hasn’t won half the games since 2003. The NL hasn’t outscored the AL since 2003. The NL hasn’t had an advantage in OPS differential since 2002. Below, you can look at a couple charts, showing the history of the three statistics.
I should note that I used OPS instead of wOBA out of convenience — data’s been pulled from Baseball-Reference, and Baseball-Reference uses OPS instead of wOBA. I can’t imagine wOBA would tell a meaningfully different story, as OPS gets the job done, as strange as it is to consider.
Depending on the stat, you can spot some different eras. By winning percentage, the AL’s had a pretty firm lead for a decade. By run differential per game, things have calmed down since an AL peak between 2005 – 2009. By OPS differential, it’s been a more recent calming effect, really kicking in last season. Not coincidentally, last season, the Astros moved from the NL to the AL, and while the Astros have lately gotten a bit better, they were terrible in 2012, they were terrible in 2013, and they were terrible to start 2014. Leagues are massive entities, but the Astros evened the field a little bit. Moving a team was long overdue, and the Astros weren’t going to be terrible forever.
It used to be, when people would talk about the AL’s advantage, they’d make sure to point to payroll inequality as a factor. For years, the average AL payroll was higher than the average NL payroll, and spending, of course, correlates to success. But this year, the average NL team is outspending the average AL team by about three million dollars or so. So a leg or two has been kicked out from under that argument, but of course, this could be more detailed — what we’re lacking is comprehensive service-time information. Not every player’s in position to make free-agent money, and so this might still be a meaningful point.
Besides the Astros point, and the payroll point, how might the NL be making up some ground? Perhaps the NL is now the better defensive league. According to UZR, since the start of 2013, the NL has been better defensively by almost 130 runs. And according to Defensive Runs Saved, since the start of 2013, the NL has been better defensively by almost 800 runs. I don’t know how to explain so big a difference — it probably has something to do with how shifts are treated — but we can at least say that the NL is better in the field, and it might be way better. This would be one reason the difference between the leagues has settled down.
There’s also the Dodgers factor. And there’s the declining-Yankees factor. Baseball isn’t controlled by the Boston/New York rivalry the way it seemed to be several years ago, and that’s helped to even the playing field, even though the situation is still slightly tilted in the AL’s favor. An explanation for the continued superiority could come down to front-office superiority, but that’s a difficult thing to prove. Anecdotally, one of the leagues has Billy Beane and one of the leagues has Ruben Amaro, but that’s not very scientific.
The long and short of it: for another season, it would appear that the American League is stronger than the National League. This is a trend that’s kept up for years, but to the NL’s credit, the two leagues aren’t as different as they were a few years back, and it seems like things might be balancing out some. This season there’s no AL payroll advantage, and it stands to reason this ought to be pretty cyclical. Within recorded history, the NL has won the majority of interleague contests in a year. That’s probably not going to happen in 2014, but maybe next year or the year after that. So, something to look forward to, fans of the National League. I don’t know why there would be fans of leagues, but I don’t know why there would be fans of American Authors so I’ll just assume some are out there and leave it at that.
The hard way
The easy way
The easiest way
The easiest way is to just pick one and stand by it. Think the National League’s better? Declare as much and refuse to give any ground, no matter the evidence. You have made your determination!
That leaves two ways to do this with actual math. The more complicated way is to look at the performances of players who’ve switched leagues, and compare those performances to expected performances. That’ll get you somewhere, but that’ll also cost you a good amount of time, most probably. Thankfully, there’s an easier way that works just fine. Want to know which league is better? Look at how each league has performed against the other league! This is the 18th year of interleague play. It’s as old as Brady Aiken. It’s not new anymore — it’s old enough to join the army — and we can make use of the data it provides.
Of course, the season isn’t over. Of course, not every team in each league plays every team in the other league. So of course, any information you get out of this is going to come with its attendant uncertainties, but when life provides an easy way to get at the answer to a question, you seize it without looking back. In 2014, we’re 190 games into the slate of interleague play. AL teams have won 102 games and lost 88. They’ve outscored NL teams 845 – 799. The AL leads in OPS differential by 14 points. Based on the evidence we have, the AL is the superior league, and I think many of us have gotten used to this.
The NL hasn’t won half the games since 2003. The NL hasn’t outscored the AL since 2003. The NL hasn’t had an advantage in OPS differential since 2002. Below, you can look at a couple charts, showing the history of the three statistics.
I should note that I used OPS instead of wOBA out of convenience — data’s been pulled from Baseball-Reference, and Baseball-Reference uses OPS instead of wOBA. I can’t imagine wOBA would tell a meaningfully different story, as OPS gets the job done, as strange as it is to consider.
Depending on the stat, you can spot some different eras. By winning percentage, the AL’s had a pretty firm lead for a decade. By run differential per game, things have calmed down since an AL peak between 2005 – 2009. By OPS differential, it’s been a more recent calming effect, really kicking in last season. Not coincidentally, last season, the Astros moved from the NL to the AL, and while the Astros have lately gotten a bit better, they were terrible in 2012, they were terrible in 2013, and they were terrible to start 2014. Leagues are massive entities, but the Astros evened the field a little bit. Moving a team was long overdue, and the Astros weren’t going to be terrible forever.
It used to be, when people would talk about the AL’s advantage, they’d make sure to point to payroll inequality as a factor. For years, the average AL payroll was higher than the average NL payroll, and spending, of course, correlates to success. But this year, the average NL team is outspending the average AL team by about three million dollars or so. So a leg or two has been kicked out from under that argument, but of course, this could be more detailed — what we’re lacking is comprehensive service-time information. Not every player’s in position to make free-agent money, and so this might still be a meaningful point.
Besides the Astros point, and the payroll point, how might the NL be making up some ground? Perhaps the NL is now the better defensive league. According to UZR, since the start of 2013, the NL has been better defensively by almost 130 runs. And according to Defensive Runs Saved, since the start of 2013, the NL has been better defensively by almost 800 runs. I don’t know how to explain so big a difference — it probably has something to do with how shifts are treated — but we can at least say that the NL is better in the field, and it might be way better. This would be one reason the difference between the leagues has settled down.
There’s also the Dodgers factor. And there’s the declining-Yankees factor. Baseball isn’t controlled by the Boston/New York rivalry the way it seemed to be several years ago, and that’s helped to even the playing field, even though the situation is still slightly tilted in the AL’s favor. An explanation for the continued superiority could come down to front-office superiority, but that’s a difficult thing to prove. Anecdotally, one of the leagues has Billy Beane and one of the leagues has Ruben Amaro, but that’s not very scientific.
The long and short of it: for another season, it would appear that the American League is stronger than the National League. This is a trend that’s kept up for years, but to the NL’s credit, the two leagues aren’t as different as they were a few years back, and it seems like things might be balancing out some. This season there’s no AL payroll advantage, and it stands to reason this ought to be pretty cyclical. Within recorded history, the NL has won the majority of interleague contests in a year. That’s probably not going to happen in 2014, but maybe next year or the year after that. So, something to look forward to, fans of the National League. I don’t know why there would be fans of leagues, but I don’t know why there would be fans of American Authors so I’ll just assume some are out there and leave it at that.
The Most Unlikely All Star of All.
With the season on hiatus for the playing of the Midsummer Classic, we might recall some of the best players never to play on all All Star team. My personal nominations for such an award, if it were to exist, would be for Garry Maddox, one of the best center fielders I’ve ever had the pleasure to watch, and Tim Salmon, a consistent, prolific middle-of-the-order power threat. Toss in Kirk Gibson for good measure. Articles are also written about the worst players ever to play in All Star Game, but this is not one of them. This is about an unlikely participant – the Reds’ Alfredo Simon, who was yesterday named as a late addition to the NL roster. Anyone who had him in the “Future All Star” pool at any time in the last decade and a half, please step to the head of the line.
Before there was Alfredo Simon, there was Carlos Cabrera. Cabrera was signed as an amateur free agent out of the Dominican Republic in 1999, supposedly at the age of 16. He battled his way through the short-season levels of the Phillies’ system through 2002, showcasing a large, durable frame and a mid-to-upper 90′s fastball. I had the opportunity to scout him at Low-A Lakewood in 2003, his first year in a full-season league. I assumed he was 20 years at the time, and turned in a favorable report after watching him pitch. Within months, however, word had leaked out that Cabrera was actually named Alfredo Simon, and was 21 months older than his listed age. This affected my view of his upside, but he still looked like a future major leaguer to me, more specifically a reliever with end of the game potential. No, I did not envision a future All Star starter who pitched to contact with a very low walk rate.
Simon didn’t last long with the Phillies after his age adjustment, being dispatched to the Giants along with Ricky Ledee for reliever Felix Rodriguez. He quickly set about earning minor league journeyman status upon arrival in the Giants’ organization, never posting an ERA under 5.00 in any of his minor league stops in his season and a half there. He then became a minor league free agent (multiple times), a Rule 5 pick and even pitched in the Mexican League for a spell, bouncing from organization to organization before settling in for awhile with the Orioles in 2009.
Just when it appeared Simon was ready to make the major league club out of spring training, he suffered a UCL injury and required Tommy John surgery. He recovered and rehabbed relatively quickly, and unlike many hurlers who require a period of readjustment to regain their command, established dominance at the Triple-A level and was summoned to the big leagues in early 2010. Except for four starts in 2011, in an initial attempted conversion to a starting role, he hasn’t been back since.
Truth be told, the Alfredo Simon who largely struggled in the major leagues with the Orioles over parts of four seasons wasn’t much different from the Carlos Cabrera I saw back in Lakewood. He had filled out noticeably, to 6’6″, 265, and still tantalized with raw velocity, but didn’t command his fastball particularly well, and his secondary pitches were inconsistent. In the leadup to Opening Day 2012, however, Simon got the break of his professional life, as he was claimed off of waivers by the Reds, and was turned over to their then pitching coach and current manager, Bryan Price.
Simon was used exclusively out of the pen in his first two seasons in Cincinnati, but was a totally different cat than he had been at any previous point in his professional career. He repeated his delivery much more consistently, threw a lot more strikes – including a higher percentage of quality strikes – and began his evolution into a ground ball pitcher. He began to use his cutter much more often at the expense of his slider, and has much more deadly to same-handed hitters in the process. Price became the Reds’ manager this season, and decided to once again attempt to turn this huge, durable guy with the newly repeatable delivery into a starter. And here we are – Simon is tied for the major league lead in wins, with 12, and has become the latest in a long line of against all odds All Stars.
Let’s take a step back now and attempt to get to the nub of Simon’s true talent. Is he what his traditional numbers suggest – a Cy Young candidate and a potentially historic late-career breakthrough starting pitcher? Is he a historic fluke – someone with gaudy traditional numbers who is benefiting from playing in front of a very strong defense? Or is he something in between? His ERA – 2.70. His FIP – 4.34. What exactly do we have in Alfredo Simon? Let’s take a closer look at his 2014 plate appearance outcome frequency and production by BIP type data to get a better feel for him. First, the frequency data:
FREQ – 2014
Simon % REL PCT
K 16.0% 79 3
BB 6.0% 77 32
POP 6.9% 90 50
FLY 25.4% 91 34
LD 20.8% 100 34
GB 46.8% 107 72
The standout piece of information in the table above is Simon’s very low K rate. Using full-season 2013 data, his 16.0% K rate is good for a 3 percentile rank. Striking out so few hitters puts inordinate pressure on a pitcher to manage contact on balls in play. His control is solid, a 6.0% BB rate good for a respectably low 32 percentile rank. His batted ball profile isn’t particularly notable in any meaningful way – he has somewhat of a ground ball tendency, with a 72 percentile rank, but doesn’t rank among the elite ground ball inducers in the game. This is the frequency profile of a pitch-to-contact, league-averageish type pitcher who lacks a single go-to skill or ability that would qualify him for an All Star Game. Simon’s production by BIP type allowed information for 2014, both before and after adjustment for context, should offer more insight into his performance to date:
PROD – 2014
Simon AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD ACT ERA CALC ERA TRU ERA
FLY 0.274 0.810 112 119
LD 0.580 0.768 77 99
GB 0.155 0.161 40 98
ALL BIP 0.264 0.433 71 98
ALL PA 0.218 0.266 0.357 76 101 2.70 2.90 3.86
The actual production allowed by Simon on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and is converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure is then adjusted for context, such as home park, team defense, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. In the three right-most columns, his actual ERA, his calculated component ERA based on actual production allowed, and his “tru” ERA, which is adjusted for context, are all presented. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.
Simon does not allow a ton of fly balls, as shown in the first table, but the ones he does allow are hit quite hard – his fly ball REL PRD of 112 is adjusted upward for context to 119. The most stark information on the production table occurs on the next two line items – Simon has allowed well below MLB average production on line drives (77 ADJ PRD) and ground balls (40 ADJ PRD – which would have been by far the lowest among 2013 MLB ERA qualifiers). Simon, however, does not allow materially less authoritative line drive and ground ball contact – after adjustment for context, he should be allowing basically MLB average production on those types of batted balls. Simon has been significantly aided both by luck and well above average team defense – particularly in the infield. Without adjustment for context, Simon’s overall REL PRD – his unadjusted contact score – of 71 is a candidate to the lead the NL in 2014. His true contact management talent is better measured by his ADJ PRD, which gives him an adjusted contact score of 98, basically league average. Add back his K’s and BB’s, and his overall ADJ PRD creeps up a bit higher to 101, giving him a “tru” ERA of 3.86, just above MLB average, over a full run above his actual ERA.
I am not here to diminish the accomplishments of Alfredo Simon or the Cincinnati Reds. The club deserves a ton of credit for seeing a starter in Simon, and he deserves a ton of credit for turning himself into somewhat of a control artist, who pitches to his strengths. His decent swing-and-miss rate of 8.9% even suggests there may be more K’s in there somewhere. In the big picture, Simon is a letter-perfect fit for his club – a strikethrower who gets more than his share of ground balls, pitching in front of what may be the best infield defense in the game. What he is not, however, is a true-talent sub-3.00 ERA pitcher. This exact moment in time is very likely the pinnacle of Alfredo Simon’s major league career.
I searched one of my many databases for 33-year-old first-time ERA qualifiers, and came up with a whopping seven names – Ewald Pyle (1944), Mel Queen, Sr. (1951), Milt Shoffner (1939), Eric Stults (2013), Tom Timmermann (1973), Jim Turner (1937) and Ryan Vogelsong (2011). Suffice it to say, this group did not go on to record a prodigious amount of major league success. In fact, the seven of them combined for a grand total of four additional ERA-qualifying seasons after their age-33 year, three of them posted by Turner – who had previously logged 12 minor league seasons – and the other by Vogelsong. Stults and Vogelsong could add to that total this season, but even if they do, this group of peers doesn’t exactly suggest extended success as a starting pitcher for Simon.
Even if this is his peak, however, Simon is still of substantial value to the Reds. They initially needed him to be no more than a 4th or 5th starter, and with the first half injury to Mat Latos and the extended early-season ineffectiveness of Homer Bailey, Simon stepped up and was much, much more than that. A lot has gone wrong for the Cincinnati Reds in the first half, but there they are, lurking just behind the front-running Brewers and Cardinals, thanks in large part to the efforts of Alfredo Simon. Cheers to the elder statesman of the Reds’ rotation as he enjoys a hard-earned moment in the sun, a highlight of the dream season of his unlikely career on Tuesday night in Minneapolis.
Before there was Alfredo Simon, there was Carlos Cabrera. Cabrera was signed as an amateur free agent out of the Dominican Republic in 1999, supposedly at the age of 16. He battled his way through the short-season levels of the Phillies’ system through 2002, showcasing a large, durable frame and a mid-to-upper 90′s fastball. I had the opportunity to scout him at Low-A Lakewood in 2003, his first year in a full-season league. I assumed he was 20 years at the time, and turned in a favorable report after watching him pitch. Within months, however, word had leaked out that Cabrera was actually named Alfredo Simon, and was 21 months older than his listed age. This affected my view of his upside, but he still looked like a future major leaguer to me, more specifically a reliever with end of the game potential. No, I did not envision a future All Star starter who pitched to contact with a very low walk rate.
Simon didn’t last long with the Phillies after his age adjustment, being dispatched to the Giants along with Ricky Ledee for reliever Felix Rodriguez. He quickly set about earning minor league journeyman status upon arrival in the Giants’ organization, never posting an ERA under 5.00 in any of his minor league stops in his season and a half there. He then became a minor league free agent (multiple times), a Rule 5 pick and even pitched in the Mexican League for a spell, bouncing from organization to organization before settling in for awhile with the Orioles in 2009.
Just when it appeared Simon was ready to make the major league club out of spring training, he suffered a UCL injury and required Tommy John surgery. He recovered and rehabbed relatively quickly, and unlike many hurlers who require a period of readjustment to regain their command, established dominance at the Triple-A level and was summoned to the big leagues in early 2010. Except for four starts in 2011, in an initial attempted conversion to a starting role, he hasn’t been back since.
Truth be told, the Alfredo Simon who largely struggled in the major leagues with the Orioles over parts of four seasons wasn’t much different from the Carlos Cabrera I saw back in Lakewood. He had filled out noticeably, to 6’6″, 265, and still tantalized with raw velocity, but didn’t command his fastball particularly well, and his secondary pitches were inconsistent. In the leadup to Opening Day 2012, however, Simon got the break of his professional life, as he was claimed off of waivers by the Reds, and was turned over to their then pitching coach and current manager, Bryan Price.
Simon was used exclusively out of the pen in his first two seasons in Cincinnati, but was a totally different cat than he had been at any previous point in his professional career. He repeated his delivery much more consistently, threw a lot more strikes – including a higher percentage of quality strikes – and began his evolution into a ground ball pitcher. He began to use his cutter much more often at the expense of his slider, and has much more deadly to same-handed hitters in the process. Price became the Reds’ manager this season, and decided to once again attempt to turn this huge, durable guy with the newly repeatable delivery into a starter. And here we are – Simon is tied for the major league lead in wins, with 12, and has become the latest in a long line of against all odds All Stars.
Let’s take a step back now and attempt to get to the nub of Simon’s true talent. Is he what his traditional numbers suggest – a Cy Young candidate and a potentially historic late-career breakthrough starting pitcher? Is he a historic fluke – someone with gaudy traditional numbers who is benefiting from playing in front of a very strong defense? Or is he something in between? His ERA – 2.70. His FIP – 4.34. What exactly do we have in Alfredo Simon? Let’s take a closer look at his 2014 plate appearance outcome frequency and production by BIP type data to get a better feel for him. First, the frequency data:
FREQ – 2014
Simon % REL PCT
K 16.0% 79 3
BB 6.0% 77 32
POP 6.9% 90 50
FLY 25.4% 91 34
LD 20.8% 100 34
GB 46.8% 107 72
The standout piece of information in the table above is Simon’s very low K rate. Using full-season 2013 data, his 16.0% K rate is good for a 3 percentile rank. Striking out so few hitters puts inordinate pressure on a pitcher to manage contact on balls in play. His control is solid, a 6.0% BB rate good for a respectably low 32 percentile rank. His batted ball profile isn’t particularly notable in any meaningful way – he has somewhat of a ground ball tendency, with a 72 percentile rank, but doesn’t rank among the elite ground ball inducers in the game. This is the frequency profile of a pitch-to-contact, league-averageish type pitcher who lacks a single go-to skill or ability that would qualify him for an All Star Game. Simon’s production by BIP type allowed information for 2014, both before and after adjustment for context, should offer more insight into his performance to date:
PROD – 2014
Simon AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD ACT ERA CALC ERA TRU ERA
FLY 0.274 0.810 112 119
LD 0.580 0.768 77 99
GB 0.155 0.161 40 98
ALL BIP 0.264 0.433 71 98
ALL PA 0.218 0.266 0.357 76 101 2.70 2.90 3.86
The actual production allowed by Simon on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and is converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure is then adjusted for context, such as home park, team defense, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. In the three right-most columns, his actual ERA, his calculated component ERA based on actual production allowed, and his “tru” ERA, which is adjusted for context, are all presented. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.
Simon does not allow a ton of fly balls, as shown in the first table, but the ones he does allow are hit quite hard – his fly ball REL PRD of 112 is adjusted upward for context to 119. The most stark information on the production table occurs on the next two line items – Simon has allowed well below MLB average production on line drives (77 ADJ PRD) and ground balls (40 ADJ PRD – which would have been by far the lowest among 2013 MLB ERA qualifiers). Simon, however, does not allow materially less authoritative line drive and ground ball contact – after adjustment for context, he should be allowing basically MLB average production on those types of batted balls. Simon has been significantly aided both by luck and well above average team defense – particularly in the infield. Without adjustment for context, Simon’s overall REL PRD – his unadjusted contact score – of 71 is a candidate to the lead the NL in 2014. His true contact management talent is better measured by his ADJ PRD, which gives him an adjusted contact score of 98, basically league average. Add back his K’s and BB’s, and his overall ADJ PRD creeps up a bit higher to 101, giving him a “tru” ERA of 3.86, just above MLB average, over a full run above his actual ERA.
I am not here to diminish the accomplishments of Alfredo Simon or the Cincinnati Reds. The club deserves a ton of credit for seeing a starter in Simon, and he deserves a ton of credit for turning himself into somewhat of a control artist, who pitches to his strengths. His decent swing-and-miss rate of 8.9% even suggests there may be more K’s in there somewhere. In the big picture, Simon is a letter-perfect fit for his club – a strikethrower who gets more than his share of ground balls, pitching in front of what may be the best infield defense in the game. What he is not, however, is a true-talent sub-3.00 ERA pitcher. This exact moment in time is very likely the pinnacle of Alfredo Simon’s major league career.
I searched one of my many databases for 33-year-old first-time ERA qualifiers, and came up with a whopping seven names – Ewald Pyle (1944), Mel Queen, Sr. (1951), Milt Shoffner (1939), Eric Stults (2013), Tom Timmermann (1973), Jim Turner (1937) and Ryan Vogelsong (2011). Suffice it to say, this group did not go on to record a prodigious amount of major league success. In fact, the seven of them combined for a grand total of four additional ERA-qualifying seasons after their age-33 year, three of them posted by Turner – who had previously logged 12 minor league seasons – and the other by Vogelsong. Stults and Vogelsong could add to that total this season, but even if they do, this group of peers doesn’t exactly suggest extended success as a starting pitcher for Simon.
Even if this is his peak, however, Simon is still of substantial value to the Reds. They initially needed him to be no more than a 4th or 5th starter, and with the first half injury to Mat Latos and the extended early-season ineffectiveness of Homer Bailey, Simon stepped up and was much, much more than that. A lot has gone wrong for the Cincinnati Reds in the first half, but there they are, lurking just behind the front-running Brewers and Cardinals, thanks in large part to the efforts of Alfredo Simon. Cheers to the elder statesman of the Reds’ rotation as he enjoys a hard-earned moment in the sun, a highlight of the dream season of his unlikely career on Tuesday night in Minneapolis.
Prospect Watch: ’14 Draftee Arms in the Appy.
Foster Griffin, LHP, Kansas City Royals (Profile)
Level: Rookie-Advanced Age: 18 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 8.2 IP, 3 H, 1 R, 6/3 K/BB, 1.04 ERA, 5.15 FIP
Summary
More about projection than current ability, Griffin is nonetheless off to a good start in pro ball.
Notes
Foster Griffin was selected with the 28th overall pick in last month’s draft and signed for nearly $2 million, which automatically makes him quite intriguing. The Royals have kept him on a short leash so far, only allowing him to throw 8 2/3 innings across four starts, but the Florida high school product has had no problem adjusting to pro ball in that small sample. I’ve taken in two of his outings–in those, he’s faced fifteen batters and retired all of them. Here’s what that looked like:
Certainly, being selected in the first round puts expectations on a player, and when you see Griffin throw, he falls short of those expectations when it comes to lighting up radar guns. In my first look at him, he worked at 88-91 mph, touching 92 once; in the second, he only was at 88-90. Now, Griffin’s just 18 years old and has a lot of projection in his frame, he shows the ability to get the pitch to cut or run at times, and he has an easy motion that helps him have better fastball command than most pitchers his age, so the fastball is not without positives, but it’s certainly not a pitch that is going to awe anyone.
Griffin’s second pitch is a 73-75 mph curveball. He only threw one in the first game but turned to it more extensively in his last outing. It flashes classic 12-to-6 shape at times, but is a bit lacking in depth and isn’t quite consistent enough to rate as an average pitch yet; however, it’s not hard to imagine it becoming a plus pitch in the future. He also tosses in a 79-81 mph changeup that has credible speed separation but not much movement–it’s just a 30-grade pitch right now, but given that he’s just out of high school, the fact that he can throw a changeup with reasonable arm speed and velocity separation is satisfactory.
What that all means is that Foster Griffin is a first-round pick who doesn’t have any present average pitches, and you’d be forgiven for getting a little skittish at that. However, that should not at all imply that Griffin doesn’t have the potential to be a big league starting pitcher–you just have to bet on his projection and development for that to happen. It’s entirely possible to imagine him picking up two miles an hour because of the projection in his body, the curveball could end up being a real weapon, and he’s got plenty of time to turn the changeup into something near an average pitch. If all of that happens, you have a big, durable three-pitch lefty who can throw strikes, work downhill, and spin a bat-missing breaking ball, which all starts to sound a lot like Tyler Skaggs. Given that the Royals had another first-round pick (Brandon Finnegan) and a supplemental pick (Chase Vallot), they could afford to bet on Griffin’s projection–the success of their draft doesn’t necessarily hinge on his outcome. He’s got plenty of work ahead of him, but he definitely has a chance to prove that he was a sound investment.
***
Michael Cederoth, RHP, Minnesota Twins (Profile)
Level: Rookie-Advanced Age: 21 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 16.1 IP, 17 H, 11 R, 14/5 K/BB, 4.41 ERA, 3.20 FIP
Summary
Billed as an electric but erratic prospect going into the draft, Cederoth has lived up to his reputation in the early going as a pro.
Notes
Michael Cederoth is an enigma. He’s a hulking 6’6″ righthander who touched triple digits in college and was once thought to be a first-round pick, but inconsistency sent him from starting to closing as a junior and made him slip to the third round of the draft, where the Twins took him one round after they selected flamethrowing Louisville closer Nick Burdi.
Unlike Burdi, who was sent straight to full-season ball as a reliever, Cederoth was assigned to Minnesota’s Elizabethton affiliate in the Appy League and moved back to starting. I took in his last start against Danville two days ago, about 90% of which is presented in this video:
Occasionally, erratic collegians move to pro ball and suddenly find consistency, and a look at Cederoth’s numbers (hey, only five walks in 16 1/3 innings!) might tempt one to think (hope?) that’s the case here. It isn’t.
That doesn’t mean the stuff isn’t more than enough to make Cederoth a very interesting project. He worked mostly at 92-96 mph in the outing, and the ball gets on hitters quickly from his high arm slot–it’s clearly a plus pitch even without considering that he threw harder in college. He pairs it with a slider at 80-86 mph, usually 84-86, that actually is more of a curveball when he throws it right, with hard two-plane bite and big depth. It’s a plus pitch when he throws it right, and he gained a feel for it later in the outing, but he’ll overthrow it and spike it at times, making it more of an average pitch overall.
And that’s pretty much where the positives with Cederoth end–big presence, two really interesting pitches, and minuses everywhere else. For one, his changeup is a bottom-of-the-scale offering. He threw exactly two, both at 88 mph, and I would’ve had no idea they were changeups if I wasn’t looking at the velocity readings, because they came in with no movement.
And then there’s the delivery.
Look, I’m all for trying out big legkicks and hip turns, because they can add deception to a motion without making it any more mechanically unsound. They add levels of mechanical complexity, however, that many pitchers are going to struggle with, especially long-levered ones like Cederoth. There’s a ton of moving parts in his motion, and he doesn’t sync them up well. He tends to rush through the back side of his delivery and then slow down as he turns to the plate and approaches foot strike, and invariably he falls out of sync on a high number of his pitches. Further, he overrotates in his motion, stepping over toward first base and pulling him off line to to the plate. A particularly bad example of the cascading effect of his timing inconsistencies occurs at 15:55 in the video, where Jordan Edgerton gets a 96 mph fastball in the back because Cederoth’s arm is way behind his legs.
While he hasn’t walked a ton of guys yet, he’s not exactly facing a high level of competition, and even then, hitters were often ahead in the count against Cederoth, working very long at-bats and forcing him to throw softer in order to find the plate. He’ll only draw more challenging opponents as he moves up the chain, and it’s hard to foresee him finding consistency with his current mechanics.
Given Cederoth’s mechanical troubles and the poor quality of his changeup, his future home clearly lies in the bullpen, where he can unleash his fastball at higher velocities, eschew the changeup, and probably throw exclusively from the stretch. His chance at becoming a real imposing bullpen presence in the big leagues depends on whether he can find a delivery that works for him. I’m not about to say he can’t, because he has some athleticism and the arm action itself is quite clean. If the Twins’ coaches can find a way to get Cederoth on a more direct line to the plate and simplify what his trunk and lower half are doing, he has a chance to find enough command to let that potentially dominating stuff play up to its promise. If not, he’ll be eternally frustrating to scouts.
***
Max Povse, RHP, Atlanta Braves (Profile)
Level: Rookie-Advanced Age: 20 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 5 IP, 6 H, 4 R, 7/1 K/BB, 5.40 ERA, 1.80 FIP
Summary
This towering righthander has an emerging feel for his craft and the makings of quality stuff.
Notes
“6’8, 185 lbs.” is not a typical build for anyone, let alone a professional baseball player, but that’s exactly what Max Povse is listed at. The Braves took this towering righthander out of UNC-Greensboro 23 picks after Minnesota took Cederoth last month, subsequently assigning Povse, who is quite young for a college draftee, to the Appy to get stretched back out as a pro. So far, he’s made three starts and gone just five innings, with the latest coming as Cederoth’s opponent on Sunday, where he hit his pitch count two batters into the third frame. Here’s complete video of his outing:
A primary concern with pitchers of Povse’s size is the ability to repeat a delivery and thus have a chance at commanding the baseball, and he grades out rather well in this regard. His motion is pretty simple overall and he does a nice job of using his lower half and driving toward the plate, getting solid extension and helping him use his height to good effect. He does have a bit of a collapse on his back leg and could stand to be a bit taller as he drives to the plate, but that’s largely a semantic issue–he’s got good leverage either way.
At present, Povse’s fastball is his best pitch, coming in at 90-92 mph and touching 93 a few times. That’s merely average velocity, but the pitch plays solid-average thanks to the sink and run he generates. When Povse gets the pitch down in the zone, he’s very tough to lift because of the combination of his natural plane and the extra sink on the ball. He also throws an 82-84 mph changeup with good fading action that flashes average and could be a second solid-average pitch in time. His third pitch is a 78-81 mph hybrid breaker that flashes a lot of horizontal action away from righthanded batters but doesn’t have optimal depth for its velocity and gets short at times. There’s clearly some sharpness to the pitch and it could become a weapon if he can get consistent shape on it, either turning it into a power curve or a tilting slider.
With good leverage, a solid-average fastball, two interesting offspeed pitches, and the potential for good command, Povse is the sort of somewhat-polished-but-still-projectable college arm that fits well as a third-round pick. He probably weighs more than his listed 185, maybe 210 or so, but he’s still got some projection in his frame and could add another tick of fastball velocity before maturation. Given his size and easy motion, he could become a workhorse starter with solid groundball rates and low walk rates, in the Rick Porcello mold. As with any player at this nascent stage of pro ball, Povse has work to do to reach his upside, but he’s got a lot of interesting raw materials that are somewhat far along.
Level: Rookie-Advanced Age: 18 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 8.2 IP, 3 H, 1 R, 6/3 K/BB, 1.04 ERA, 5.15 FIP
Summary
More about projection than current ability, Griffin is nonetheless off to a good start in pro ball.
Notes
Foster Griffin was selected with the 28th overall pick in last month’s draft and signed for nearly $2 million, which automatically makes him quite intriguing. The Royals have kept him on a short leash so far, only allowing him to throw 8 2/3 innings across four starts, but the Florida high school product has had no problem adjusting to pro ball in that small sample. I’ve taken in two of his outings–in those, he’s faced fifteen batters and retired all of them. Here’s what that looked like:
Certainly, being selected in the first round puts expectations on a player, and when you see Griffin throw, he falls short of those expectations when it comes to lighting up radar guns. In my first look at him, he worked at 88-91 mph, touching 92 once; in the second, he only was at 88-90. Now, Griffin’s just 18 years old and has a lot of projection in his frame, he shows the ability to get the pitch to cut or run at times, and he has an easy motion that helps him have better fastball command than most pitchers his age, so the fastball is not without positives, but it’s certainly not a pitch that is going to awe anyone.
Griffin’s second pitch is a 73-75 mph curveball. He only threw one in the first game but turned to it more extensively in his last outing. It flashes classic 12-to-6 shape at times, but is a bit lacking in depth and isn’t quite consistent enough to rate as an average pitch yet; however, it’s not hard to imagine it becoming a plus pitch in the future. He also tosses in a 79-81 mph changeup that has credible speed separation but not much movement–it’s just a 30-grade pitch right now, but given that he’s just out of high school, the fact that he can throw a changeup with reasonable arm speed and velocity separation is satisfactory.
What that all means is that Foster Griffin is a first-round pick who doesn’t have any present average pitches, and you’d be forgiven for getting a little skittish at that. However, that should not at all imply that Griffin doesn’t have the potential to be a big league starting pitcher–you just have to bet on his projection and development for that to happen. It’s entirely possible to imagine him picking up two miles an hour because of the projection in his body, the curveball could end up being a real weapon, and he’s got plenty of time to turn the changeup into something near an average pitch. If all of that happens, you have a big, durable three-pitch lefty who can throw strikes, work downhill, and spin a bat-missing breaking ball, which all starts to sound a lot like Tyler Skaggs. Given that the Royals had another first-round pick (Brandon Finnegan) and a supplemental pick (Chase Vallot), they could afford to bet on Griffin’s projection–the success of their draft doesn’t necessarily hinge on his outcome. He’s got plenty of work ahead of him, but he definitely has a chance to prove that he was a sound investment.
***
Michael Cederoth, RHP, Minnesota Twins (Profile)
Level: Rookie-Advanced Age: 21 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 16.1 IP, 17 H, 11 R, 14/5 K/BB, 4.41 ERA, 3.20 FIP
Summary
Billed as an electric but erratic prospect going into the draft, Cederoth has lived up to his reputation in the early going as a pro.
Notes
Michael Cederoth is an enigma. He’s a hulking 6’6″ righthander who touched triple digits in college and was once thought to be a first-round pick, but inconsistency sent him from starting to closing as a junior and made him slip to the third round of the draft, where the Twins took him one round after they selected flamethrowing Louisville closer Nick Burdi.
Unlike Burdi, who was sent straight to full-season ball as a reliever, Cederoth was assigned to Minnesota’s Elizabethton affiliate in the Appy League and moved back to starting. I took in his last start against Danville two days ago, about 90% of which is presented in this video:
Occasionally, erratic collegians move to pro ball and suddenly find consistency, and a look at Cederoth’s numbers (hey, only five walks in 16 1/3 innings!) might tempt one to think (hope?) that’s the case here. It isn’t.
That doesn’t mean the stuff isn’t more than enough to make Cederoth a very interesting project. He worked mostly at 92-96 mph in the outing, and the ball gets on hitters quickly from his high arm slot–it’s clearly a plus pitch even without considering that he threw harder in college. He pairs it with a slider at 80-86 mph, usually 84-86, that actually is more of a curveball when he throws it right, with hard two-plane bite and big depth. It’s a plus pitch when he throws it right, and he gained a feel for it later in the outing, but he’ll overthrow it and spike it at times, making it more of an average pitch overall.
And that’s pretty much where the positives with Cederoth end–big presence, two really interesting pitches, and minuses everywhere else. For one, his changeup is a bottom-of-the-scale offering. He threw exactly two, both at 88 mph, and I would’ve had no idea they were changeups if I wasn’t looking at the velocity readings, because they came in with no movement.
And then there’s the delivery.
Look, I’m all for trying out big legkicks and hip turns, because they can add deception to a motion without making it any more mechanically unsound. They add levels of mechanical complexity, however, that many pitchers are going to struggle with, especially long-levered ones like Cederoth. There’s a ton of moving parts in his motion, and he doesn’t sync them up well. He tends to rush through the back side of his delivery and then slow down as he turns to the plate and approaches foot strike, and invariably he falls out of sync on a high number of his pitches. Further, he overrotates in his motion, stepping over toward first base and pulling him off line to to the plate. A particularly bad example of the cascading effect of his timing inconsistencies occurs at 15:55 in the video, where Jordan Edgerton gets a 96 mph fastball in the back because Cederoth’s arm is way behind his legs.
While he hasn’t walked a ton of guys yet, he’s not exactly facing a high level of competition, and even then, hitters were often ahead in the count against Cederoth, working very long at-bats and forcing him to throw softer in order to find the plate. He’ll only draw more challenging opponents as he moves up the chain, and it’s hard to foresee him finding consistency with his current mechanics.
Given Cederoth’s mechanical troubles and the poor quality of his changeup, his future home clearly lies in the bullpen, where he can unleash his fastball at higher velocities, eschew the changeup, and probably throw exclusively from the stretch. His chance at becoming a real imposing bullpen presence in the big leagues depends on whether he can find a delivery that works for him. I’m not about to say he can’t, because he has some athleticism and the arm action itself is quite clean. If the Twins’ coaches can find a way to get Cederoth on a more direct line to the plate and simplify what his trunk and lower half are doing, he has a chance to find enough command to let that potentially dominating stuff play up to its promise. If not, he’ll be eternally frustrating to scouts.
***
Max Povse, RHP, Atlanta Braves (Profile)
Level: Rookie-Advanced Age: 20 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 5 IP, 6 H, 4 R, 7/1 K/BB, 5.40 ERA, 1.80 FIP
Summary
This towering righthander has an emerging feel for his craft and the makings of quality stuff.
Notes
“6’8, 185 lbs.” is not a typical build for anyone, let alone a professional baseball player, but that’s exactly what Max Povse is listed at. The Braves took this towering righthander out of UNC-Greensboro 23 picks after Minnesota took Cederoth last month, subsequently assigning Povse, who is quite young for a college draftee, to the Appy to get stretched back out as a pro. So far, he’s made three starts and gone just five innings, with the latest coming as Cederoth’s opponent on Sunday, where he hit his pitch count two batters into the third frame. Here’s complete video of his outing:
A primary concern with pitchers of Povse’s size is the ability to repeat a delivery and thus have a chance at commanding the baseball, and he grades out rather well in this regard. His motion is pretty simple overall and he does a nice job of using his lower half and driving toward the plate, getting solid extension and helping him use his height to good effect. He does have a bit of a collapse on his back leg and could stand to be a bit taller as he drives to the plate, but that’s largely a semantic issue–he’s got good leverage either way.
At present, Povse’s fastball is his best pitch, coming in at 90-92 mph and touching 93 a few times. That’s merely average velocity, but the pitch plays solid-average thanks to the sink and run he generates. When Povse gets the pitch down in the zone, he’s very tough to lift because of the combination of his natural plane and the extra sink on the ball. He also throws an 82-84 mph changeup with good fading action that flashes average and could be a second solid-average pitch in time. His third pitch is a 78-81 mph hybrid breaker that flashes a lot of horizontal action away from righthanded batters but doesn’t have optimal depth for its velocity and gets short at times. There’s clearly some sharpness to the pitch and it could become a weapon if he can get consistent shape on it, either turning it into a power curve or a tilting slider.
With good leverage, a solid-average fastball, two interesting offspeed pitches, and the potential for good command, Povse is the sort of somewhat-polished-but-still-projectable college arm that fits well as a third-round pick. He probably weighs more than his listed 185, maybe 210 or so, but he’s still got some projection in his frame and could add another tick of fastball velocity before maturation. Given his size and easy motion, he could become a workhorse starter with solid groundball rates and low walk rates, in the Rick Porcello mold. As with any player at this nascent stage of pro ball, Povse has work to do to reach his upside, but he’s got a lot of interesting raw materials that are somewhat far along.
The Orioles Don’t Care About Our Expectations.
In 2012, the Orioles — fresh off a losing streak dating back to the Cal Ripken / Mike Mussina / Davey Johnson squad of 1997 — shocked all of baseball by winning 93 games and the American League wild card game. Backed by what seemed like completely unsustainable one-run luck and with the knowledge that the rest of the AL East was still dangerous, most analysts said something along the lines of “that was fun, good luck doing it again.” They didn’t quite get back to the playoffs in 2013, but 85 wins was still something to be proud of, thanks mostly to 53 homers from Chris Davis and the smashing defensive debut of Manny Machado.
Once again, no one thought much of them headed into 2014. The Red Sox had just won the World Series; the Yankees had added Masahiro Tanaka, Brian McCann, Jacoby Ellsbury and Carlos Beltran. The Jays couldn’t possibly be as bad as they’d been in 2013, and the Rays might have been the best team of any of them. In our 2014 predictions, only two writers picked the O’s to win the division.
And why not? Think about all the things that would have needed to go right for the Orioles to make it back in the playoffs. Even with a pair of six-win seasons from Davis and Machado, last year, they had merely a good season, not a great one. They’d need repeats of that and for others to step up. Now, think about how little of that actually happened. Think instead about how much has gone terribly wrong. So much, in fact, that we’re going to lightning-round it with a list of unfortunate calamity — some that seemed obviously bad at the moment, only to turn out much differently, and others that have been a slow train wreck over the course of the season. In rough but not necessarily precise chronological order:
Jim Johnson, a probably overrated but still effective closer, was dealt to Oakland for a spare part (Jemile Weeks) because the O’s couldn’t afford his arbitration award.
Grant Balfour, a very good closer who’d agreed to join Baltimore at a very fair price, didn’t have his contract finalized when the O’s team doctors disliked his physical. He signed with AL East rivals Tampa Bay, leading to no shortage of ridicule for the Orioles — especially when the same thing happened with Tyler Colvin.
Two departed members of the 2013 rotation, Jason Hammel and Jake Arrieta, suddenly became among the most-improved pitchers in baseball with the Cubs.
Matt Wieters played well for a month, then blew out his arm.
J.J. Hardy, who had hit 77 homers in the last three seasons, didn’t get his first until June 21.
Machado, when he wasn’t being suspended for bizarrely throwing his bat at people, didn’t make it back from knee surgery until May, then revealed himself to be far more advanced on defense than offense, with a mere 87 wRC+ over the last calendar year, though he’s been very hot recently.
Davis, who’d put up one of the five best hitting seasons in Baltimore history last year, has been so awful in 2014 that he’s actually been below replacement-level.
Of the 10 players with the most playing time at each position, three — Davis, Caleb Joseph and David Lough — have batting averages that start with a “1,” and even though batting average isn’t wRC+, that still stands out.
Oh, and second baseman Jonathan Schoop has been just as bad, giving the team four problem spots in the lineup, and five if you include Hardy.
Free agent acquisition Ubaldo Jimenez has been an expensive disaster, with the worst walk percentage in baseball, and just landed on the disabled list with an ankle reportedly sprained while walking through the parking lot near his home.
The best — best! — FIP among their five primary starters is 4.41, by Wei-Yin Chen, good for 80th in baseball, between Tommy Milone and Kyle Kendrick.
Lottery ticket Johan Santana tore his Achilles weeks before making it back to the big leagues.
Last year’s “shockingly effective reliever” version of Brian Matusz has become this year’s “sub-replacement inferno” version of Brian Matusz.
… and so on. Every team has problems, sure, but that’s quite the list, encompassing three of the team’s four most important players on offense (Adam Jones, thus far, has been hitting about the same as he always does), two of 2013′s most important bullpen pieces, and an entire rotation. Had you read this list prior to the season, you’d have likely expected that they’d either be well on the way to a 100-loss season, or have simply folded entirely before the curse got any worse. It would have been hard for the best team in baseball to overcome all that, and few would have suggested the Orioles were the best team in baseball.
They’re not on the way to 100 losses, of course. They’re in first place at the All-Star break, with the fourth-most wins in the American League and the third-largest division lead in the game, and are the overwhelming favorites to stay in first place according to our projections. Just like we all expected, of course. Never change, baseball. You’re the best.
So, which is it going to be? Are they playing wildly over their heads, not unreasonable given all the negatives they’ve had to overcome? Or have we just continued to underestimate Dan Duquette, Buck Showalter and friends? Perhaps not unexpectedly, the answer is a little of both, but less so on offense, which is performing to expectations:
2014 Orioles, runs/game
Batting to Date Batting Projected ROS
4.31 4.41
Pitching to Date Pitching Projected ROS
4.03 4.49
One might think with so many problems on offense, the Orioles would either be desperate for runs or hitting something like .700 with the few runners in scoring position that they managed to accumulate. Not so, in fact; Baltimore’s non-pitchers have the No. 10 wRC+; they’ve scored the 9th-most runs. That level of run-scoring is in line with what you’d expect from that wRC+, so it’s not luck or sequencing or ballpark. It’s just not happening from the sources you’d expect it to be. Jones, again, is a constant, but in the absence of consistent production from Davis, Machado and Wieters, the Orioles have counted on a most unlikely source of offense.
I’m talking about Steve Pearce, of course. Yes, obviously all anyone wants to talk about is Nelson Cruz, on track to become arguably the best one-year free agent in the history of free agency, and his second-in-MLB 28 homers and top-15, better-than-Miguel Cabrera 150 wRC+ have been both incredible and a huge part of why the Orioles are where they are. (Particularly when you remember that had he not landed in Baltimore in the spring, those plate appearances might have been going to some combination of Lough, Delmon Young and Henry Urrutia.) But it’s the 31-year-old Pearce, who has been property of five teams dating back to 2011, and had been dropped by Baltimore twice in the last two years, who has helped pick up the slack, putting up an only-partially BABIP-fueled 163 wRC+ in 209 plate appearances. As Nick Markakis‘ rebound has been a mild one, better than 2013 but still nowhere near where he was at his best, Pearce and Cruz have been saviors.
It’s the pitching that’s a concern, as you can see above; without a single elite starter, and with the worst (non-Rockies division) pitching FIP in baseball, we’re actually seeing them be outscored over the remainder of the division. Perhaps unsurprisingly, only two teams have a larger negative discrepancy between their ERA and FIP, and it looks like regression is coming.
I’m not going to sugarcoat that for you, really. This rotation isn’t good. Only the Rockies and Twins strike out fewer; only the Rockies walk more. Only five rotations allow more homers. They don’t generate many ground balls, despite the spectacular left-side infield defense behind them. Perhaps there’s hope, though; less Jimenez means more Kevin Gausman, which can only be an upgrade, and Duquette has a few weeks to further improve it. No, this isn’t a landing spot for David Price, though an Ian Kennedy-type might be a fit.
Through foresight, luck, or both, they avoided the horrendous seasons of both Johnson and Balfour, and when Tommy Hunter failed as the closer, Zach Britton stepped in ably, though the bullpen as a whole has been somewhat middle of the pack. All of them are helped by what has become one of the better defenses in baseball, and not just the expected pair of Machado & Hardy; Jones has improved, Joseph has seen high marks, and even Pearce has contributed. If you’ve been following Duquette’s never-ending roster moves closely, he’s been constantly turning over his players to take advantage of options and get a starting pitcher out of the way in between turns to get Showalter another reliever. (Bud Norris, who had made just one start since returning from the DL, was sent to Double-A yesterday to start for the nearby Aberdeen Ironbirds, making an 11:05 a.m. start.)
It helps, of course, that the Rays have collapsed, and the Red Sox have collapsed, and the post-Tanaka Yankees are about to collapse, and the Blue Jays are in the process of collapsing, and maybe that’s the biggest factor. Against their rivals, the Orioles are 26-18, the only team in the division to be more than one game over .500 inside the East. Depending on how you look at it, they either have a very tough remaining schedule, or they don’t. Sometimes, all you have to do is be the team that manages not to implode. That’s probably not good enough to get past the Athletics, Angels and Tigers into the World Series, but anything can happen once you get to October. For the continually confounding Orioles, whether we respect them or not, it sure looks like they’re on their way to doing just that.
Once again, no one thought much of them headed into 2014. The Red Sox had just won the World Series; the Yankees had added Masahiro Tanaka, Brian McCann, Jacoby Ellsbury and Carlos Beltran. The Jays couldn’t possibly be as bad as they’d been in 2013, and the Rays might have been the best team of any of them. In our 2014 predictions, only two writers picked the O’s to win the division.
And why not? Think about all the things that would have needed to go right for the Orioles to make it back in the playoffs. Even with a pair of six-win seasons from Davis and Machado, last year, they had merely a good season, not a great one. They’d need repeats of that and for others to step up. Now, think about how little of that actually happened. Think instead about how much has gone terribly wrong. So much, in fact, that we’re going to lightning-round it with a list of unfortunate calamity — some that seemed obviously bad at the moment, only to turn out much differently, and others that have been a slow train wreck over the course of the season. In rough but not necessarily precise chronological order:
Jim Johnson, a probably overrated but still effective closer, was dealt to Oakland for a spare part (Jemile Weeks) because the O’s couldn’t afford his arbitration award.
Grant Balfour, a very good closer who’d agreed to join Baltimore at a very fair price, didn’t have his contract finalized when the O’s team doctors disliked his physical. He signed with AL East rivals Tampa Bay, leading to no shortage of ridicule for the Orioles — especially when the same thing happened with Tyler Colvin.
Two departed members of the 2013 rotation, Jason Hammel and Jake Arrieta, suddenly became among the most-improved pitchers in baseball with the Cubs.
Matt Wieters played well for a month, then blew out his arm.
J.J. Hardy, who had hit 77 homers in the last three seasons, didn’t get his first until June 21.
Machado, when he wasn’t being suspended for bizarrely throwing his bat at people, didn’t make it back from knee surgery until May, then revealed himself to be far more advanced on defense than offense, with a mere 87 wRC+ over the last calendar year, though he’s been very hot recently.
Davis, who’d put up one of the five best hitting seasons in Baltimore history last year, has been so awful in 2014 that he’s actually been below replacement-level.
Of the 10 players with the most playing time at each position, three — Davis, Caleb Joseph and David Lough — have batting averages that start with a “1,” and even though batting average isn’t wRC+, that still stands out.
Oh, and second baseman Jonathan Schoop has been just as bad, giving the team four problem spots in the lineup, and five if you include Hardy.
Free agent acquisition Ubaldo Jimenez has been an expensive disaster, with the worst walk percentage in baseball, and just landed on the disabled list with an ankle reportedly sprained while walking through the parking lot near his home.
The best — best! — FIP among their five primary starters is 4.41, by Wei-Yin Chen, good for 80th in baseball, between Tommy Milone and Kyle Kendrick.
Lottery ticket Johan Santana tore his Achilles weeks before making it back to the big leagues.
Last year’s “shockingly effective reliever” version of Brian Matusz has become this year’s “sub-replacement inferno” version of Brian Matusz.
… and so on. Every team has problems, sure, but that’s quite the list, encompassing three of the team’s four most important players on offense (Adam Jones, thus far, has been hitting about the same as he always does), two of 2013′s most important bullpen pieces, and an entire rotation. Had you read this list prior to the season, you’d have likely expected that they’d either be well on the way to a 100-loss season, or have simply folded entirely before the curse got any worse. It would have been hard for the best team in baseball to overcome all that, and few would have suggested the Orioles were the best team in baseball.
They’re not on the way to 100 losses, of course. They’re in first place at the All-Star break, with the fourth-most wins in the American League and the third-largest division lead in the game, and are the overwhelming favorites to stay in first place according to our projections. Just like we all expected, of course. Never change, baseball. You’re the best.
So, which is it going to be? Are they playing wildly over their heads, not unreasonable given all the negatives they’ve had to overcome? Or have we just continued to underestimate Dan Duquette, Buck Showalter and friends? Perhaps not unexpectedly, the answer is a little of both, but less so on offense, which is performing to expectations:
2014 Orioles, runs/game
Batting to Date Batting Projected ROS
4.31 4.41
Pitching to Date Pitching Projected ROS
4.03 4.49
One might think with so many problems on offense, the Orioles would either be desperate for runs or hitting something like .700 with the few runners in scoring position that they managed to accumulate. Not so, in fact; Baltimore’s non-pitchers have the No. 10 wRC+; they’ve scored the 9th-most runs. That level of run-scoring is in line with what you’d expect from that wRC+, so it’s not luck or sequencing or ballpark. It’s just not happening from the sources you’d expect it to be. Jones, again, is a constant, but in the absence of consistent production from Davis, Machado and Wieters, the Orioles have counted on a most unlikely source of offense.
I’m talking about Steve Pearce, of course. Yes, obviously all anyone wants to talk about is Nelson Cruz, on track to become arguably the best one-year free agent in the history of free agency, and his second-in-MLB 28 homers and top-15, better-than-Miguel Cabrera 150 wRC+ have been both incredible and a huge part of why the Orioles are where they are. (Particularly when you remember that had he not landed in Baltimore in the spring, those plate appearances might have been going to some combination of Lough, Delmon Young and Henry Urrutia.) But it’s the 31-year-old Pearce, who has been property of five teams dating back to 2011, and had been dropped by Baltimore twice in the last two years, who has helped pick up the slack, putting up an only-partially BABIP-fueled 163 wRC+ in 209 plate appearances. As Nick Markakis‘ rebound has been a mild one, better than 2013 but still nowhere near where he was at his best, Pearce and Cruz have been saviors.
It’s the pitching that’s a concern, as you can see above; without a single elite starter, and with the worst (non-Rockies division) pitching FIP in baseball, we’re actually seeing them be outscored over the remainder of the division. Perhaps unsurprisingly, only two teams have a larger negative discrepancy between their ERA and FIP, and it looks like regression is coming.
I’m not going to sugarcoat that for you, really. This rotation isn’t good. Only the Rockies and Twins strike out fewer; only the Rockies walk more. Only five rotations allow more homers. They don’t generate many ground balls, despite the spectacular left-side infield defense behind them. Perhaps there’s hope, though; less Jimenez means more Kevin Gausman, which can only be an upgrade, and Duquette has a few weeks to further improve it. No, this isn’t a landing spot for David Price, though an Ian Kennedy-type might be a fit.
Through foresight, luck, or both, they avoided the horrendous seasons of both Johnson and Balfour, and when Tommy Hunter failed as the closer, Zach Britton stepped in ably, though the bullpen as a whole has been somewhat middle of the pack. All of them are helped by what has become one of the better defenses in baseball, and not just the expected pair of Machado & Hardy; Jones has improved, Joseph has seen high marks, and even Pearce has contributed. If you’ve been following Duquette’s never-ending roster moves closely, he’s been constantly turning over his players to take advantage of options and get a starting pitcher out of the way in between turns to get Showalter another reliever. (Bud Norris, who had made just one start since returning from the DL, was sent to Double-A yesterday to start for the nearby Aberdeen Ironbirds, making an 11:05 a.m. start.)
It helps, of course, that the Rays have collapsed, and the Red Sox have collapsed, and the post-Tanaka Yankees are about to collapse, and the Blue Jays are in the process of collapsing, and maybe that’s the biggest factor. Against their rivals, the Orioles are 26-18, the only team in the division to be more than one game over .500 inside the East. Depending on how you look at it, they either have a very tough remaining schedule, or they don’t. Sometimes, all you have to do is be the team that manages not to implode. That’s probably not good enough to get past the Athletics, Angels and Tigers into the World Series, but anything can happen once you get to October. For the continually confounding Orioles, whether we respect them or not, it sure looks like they’re on their way to doing just that.
The Aftermath of the Carlos Santana Experiment.
Cleveland Indians manager Terry Francona had this to say before Wednesday’s home game against the New York Yankees:
“Early in the year, there’s always some inconsistencies that take a while to kind of play themselves out. That’s just the way a year is. It happens with every team. Then, once guys get settled in and get on a roll, then you see how good you can be. For whatever reason, sometimes it takes a while.”
Carlos Santana started this game at first base for the Indians. Lonnie Chisenhall played third. Nick Swisher served as the designated hitter.
There’s a reason I’ve presented those three facts to you immediately following that quote. The reason is because the “inconsistencies” Francona spoke of relate to an experiment the Indians underwent to begin the season, concerning those three players and those three positions.
Well, the experiment really had just one subject, Santana, but it ended up effecting all three players. The experiment was a big deal when it was first announced. Quietly, nearly two months ago, the experiment came to an end without an official announcement or much fanfare.
Carlos Santana has always been a catcher, but he was never a particularly good catcher. Let me rephrase that: he was never a particularly good defensive catcher. Immediately upon entering the league, Santana started to hit. And he hasn’t stopped since. From 2011-13, when Santana was the Indians everyday catcher, he was in an elite class offensively among his peers, right there with Joe Mauer and Yadier Molina. Difference is, Yadier Molina is the best defensive catcher in baseball. Mauer was average. Santana was one of the worst. In that same span, Santana’s -14 Defensive Runs Saved were third-worst in baseball among catchers. He had a league-average arm, but was the worst pitch-blocker in the MLB. According to the StatCorner framing report, Santana was also the league’s worst pitch-framer, and by a pretty significant margin.
Santana was still the sixth-most valuable catcher over those three years because of the offense he supplied from an offensively-suppressed position. But his deficiencies behind the plate were starting to take their toll on the Indians pitching staff. Enter Yan Gomes.
Gomes landed in Cleveland along with Mike Aviles in a 2012 trade with Toronto for Esmil Rogers. As soon as Gomes was put in the lineup, he made it impossible for Francona to take him out of it. He hit, he blocked pitches, he called a good game and showed off one of the strongest arms in baseball. After just a half-season behind the plate for Cleveland, the Indians locked him up to a six-year extension, effectively ending Santana’s time as an everyday catcher.
This created a little predicament for the Indians. Santana is a good, young hitter and a building block of their core. But Gomes was the catcher and Swisher was the first baseman. These were the only two positions Santana had played at the major league level. The next logical step would be to make him a full-time designated hitter, but there’s a caveat to that. It’s easy sometimes to get wrapped up in numbers and fantasy sports and forget that athletes are still human beings with unique minds, routines and feelings that can affect them in ways which will never be quantified in a statistic. It would make sense to just DH Santana, but Francona mentioned that Santana doesn’t like to DH. And for what it’s worth, the numbers sort of back this up as Santana’s OPS as a DH is 40 points lower than his career OPS. I asked him about his feelings toward being the DH:
“Some days, it’s good for me and my body,” Santana said. “But, I’m younger and I don’t feel comfortable when I play DH. I want to play defense. When I play defense I feel more tied to the game, timing, my teammates, everything. This is what I want, to play defense. Because I feel comfortable.”
So the Indians got a little creative.
On November 13, 2013, it was reported that Santana would be taking grounders at third base in Spring Training. It was an interesting tidbit, but not one taken too seriously. The thoughts from most were that Santana would do a little catching, play some first, DH a bit and maybe be available at third in an emergency situation. On March 25, Francona announced that Santana would be the everyday third baseman. Six days later, the Indians handed Gomes his extension. This came as somewhat of a shock. The Indians were a playoff team the year prior and were handing the keys at third base to a guy who hadn’t played there since Single-A ball seven years ago, save for a handful of Spring Training games in which Santana had clearly impressed the Tribe coaching staff.
Once the regular season started, he showed some flashes at third. This was on Opening Day:
This was a month later:
But the bad eventually started to outweigh the good:
Santana’s defense at third base graded out at -5 Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) and -6 UZR, giving him the worst UZR/150 of any third baseman in baseball. Defensive metrics in 225-inning samples are hardly the end-all-be-all of a players true defensive ability, but league-worst numbers paired with the visual evidence above make a pretty strong case that Santana was hurting the Indians at third base more than he was helping them.
Nearly two months ago, on May 22, Santana started at third base against the Baltimore Orioles. It was his 26th start at third in the 2014 season. In the seventh inning of that game, he made the error shown in that last GIF there, where he threw the double-play ball into right field. That was the last time he played third base. Three days later, he took a foul tip off the mask while catching his 10th game of the year. He went on the disabled list with a mild concussion and missed two weeks. Since then, he has played exclusively first base.
There’s a few other things in play here. First, recently-qualified batting leader and third baseman Lonnie Chisenhall has a better wRC+ than Jose Bautista, Giancarlo Stanton and Jose Abreu. Defensively, he’s probably not much better than Santana at third, but it is his natural position and he’s earned it back.
“It’s actually a pretty good story,” Francona said. “Last year, he’s given the job and plays his way out of it to the point where we had to send him to Triple-A. This year, he’s given nothing. Santana does a really good job in Spring Training, but Lonnie also did a really good job to the point where, even though it was a little repetitive, we kept him on our team because we thought he did so well. Rather than hang his head and go, ‘Oh, woe is me,’ his work ethic was incredible. His routines picked up and it started to show on the field and in the consistency of his at-bats. Now, it’s kind of hard not to want him there. Which is a big compliment to him.”
Coinciding with Santana’s trip to the disabled list was regular first baseman Nick Swisher’s trip to the disabled list. Swisher, 33, has been battling a sore knee for a lot of the season. Swisher’s year has been notable because he’s posted career-worsts in just about every offensive category. But he’s had a rough go in the field as well:
Swisher’s matching DRS and UZR totals of -6 are worst in the MLB among first basemen this year. In 3,000 innings at first base before this season, though, Swisher has graded out as an above-average first baseman, so you have to wonder how much his knee has played into his struggles. Since returning from the disabled list, Swisher has DH’ed in 16 of 20 games, while Santana has taken over at first base.
Unlike Santana, the veteran Swisher doesn’t mind DH’ing. First, it means extra rest for his sore knee. Francona says Swisher keeps loose between innings by hitting in the cages and uses the downtime during games to watch film on the opposing pitcher. Swisher just wants to do whatever will help the team win:
“Right now, Carlos is playing a killer first base,” Swisher said. “So it’s like, ‘Hey, why mess with that?’ This is a team game and sometimes you’ve got to do different things that you’re not used to doing. This is a little different role for me, but whatever we can do to put W’s up on the board each and every night, bro, I’m all for it.”
As someone who has seen nearly every game Santana has played at first since returning from the DL, I can vouch for Swisher’s praise being more than just your typical teammate fluff. Santana legitimately does appear to be smoother and more comfortable than he’s ever been in the field. But what’s my opinion worth when you’ve got Indians general manager Chris Antonetti’s:
“I think we’re seeing the benefit of his work at third base translate to helping him as a defender at first,” Antonetti said. “Because he’s actually played really well over there. He’s been an above-average first baseman.”
Santana admitted to me that juggling the learning curve of third base with the physical side of catching created an “imbalance” for him early in the season. Since scrapping all of that nearly two months ago and finding himself entrenched at first, Santana has been the Indians next-best hitter to Michael Brantley, posting a 163 wRC+. There’s no way of knowing how much causation, if any, there actually is between Santana snapping his season-long slump and his move to first base. But it’s certainly something that’s worth noting, especially given his and Francona’s comments. In the meantime, Chisenhall continues to produce and Swisher is currently riding a seven-game hitting streak with three homers in his last five games leading up to the All-Star break, raising his season OPS to the highest it’s been since April 28.
After a couple months of “inconsistencies,” it appears the Indians have found the trifecta that suits them best. The banged up 33-year-old who struggled at first base becomes the designated hitter, a role he makes the most out of while getting extra rest for his knee. The 25-year-old third baseman who lost his job to a catcher in the offseason earns it back by working his tail off and putting up one of the best first halfs in baseball. Our subject is no longer having to juggle the mental aspects of learning a new position with the physical rigors of catching, while still getting his wish of playing in the field. And whether there’s anything to it or not, all three are hitting well together for the first time this season.
Sometimes, experiments work out just the way you wanted them to. Sometimes they don’t work out at all. Other times, they work out in ways you never expected.
“Early in the year, there’s always some inconsistencies that take a while to kind of play themselves out. That’s just the way a year is. It happens with every team. Then, once guys get settled in and get on a roll, then you see how good you can be. For whatever reason, sometimes it takes a while.”
Carlos Santana started this game at first base for the Indians. Lonnie Chisenhall played third. Nick Swisher served as the designated hitter.
There’s a reason I’ve presented those three facts to you immediately following that quote. The reason is because the “inconsistencies” Francona spoke of relate to an experiment the Indians underwent to begin the season, concerning those three players and those three positions.
Well, the experiment really had just one subject, Santana, but it ended up effecting all three players. The experiment was a big deal when it was first announced. Quietly, nearly two months ago, the experiment came to an end without an official announcement or much fanfare.
Carlos Santana has always been a catcher, but he was never a particularly good catcher. Let me rephrase that: he was never a particularly good defensive catcher. Immediately upon entering the league, Santana started to hit. And he hasn’t stopped since. From 2011-13, when Santana was the Indians everyday catcher, he was in an elite class offensively among his peers, right there with Joe Mauer and Yadier Molina. Difference is, Yadier Molina is the best defensive catcher in baseball. Mauer was average. Santana was one of the worst. In that same span, Santana’s -14 Defensive Runs Saved were third-worst in baseball among catchers. He had a league-average arm, but was the worst pitch-blocker in the MLB. According to the StatCorner framing report, Santana was also the league’s worst pitch-framer, and by a pretty significant margin.
Santana was still the sixth-most valuable catcher over those three years because of the offense he supplied from an offensively-suppressed position. But his deficiencies behind the plate were starting to take their toll on the Indians pitching staff. Enter Yan Gomes.
Gomes landed in Cleveland along with Mike Aviles in a 2012 trade with Toronto for Esmil Rogers. As soon as Gomes was put in the lineup, he made it impossible for Francona to take him out of it. He hit, he blocked pitches, he called a good game and showed off one of the strongest arms in baseball. After just a half-season behind the plate for Cleveland, the Indians locked him up to a six-year extension, effectively ending Santana’s time as an everyday catcher.
This created a little predicament for the Indians. Santana is a good, young hitter and a building block of their core. But Gomes was the catcher and Swisher was the first baseman. These were the only two positions Santana had played at the major league level. The next logical step would be to make him a full-time designated hitter, but there’s a caveat to that. It’s easy sometimes to get wrapped up in numbers and fantasy sports and forget that athletes are still human beings with unique minds, routines and feelings that can affect them in ways which will never be quantified in a statistic. It would make sense to just DH Santana, but Francona mentioned that Santana doesn’t like to DH. And for what it’s worth, the numbers sort of back this up as Santana’s OPS as a DH is 40 points lower than his career OPS. I asked him about his feelings toward being the DH:
“Some days, it’s good for me and my body,” Santana said. “But, I’m younger and I don’t feel comfortable when I play DH. I want to play defense. When I play defense I feel more tied to the game, timing, my teammates, everything. This is what I want, to play defense. Because I feel comfortable.”
So the Indians got a little creative.
On November 13, 2013, it was reported that Santana would be taking grounders at third base in Spring Training. It was an interesting tidbit, but not one taken too seriously. The thoughts from most were that Santana would do a little catching, play some first, DH a bit and maybe be available at third in an emergency situation. On March 25, Francona announced that Santana would be the everyday third baseman. Six days later, the Indians handed Gomes his extension. This came as somewhat of a shock. The Indians were a playoff team the year prior and were handing the keys at third base to a guy who hadn’t played there since Single-A ball seven years ago, save for a handful of Spring Training games in which Santana had clearly impressed the Tribe coaching staff.
Once the regular season started, he showed some flashes at third. This was on Opening Day:
This was a month later:
But the bad eventually started to outweigh the good:
Santana’s defense at third base graded out at -5 Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) and -6 UZR, giving him the worst UZR/150 of any third baseman in baseball. Defensive metrics in 225-inning samples are hardly the end-all-be-all of a players true defensive ability, but league-worst numbers paired with the visual evidence above make a pretty strong case that Santana was hurting the Indians at third base more than he was helping them.
Nearly two months ago, on May 22, Santana started at third base against the Baltimore Orioles. It was his 26th start at third in the 2014 season. In the seventh inning of that game, he made the error shown in that last GIF there, where he threw the double-play ball into right field. That was the last time he played third base. Three days later, he took a foul tip off the mask while catching his 10th game of the year. He went on the disabled list with a mild concussion and missed two weeks. Since then, he has played exclusively first base.
There’s a few other things in play here. First, recently-qualified batting leader and third baseman Lonnie Chisenhall has a better wRC+ than Jose Bautista, Giancarlo Stanton and Jose Abreu. Defensively, he’s probably not much better than Santana at third, but it is his natural position and he’s earned it back.
“It’s actually a pretty good story,” Francona said. “Last year, he’s given the job and plays his way out of it to the point where we had to send him to Triple-A. This year, he’s given nothing. Santana does a really good job in Spring Training, but Lonnie also did a really good job to the point where, even though it was a little repetitive, we kept him on our team because we thought he did so well. Rather than hang his head and go, ‘Oh, woe is me,’ his work ethic was incredible. His routines picked up and it started to show on the field and in the consistency of his at-bats. Now, it’s kind of hard not to want him there. Which is a big compliment to him.”
Coinciding with Santana’s trip to the disabled list was regular first baseman Nick Swisher’s trip to the disabled list. Swisher, 33, has been battling a sore knee for a lot of the season. Swisher’s year has been notable because he’s posted career-worsts in just about every offensive category. But he’s had a rough go in the field as well:
Swisher’s matching DRS and UZR totals of -6 are worst in the MLB among first basemen this year. In 3,000 innings at first base before this season, though, Swisher has graded out as an above-average first baseman, so you have to wonder how much his knee has played into his struggles. Since returning from the disabled list, Swisher has DH’ed in 16 of 20 games, while Santana has taken over at first base.
Unlike Santana, the veteran Swisher doesn’t mind DH’ing. First, it means extra rest for his sore knee. Francona says Swisher keeps loose between innings by hitting in the cages and uses the downtime during games to watch film on the opposing pitcher. Swisher just wants to do whatever will help the team win:
“Right now, Carlos is playing a killer first base,” Swisher said. “So it’s like, ‘Hey, why mess with that?’ This is a team game and sometimes you’ve got to do different things that you’re not used to doing. This is a little different role for me, but whatever we can do to put W’s up on the board each and every night, bro, I’m all for it.”
As someone who has seen nearly every game Santana has played at first since returning from the DL, I can vouch for Swisher’s praise being more than just your typical teammate fluff. Santana legitimately does appear to be smoother and more comfortable than he’s ever been in the field. But what’s my opinion worth when you’ve got Indians general manager Chris Antonetti’s:
“I think we’re seeing the benefit of his work at third base translate to helping him as a defender at first,” Antonetti said. “Because he’s actually played really well over there. He’s been an above-average first baseman.”
Santana admitted to me that juggling the learning curve of third base with the physical side of catching created an “imbalance” for him early in the season. Since scrapping all of that nearly two months ago and finding himself entrenched at first, Santana has been the Indians next-best hitter to Michael Brantley, posting a 163 wRC+. There’s no way of knowing how much causation, if any, there actually is between Santana snapping his season-long slump and his move to first base. But it’s certainly something that’s worth noting, especially given his and Francona’s comments. In the meantime, Chisenhall continues to produce and Swisher is currently riding a seven-game hitting streak with three homers in his last five games leading up to the All-Star break, raising his season OPS to the highest it’s been since April 28.
After a couple months of “inconsistencies,” it appears the Indians have found the trifecta that suits them best. The banged up 33-year-old who struggled at first base becomes the designated hitter, a role he makes the most out of while getting extra rest for his knee. The 25-year-old third baseman who lost his job to a catcher in the offseason earns it back by working his tail off and putting up one of the best first halfs in baseball. Our subject is no longer having to juggle the mental aspects of learning a new position with the physical rigors of catching, while still getting his wish of playing in the field. And whether there’s anything to it or not, all three are hitting well together for the first time this season.
Sometimes, experiments work out just the way you wanted them to. Sometimes they don’t work out at all. Other times, they work out in ways you never expected.
Looking Back at the 2013 Trade Value List.
Next Monday, we’re kicking off one of the most popular things we do around here: the Trade Value series. It’s been an annual tradition for going on 10 years now, and I find it a nice distraction from the fact that the All-Star break fails to give us any interesting baseball to talk about. Plus, it gives you guys all kinds of ammunition to prove that I am, in fact, an idiot.
To that end, I’d like to look back at last year’s list, and make some comments about what we might have learned over the last calendar year. List first, then comments.
Rank Player Position
1 Mike Trout OF
2 Bryce Harper OF
3 Manny Machado 3B
4 Andrew McCutchen OF
5 Evan Longoria 3B
6 Buster Posey C
7 Matt Harvey SP
8 Giancarlo Stanton OF
9 Paul Goldschmidt 1B
10 Carlos Gonzalez OF
11 Yadier Molina C
12 Miguel Cabrera 1B
13 Troy Tulowitzki SS
14 Stephen Strasburg SP
15 Clayton Kershaw SP
16 Chris Sale SP
17 Jose Fernandez SP
18 Chris Davis 1B
19 Madison Bumgarner SP
20 Yu Darvish SP
21 David Wright 3B
22 Felix Hernandez SP
23 Adam Wainwright SP
24 Yasiel Puig OF
25 Dustin Pedroia 2B
26 Jurickson Profar SS
27 Jason Kipnis 2B
28 Byron Buxton OF
29 Xander Bogaerts SS
30 Matt Moore SP
31 Starling Marte OF
32 Shelby Miller SP
33 Carlos Gomez OF
34 Ian Desmond SS
35 Jose Bautista OF
36 Salvador Perez C
37 Anthony Rizzo 1B
38 Wil Myers OF
39 Carlos Santana C
40 Allen Craig 1B
41 Jeff Samardzija SP
42 Jean Segura SS
43 Jason Heyward OF
44 Anthony Rendon 3B
45 Edwin Encarnacion DH
46 Desmond Jennings OF
47 David Price SP
48 Adrian Beltre 3B
49 Justin Verlander SP
50 Austin Jackson OF
Now for the lessons.
It feels like every year I tell myself “no pitchers in the top 10″ and every year I talk myself into why this guy or that guy should be the exception. Yeah, the risks are high, but this guy is so good that he’s worth it, right? No, they’re not. They’re going to blow out their arms at some point, and the recent surge in Tommy John surgeries is only going to make teams even more gun shy about building around pitching. Pitchers are great until they aren’t. Hitters have risks too, but they don’t regularly need a couple of years to go heal themselves. No pitchers in the top 10 this year. I swear.
Because the All-Star break was a week later last year, our last calendar year split isn’t exactly “since the list was published”, but it’s very close. And so, with that said, I present Buster Posey‘s line very close to since the list was published: .272/.339/.383, .316 wOBA, 105 wRC+, +2.6 WAR. That puts him right between Zack Cozart and Jimmy Rollins in overall value. His track record suggests that he’s better than this, but for the last year, Buster Posey hasn’t been very good, and he certainly won’t be this high again.
There were two guys who really gave me problems last year: Chris Davis and Yasiel Puig. Both were remarkable in small samples, and both provided the kind of skills that teams pay through the nose for. I ended up going with Davis over Puig, but ranked both pretty aggressively. Puig now looks low, while Davis looks high. I still don’t know what I should have done with them. And this year, I get to try and figure it out again with Jose Abreu.
The other challenging guys are star players with big contracts. Of course teams would pay through the nose to get Felix Hernandez, but then you see Justin Verlander and pause a little bit. Yeah, there are rich teams that would take the money, but would they take the money and give up premium talent like the other guys on this list in return? Maybe? I don’t know? I don’t know.
It’s kind of fitting that Dustin Pedroia, Jurickson Profar, Jason Kipnis, and Xander Bogaerts are all right next to each other. It’s like a club for middle infielders who were supposed to hit but haven’t. And Jean Segura thinks they’re all on fire.
Shelby Miller, almost since the list was published: 183 IP, 4.74 FIP, 4.68 xFIP. He’s in a three way tie — with Edinson Volquez and Eric Stults — for last in pitcher WAR among 79 qualified starters. This isn’t a slump. Shelby Miller is broken.
Will anyone challenge Mike Trout for the top spot this year? Who is going to be the highest ranked player that didn’t appear last year? What else should I have seen a year ago that proves, definitively, that I am an idiot? Let me know in the comments, and we’ll see you on Monday for this year’s edition of the list.
To that end, I’d like to look back at last year’s list, and make some comments about what we might have learned over the last calendar year. List first, then comments.
Rank Player Position
1 Mike Trout OF
2 Bryce Harper OF
3 Manny Machado 3B
4 Andrew McCutchen OF
5 Evan Longoria 3B
6 Buster Posey C
7 Matt Harvey SP
8 Giancarlo Stanton OF
9 Paul Goldschmidt 1B
10 Carlos Gonzalez OF
11 Yadier Molina C
12 Miguel Cabrera 1B
13 Troy Tulowitzki SS
14 Stephen Strasburg SP
15 Clayton Kershaw SP
16 Chris Sale SP
17 Jose Fernandez SP
18 Chris Davis 1B
19 Madison Bumgarner SP
20 Yu Darvish SP
21 David Wright 3B
22 Felix Hernandez SP
23 Adam Wainwright SP
24 Yasiel Puig OF
25 Dustin Pedroia 2B
26 Jurickson Profar SS
27 Jason Kipnis 2B
28 Byron Buxton OF
29 Xander Bogaerts SS
30 Matt Moore SP
31 Starling Marte OF
32 Shelby Miller SP
33 Carlos Gomez OF
34 Ian Desmond SS
35 Jose Bautista OF
36 Salvador Perez C
37 Anthony Rizzo 1B
38 Wil Myers OF
39 Carlos Santana C
40 Allen Craig 1B
41 Jeff Samardzija SP
42 Jean Segura SS
43 Jason Heyward OF
44 Anthony Rendon 3B
45 Edwin Encarnacion DH
46 Desmond Jennings OF
47 David Price SP
48 Adrian Beltre 3B
49 Justin Verlander SP
50 Austin Jackson OF
Now for the lessons.
It feels like every year I tell myself “no pitchers in the top 10″ and every year I talk myself into why this guy or that guy should be the exception. Yeah, the risks are high, but this guy is so good that he’s worth it, right? No, they’re not. They’re going to blow out their arms at some point, and the recent surge in Tommy John surgeries is only going to make teams even more gun shy about building around pitching. Pitchers are great until they aren’t. Hitters have risks too, but they don’t regularly need a couple of years to go heal themselves. No pitchers in the top 10 this year. I swear.
Because the All-Star break was a week later last year, our last calendar year split isn’t exactly “since the list was published”, but it’s very close. And so, with that said, I present Buster Posey‘s line very close to since the list was published: .272/.339/.383, .316 wOBA, 105 wRC+, +2.6 WAR. That puts him right between Zack Cozart and Jimmy Rollins in overall value. His track record suggests that he’s better than this, but for the last year, Buster Posey hasn’t been very good, and he certainly won’t be this high again.
There were two guys who really gave me problems last year: Chris Davis and Yasiel Puig. Both were remarkable in small samples, and both provided the kind of skills that teams pay through the nose for. I ended up going with Davis over Puig, but ranked both pretty aggressively. Puig now looks low, while Davis looks high. I still don’t know what I should have done with them. And this year, I get to try and figure it out again with Jose Abreu.
The other challenging guys are star players with big contracts. Of course teams would pay through the nose to get Felix Hernandez, but then you see Justin Verlander and pause a little bit. Yeah, there are rich teams that would take the money, but would they take the money and give up premium talent like the other guys on this list in return? Maybe? I don’t know? I don’t know.
It’s kind of fitting that Dustin Pedroia, Jurickson Profar, Jason Kipnis, and Xander Bogaerts are all right next to each other. It’s like a club for middle infielders who were supposed to hit but haven’t. And Jean Segura thinks they’re all on fire.
Shelby Miller, almost since the list was published: 183 IP, 4.74 FIP, 4.68 xFIP. He’s in a three way tie — with Edinson Volquez and Eric Stults — for last in pitcher WAR among 79 qualified starters. This isn’t a slump. Shelby Miller is broken.
Will anyone challenge Mike Trout for the top spot this year? Who is going to be the highest ranked player that didn’t appear last year? What else should I have seen a year ago that proves, definitively, that I am an idiot? Let me know in the comments, and we’ll see you on Monday for this year’s edition of the list.
2014 Trade Value Series: Intro and Runner-Ups.
It’s time for the FanGraphs annual All-Star break tradition: distract ourselves from a lack of baseball by arguing about a subjective list of speculative value. Yes, it’s Trade Value time again. This is actually the 10th year I’ve done this list, as my first one came back in 2005, and it included immortals like Daniel Cabrera, Felipe Lopez, and Bobby Crosby. I moved the list to FanGraphs back in 2008, so this will be the seventh edition here on this site.
As always, I’d like to acknowledge that this project has been borrowed from Bill Simmons, who does his own NBA Trade Value series at Grantland. It’s a fun project, and one I’m glad he popularized.
As a quick overview for those who might be new to the series, he’s the basic concept: which players would bring the most return in trade if they were made available by their current clubs? To answer this question as best as we can, we not only look at a player’s performance — both now and in the future — but also the amount of years a team would be acquiring a player for, and how much that player would earn in salary before he could become a free agent. The most valuable assets in the game aren’t just great players, but they’re great players who offer significant value for multiple seasons at salaries below what comparable players earn on the open market.
Of course, because every team has a different priority and varying access to resources, a player’s trade value will not be the same to all 30 organizations. There are players that have significant value to one franchise that another team would have no interest in, and so, we have to try and measure aggregate demand, not just the specific question “would this team trade Player X for Player Y?” Instead of viewing a player’s trade value as specific to a franchise, it’s more accurate to think of this exercise as kind of like an auction; if each MLB player was put up for trade, with their current contracts remaining in place, who would generate the most interest?
Clearly, current value is going to be highly important here, and over the years, I’ve received feedback from people in the game that teams think more short-term than I used to believe. The most aggressive teams in trades are often the ones trying to upgrade their roster in the present, and this is where the most egregious overpays often come, so players who are significant contributors in 2014 get a significant bump in value. However, long-term performance and costs are still significant factors as well, so this isn’t just a list of the 50 best players in baseball right now. Trade value is a combination of short-term and long-term value, and a player’s future salary and years of team-control are big factors in how teams view a player’s long-term value.
For more reference on this series, I’d suggest reading through last year’s posts; they should help you get a feel for the relative emphasis of short-term and long-term value. Also, try to keep in mind that this list is completely subjective, and there’s no real way to measure a player’s aggregate trade value; we’re guessing the best that we can, but we’re still guessing. Feel free to disagree with the rankings, and come up with your own list if you’d like. I think I have some feel for what baseball executives value, but this is all just my opinion, and if you find one of my picks objectionable, you may very well be more correct than I am.
This exercise is supposed to be fun. Don’t take it too seriously. It’s a thing to talk about while MLB takes baseball away from us for a few days.
Now, with that out of the way, let’s talk about a few guys who won’t be appearing on this year’s list, but are notable enough that I want to explain why they missed the cut. For brevity’s sake, I’ll group them into a few categories.
The Free Agent Class of 2015
There is not a single player on this year’s Trade Value list that is eligible to become a free agent after next season. While players like David Price, Justin Upton, Johnny Cueto, and the recently traded Jeff Samardzija are all very valuable trade chips, a year and a half of performance is almost never enough to get back the kind of core player that will appear in the trade value series. You can get a very good prospect for these guys, or a few good-not-great prospects, but teams aren’t giving up above average big leaguers in exchange for eight months of baseball. There just isn’t enough long-term value attached to a player who is 15 months from free agency to command the kind of bidding war that would lead to a greater return than players with significantly more quantity to offer.
And, obviously, this same philosophy knocks out any player who will be a free agent after this season too. Jon Lester would net the Red Sox a nifty package in trade, but with only a few months left until he hits the open market, teams just aren’t going to pay premium prices for a rental.
Great Players, Problem Contracts
This category basically covers two players who prominently appeared on last year’s list, but will not make the cut this season due to extensions they’ve signed since. The two players? Miguel Cabrera and Clayton Kershaw.
Few players in baseball can match either one for short-term value, but both have problematic contracts, though for differing reasons. Cabrera’s is the traditional one; the Tigers extended him at a very high price covering years where he is likely to be unproductive. Even ignoring his 2014 salary, he’s due $270 million over the next nine years, and there just aren’t very many teams in baseball that can even think about affording that kind of contract. And the ones who can aren’t really great fits, as almost all of the high payroll teams already have money significant money tied up at 1B/DH. Cabrera’s a great player, but the contract extension basically killed any chance of a significant bidding war by taking so many teams out of the running. Of course, the Tigers aren’t trading Cabrera, so they don’t care about his trade value, but for this list, we do.
Kershaw’s a different story. He’s expensive too, but that’s not why he missed the cut this year. Teams would still line up to pay him $30 million a year, as he’s the perfect combination of young and great. However, the Dodgers agreed to put a clause in Kershaw’s contract that makes him virtually impossible to trade. if he is traded, he then has the right to void the deal and become a free agent at the end of the season. If the Dodgers traded Kershaw now, he’d be a free agent this winter. If they traded him this off-season, he’d be a free agent next winter. Either way, any team trading for Kershaw would be acquiring a rental, and no one can justify paying what it would take to get him for one year of team control.
Current Injuries Nuking Value
There are some really good players that, if healthy, would have been easy choices for the list. But they aren’t healthy, and teams are reticent to pay premiums for players with health risks. Carlos Gonzalez ranked 10th on this list a year ago, but won’t appear this season due to his recurring injury problems. Michael Wacha almost certainly would have been on the list before he went to the DL with a mysterious shoulder problem. Wil Myers might not have made the cut either way, but he wasn’t even strongly considered given his lack of present value.
There are injured players on this year’s list, but they are the kinds of injured players where the upside is so great that teams would still pay for just the future value knowing the recovery timeline. For guys who were going to appear towards the back half of the list, injuries that limit their short-term value almost universally pushed them off the list. It’s hard to have premium trade value from the disabled list. Not impossible, but difficult.
I Just Can’t List Everyone
There’s nothing wrong with these guys. In fact, all of them made a preliminary version of the list at some point during the compiling of the final version. The margin between the guys at the end and the guys not listed is so small that it’s basically inconsequential. You could realistically argue for any of about 20 or 25 guys to fill the last 10 spots and not get much of an argument from me. At the end of the day, though, I had to pick 50, which leaves a few very good players on very reasonable contracts out in the cold. With all due respect, I offer my apologies to the following:
Adrian Beltre: $34 million in salary over next two seasons, and already 35.
Adam Jones: Good player, good contract, but not a star and not a steal.
Garrett Richards: Amazing first half. Not enough of a track record. Super-Two.
Todd Frazier: Good player, not a great one, and only arb. seasons left.
Jose Altuve: Super fun, great contract, but upside is a bit limited, unfortunately.
George Springer: Power is great, but rest of his game needs work.
Jason Kipnis: Power is what makes him valuable; power currently missing.
Brandon Belt: Took too long to get good, and already into arbitration years.
In a few hours, we’ll unveil the last 10 guys who did make the list, and do 10 more each day until we get to the top 10 on Friday. I hope you enjoy the series as much as I enjoy doing it.
As always, I’d like to acknowledge that this project has been borrowed from Bill Simmons, who does his own NBA Trade Value series at Grantland. It’s a fun project, and one I’m glad he popularized.
As a quick overview for those who might be new to the series, he’s the basic concept: which players would bring the most return in trade if they were made available by their current clubs? To answer this question as best as we can, we not only look at a player’s performance — both now and in the future — but also the amount of years a team would be acquiring a player for, and how much that player would earn in salary before he could become a free agent. The most valuable assets in the game aren’t just great players, but they’re great players who offer significant value for multiple seasons at salaries below what comparable players earn on the open market.
Of course, because every team has a different priority and varying access to resources, a player’s trade value will not be the same to all 30 organizations. There are players that have significant value to one franchise that another team would have no interest in, and so, we have to try and measure aggregate demand, not just the specific question “would this team trade Player X for Player Y?” Instead of viewing a player’s trade value as specific to a franchise, it’s more accurate to think of this exercise as kind of like an auction; if each MLB player was put up for trade, with their current contracts remaining in place, who would generate the most interest?
Clearly, current value is going to be highly important here, and over the years, I’ve received feedback from people in the game that teams think more short-term than I used to believe. The most aggressive teams in trades are often the ones trying to upgrade their roster in the present, and this is where the most egregious overpays often come, so players who are significant contributors in 2014 get a significant bump in value. However, long-term performance and costs are still significant factors as well, so this isn’t just a list of the 50 best players in baseball right now. Trade value is a combination of short-term and long-term value, and a player’s future salary and years of team-control are big factors in how teams view a player’s long-term value.
For more reference on this series, I’d suggest reading through last year’s posts; they should help you get a feel for the relative emphasis of short-term and long-term value. Also, try to keep in mind that this list is completely subjective, and there’s no real way to measure a player’s aggregate trade value; we’re guessing the best that we can, but we’re still guessing. Feel free to disagree with the rankings, and come up with your own list if you’d like. I think I have some feel for what baseball executives value, but this is all just my opinion, and if you find one of my picks objectionable, you may very well be more correct than I am.
This exercise is supposed to be fun. Don’t take it too seriously. It’s a thing to talk about while MLB takes baseball away from us for a few days.
Now, with that out of the way, let’s talk about a few guys who won’t be appearing on this year’s list, but are notable enough that I want to explain why they missed the cut. For brevity’s sake, I’ll group them into a few categories.
The Free Agent Class of 2015
There is not a single player on this year’s Trade Value list that is eligible to become a free agent after next season. While players like David Price, Justin Upton, Johnny Cueto, and the recently traded Jeff Samardzija are all very valuable trade chips, a year and a half of performance is almost never enough to get back the kind of core player that will appear in the trade value series. You can get a very good prospect for these guys, or a few good-not-great prospects, but teams aren’t giving up above average big leaguers in exchange for eight months of baseball. There just isn’t enough long-term value attached to a player who is 15 months from free agency to command the kind of bidding war that would lead to a greater return than players with significantly more quantity to offer.
And, obviously, this same philosophy knocks out any player who will be a free agent after this season too. Jon Lester would net the Red Sox a nifty package in trade, but with only a few months left until he hits the open market, teams just aren’t going to pay premium prices for a rental.
Great Players, Problem Contracts
This category basically covers two players who prominently appeared on last year’s list, but will not make the cut this season due to extensions they’ve signed since. The two players? Miguel Cabrera and Clayton Kershaw.
Few players in baseball can match either one for short-term value, but both have problematic contracts, though for differing reasons. Cabrera’s is the traditional one; the Tigers extended him at a very high price covering years where he is likely to be unproductive. Even ignoring his 2014 salary, he’s due $270 million over the next nine years, and there just aren’t very many teams in baseball that can even think about affording that kind of contract. And the ones who can aren’t really great fits, as almost all of the high payroll teams already have money significant money tied up at 1B/DH. Cabrera’s a great player, but the contract extension basically killed any chance of a significant bidding war by taking so many teams out of the running. Of course, the Tigers aren’t trading Cabrera, so they don’t care about his trade value, but for this list, we do.
Kershaw’s a different story. He’s expensive too, but that’s not why he missed the cut this year. Teams would still line up to pay him $30 million a year, as he’s the perfect combination of young and great. However, the Dodgers agreed to put a clause in Kershaw’s contract that makes him virtually impossible to trade. if he is traded, he then has the right to void the deal and become a free agent at the end of the season. If the Dodgers traded Kershaw now, he’d be a free agent this winter. If they traded him this off-season, he’d be a free agent next winter. Either way, any team trading for Kershaw would be acquiring a rental, and no one can justify paying what it would take to get him for one year of team control.
Current Injuries Nuking Value
There are some really good players that, if healthy, would have been easy choices for the list. But they aren’t healthy, and teams are reticent to pay premiums for players with health risks. Carlos Gonzalez ranked 10th on this list a year ago, but won’t appear this season due to his recurring injury problems. Michael Wacha almost certainly would have been on the list before he went to the DL with a mysterious shoulder problem. Wil Myers might not have made the cut either way, but he wasn’t even strongly considered given his lack of present value.
There are injured players on this year’s list, but they are the kinds of injured players where the upside is so great that teams would still pay for just the future value knowing the recovery timeline. For guys who were going to appear towards the back half of the list, injuries that limit their short-term value almost universally pushed them off the list. It’s hard to have premium trade value from the disabled list. Not impossible, but difficult.
I Just Can’t List Everyone
There’s nothing wrong with these guys. In fact, all of them made a preliminary version of the list at some point during the compiling of the final version. The margin between the guys at the end and the guys not listed is so small that it’s basically inconsequential. You could realistically argue for any of about 20 or 25 guys to fill the last 10 spots and not get much of an argument from me. At the end of the day, though, I had to pick 50, which leaves a few very good players on very reasonable contracts out in the cold. With all due respect, I offer my apologies to the following:
Adrian Beltre: $34 million in salary over next two seasons, and already 35.
Adam Jones: Good player, good contract, but not a star and not a steal.
Garrett Richards: Amazing first half. Not enough of a track record. Super-Two.
Todd Frazier: Good player, not a great one, and only arb. seasons left.
Jose Altuve: Super fun, great contract, but upside is a bit limited, unfortunately.
George Springer: Power is great, but rest of his game needs work.
Jason Kipnis: Power is what makes him valuable; power currently missing.
Brandon Belt: Took too long to get good, and already into arbitration years.
In a few hours, we’ll unveil the last 10 guys who did make the list, and do 10 more each day until we get to the top 10 on Friday. I hope you enjoy the series as much as I enjoy doing it.
Top 25 Prospects: A Midseason Update.
It’s a good time to be a talented (and cost-effective) young professional baseball prospect.
We’ve seen quite a few members of the pre-season Top 100 Prospects list graduate to the Majors. Clubs appear to be accelerating the development of top prospects and leaning heavily on them right out of the chute; freshman and sophomore players can be found playing key roles on the top teams in each division.
Some of the players still eligible for the list will become ineligible for the offseason Top 100 list when, in the second half, the front office comes calling. Prospects that could get the call include: Francisco Lindor (Indians), Taijuan Walker (Mariners), Archie Bradley (Diamondbacks), Aaron Sanchez (Blue Jays), Noah Syndergaard (Mets), Joc Pederson (Dodgers), and even Dylan Bundy (Baltimore).
So who sits atop the heap at the midpoint of the 2014 season? Let’s have a look….
Any prospect-eligible player currently in the Majors was not considered for this list, including Oscar Taveras (Cardinals), Marcus Stroman (Blue Jays) and Mookie Betts (Red Sox). Any amateur turning pro in 2014 was also not included.
#1 Kris Bryant | Cubs (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 396 116 26 31 55 107 11 .346 .444 .701 .495
Bryant headlines perhaps the top minor league system in baseball and could be playing in the big leagues right now for some organizations. There isn’t much that this former second-overall draft pick hasn’t done; he’s hit for average and power while producing impressive on-base rates. The big league combination at third base of Luis Valbuena and Mike Olt won’t be around much longer. Bryant should be one of the premier power hitters in the Majors for years to come while hitting in the middle of the Cubs’ lineup. [Pre-season Ranking: 6th]
#2 Byron Buxton | Twins (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 29 3 1 1 1 10 1 .107 .138 .250 .179
Buxton’s slide from the No. 1 slot on the pre-season list has less to do with the Twins prospect and more to do with what Kris Bryant has done in 2014. Sidelined for much of the year with a wrist injury, Buxton returned from the disabled list on July 6. After looking like a potential 2014 call-up, the injury has probably pushed his MLB debut to mid-to-late 2015. [Pre-season Ranking: 1st]
#3 Francisco Lindor | Indians (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 364 91 11 6 39 58 24 .284 .361 .400 .348
Lindor has always been considered one of the top defensive shortstop prospects in the game. Nothing has changed in that regard and he’s continued to hold his own at the plate in Double-A this season will showing a little more pop in his bat (at the expense of a few more strikeouts). Toss in his ability to steal 20+ bases and you have yourself a valuable middle infielder. And most likely Cleveland’s starting shortstop for 2015. [Pre-season Ranking: 12th]
#4 Addison Russell | Cubs (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 94 23 3 1 10 19 5 .277 .362 .373 .343
It’s not often that you get a chance to acquire a Top 5 prospect talent but Chicago did just that after agreeing to part with two established big league starters. Russell missed a significant chunk of the season thanks to a hamstring injury but has been performing well lately. The re-emergence of Starlin Castro, as well as impressive infield depth in the minor, makes things interesting but expect to see Russell take over the Cubs’ starting shortstop gig at some point in 2015. [Pre-season Ranking: 8th]
#5 Carlos Correa | Astros (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 293 81 16 6 36 45 20 .325 .416 .510 .409
Correa won’t turn 20 until the end of September but he produced an eye-brow raising .325/.416/.510 in 62 High-A ball games. Unfortunately, he suffered a serious leg injury, which likely ended his season and prevented him from reaching Double-A as a teenager. Look for him to possibly make up for lost development time in the Arizona Fall League. [Pre-season Ranking: 9th]
#6 Corey Seager | Dodgers (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 365 115 34 18 30 76 5 .352 .411 .633 .445
You have to have a pretty impressive three months to jump from being ranked 28th overall to sixth and that’s exactly what Seager experienced. The shortstop prospect — who will permanently move to third base any day now — has produced a 1.011 OPS in 75 games at the High-A ball level despite turning just 20 in April. He has some polish to add to his overall game but he should be a beast. [Pre-season Ranking: 28th]
#7 Taijuan Walker | Mariners (P)
Age IP K/9 BB/9 GB% ERA FIP xFIP RA9-WAR WAR
21 10.0 8.10 6.30 50.0 % 3.60 6.32 4.36 0.2 -0.1
It’s been a rough year for Walker, who was supposed to be a key arm in the Mariners rotation right from the get-go in April. Unfortunately, the right-hander suffered a shoulder injury that kept him from throwing his first big league pitch of the year until the end of June. Since returning, he’s flashes his dominating stuff but both his command and control have understandably been off. [Pre-season Ranking: 7th]
#8 Javier Baez | Cubs (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
21 348 75 19 14 28 110 15 .240 .305 .449 .324
It’s been a terribly disappointing season for Baez, who has taken a step backward in his development. However, there are few prospects in the minors that can produce the kind of power that this Puerto Rico native can. The Cubs’ impressive infield depth will allow the organization to be extremely patient with this 21-year-old shortstop (possibly soon-to-be right-fielder). [Pre-season Ranking: 4th]
#9 Archie Bradley | Diamondbacks (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 9 9 41.0 42 0 7.24 4.83 3.95 3.92
Bradley is another top-ranked prospect who has seen injuries throw a wet blanket on his season. He opened the year in Triple-A as a 21 year old but suffered an elbow injury five starts in. He’s back in game action now (in Double-A) but both his command and control have been off — and understandably so. If he can get his feet under him in the latter half of the year he has the talent to reach the Majors in 2014. [Pre-season Ranking: 5th]
#10 Lucas Giolito | Nationals (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 14 14 65.2 47 6 9.87 3.29 2.47 3.82
The Washington Nationals’ system isn’t exactly overflowing with premium talent so it may help Giolito, 20, fly under the radar a bit. He hasn’t received much hype in 2014 despite posting a 2.14 ERA and a strikeout rate of 9.63 K/9 through 13 starts. Batters are hitting just .174 against him, which is all the more impressive when you consider he spent much of 2013 rehabbing from Tommy John surgery. [Pre-season Ranking: 13th]
#11 Joey Gallo | Rangers (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 362 89 16 31 65 113 5 .307 .434 .703 .487
What’s the quickest way to ascend the Top 100 prospects list? Well, there are a number of ways to do it but slugging 70 home runs in less than 200 games will certainly get it done. Gallo just missed making the pre-season Top 100 list due to concerns over his swing-and-miss tendencies but we now have to give credit where credit is due. He’s not going to hit for a high average once his BABIP normalizes but there’s a pretty strong market for sluggers with 80-grade power and a high on-base percentage. [Pre-season Ranking: Not Rank]
#12 Miguel Sano | Twins (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 519 123 30 35 65 142 11 .280 .382 .610 .435
Speaking of 80-grade power, Sano is a player who can give Gallo a run for his money… well, when he’s healthy. The Dominican native slugged 35 home runs between High-A and Double-A in 2013 but he may miss all of 2014 after having Tommy John surgery. The injury is not expected to have any long-term effects but the missed development time could set him back a bit as the 21 year old looks to improve his contact rate. [Pre-season Ranking: 10th]
#13 Aaron Sanchez | Blue Jays (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 20 20 98.1 84 6 7.51 5.22 3.94 4.53
Trades over the past couple of seasons have left the cupboard bare in the upper levels of the Jays system in terms of depth. As such, the organization has been aggressive with some of its young arms, including Sanchez. He’s an extremely talented pitcher with the potential to produce above-average strikeout rates and ground-out rates but he also struggles with both his command and control. A previous shoulder injury appears to be behind him now. [Pre-season Ranking: 22nd]
#14 Noah Syndergaard | Mets (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 16 16 79.2 97 9 9.26 2.60 5.31 3.98
It’s been a rougher-than-expected year for Syndergaard, who has dealt with health woes, as well as the unfavorable park factors in the Pacific Coast League. The good news is that he’s shown signs of turning things around and he’s still just 21 years old. Despite giving up 97 hits in 79.2 innings due to inconsistent command, he’s shown above-average control and struck out 82 batters. [Pre-season Ranking: 18th]
#15 Dylan Bundy | Orioles (P)
Age IP K/9 BB/9 GB% ERA FIP xFIP RA9-WAR WAR
19 1.2 0.00 5.40 20.0 % 0.00 4.89 8.42 0.1 0.0
Bundy reached the Major Leagues as a teenager back in 2012 but then missed all of 2013 while recovering from Tommy John surgery. His rehab has been going well and he’s currently throwing in High-A ball. He has a shot at returning to The Show in September. [Pre-season Ranking: 19th]
#16 Tyler Glasnow | Pirates (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
20 14 14 70.2 43 1 10.44 4.84 1.91 2.91
Glasnow’s breakout began in 2013 and has continued on into the current season. The right-hander is a tough guy to hit and has allowed just 36 base knocks in 65.0 innings. Unfortunately, his control remains a work in progress and he’s issued 37 free passes. If/when he conquers that demon, the Pirates prospect could become a top-of-the-rotation mainstay. [Pre-season Ranking: 43rd]
#17 Robert Stephenson | Reds (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 18 17 93.0 74 10 9.00 4.65 3.97 4.19
Stephenson ranked higher on FanGraphs’ pre-season Top 100 list than any other publication. His stuff has remained impressive in 2014 but the results have not been there due to inconsistent command. Even with his struggles, he’s kept his composure and has held his own at the Double-A level. He’ll be down right scary once he polishes his command and control. [Pre-season Ranking: 11th]
#18 Joc Pederson | Dodgers (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 350 92 12 17 62 101 20 .322 .443 .570 .440
I’ll admit that it’s taken some time for me to warm up to Pederson as a legitimate Top 100 prospect but he’s done his part and I’ve finally climbed aboard the bandwagon. The toolsy outfielder could be starting at the MLB level for a lot of organizations right now but the veteran presence (and large contracts) has kept the young outfielder glued to Triple-A. [Pre-season Ranking: 58th]
#19 Kohl Stewart | Twins (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 16 16 76.2 65 3 6.46 2.70 2.58 3.81
The athletic 19-year-old has enjoyed his time in A-ball. He’s produced a strong ground-ball rate while allowing just 59 hits and 23 free passes in 70.2 innings of work. He doesn’t flash the same raw stuff that fellow Twins prospect Alex Meyer does, but he has a chance to be a much more complete pitcher. [Pre-season Ranking: 32nd]
#20 J.P. Crawford | Phillies (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 360 87 17 7 45 57 14 .279 .373 .401 .364
Within the next year, Crawford could easily find his name mentioned among the top three or four shortstop prospects in the game. The young, athletic infielder flashes impressive tools in the field but needs to add strength and show more polish at the plate to truly realize his full potential. He’s probably about two years away from reaching the Majors. [Pre-season Ranking: 50th]
#21 Alex Meyer | Twins (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
24 18 18 89.1 75 7 10.38 4.33 3.43 3.76
Meyer has overpowered Triple-A hitters with 103 strikeouts in 89.1 innings. The biggest thing holding back the 6-9 hurler is his inconsistent command and control; he’s walked 43 batters. Meyer, 24, should join the Twins’ rotation late in the year or early in 2015. [Pre-season ranking: 23rd]
#22 Daniel Norris | Blue Jays (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 17 17 83.1 63 3 10.91 2.81 1.84 2.39
A highly-regarded amateur, Norris suffered through a nightmare first pro season in 2012 but made adjustments and rebounded nicely in the second half of 2013. He’s spent the 2014 season pitching in both High-A and Double-A ball and has struck out 101 batters in 83.1 innings. The lefty has great makeup, a strong work ethic and the pure stuff to be a No. 2 or 3 hurler once he becomes more consistent with his command. [Pre-season Ranking: N/A]
#23 Jon Gray | Rockies (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
22 17 17 88.1 79 9 8.25 2.65 3.77 3.48
Gray flashes an upper-90s fastball and is showing improved secondary offerings. At 6-4, he’s going to have to learn to create more downward plane on his offerings if he’s going to have success pitching at home in Colorado. [Pre-season Ranking: 16th]
#24 Jose Berrios | Twins (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
20 17 17 101.1 81 6 10.04 2.31 2.31 2.78
The third Twins pitcher on this list, Berrios recently received a promotion to Double-A at the age of 20. The biggest knock on the hard-throwing Puerto Rico native is his lack of size. He stands just 6-0 and struggles to stay on top of the ball at times, creating high fly-ball rates. The Twins could easily go from having one of the worst big league rotations to one of the best in only a few seasons. [Pre-season Ranking: 93rd]
#25 Blake Swihart | Red Sox (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 308 82 17 9 24 49 4 .292 .347 .470 .364
Swihart continues to show a strong bat and, as a result, the switch-hitter has become the best backstop prospect in the game, narrowly edging out defensive specialist Austin Hedges of the Padres. With a strong finish to the year, and perhaps a trip to the Arizona Fall League, he 22-year-old Texas native has a shot at opening 2015 as the Red Sox’s starting catcher. [Pre-season Ranking: 66th]
Just Missed Julio Urias | Dodgers (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
17 17 13 52.1 43 3 9.97 4.30 3.44 3.96
Just Missed Henry Owens | Red Sox (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 17 17 105.2 69 5 9.45 3.41 2.21 3.12
We’ve seen quite a few members of the pre-season Top 100 Prospects list graduate to the Majors. Clubs appear to be accelerating the development of top prospects and leaning heavily on them right out of the chute; freshman and sophomore players can be found playing key roles on the top teams in each division.
Some of the players still eligible for the list will become ineligible for the offseason Top 100 list when, in the second half, the front office comes calling. Prospects that could get the call include: Francisco Lindor (Indians), Taijuan Walker (Mariners), Archie Bradley (Diamondbacks), Aaron Sanchez (Blue Jays), Noah Syndergaard (Mets), Joc Pederson (Dodgers), and even Dylan Bundy (Baltimore).
So who sits atop the heap at the midpoint of the 2014 season? Let’s have a look….
Any prospect-eligible player currently in the Majors was not considered for this list, including Oscar Taveras (Cardinals), Marcus Stroman (Blue Jays) and Mookie Betts (Red Sox). Any amateur turning pro in 2014 was also not included.
#1 Kris Bryant | Cubs (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 396 116 26 31 55 107 11 .346 .444 .701 .495
Bryant headlines perhaps the top minor league system in baseball and could be playing in the big leagues right now for some organizations. There isn’t much that this former second-overall draft pick hasn’t done; he’s hit for average and power while producing impressive on-base rates. The big league combination at third base of Luis Valbuena and Mike Olt won’t be around much longer. Bryant should be one of the premier power hitters in the Majors for years to come while hitting in the middle of the Cubs’ lineup. [Pre-season Ranking: 6th]
#2 Byron Buxton | Twins (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 29 3 1 1 1 10 1 .107 .138 .250 .179
Buxton’s slide from the No. 1 slot on the pre-season list has less to do with the Twins prospect and more to do with what Kris Bryant has done in 2014. Sidelined for much of the year with a wrist injury, Buxton returned from the disabled list on July 6. After looking like a potential 2014 call-up, the injury has probably pushed his MLB debut to mid-to-late 2015. [Pre-season Ranking: 1st]
#3 Francisco Lindor | Indians (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 364 91 11 6 39 58 24 .284 .361 .400 .348
Lindor has always been considered one of the top defensive shortstop prospects in the game. Nothing has changed in that regard and he’s continued to hold his own at the plate in Double-A this season will showing a little more pop in his bat (at the expense of a few more strikeouts). Toss in his ability to steal 20+ bases and you have yourself a valuable middle infielder. And most likely Cleveland’s starting shortstop for 2015. [Pre-season Ranking: 12th]
#4 Addison Russell | Cubs (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 94 23 3 1 10 19 5 .277 .362 .373 .343
It’s not often that you get a chance to acquire a Top 5 prospect talent but Chicago did just that after agreeing to part with two established big league starters. Russell missed a significant chunk of the season thanks to a hamstring injury but has been performing well lately. The re-emergence of Starlin Castro, as well as impressive infield depth in the minor, makes things interesting but expect to see Russell take over the Cubs’ starting shortstop gig at some point in 2015. [Pre-season Ranking: 8th]
#5 Carlos Correa | Astros (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 293 81 16 6 36 45 20 .325 .416 .510 .409
Correa won’t turn 20 until the end of September but he produced an eye-brow raising .325/.416/.510 in 62 High-A ball games. Unfortunately, he suffered a serious leg injury, which likely ended his season and prevented him from reaching Double-A as a teenager. Look for him to possibly make up for lost development time in the Arizona Fall League. [Pre-season Ranking: 9th]
#6 Corey Seager | Dodgers (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 365 115 34 18 30 76 5 .352 .411 .633 .445
You have to have a pretty impressive three months to jump from being ranked 28th overall to sixth and that’s exactly what Seager experienced. The shortstop prospect — who will permanently move to third base any day now — has produced a 1.011 OPS in 75 games at the High-A ball level despite turning just 20 in April. He has some polish to add to his overall game but he should be a beast. [Pre-season Ranking: 28th]
#7 Taijuan Walker | Mariners (P)
Age IP K/9 BB/9 GB% ERA FIP xFIP RA9-WAR WAR
21 10.0 8.10 6.30 50.0 % 3.60 6.32 4.36 0.2 -0.1
It’s been a rough year for Walker, who was supposed to be a key arm in the Mariners rotation right from the get-go in April. Unfortunately, the right-hander suffered a shoulder injury that kept him from throwing his first big league pitch of the year until the end of June. Since returning, he’s flashes his dominating stuff but both his command and control have understandably been off. [Pre-season Ranking: 7th]
#8 Javier Baez | Cubs (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
21 348 75 19 14 28 110 15 .240 .305 .449 .324
It’s been a terribly disappointing season for Baez, who has taken a step backward in his development. However, there are few prospects in the minors that can produce the kind of power that this Puerto Rico native can. The Cubs’ impressive infield depth will allow the organization to be extremely patient with this 21-year-old shortstop (possibly soon-to-be right-fielder). [Pre-season Ranking: 4th]
#9 Archie Bradley | Diamondbacks (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 9 9 41.0 42 0 7.24 4.83 3.95 3.92
Bradley is another top-ranked prospect who has seen injuries throw a wet blanket on his season. He opened the year in Triple-A as a 21 year old but suffered an elbow injury five starts in. He’s back in game action now (in Double-A) but both his command and control have been off — and understandably so. If he can get his feet under him in the latter half of the year he has the talent to reach the Majors in 2014. [Pre-season Ranking: 5th]
#10 Lucas Giolito | Nationals (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 14 14 65.2 47 6 9.87 3.29 2.47 3.82
The Washington Nationals’ system isn’t exactly overflowing with premium talent so it may help Giolito, 20, fly under the radar a bit. He hasn’t received much hype in 2014 despite posting a 2.14 ERA and a strikeout rate of 9.63 K/9 through 13 starts. Batters are hitting just .174 against him, which is all the more impressive when you consider he spent much of 2013 rehabbing from Tommy John surgery. [Pre-season Ranking: 13th]
#11 Joey Gallo | Rangers (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 362 89 16 31 65 113 5 .307 .434 .703 .487
What’s the quickest way to ascend the Top 100 prospects list? Well, there are a number of ways to do it but slugging 70 home runs in less than 200 games will certainly get it done. Gallo just missed making the pre-season Top 100 list due to concerns over his swing-and-miss tendencies but we now have to give credit where credit is due. He’s not going to hit for a high average once his BABIP normalizes but there’s a pretty strong market for sluggers with 80-grade power and a high on-base percentage. [Pre-season Ranking: Not Rank]
#12 Miguel Sano | Twins (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 519 123 30 35 65 142 11 .280 .382 .610 .435
Speaking of 80-grade power, Sano is a player who can give Gallo a run for his money… well, when he’s healthy. The Dominican native slugged 35 home runs between High-A and Double-A in 2013 but he may miss all of 2014 after having Tommy John surgery. The injury is not expected to have any long-term effects but the missed development time could set him back a bit as the 21 year old looks to improve his contact rate. [Pre-season Ranking: 10th]
#13 Aaron Sanchez | Blue Jays (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 20 20 98.1 84 6 7.51 5.22 3.94 4.53
Trades over the past couple of seasons have left the cupboard bare in the upper levels of the Jays system in terms of depth. As such, the organization has been aggressive with some of its young arms, including Sanchez. He’s an extremely talented pitcher with the potential to produce above-average strikeout rates and ground-out rates but he also struggles with both his command and control. A previous shoulder injury appears to be behind him now. [Pre-season Ranking: 22nd]
#14 Noah Syndergaard | Mets (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 16 16 79.2 97 9 9.26 2.60 5.31 3.98
It’s been a rougher-than-expected year for Syndergaard, who has dealt with health woes, as well as the unfavorable park factors in the Pacific Coast League. The good news is that he’s shown signs of turning things around and he’s still just 21 years old. Despite giving up 97 hits in 79.2 innings due to inconsistent command, he’s shown above-average control and struck out 82 batters. [Pre-season Ranking: 18th]
#15 Dylan Bundy | Orioles (P)
Age IP K/9 BB/9 GB% ERA FIP xFIP RA9-WAR WAR
19 1.2 0.00 5.40 20.0 % 0.00 4.89 8.42 0.1 0.0
Bundy reached the Major Leagues as a teenager back in 2012 but then missed all of 2013 while recovering from Tommy John surgery. His rehab has been going well and he’s currently throwing in High-A ball. He has a shot at returning to The Show in September. [Pre-season Ranking: 19th]
#16 Tyler Glasnow | Pirates (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
20 14 14 70.2 43 1 10.44 4.84 1.91 2.91
Glasnow’s breakout began in 2013 and has continued on into the current season. The right-hander is a tough guy to hit and has allowed just 36 base knocks in 65.0 innings. Unfortunately, his control remains a work in progress and he’s issued 37 free passes. If/when he conquers that demon, the Pirates prospect could become a top-of-the-rotation mainstay. [Pre-season Ranking: 43rd]
#17 Robert Stephenson | Reds (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 18 17 93.0 74 10 9.00 4.65 3.97 4.19
Stephenson ranked higher on FanGraphs’ pre-season Top 100 list than any other publication. His stuff has remained impressive in 2014 but the results have not been there due to inconsistent command. Even with his struggles, he’s kept his composure and has held his own at the Double-A level. He’ll be down right scary once he polishes his command and control. [Pre-season Ranking: 11th]
#18 Joc Pederson | Dodgers (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 350 92 12 17 62 101 20 .322 .443 .570 .440
I’ll admit that it’s taken some time for me to warm up to Pederson as a legitimate Top 100 prospect but he’s done his part and I’ve finally climbed aboard the bandwagon. The toolsy outfielder could be starting at the MLB level for a lot of organizations right now but the veteran presence (and large contracts) has kept the young outfielder glued to Triple-A. [Pre-season Ranking: 58th]
#19 Kohl Stewart | Twins (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 16 16 76.2 65 3 6.46 2.70 2.58 3.81
The athletic 19-year-old has enjoyed his time in A-ball. He’s produced a strong ground-ball rate while allowing just 59 hits and 23 free passes in 70.2 innings of work. He doesn’t flash the same raw stuff that fellow Twins prospect Alex Meyer does, but he has a chance to be a much more complete pitcher. [Pre-season Ranking: 32nd]
#20 J.P. Crawford | Phillies (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 360 87 17 7 45 57 14 .279 .373 .401 .364
Within the next year, Crawford could easily find his name mentioned among the top three or four shortstop prospects in the game. The young, athletic infielder flashes impressive tools in the field but needs to add strength and show more polish at the plate to truly realize his full potential. He’s probably about two years away from reaching the Majors. [Pre-season Ranking: 50th]
#21 Alex Meyer | Twins (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
24 18 18 89.1 75 7 10.38 4.33 3.43 3.76
Meyer has overpowered Triple-A hitters with 103 strikeouts in 89.1 innings. The biggest thing holding back the 6-9 hurler is his inconsistent command and control; he’s walked 43 batters. Meyer, 24, should join the Twins’ rotation late in the year or early in 2015. [Pre-season ranking: 23rd]
#22 Daniel Norris | Blue Jays (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 17 17 83.1 63 3 10.91 2.81 1.84 2.39
A highly-regarded amateur, Norris suffered through a nightmare first pro season in 2012 but made adjustments and rebounded nicely in the second half of 2013. He’s spent the 2014 season pitching in both High-A and Double-A ball and has struck out 101 batters in 83.1 innings. The lefty has great makeup, a strong work ethic and the pure stuff to be a No. 2 or 3 hurler once he becomes more consistent with his command. [Pre-season Ranking: N/A]
#23 Jon Gray | Rockies (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
22 17 17 88.1 79 9 8.25 2.65 3.77 3.48
Gray flashes an upper-90s fastball and is showing improved secondary offerings. At 6-4, he’s going to have to learn to create more downward plane on his offerings if he’s going to have success pitching at home in Colorado. [Pre-season Ranking: 16th]
#24 Jose Berrios | Twins (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
20 17 17 101.1 81 6 10.04 2.31 2.31 2.78
The third Twins pitcher on this list, Berrios recently received a promotion to Double-A at the age of 20. The biggest knock on the hard-throwing Puerto Rico native is his lack of size. He stands just 6-0 and struggles to stay on top of the ball at times, creating high fly-ball rates. The Twins could easily go from having one of the worst big league rotations to one of the best in only a few seasons. [Pre-season Ranking: 93rd]
#25 Blake Swihart | Red Sox (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 308 82 17 9 24 49 4 .292 .347 .470 .364
Swihart continues to show a strong bat and, as a result, the switch-hitter has become the best backstop prospect in the game, narrowly edging out defensive specialist Austin Hedges of the Padres. With a strong finish to the year, and perhaps a trip to the Arizona Fall League, he 22-year-old Texas native has a shot at opening 2015 as the Red Sox’s starting catcher. [Pre-season Ranking: 66th]
Just Missed Julio Urias | Dodgers (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
17 17 13 52.1 43 3 9.97 4.30 3.44 3.96
Just Missed Henry Owens | Red Sox (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 17 17 105.2 69 5 9.45 3.41 2.21 3.12
2014 Trade Value: #50 – #41.
Welcome to the kick-off of this year’s Trade Value series. If you haven’t already, read the intro and get yourself acquainted with what question this is trying to answer, as well as an incomplete list of guys who missed the cut for one reason or another.
There will be a couple of formatting changes this year. Instead of doing two posts per day, with five players in each post, I’m consolidating those posts into one longer list per day. Additionally, instead of having a player listed and then some paragraphs about his ranking, I’m going to list all ten players in a table at the top of the post, and then write about all ten in more of an article style than a selection of blurbs. Having all of the names available in a single table makes for easier comparison of some relevant facts, and in past years, the player capsules started to feel pretty repetitive by the end. Hopefully, this cuts down on some of the redundant text. We’ll find out, I guess.
A few quick notes on the columns in the table. After the normal biographical information, I’ve listed Projected WAR, which is essentially a combination of ZIPS and Steamer’s current rest-of-season forecasts extrapolated out to a full-season’s worth of playing time. For non-catcher position players, this is 600 plate appearances; catchers are extrapolated to 450 PAs. For pitchers, this is extrapolated to 200 innings. It is not their 2014 WAR, or their last calendar year WAR; it is a rough estimate of what we might expect them to do over a full-season, based on the information we have now.
The two columns to the right of that give you an idea of the player’s contract status. “Controlled Through” includes all years before a player accumulates enough time to be eligible for free agency, all guaranteed years of a contract already signed, and any years covered by team options that could be exercised in the future. Player options and mutual options are not included, as the assumption is that players of this caliber will generally opt-out of their current contracts if given the chance.
The “Contract Dollars” column includes the base salaries of each player in the controlled years going forward, starting from 2015 — the 40% of 2014 salary remaining is not included in the calculation — including the value of team options, since we’re assuming that they will be picked up. In many cases, players have incentives for various accomplishments that affect the base salaries, but those are not accounted for here, simply because of the tedious work of calculating all those incentive prices and the fact that $100,000 for an All-Star appearance or $500,000 for an MVP-finish there aren’t going to change the overall calculations. This column is not an exact representation of their future earnings, but should be close enough for our purposes.
For players who are under team control but not under guaranteed contract, I’ve listed out which arbitration years they still have remaining. There are a few players who have both guaranteed contracts and arbitration eligibility remaining, but we’ll deal with those cases in the article when a simple line in the chart doesn’t explain their situation perfectly.
Finally, “Last Year” notes where a player was ranked on this list last year, or if he wasn’t on the 2013 Trade Value series, then he is denoted as unranked. As you can imagine, there’s a lot more turnover at the end of the list than the beginning.
Alright, enough fooling around; let’s get to the list.
Rank Name Age Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
50 Yan Gomes 26 C 3.4 2021 $40,950,000 Unranked
49 Starling Marte 25 OF 3.0 2021 $52,500,000 31
48 Kyle Seager 26 3B 3.4 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
47 Alex Cobb 26 SP 3.1 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
46 Edwin Encarnacion 31 DH 3.7 2016 $20,000,000 45
45 Julio Teheran 23 SP 2.3 2020 $41,600,000 Unranked
44 Chris Archer 25 SP 2.4 2021 $42,250,000 Unranked
43 Devin Mesoraco 26 C 3.0 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
42 Corey Kluber 28 SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
41 Michael Brantley 27 OF 2.6 2018 $30,000,000 Unranked
As noted in the intro, there is essentially no meaningful difference between the guys at the end of the list and the guys who just missed. A reasonable person could easily prefer Adam Jones to Starling Marte, or Adrian Beltre to Edwin Encarnacion, or Todd Frazier to Kyle Seager. We’re hair splitting. It’s the nature of the list format.
Overall, this group has a few traits in common, though no group of 10 players will be perfectly identical. As a whole, though, this group is made up of above average players, but guys who probably aren’t ever going to become franchise cornerstones. Note that the average age here is 26 and the average projected WAR is 3.1; these guys are close to being in their physical prime, and are not quite at the level of a true star, though they are valuable contributors.
The guys you could argue for breaking out of that good-not-great section include Kluber and the younger guys on the list: Marte, Teheran, and Archer. These guys might have a bit more upside than average, but they also come with additional risk; Marte’s offensive profile provides a lot of seasonal variability, while the other three are pitchers. Kluber’s also 350 innings into his big league career and has a .332 BABIP, so his trade value probably doesn’t quite match his FIP-based WAR value. If you were going to pick a guy from this section who could be significantly higher next year, Kluber would probably be the best bet, but he’s also a pitcher and I probably would have said the same thing about Shelby Miller a year ago.
On the other end of the scale is Encarnacion, who basically has no “upside” remaining, and would be a short-term only play. However, because of the extremely friendly contract he signed with Toronto during his breakout season, he’d also be one of the cheapest sources of elite offense around, and given how much teams covet right-handed power these days, you can bet there would be a long line of suitors lining up for Encarnacion’s services, even given his limited defensive value and the fact that he’s on the wrong side of 30.
Speaking of defensive value, we have to talk about the two catchers on the list. You’ll note that Gomes is projected as a better player than Mesoraco and has already signed a below-market extension with the Indians, and he’s the same age, but is still ranked a few spots lower. This reflects the current reality that baseball teams simply pay for more offense than they do for defense, and players who accumulate their value with their bats are going to command a larger premium than those whose value is tied to what they do in the field.
Personally, I think I’d probably take Gomes over Mesoraco, given just how cheap his extension is and the extra years of team control. But keep in mind that the option years that the Indians hold on Gomes cover ages 32 and 33, and it isn’t any kind of guarantee that he’ll still be a productive player at that point. The difference in years of useful control may be less than what the chart makes it out to be, and while Gomes is certainly going to be cheaper, teams may be more willing to pay a slight premium to get the value from offense instead of defense.
The other positive in Mesoraco’s favor also applies to both Seager and Cobb. The biggest knocks against them are the the fact that all three are headed for arbitration without long-term extensions in place, and are only under control for three more years after this season. However, in each case, the arbitration awards are unlikely to match the player’s expected value, because they haven’t achieved the kinds of milestones that return big arbitration paydays yet.
Seager’s value comes from doing a lot of things fairly well, but he’s not great at anything. He’s a career .263 hitter, he’s never hit more than 22 home runs in a season, he doesn’t steal bases, and he won’t win a gold glove. The case for Seager is built on hitting well in a tough pitcher’s park, but that’s not the kind of argument that is going to win over a panel of casual fans who don’t know what park factors are.
The same is true for Cobb. He’s shown flashes of brilliance, but he’s never thrown more than 150 innings in a season and he has a career record of 29-20. The peripherals suggest that he’s a high quality arm, but the arbiters aren’t going to see his track record as being worthy of big dollars. With players like this, a long-term contract isn’t actually that beneficial, because the arbitration system itself will keep the player’s salaries in check without forcing the team to take on the risk of a multi-year commitment.
Teheran and Archer are on the other end of the spectrum. Their traditional stats are more impressive than their analytic numbers, and might not have appeared on the list had their teams been forced into the arbitration process. However, both pitchers signed deals that will keep their salaries to a minimum, and secure significant upside for the team even if they continue to outperform their peripherals.
And finally, we get the guy who doesn’t really fit any of the larger categories of his fellow players on this list. Michael Brantley was a very difficult player for me to rank, and I’ll readily admit that there’s a good case for him to be both 20 spots and 20 spots lower. His ranking here reflects essentially one half of a great season, and he’s never done anything remotely close to this before. His value is tied up primarily in making contact and running the bases, which teams usually don’t pay for, especially if it comes at a corner position. Neither ZIPS nor Steamer think this is a real breakout that is likely to continue, projecting him as closer to an average player than a star going forward.
That said, it isn’t unheard of for players to develop some power later in their careers, and Brantley was basically just a power boost away from becoming a good player. If he sustains even part of this increase in home runs, he looks like a three win player in his prime signed to a contract that will pay him a grand total of $19 million over the next three years. If the breakout is real, then the Indians can pick up an option for a fourth year at $11 million; if it’s not, they don’t have to. The risk here is minimal, and there is some legitimate upside if this is more legitimate improvement than good first half.
I don’t know which way Brantley will go. If the projections are right, he probably won’t be on the list again next year, but the chance that he’s going to keep enough of this up to be a very good hitter signed for basically no money gets him on the list this year.
Tomorrow, we’ll do the next 10, and we’ll start to analyze some much higher risk/reward imbalances.
There will be a couple of formatting changes this year. Instead of doing two posts per day, with five players in each post, I’m consolidating those posts into one longer list per day. Additionally, instead of having a player listed and then some paragraphs about his ranking, I’m going to list all ten players in a table at the top of the post, and then write about all ten in more of an article style than a selection of blurbs. Having all of the names available in a single table makes for easier comparison of some relevant facts, and in past years, the player capsules started to feel pretty repetitive by the end. Hopefully, this cuts down on some of the redundant text. We’ll find out, I guess.
A few quick notes on the columns in the table. After the normal biographical information, I’ve listed Projected WAR, which is essentially a combination of ZIPS and Steamer’s current rest-of-season forecasts extrapolated out to a full-season’s worth of playing time. For non-catcher position players, this is 600 plate appearances; catchers are extrapolated to 450 PAs. For pitchers, this is extrapolated to 200 innings. It is not their 2014 WAR, or their last calendar year WAR; it is a rough estimate of what we might expect them to do over a full-season, based on the information we have now.
The two columns to the right of that give you an idea of the player’s contract status. “Controlled Through” includes all years before a player accumulates enough time to be eligible for free agency, all guaranteed years of a contract already signed, and any years covered by team options that could be exercised in the future. Player options and mutual options are not included, as the assumption is that players of this caliber will generally opt-out of their current contracts if given the chance.
The “Contract Dollars” column includes the base salaries of each player in the controlled years going forward, starting from 2015 — the 40% of 2014 salary remaining is not included in the calculation — including the value of team options, since we’re assuming that they will be picked up. In many cases, players have incentives for various accomplishments that affect the base salaries, but those are not accounted for here, simply because of the tedious work of calculating all those incentive prices and the fact that $100,000 for an All-Star appearance or $500,000 for an MVP-finish there aren’t going to change the overall calculations. This column is not an exact representation of their future earnings, but should be close enough for our purposes.
For players who are under team control but not under guaranteed contract, I’ve listed out which arbitration years they still have remaining. There are a few players who have both guaranteed contracts and arbitration eligibility remaining, but we’ll deal with those cases in the article when a simple line in the chart doesn’t explain their situation perfectly.
Finally, “Last Year” notes where a player was ranked on this list last year, or if he wasn’t on the 2013 Trade Value series, then he is denoted as unranked. As you can imagine, there’s a lot more turnover at the end of the list than the beginning.
Alright, enough fooling around; let’s get to the list.
Rank Name Age Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
50 Yan Gomes 26 C 3.4 2021 $40,950,000 Unranked
49 Starling Marte 25 OF 3.0 2021 $52,500,000 31
48 Kyle Seager 26 3B 3.4 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
47 Alex Cobb 26 SP 3.1 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
46 Edwin Encarnacion 31 DH 3.7 2016 $20,000,000 45
45 Julio Teheran 23 SP 2.3 2020 $41,600,000 Unranked
44 Chris Archer 25 SP 2.4 2021 $42,250,000 Unranked
43 Devin Mesoraco 26 C 3.0 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
42 Corey Kluber 28 SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
41 Michael Brantley 27 OF 2.6 2018 $30,000,000 Unranked
As noted in the intro, there is essentially no meaningful difference between the guys at the end of the list and the guys who just missed. A reasonable person could easily prefer Adam Jones to Starling Marte, or Adrian Beltre to Edwin Encarnacion, or Todd Frazier to Kyle Seager. We’re hair splitting. It’s the nature of the list format.
Overall, this group has a few traits in common, though no group of 10 players will be perfectly identical. As a whole, though, this group is made up of above average players, but guys who probably aren’t ever going to become franchise cornerstones. Note that the average age here is 26 and the average projected WAR is 3.1; these guys are close to being in their physical prime, and are not quite at the level of a true star, though they are valuable contributors.
The guys you could argue for breaking out of that good-not-great section include Kluber and the younger guys on the list: Marte, Teheran, and Archer. These guys might have a bit more upside than average, but they also come with additional risk; Marte’s offensive profile provides a lot of seasonal variability, while the other three are pitchers. Kluber’s also 350 innings into his big league career and has a .332 BABIP, so his trade value probably doesn’t quite match his FIP-based WAR value. If you were going to pick a guy from this section who could be significantly higher next year, Kluber would probably be the best bet, but he’s also a pitcher and I probably would have said the same thing about Shelby Miller a year ago.
On the other end of the scale is Encarnacion, who basically has no “upside” remaining, and would be a short-term only play. However, because of the extremely friendly contract he signed with Toronto during his breakout season, he’d also be one of the cheapest sources of elite offense around, and given how much teams covet right-handed power these days, you can bet there would be a long line of suitors lining up for Encarnacion’s services, even given his limited defensive value and the fact that he’s on the wrong side of 30.
Speaking of defensive value, we have to talk about the two catchers on the list. You’ll note that Gomes is projected as a better player than Mesoraco and has already signed a below-market extension with the Indians, and he’s the same age, but is still ranked a few spots lower. This reflects the current reality that baseball teams simply pay for more offense than they do for defense, and players who accumulate their value with their bats are going to command a larger premium than those whose value is tied to what they do in the field.
Personally, I think I’d probably take Gomes over Mesoraco, given just how cheap his extension is and the extra years of team control. But keep in mind that the option years that the Indians hold on Gomes cover ages 32 and 33, and it isn’t any kind of guarantee that he’ll still be a productive player at that point. The difference in years of useful control may be less than what the chart makes it out to be, and while Gomes is certainly going to be cheaper, teams may be more willing to pay a slight premium to get the value from offense instead of defense.
The other positive in Mesoraco’s favor also applies to both Seager and Cobb. The biggest knocks against them are the the fact that all three are headed for arbitration without long-term extensions in place, and are only under control for three more years after this season. However, in each case, the arbitration awards are unlikely to match the player’s expected value, because they haven’t achieved the kinds of milestones that return big arbitration paydays yet.
Seager’s value comes from doing a lot of things fairly well, but he’s not great at anything. He’s a career .263 hitter, he’s never hit more than 22 home runs in a season, he doesn’t steal bases, and he won’t win a gold glove. The case for Seager is built on hitting well in a tough pitcher’s park, but that’s not the kind of argument that is going to win over a panel of casual fans who don’t know what park factors are.
The same is true for Cobb. He’s shown flashes of brilliance, but he’s never thrown more than 150 innings in a season and he has a career record of 29-20. The peripherals suggest that he’s a high quality arm, but the arbiters aren’t going to see his track record as being worthy of big dollars. With players like this, a long-term contract isn’t actually that beneficial, because the arbitration system itself will keep the player’s salaries in check without forcing the team to take on the risk of a multi-year commitment.
Teheran and Archer are on the other end of the spectrum. Their traditional stats are more impressive than their analytic numbers, and might not have appeared on the list had their teams been forced into the arbitration process. However, both pitchers signed deals that will keep their salaries to a minimum, and secure significant upside for the team even if they continue to outperform their peripherals.
And finally, we get the guy who doesn’t really fit any of the larger categories of his fellow players on this list. Michael Brantley was a very difficult player for me to rank, and I’ll readily admit that there’s a good case for him to be both 20 spots and 20 spots lower. His ranking here reflects essentially one half of a great season, and he’s never done anything remotely close to this before. His value is tied up primarily in making contact and running the bases, which teams usually don’t pay for, especially if it comes at a corner position. Neither ZIPS nor Steamer think this is a real breakout that is likely to continue, projecting him as closer to an average player than a star going forward.
That said, it isn’t unheard of for players to develop some power later in their careers, and Brantley was basically just a power boost away from becoming a good player. If he sustains even part of this increase in home runs, he looks like a three win player in his prime signed to a contract that will pay him a grand total of $19 million over the next three years. If the breakout is real, then the Indians can pick up an option for a fourth year at $11 million; if it’s not, they don’t have to. The risk here is minimal, and there is some legitimate upside if this is more legitimate improvement than good first half.
I don’t know which way Brantley will go. If the projections are right, he probably won’t be on the list again next year, but the chance that he’s going to keep enough of this up to be a very good hitter signed for basically no money gets him on the list this year.
Tomorrow, we’ll do the next 10, and we’ll start to analyze some much higher risk/reward imbalances.
2014 Trade Value: #40 – #31.
Welcome to the second part of this year’s Trade Value series. If you haven’t already, read the intro and get yourself acquainted with what question this is trying to answer, as well as an incomplete list of guys who missed the cut for one reason or another. And then read the first ten entries on the list from yesterday.
There will be a couple of formatting changes this year. Instead of doing two posts per day, with five players in each post, I’m consolidating those posts into one longer list per day. Additionally, instead of having a player listed and then some paragraphs about his ranking, I’m going to list all ten players in a table at the top of the post, and then write about all ten in more of an article style than a selection of blurbs. Having all of the names available in a single table makes for easier comparison of some relevant facts, and in past years, the player capsules started to feel pretty repetitive by the end. Hopefully, this cuts down on some of the redundant text. We’ll find out, I guess.
A few quick notes on the columns in the table. After the normal biographical information, I’ve listed Projected WAR, which is essentially a combination of ZIPS and Steamer’s current rest-of-season forecasts extrapolated out to a full-season’s worth of playing time. For non-catcher position players, this is 600 plate appearances; catchers are extrapolated to 450 PAs. For pitchers, this is extrapolated to 200 innings. It is not their 2014 WAR, or their last calendar year WAR; it is a rough estimate of what we might expect them to do over a full-season, based on the information we have now.
The two columns to the right of that give you an idea of the player’s contract status. “Controlled Through” includes all years before a player accumulates enough time to be eligible for free agency, all guaranteed years of a contract already signed, and any years covered by team options that could be exercised in the future. Player options and mutual options are not included, as the assumption is that players of this caliber will generally opt-out of their current contracts if given the chance.
The “Contract Dollars” column includes the base salaries of each player in the controlled years going forward, starting from 2015 — the 40% of 2014 salary remaining is not included in the calculation — including the value of team options, since we’re assuming that they will be picked up. In many cases, players have incentives for various accomplishments that affect the base salaries, but those are not accounted for here, simply because of the tedious work of calculating all those incentive prices and the fact that $100,000 for an All-Star appearance or $500,000 for an MVP-finish there aren’t going to change the overall calculations. This column is not an exact representation of their future earnings, but should be close enough for our purposes.
For players who are under team control but not under guaranteed contract, I’ve listed out which arbitration years they still have remaining. There are a few players who have both guaranteed contracts and arbitration eligibility remaining, but we’ll deal with those cases in the article when a simple line in the chart doesn’t explain their situation perfectly.
Finally, “Last Year” notes where a player was ranked on this list last year, or if he wasn’t on the 2013 Trade Value series, then he is denoted as unranked. As you can imagine, there’s a lot more turnover at the end of the list than the beginning.
Alright, enough fooling around; let’s get to the list. For reference, I’m going to include the entire list up to this point.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Contract Dollars Last Year
50 Yan Gomes 26 CLE C 3.4 2021 $40,950,000 Unranked
49 Starling Marte 25 PIT OF 3.0 2021 $52,500,000 31
48 Kyle Seager 26 SEA 3B 3.4 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
47 Alex Cobb 26 TB SP 3.1 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
46 Edwin Encarnacion 31 TOR DH 3.7 2016 $20,000,000 45
45 Julio Teheran 23 ATL SP 2.3 2020 $41,600,000 Unranked
44 Chris Archer 25 TB SP 2.4 2021 $42,250,000 Unranked
43 Devin Mesoraco 26 CIN C 3.0 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
42 Corey Kluber 28 CLE SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
41 Michael Brantley 27 CLE OF 2.6 2018 $30,000,000 Unranked
40 David Wright 31 NYM 3B 4.1 2020 $107,000,000 21
39 Dustin Pedroia 30 BOS 2B 4.2 2021 $107,500,000 25
38 Byron Buxton 20 MIN OF 1.2 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 28
37 Jose Quintana 25 CHW SP 3.3 2020 $40,650,000 Unranked
36 Billy Hamilton 23 CIN OF 2.7 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
35 Matt Carpenter 28 STL 3B 3.9 2020 $66,000,000 Unranked
34 Jose Fernandez 21 MIA SP 4.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 17
33 Carlos Gomez 28 MIL OF 4.8 2016 $17,000,000 33
32 Yordano Ventura 23 KC SP 2.8 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
31 Sonny Gray 24 OAK SP 3.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
Yesterday, I noted that the average age for the last ten in was 26 and their average forecast WAR was just a tick over 3.0, noting that it was a group of guys already close to their prime who probably weren’t going to become franchise cornerstones. This group is entirely different. Even though it includes both Wright and Pedroia, the average age is a full year younger. Even though it includes a not-ready-for-MLB Byron Buxton, the average forecast WAR is 3.5. This is a group of players who either have top-line potential, or have recently been elite MLB performers.
Let’s start with the two guys who probably have peaked as MLB players, and whose value comes from attempting to remain where they are for as long as possible. Wright and Pedroia both took hometown discounts to re-sign with their current organizations, and while both are having disappointing 2014 seasons, they’re significantly underpaid relative to other +4 WAR players in the game. Even though these contracts carry well into the decline phase of each player’s career, there is substantial short-term value in acquiring star-level players at highly discounted rates, and the costs at the end of the deal are not so high as to offset that value.
One could make an argument that Matt Carpenter is in a similar stage, even though he’s a couple of years younger than both Wright and Pedroia. Even with the move back to third base and some expected offensive regression, Carpenter is still a very valuable player, though the lack of power limits his upside to some degree. It’s unlikely Carpenter is going to develop much more power at this point, so for him, the question is how long he can maintain elite line drive rates and avoid weak contact; his seven career infield flies is Votto-esque, and one of the reasons why he has a career .346 BABIP.
It’s a bit of a unique skillset, and not one that teams traditionally pay as much for as they do for power or speed, but Carpenter has 1,500 plate appearances and a 132 wRC+ in the big leagues. Given the lack of offense in the game and the guaranteed minimal salaries he will earn over the length of his deal, there would be significant interest in Carpenter’s services if the Cardinals put him on the block.
But maybe not as much as if the Brewers put Carlos Gomez on the block. Gomez is this section’s Edwin Encarnacion; a player with only two years left on his contract, but a present value/low salary combination that is ridiculously slanted in the team’s favor, and makes up for the lack of years of team control. Since making the transition into a legitimate power hitter, Gomez has blossomed into a true superstar. He’s not going to repeat last year’s UZR-driven +7.5 WAR season, but he’s on pace for a +6 WAR season that might be seen as even more reliable, given that it is being compiled on the back of a 145 wRC+ instead of a +25 UZR.
Realistically, Gomez is worth something in the neighborhood of $30 to $35 million per season right now; he will make $8 million next year and $9 million the year after. He’s unlikely to accept another team-friendly extension after giving away three free agent years right before he turned into a superstar, so any acquiring team would have to look at this as a two year rental before a market price correction kicked in, but those are two absurdly valuable seasons.
Beyond Pedroia, Wright, Carpenter, and Gomez, though, the rest of the players on this section of the list are brimming with future value. Buxton was widely viewed as the best prospect in baseball before the season, drawing (unrealistic) comparisons to Mike Trout based on his overall package of tools. 2014 has been a lost season to date, but those tools are still there, and scouts are still convinced that Buxton has the ability to eventually become a legitimate superstar. He offers little in the way of short-term value, and probably won’t be big league ready for a few years, but for teams with the patience to wait, the payoff could be dramatic.
But perhaps the biggest upside play here is already a big leaguer. Before his elbow exploded, Jose Fernandez was making a legitimate run at Clayton Kershaw‘s title for best pitcher in baseball, and even if he’s out for all of the 2015 season as well, he’d still be looking at a full recovery for 2016 as a 23 year old.
Yes, he’ll have burned through all of his pre-arbitration years by that point, but the injury is also going to limit his earnings in arbitration, so any team paying for Fernandez’s rehab would get Fernandez’s age-23 through age-25 seasons at highly discounted rates. Given the success rates of Tommy John surgery and Fernandez’s ridiculous performances before the injury, the lack of value for the next 18 months wouldn’t dissuade teams from aggressively pursuing his long-term value.
Of course, if a team didn’t want to wait for 2016 to upgrade their rotation, you could do a lot worse than choosing between Quintana, Ventura, and Gray. In his third year in the big leagues, Quintana is the seasoned veteran of the three, but has quietly developed into one of the best young starting pitchers in the game today. And because the White Sox had the foresight to sign him to a long-term deal before last season, he’ll make a grand total of $20 million over the next four years, and then the White Sox hold a pair of $10 million options if he stays healthy and keeps pitching well.
Ventura and Gray haven’t signed long-term deals yet, but since both are in their first full seasons in the majors, each have five more years of team-control, including a pair of pre-arbitration seasons that will see them make something close to the league minimum. Gray and Ventura rank a bit higher than Quintana mostly for upside reasons, but you really can’t go wrong with any of the three. These are three of the most valuable young arms in baseball, and they only rank this low because pitchers break.
That leaves us with just one player left to discuss, and the guy who doesn’t fit into any other mold. Billy Hamilton is his own guy, a legitimately unique player whose value is exceedingly difficult to narrow down. On the one hand, I still know a lot of smart people in the game who don’t think Hamilton is going to sustain enough offense to be more than steals-and-defense specialist. On the other hand, Hamilton already has 30 extra base hits this year, and the Ben Revere comparisons look outdated at this point.
Here’s what we’re pretty sure we know; Hamilton is among the game’s most valuable baserunners, and his defense in center field has been even better than the most optimistic forecast. If Hamilton maxes out as an average hitter in the big leagues, then he’s Jacoby Ellsbury with perhaps even better defense. But Hamilton’s already exceeding expectations at the plate, and has a career 107 wRC+ in 381 big league plate appearances. His Triple-A performance remains worrisome and can’t just be discarded, but Hamilton’s base from which to grow as a hitter appears higher than he was given credit for.
Hamilton’s probably never going to be a good hitter, but the surprising power has put away any thought that he might not play as an everyday regular. Now, the question is more of how much higher he can go from here. If he sustains offensive performance even close to where he’s at now, then he’s a legitimate star in the making.
There will be a couple of formatting changes this year. Instead of doing two posts per day, with five players in each post, I’m consolidating those posts into one longer list per day. Additionally, instead of having a player listed and then some paragraphs about his ranking, I’m going to list all ten players in a table at the top of the post, and then write about all ten in more of an article style than a selection of blurbs. Having all of the names available in a single table makes for easier comparison of some relevant facts, and in past years, the player capsules started to feel pretty repetitive by the end. Hopefully, this cuts down on some of the redundant text. We’ll find out, I guess.
A few quick notes on the columns in the table. After the normal biographical information, I’ve listed Projected WAR, which is essentially a combination of ZIPS and Steamer’s current rest-of-season forecasts extrapolated out to a full-season’s worth of playing time. For non-catcher position players, this is 600 plate appearances; catchers are extrapolated to 450 PAs. For pitchers, this is extrapolated to 200 innings. It is not their 2014 WAR, or their last calendar year WAR; it is a rough estimate of what we might expect them to do over a full-season, based on the information we have now.
The two columns to the right of that give you an idea of the player’s contract status. “Controlled Through” includes all years before a player accumulates enough time to be eligible for free agency, all guaranteed years of a contract already signed, and any years covered by team options that could be exercised in the future. Player options and mutual options are not included, as the assumption is that players of this caliber will generally opt-out of their current contracts if given the chance.
The “Contract Dollars” column includes the base salaries of each player in the controlled years going forward, starting from 2015 — the 40% of 2014 salary remaining is not included in the calculation — including the value of team options, since we’re assuming that they will be picked up. In many cases, players have incentives for various accomplishments that affect the base salaries, but those are not accounted for here, simply because of the tedious work of calculating all those incentive prices and the fact that $100,000 for an All-Star appearance or $500,000 for an MVP-finish there aren’t going to change the overall calculations. This column is not an exact representation of their future earnings, but should be close enough for our purposes.
For players who are under team control but not under guaranteed contract, I’ve listed out which arbitration years they still have remaining. There are a few players who have both guaranteed contracts and arbitration eligibility remaining, but we’ll deal with those cases in the article when a simple line in the chart doesn’t explain their situation perfectly.
Finally, “Last Year” notes where a player was ranked on this list last year, or if he wasn’t on the 2013 Trade Value series, then he is denoted as unranked. As you can imagine, there’s a lot more turnover at the end of the list than the beginning.
Alright, enough fooling around; let’s get to the list. For reference, I’m going to include the entire list up to this point.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Contract Dollars Last Year
50 Yan Gomes 26 CLE C 3.4 2021 $40,950,000 Unranked
49 Starling Marte 25 PIT OF 3.0 2021 $52,500,000 31
48 Kyle Seager 26 SEA 3B 3.4 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
47 Alex Cobb 26 TB SP 3.1 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
46 Edwin Encarnacion 31 TOR DH 3.7 2016 $20,000,000 45
45 Julio Teheran 23 ATL SP 2.3 2020 $41,600,000 Unranked
44 Chris Archer 25 TB SP 2.4 2021 $42,250,000 Unranked
43 Devin Mesoraco 26 CIN C 3.0 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
42 Corey Kluber 28 CLE SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
41 Michael Brantley 27 CLE OF 2.6 2018 $30,000,000 Unranked
40 David Wright 31 NYM 3B 4.1 2020 $107,000,000 21
39 Dustin Pedroia 30 BOS 2B 4.2 2021 $107,500,000 25
38 Byron Buxton 20 MIN OF 1.2 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 28
37 Jose Quintana 25 CHW SP 3.3 2020 $40,650,000 Unranked
36 Billy Hamilton 23 CIN OF 2.7 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
35 Matt Carpenter 28 STL 3B 3.9 2020 $66,000,000 Unranked
34 Jose Fernandez 21 MIA SP 4.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 17
33 Carlos Gomez 28 MIL OF 4.8 2016 $17,000,000 33
32 Yordano Ventura 23 KC SP 2.8 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
31 Sonny Gray 24 OAK SP 3.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
Yesterday, I noted that the average age for the last ten in was 26 and their average forecast WAR was just a tick over 3.0, noting that it was a group of guys already close to their prime who probably weren’t going to become franchise cornerstones. This group is entirely different. Even though it includes both Wright and Pedroia, the average age is a full year younger. Even though it includes a not-ready-for-MLB Byron Buxton, the average forecast WAR is 3.5. This is a group of players who either have top-line potential, or have recently been elite MLB performers.
Let’s start with the two guys who probably have peaked as MLB players, and whose value comes from attempting to remain where they are for as long as possible. Wright and Pedroia both took hometown discounts to re-sign with their current organizations, and while both are having disappointing 2014 seasons, they’re significantly underpaid relative to other +4 WAR players in the game. Even though these contracts carry well into the decline phase of each player’s career, there is substantial short-term value in acquiring star-level players at highly discounted rates, and the costs at the end of the deal are not so high as to offset that value.
One could make an argument that Matt Carpenter is in a similar stage, even though he’s a couple of years younger than both Wright and Pedroia. Even with the move back to third base and some expected offensive regression, Carpenter is still a very valuable player, though the lack of power limits his upside to some degree. It’s unlikely Carpenter is going to develop much more power at this point, so for him, the question is how long he can maintain elite line drive rates and avoid weak contact; his seven career infield flies is Votto-esque, and one of the reasons why he has a career .346 BABIP.
It’s a bit of a unique skillset, and not one that teams traditionally pay as much for as they do for power or speed, but Carpenter has 1,500 plate appearances and a 132 wRC+ in the big leagues. Given the lack of offense in the game and the guaranteed minimal salaries he will earn over the length of his deal, there would be significant interest in Carpenter’s services if the Cardinals put him on the block.
But maybe not as much as if the Brewers put Carlos Gomez on the block. Gomez is this section’s Edwin Encarnacion; a player with only two years left on his contract, but a present value/low salary combination that is ridiculously slanted in the team’s favor, and makes up for the lack of years of team control. Since making the transition into a legitimate power hitter, Gomez has blossomed into a true superstar. He’s not going to repeat last year’s UZR-driven +7.5 WAR season, but he’s on pace for a +6 WAR season that might be seen as even more reliable, given that it is being compiled on the back of a 145 wRC+ instead of a +25 UZR.
Realistically, Gomez is worth something in the neighborhood of $30 to $35 million per season right now; he will make $8 million next year and $9 million the year after. He’s unlikely to accept another team-friendly extension after giving away three free agent years right before he turned into a superstar, so any acquiring team would have to look at this as a two year rental before a market price correction kicked in, but those are two absurdly valuable seasons.
Beyond Pedroia, Wright, Carpenter, and Gomez, though, the rest of the players on this section of the list are brimming with future value. Buxton was widely viewed as the best prospect in baseball before the season, drawing (unrealistic) comparisons to Mike Trout based on his overall package of tools. 2014 has been a lost season to date, but those tools are still there, and scouts are still convinced that Buxton has the ability to eventually become a legitimate superstar. He offers little in the way of short-term value, and probably won’t be big league ready for a few years, but for teams with the patience to wait, the payoff could be dramatic.
But perhaps the biggest upside play here is already a big leaguer. Before his elbow exploded, Jose Fernandez was making a legitimate run at Clayton Kershaw‘s title for best pitcher in baseball, and even if he’s out for all of the 2015 season as well, he’d still be looking at a full recovery for 2016 as a 23 year old.
Yes, he’ll have burned through all of his pre-arbitration years by that point, but the injury is also going to limit his earnings in arbitration, so any team paying for Fernandez’s rehab would get Fernandez’s age-23 through age-25 seasons at highly discounted rates. Given the success rates of Tommy John surgery and Fernandez’s ridiculous performances before the injury, the lack of value for the next 18 months wouldn’t dissuade teams from aggressively pursuing his long-term value.
Of course, if a team didn’t want to wait for 2016 to upgrade their rotation, you could do a lot worse than choosing between Quintana, Ventura, and Gray. In his third year in the big leagues, Quintana is the seasoned veteran of the three, but has quietly developed into one of the best young starting pitchers in the game today. And because the White Sox had the foresight to sign him to a long-term deal before last season, he’ll make a grand total of $20 million over the next four years, and then the White Sox hold a pair of $10 million options if he stays healthy and keeps pitching well.
Ventura and Gray haven’t signed long-term deals yet, but since both are in their first full seasons in the majors, each have five more years of team-control, including a pair of pre-arbitration seasons that will see them make something close to the league minimum. Gray and Ventura rank a bit higher than Quintana mostly for upside reasons, but you really can’t go wrong with any of the three. These are three of the most valuable young arms in baseball, and they only rank this low because pitchers break.
That leaves us with just one player left to discuss, and the guy who doesn’t fit into any other mold. Billy Hamilton is his own guy, a legitimately unique player whose value is exceedingly difficult to narrow down. On the one hand, I still know a lot of smart people in the game who don’t think Hamilton is going to sustain enough offense to be more than steals-and-defense specialist. On the other hand, Hamilton already has 30 extra base hits this year, and the Ben Revere comparisons look outdated at this point.
Here’s what we’re pretty sure we know; Hamilton is among the game’s most valuable baserunners, and his defense in center field has been even better than the most optimistic forecast. If Hamilton maxes out as an average hitter in the big leagues, then he’s Jacoby Ellsbury with perhaps even better defense. But Hamilton’s already exceeding expectations at the plate, and has a career 107 wRC+ in 381 big league plate appearances. His Triple-A performance remains worrisome and can’t just be discarded, but Hamilton’s base from which to grow as a hitter appears higher than he was given credit for.
Hamilton’s probably never going to be a good hitter, but the surprising power has put away any thought that he might not play as an everyday regular. Now, the question is more of how much higher he can go from here. If he sustains offensive performance even close to where he’s at now, then he’s a legitimate star in the making.
2014 Trade Value: #30 – #21.
Welcome to the third part of this year’s Trade Value series. If you haven’t already, read the intro and get yourself acquainted with what question this is trying to answer, as well as an incomplete list of guys who missed the cut for one reason or another. You can see all the posts in the series here.
Due to popular demand — or maybe unpopular outrage? — this post and the next two will revert back to the prior year’s format of listing each player individually, with a blurb beneath them, rather than the article format that I experimented with in the first two posts. The mob has spoken.
A few quick notes on the columns listed for each player. After the normal biographical information, I’ve listed Projected WAR, which is essentially a combination of ZIPS and Steamer’s current rest-of-season forecasts extrapolated out to a full-season’s worth of playing time. For non-catcher position players, this is 600 plate appearances; catchers are extrapolated to 450 PAs. For pitchers, this is extrapolated to 200 innings. It is not their 2014 WAR, or their last calendar year WAR; it is a rough estimate of what we might expect them to do over a full-season, based on the information we have now.
For contract status, we have two pieces of information. “Controlled Through” includes all years before a player accumulates enough time to be eligible for free agency, all guaranteed years of a contract already signed, and any years covered by team options that could be exercised in the future. Player options and mutual options are not included, as the assumption is that players of this caliber will generally opt-out of their current contracts if given the chance.
The “Contract Dollars” column includes the base salaries of each player in the controlled years going forward, starting from 2015 — the 40% of 2014 salary remaining is not included in the calculation — including the value of team options, since we’re assuming that they will be picked up. In many cases, players have incentives for various accomplishments that affect the base salaries, but those are not accounted for here, simply because of the tedious work of calculating all those incentive prices and the fact that $100,000 for an All-Star appearance or $500,000 for an MVP-finish there aren’t going to change the overall calculations. This column is not an exact representation of their future earnings, but should be close enough for our purposes.
For players who are under team control but not under guaranteed contract, I’ve listed out which arbitration years they still have remaining. There are a few players who have both guaranteed contracts and arbitration eligibility remaining, but we’ll deal with those cases in the article when a simple line in the chart doesn’t explain their situation perfectly.
Finally, “Last Year” notes where a player was ranked on this list last year, or if he wasn’t on the 2013 Trade Value series, then he is denoted as unranked. As you can imagine, there’s a lot more turnover at the end of the list than the beginning.
Now, for the middle section of the list.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
30 Gregory Polanco 22 PIT OF 1.5 2020 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
Polanco is the kind of player that every team covets; a useful contributor in the big leagues right now with enough upside to dream on what he could become in a few years. The mix of short-term and long-term value, combined with three and a half years of something close to league minimum salaries, make Polanco the kind of player that would generate trade interest from every single team in baseball.
It has to be noted, though, that Polanco’s short-term value was probably overstated in the backlash against the Pirates decision to leave him in the minors in order to avoid Super Two status. His power is still more projection than present day reality, and a 73% contact rate is not a great number for a guy who isn’t crushing the ball when he does make contact. History is littered with busted prospects who were supposed to hit for power and never did, and so while Polanco’s overall promise is enticing, he does come with a substantial amount of risk.
Of course, Polanco was crushing the ball in Triple-A, and he’s young enough that even holding his own at the big league level is an accomplishment. With a few more years of development, he should turn into one of the game’s best outfielders. He’s just not quite there yet, which is why he’s hanging out in the same range as the other prospects on the list, even though he’s technically not a prospect anymore.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
29 Kris Bryant 22 CHC 3B 2.8 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
Speaking of prospects that belong in the big leagues, meet Kris Bryant. While we don’t have official rest of season forecasts for Bryant on the site, since he’s not an active member of the Cubs depth chart, Dan Szymborski and Jared Cross were kind enough to run his updated forecast for me, and both systems think Bryant would be a quality big leaguer tomorrow. That probably shouldn’t be a surprise, given that Bryant is a polished college hitter whose 179 wRC+ in Triple-A is the lowest mark he’s posted at any stop on the minor league ladder. You can quibble with the strikeouts and wonder what his eventual position will be, but right-handed power like this doesn’t come around very often, and Bryant’s bat is probably ready for the big leagues right now.
For service time reasons, it makes sense for the Cubs to hold Bryant down until next May, at which point they would also control his 2021 season, so don’t expect Bryant in Chicago before then. But if he was on a team looking to maximize their win total in 2014, he’d probably already be in the big leagues, and the forecasts think he’d do just fine. Like Polanco, every team in baseball would bid on Bryant’s services, and the scarcity of power would likely drive the price up beyond reason.
Even if he tops out as Troy Glaus — a comparison I’ve heard more than once — Bryant has a lot of value, and there’s certainly room for a career beyond what Glaus did. Bryant might not be a big leaguer yet, but teams would pay a big league price to get him.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
28 Andrelton Simmons 24 ATL SS 3.8 2020 $56,000,000 Unranked
In some ways, 2014 looks to be a step backwards for Simmons, as his power numbers have declined and his defensive metrics have returned to the realm of actual human beings. But just as it wasn’t worth overreacting to last year’s second half performance — where he posted a 118 wRC+ and was one of the most valuable players in baseball — it’s also not worth overreacting to a half season where he’s been worth only” +1.8 WAR. Over the last calendar year, Simmons has been a +4.6 WAR player, and his profile is pretty well establised now; average-ish bat with elite defense.
And even as just a +15 defender at shortstop, instead of a +25 defender like he was rated last year, Simmons still projects as a nearly +4 WAR player going forward. Yes, teams will pay more for offense than defense, but they don’t ignore defense entirely, especially not at up-the-middle positions. And the $56 million remaining on the six years left of Simmons’ contract is a fraction of what he would make on the open market. The Braves were wise to lock him up through his prime years, and while he’ll probably always be a defensive specialist who won’t kill you at the plate, he’s still a highly valuable player.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
27 Jose Bautista 33 TOR OF 4.8 2016 $28,000,000 35
In the first section, we had Edwin Encarnacion. Last section, we had Carlos Gomez. This section’s two-cheap-years-of-a-star player is Jose Bautista, who has evolved to remain an elite hitter even as his power has begun to wane over the last few seasons. His breakout years were driven by ISOs over .300, but his current .210 mark is closer to his pre-breakout norms, and yet, he’s still running a 151 wRC+. As the league has shifted more and more towards strikeouts, Bautista has moved away from them. His K% by year, since the breakout: 17%, 17%, 16%, 16%, 15%.
Even without 50 home run power anymore, Bautista remains a dominant offensive force, and he’s not a defensive liability either. As a +5 WAR player making $14 million per year, Bautista is near the top of the list in terms of short-term value. His age and the fact that he’s only got two years left on his deal limit the long-term upside, but there’s enough short-term value for it to not matter too much.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
26 Stephen Strasburg 25 WAS SP 4.4 2016 Arb2 – Arb3 14
Like Bautista, Gomez, and Encarnacion, Strasburg is also only under control for two more seasons after this one. And one could reasonably argue that both Bautista and Gomez are better players today than Strasburg is, as his results continue to not match his underlying peripherals. But as an arbitration eligible player, that isn’t necessarily the worst thing in the world for his trade value.
Strasburg’s 7-6 record and 3.46 ERA aren’t going to form a foundation for a monstrous raise in arbitration, even if the analytical numbers suggest that his results should improve going forward. Even with a strong finish, Strasburg is probably looking at no more than a $4 million raise this winter, which would put him line for about $20 million in salary before he hits free agency. And unlike many other front-line starters, there is no long-term exposure in case of an injury. Fewer years of team control are simply not the same deterrent to trade value for a pitcher as they are to a hitter.
And, of course, guys with this kind of stuff don’t hit the market too often. Strasburg continues to show that he has the makings of a legitimate #1 starter, even if he might not be that quite yet. As the Jeff Samardzija trade shows, teams are certainly willing to pay a premium for short-term pitching upgrades, and Strasburg is a good step ahead of Samardzija in both present and future value. The Nationals aren’t going to make him available, but if they ever choose to, they’ll get a monstrous return.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
25 Matt Harvey 25 NYM SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 7
This is the Jose Fernandez case, only with the timetable moved forward a year. The recovery rates on Tommy John surgery are encouraging enough to think that Harvey could easily be an elite hurler again next year, at which point he will still be making something close to the league minimum, and have three arbitration years remaining after that.
There is certainly a risk component here, and some teams would likely prefer safer bets like Bryant, or even maybe one of the healthy-but-not-quite-as-good hurlers from the previous section on the list. The appeal here might not be as broad, but the potential of acquiring four cheap years of a starter who was as good as anyone when healthy would be very appealing to teams looking for a cost-controlled ace. Value is a balance of risk and reward, and while Harvey certainly comes with plenty of risk, the reward is extraordinarily high as well.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
24 Freddie Freeman 24 ATL 1B 3.7 2021 $123,500,000 Unranked
Freeman’s 2013 breakout has carried right on over into 2014, and he has firmly cemented himself as one of the game’s best young hitters. Given that he’s coming up on 2,500 career plate appearances, it’s easy to remember that he’s still just 24 years old; he’s only a week older than George Springer, for instance. If he develops more power as he grows towards his physical peak, Freeman could easily turn into a legitimate MVP candidate.
Of course, unlike some other young stars, Freeman is no longer all that cheap. While the Braves were wise to lock him up while they still could, the price to keep him in Atlanta was $135 million over eight years, and 2014 was the cheapest of those years. Going forward, Freeman’s salary will average nearly $17 million per season. That’s still a bargain compared to what he produces on the field, of course, but he’s not running ridiculously deflated salaries that allow every team in baseball to fit him into their payroll. But for teams that have room for a $120 million in future commitments, Freeman is one of the safest bets in the game, and given his age, he has plenty of upside remaining.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
23 Xander Bogaerts 21 BOS SS 2.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 29
Speaking of upside, Bogaerts is the highest ranked player on this year’s list that isn’t already a star. In fact, to date, Bogaerts has been close to replacement level, and his extended slump of late has even created questions about whether or not he should head back to Triple-A for a little more polish. However, the most relevant number here is age; Bogaerts is still only 21, and plenty of superstars were ineffective big leaguers at this same stage in their career. It is way too early to be jumping off the Xander Bogaerts bandwagon just yet.
Like with Polanco, the primary variable here is the power development. Without the ability to drive the ball, the rest of the package is more interesting than valuable, but the power should come, and Bogaerts could take a big leap forward when it does. While he’s likely going to be a guy who always profiles better at third base because of his height, he’s shown that he can play shortstop at least in the near term, and there are few shortstops in baseball with his offensive upside.
He’s not there yet, but the upside is just too high to ignore. Give it time. Bogaerts will likely justify the hype and then some.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
22 Yadier Molina 31 STL C 4.5 2017 $43,000,000 11
Molina was a tricky guy to rank this year, because as an aging catcher, he’s a short-term value play, but his 2014 value almost entirely disappeared when he hit the disabled list last week. A team trading for Yadier Molina right wouldn’t be that different from a team trading for Matt Harvey or Kris Bryant right now, and both offer significantly more long-term upside.
But Molina is so good that I simply can’t see teams passing up the chance to acquire him, even with his 2014 injury factored in. There are still plenty of parts of catcher defense that we’re not capturing in the current WAR calculations, and Molina seems to excel at almost all of them; his overall value is likely higher than even the +4.5 WAR estimate suggests. He is legitimately one of the game’s very best players.
Of course, he’ll be 32 next year, and the three remaining years on his contract cover seasons where catchers are typically not that productive. There is real risk here, but Molina would likely be just as coveted as the similarly-aging Jose Bautista, only he’s under control for an extra year as well. It would be a niche market, given his lack of 2014 value and long-term value to a rebuilding club, but for teams looking for a catching upgrade over the next few years, Molina would be manna from heaven.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
21 Buster Posey 27 SF C 4.9 2022 $165,500,000 6
Posey is an interesting case, because as I noted in the recap of last year’s list, Posey has been a pretty average player over the last calendar year. Sure, some of that is just a drop in BABIP that probably isn’t real, but there’s a decrease in power and a drop in walks that are a little more concerning, and we’re coming up on the point at which it isn’t that small of a sample anymore.
But the track record is still very strong, and Posey is still just 27, so even with a down performance of late, history suggests betting on a rebound. He probably hasn’t forgotten how to hit right as he enters his prime. However, a lot of Posey’s value is tied to being a great hitting catcher, and he’s not likely to stay behind the plate for the remainder of his contract. There’s a lot of present value here, and the contract is certainly reasonable, but he probably doesn’t have as much long-term value as other players his age given the likelihood of a move to first base at some point in the future.
But for now, Posey’s a catcher, and likely still one of the best in the game. There are plenty of teams that would love to have their main concern be whether or not Posey will go back to being the game’s best hitting catcher, or just settle in as a very good one.
And now, because I think it still serves a purpose, here’s the entire published list to date.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
50 Yan Gomes 26 CLE C 3.4 2021 $40,950,000 Unranked
49 Starling Marte 25 PIT OF 3.0 2021 $52,500,000 31
48 Kyle Seager 26 SEA 3B 3.4 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
47 Alex Cobb 26 TB SP 3.1 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
46 Edwin Encarnacion 31 TOR DH 3.7 2016 $20,000,000 45
45 Julio Teheran 23 ATL SP 2.3 2020 $41,600,000 Unranked
44 Chris Archer 25 TB SP 2.4 2021 $42,250,000 Unranked
43 Devin Mesoraco 26 CIN C 3.0 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
42 Corey Kluber 28 CLE SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
41 Michael Brantley 27 CLE OF 2.6 2018 $30,000,000 Unranked
40 David Wright 31 NYM 3B 4.1 2020 $107,000,000 21
39 Dustin Pedroia 30 BOS 2B 4.2 2021 $107,500,000 25
38 Byron Buxton 20 MIN OF 1.2 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
37 Jose Quintana 25 CHW SP 3.3 2020 $40,650,000 Unranked
36 Billy Hamilton 23 CIN OF 2.7 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
35 Matt Carpenter 28 STL 3B 3.9 2020 $66,000,000 Unranked
34 Jose Fernandez 21 MIA SP 4.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 17
33 Carlos Gomez 28 MIL OF 4.8 2016 $17,000,000 33
32 Yordano Ventura 23 KC SP 2.8 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
31 Sonny Gray 24 OAK SP 3.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
30 Gregory Polanco 22 PIT OF 1.5 2020 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
29 Kris Bryant 22 CHC 3B 2.8 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
28 Andrelton Simmons 24 ATL SS 3.8 2020 $56,000,000 Unranked
27 Jose Bautista 33 TOR OF 4.8 2016 $28,000,000 35
26 Stephen Strasburg 25 WAS SP 4.4 2016 Arb2 – Arb3 14
25 Matt Harvey 25 NYM SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 7
24 Freddie Freeman 24 ATL 1B 3.7 2021 $123,500,000 Unranked
23 Xander Bogaerts 21 BOS SS 2.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 29
22 Yadier Molina 31 STL C 4.5 2017 $43,000,000 11
21 Buster Posey 27 SF C 4.9 2022 $165,500,000 6
Due to popular demand — or maybe unpopular outrage? — this post and the next two will revert back to the prior year’s format of listing each player individually, with a blurb beneath them, rather than the article format that I experimented with in the first two posts. The mob has spoken.
A few quick notes on the columns listed for each player. After the normal biographical information, I’ve listed Projected WAR, which is essentially a combination of ZIPS and Steamer’s current rest-of-season forecasts extrapolated out to a full-season’s worth of playing time. For non-catcher position players, this is 600 plate appearances; catchers are extrapolated to 450 PAs. For pitchers, this is extrapolated to 200 innings. It is not their 2014 WAR, or their last calendar year WAR; it is a rough estimate of what we might expect them to do over a full-season, based on the information we have now.
For contract status, we have two pieces of information. “Controlled Through” includes all years before a player accumulates enough time to be eligible for free agency, all guaranteed years of a contract already signed, and any years covered by team options that could be exercised in the future. Player options and mutual options are not included, as the assumption is that players of this caliber will generally opt-out of their current contracts if given the chance.
The “Contract Dollars” column includes the base salaries of each player in the controlled years going forward, starting from 2015 — the 40% of 2014 salary remaining is not included in the calculation — including the value of team options, since we’re assuming that they will be picked up. In many cases, players have incentives for various accomplishments that affect the base salaries, but those are not accounted for here, simply because of the tedious work of calculating all those incentive prices and the fact that $100,000 for an All-Star appearance or $500,000 for an MVP-finish there aren’t going to change the overall calculations. This column is not an exact representation of their future earnings, but should be close enough for our purposes.
For players who are under team control but not under guaranteed contract, I’ve listed out which arbitration years they still have remaining. There are a few players who have both guaranteed contracts and arbitration eligibility remaining, but we’ll deal with those cases in the article when a simple line in the chart doesn’t explain their situation perfectly.
Finally, “Last Year” notes where a player was ranked on this list last year, or if he wasn’t on the 2013 Trade Value series, then he is denoted as unranked. As you can imagine, there’s a lot more turnover at the end of the list than the beginning.
Now, for the middle section of the list.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
30 Gregory Polanco 22 PIT OF 1.5 2020 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
Polanco is the kind of player that every team covets; a useful contributor in the big leagues right now with enough upside to dream on what he could become in a few years. The mix of short-term and long-term value, combined with three and a half years of something close to league minimum salaries, make Polanco the kind of player that would generate trade interest from every single team in baseball.
It has to be noted, though, that Polanco’s short-term value was probably overstated in the backlash against the Pirates decision to leave him in the minors in order to avoid Super Two status. His power is still more projection than present day reality, and a 73% contact rate is not a great number for a guy who isn’t crushing the ball when he does make contact. History is littered with busted prospects who were supposed to hit for power and never did, and so while Polanco’s overall promise is enticing, he does come with a substantial amount of risk.
Of course, Polanco was crushing the ball in Triple-A, and he’s young enough that even holding his own at the big league level is an accomplishment. With a few more years of development, he should turn into one of the game’s best outfielders. He’s just not quite there yet, which is why he’s hanging out in the same range as the other prospects on the list, even though he’s technically not a prospect anymore.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
29 Kris Bryant 22 CHC 3B 2.8 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
Speaking of prospects that belong in the big leagues, meet Kris Bryant. While we don’t have official rest of season forecasts for Bryant on the site, since he’s not an active member of the Cubs depth chart, Dan Szymborski and Jared Cross were kind enough to run his updated forecast for me, and both systems think Bryant would be a quality big leaguer tomorrow. That probably shouldn’t be a surprise, given that Bryant is a polished college hitter whose 179 wRC+ in Triple-A is the lowest mark he’s posted at any stop on the minor league ladder. You can quibble with the strikeouts and wonder what his eventual position will be, but right-handed power like this doesn’t come around very often, and Bryant’s bat is probably ready for the big leagues right now.
For service time reasons, it makes sense for the Cubs to hold Bryant down until next May, at which point they would also control his 2021 season, so don’t expect Bryant in Chicago before then. But if he was on a team looking to maximize their win total in 2014, he’d probably already be in the big leagues, and the forecasts think he’d do just fine. Like Polanco, every team in baseball would bid on Bryant’s services, and the scarcity of power would likely drive the price up beyond reason.
Even if he tops out as Troy Glaus — a comparison I’ve heard more than once — Bryant has a lot of value, and there’s certainly room for a career beyond what Glaus did. Bryant might not be a big leaguer yet, but teams would pay a big league price to get him.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
28 Andrelton Simmons 24 ATL SS 3.8 2020 $56,000,000 Unranked
In some ways, 2014 looks to be a step backwards for Simmons, as his power numbers have declined and his defensive metrics have returned to the realm of actual human beings. But just as it wasn’t worth overreacting to last year’s second half performance — where he posted a 118 wRC+ and was one of the most valuable players in baseball — it’s also not worth overreacting to a half season where he’s been worth only” +1.8 WAR. Over the last calendar year, Simmons has been a +4.6 WAR player, and his profile is pretty well establised now; average-ish bat with elite defense.
And even as just a +15 defender at shortstop, instead of a +25 defender like he was rated last year, Simmons still projects as a nearly +4 WAR player going forward. Yes, teams will pay more for offense than defense, but they don’t ignore defense entirely, especially not at up-the-middle positions. And the $56 million remaining on the six years left of Simmons’ contract is a fraction of what he would make on the open market. The Braves were wise to lock him up through his prime years, and while he’ll probably always be a defensive specialist who won’t kill you at the plate, he’s still a highly valuable player.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
27 Jose Bautista 33 TOR OF 4.8 2016 $28,000,000 35
In the first section, we had Edwin Encarnacion. Last section, we had Carlos Gomez. This section’s two-cheap-years-of-a-star player is Jose Bautista, who has evolved to remain an elite hitter even as his power has begun to wane over the last few seasons. His breakout years were driven by ISOs over .300, but his current .210 mark is closer to his pre-breakout norms, and yet, he’s still running a 151 wRC+. As the league has shifted more and more towards strikeouts, Bautista has moved away from them. His K% by year, since the breakout: 17%, 17%, 16%, 16%, 15%.
Even without 50 home run power anymore, Bautista remains a dominant offensive force, and he’s not a defensive liability either. As a +5 WAR player making $14 million per year, Bautista is near the top of the list in terms of short-term value. His age and the fact that he’s only got two years left on his deal limit the long-term upside, but there’s enough short-term value for it to not matter too much.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
26 Stephen Strasburg 25 WAS SP 4.4 2016 Arb2 – Arb3 14
Like Bautista, Gomez, and Encarnacion, Strasburg is also only under control for two more seasons after this one. And one could reasonably argue that both Bautista and Gomez are better players today than Strasburg is, as his results continue to not match his underlying peripherals. But as an arbitration eligible player, that isn’t necessarily the worst thing in the world for his trade value.
Strasburg’s 7-6 record and 3.46 ERA aren’t going to form a foundation for a monstrous raise in arbitration, even if the analytical numbers suggest that his results should improve going forward. Even with a strong finish, Strasburg is probably looking at no more than a $4 million raise this winter, which would put him line for about $20 million in salary before he hits free agency. And unlike many other front-line starters, there is no long-term exposure in case of an injury. Fewer years of team control are simply not the same deterrent to trade value for a pitcher as they are to a hitter.
And, of course, guys with this kind of stuff don’t hit the market too often. Strasburg continues to show that he has the makings of a legitimate #1 starter, even if he might not be that quite yet. As the Jeff Samardzija trade shows, teams are certainly willing to pay a premium for short-term pitching upgrades, and Strasburg is a good step ahead of Samardzija in both present and future value. The Nationals aren’t going to make him available, but if they ever choose to, they’ll get a monstrous return.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
25 Matt Harvey 25 NYM SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 7
This is the Jose Fernandez case, only with the timetable moved forward a year. The recovery rates on Tommy John surgery are encouraging enough to think that Harvey could easily be an elite hurler again next year, at which point he will still be making something close to the league minimum, and have three arbitration years remaining after that.
There is certainly a risk component here, and some teams would likely prefer safer bets like Bryant, or even maybe one of the healthy-but-not-quite-as-good hurlers from the previous section on the list. The appeal here might not be as broad, but the potential of acquiring four cheap years of a starter who was as good as anyone when healthy would be very appealing to teams looking for a cost-controlled ace. Value is a balance of risk and reward, and while Harvey certainly comes with plenty of risk, the reward is extraordinarily high as well.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
24 Freddie Freeman 24 ATL 1B 3.7 2021 $123,500,000 Unranked
Freeman’s 2013 breakout has carried right on over into 2014, and he has firmly cemented himself as one of the game’s best young hitters. Given that he’s coming up on 2,500 career plate appearances, it’s easy to remember that he’s still just 24 years old; he’s only a week older than George Springer, for instance. If he develops more power as he grows towards his physical peak, Freeman could easily turn into a legitimate MVP candidate.
Of course, unlike some other young stars, Freeman is no longer all that cheap. While the Braves were wise to lock him up while they still could, the price to keep him in Atlanta was $135 million over eight years, and 2014 was the cheapest of those years. Going forward, Freeman’s salary will average nearly $17 million per season. That’s still a bargain compared to what he produces on the field, of course, but he’s not running ridiculously deflated salaries that allow every team in baseball to fit him into their payroll. But for teams that have room for a $120 million in future commitments, Freeman is one of the safest bets in the game, and given his age, he has plenty of upside remaining.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
23 Xander Bogaerts 21 BOS SS 2.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 29
Speaking of upside, Bogaerts is the highest ranked player on this year’s list that isn’t already a star. In fact, to date, Bogaerts has been close to replacement level, and his extended slump of late has even created questions about whether or not he should head back to Triple-A for a little more polish. However, the most relevant number here is age; Bogaerts is still only 21, and plenty of superstars were ineffective big leaguers at this same stage in their career. It is way too early to be jumping off the Xander Bogaerts bandwagon just yet.
Like with Polanco, the primary variable here is the power development. Without the ability to drive the ball, the rest of the package is more interesting than valuable, but the power should come, and Bogaerts could take a big leap forward when it does. While he’s likely going to be a guy who always profiles better at third base because of his height, he’s shown that he can play shortstop at least in the near term, and there are few shortstops in baseball with his offensive upside.
He’s not there yet, but the upside is just too high to ignore. Give it time. Bogaerts will likely justify the hype and then some.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
22 Yadier Molina 31 STL C 4.5 2017 $43,000,000 11
Molina was a tricky guy to rank this year, because as an aging catcher, he’s a short-term value play, but his 2014 value almost entirely disappeared when he hit the disabled list last week. A team trading for Yadier Molina right wouldn’t be that different from a team trading for Matt Harvey or Kris Bryant right now, and both offer significantly more long-term upside.
But Molina is so good that I simply can’t see teams passing up the chance to acquire him, even with his 2014 injury factored in. There are still plenty of parts of catcher defense that we’re not capturing in the current WAR calculations, and Molina seems to excel at almost all of them; his overall value is likely higher than even the +4.5 WAR estimate suggests. He is legitimately one of the game’s very best players.
Of course, he’ll be 32 next year, and the three remaining years on his contract cover seasons where catchers are typically not that productive. There is real risk here, but Molina would likely be just as coveted as the similarly-aging Jose Bautista, only he’s under control for an extra year as well. It would be a niche market, given his lack of 2014 value and long-term value to a rebuilding club, but for teams looking for a catching upgrade over the next few years, Molina would be manna from heaven.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
21 Buster Posey 27 SF C 4.9 2022 $165,500,000 6
Posey is an interesting case, because as I noted in the recap of last year’s list, Posey has been a pretty average player over the last calendar year. Sure, some of that is just a drop in BABIP that probably isn’t real, but there’s a decrease in power and a drop in walks that are a little more concerning, and we’re coming up on the point at which it isn’t that small of a sample anymore.
But the track record is still very strong, and Posey is still just 27, so even with a down performance of late, history suggests betting on a rebound. He probably hasn’t forgotten how to hit right as he enters his prime. However, a lot of Posey’s value is tied to being a great hitting catcher, and he’s not likely to stay behind the plate for the remainder of his contract. There’s a lot of present value here, and the contract is certainly reasonable, but he probably doesn’t have as much long-term value as other players his age given the likelihood of a move to first base at some point in the future.
But for now, Posey’s a catcher, and likely still one of the best in the game. There are plenty of teams that would love to have their main concern be whether or not Posey will go back to being the game’s best hitting catcher, or just settle in as a very good one.
And now, because I think it still serves a purpose, here’s the entire published list to date.
Rank Name Age Team Position Projected WAR Controlled Through Contract Dollars Last Year
50 Yan Gomes 26 CLE C 3.4 2021 $40,950,000 Unranked
49 Starling Marte 25 PIT OF 3.0 2021 $52,500,000 31
48 Kyle Seager 26 SEA 3B 3.4 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
47 Alex Cobb 26 TB SP 3.1 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
46 Edwin Encarnacion 31 TOR DH 3.7 2016 $20,000,000 45
45 Julio Teheran 23 ATL SP 2.3 2020 $41,600,000 Unranked
44 Chris Archer 25 TB SP 2.4 2021 $42,250,000 Unranked
43 Devin Mesoraco 26 CIN C 3.0 2017 Arb1 – Arb3 Unranked
42 Corey Kluber 28 CLE SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
41 Michael Brantley 27 CLE OF 2.6 2018 $30,000,000 Unranked
40 David Wright 31 NYM 3B 4.1 2020 $107,000,000 21
39 Dustin Pedroia 30 BOS 2B 4.2 2021 $107,500,000 25
38 Byron Buxton 20 MIN OF 1.2 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
37 Jose Quintana 25 CHW SP 3.3 2020 $40,650,000 Unranked
36 Billy Hamilton 23 CIN OF 2.7 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
35 Matt Carpenter 28 STL 3B 3.9 2020 $66,000,000 Unranked
34 Jose Fernandez 21 MIA SP 4.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 17
33 Carlos Gomez 28 MIL OF 4.8 2016 $17,000,000 33
32 Yordano Ventura 23 KC SP 2.8 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
31 Sonny Gray 24 OAK SP 3.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
30 Gregory Polanco 22 PIT OF 1.5 2020 Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
29 Kris Bryant 22 CHC 3B 2.8 TBD Pre-Arb – Arb3 Unranked
28 Andrelton Simmons 24 ATL SS 3.8 2020 $56,000,000 Unranked
27 Jose Bautista 33 TOR OF 4.8 2016 $28,000,000 35
26 Stephen Strasburg 25 WAS SP 4.4 2016 Arb2 – Arb3 14
25 Matt Harvey 25 NYM SP 3.8 2018 Pre-Arb – Arb3 7
24 Freddie Freeman 24 ATL 1B 3.7 2021 $123,500,000 Unranked
23 Xander Bogaerts 21 BOS SS 2.0 2019 Pre-Arb – Arb3 29
22 Yadier Molina 31 STL C 4.5 2017 $43,000,000 11
21 Buster Posey 27 SF C 4.9 2022 $165,500,000 6
- 756
- 88
I love looking at prospect rankings. Baseball's future is forever bright. Buxton was getting Trout comps before the year, but he's battled injuries. I have no idea why the DBacks have yet to call up Archie Bradley, and there's such a wealth of young shortstop prospects. Brings you back to the days of Jeter, Nomar, A Rod, and Tejada. I read somewhere that Lindor has Vizquel potential with the glove. Can't wait until all these prospects come up....just wish the Giants had one of them
- 60,034
- 50,948
Chris Davis isn't a good baseball player. Told people that last year. Below average glove, strikeout machine and is currently batting a .198
Everyone Looks Bad In the Brady Aiken Mess.
This was supposed to be the year that things started heading in the right direction for the Houston Astros, you know. After bottoming out in 2013 with a third straight 100-loss season, a season-ending 16-game losing streak, 0.0 television ratings, and endless accusations of “not trying to win,” they were expected to at least trend upwards in 2014. Thanks to importing major league players in Dexter Fowler and Scott Feldman, welcoming top prospects George Springer and Jon Singleton, and seeing unexpected steps forward from Jose Altuve and Dallas Keuchel, it largely has. The Astros are still a bad team, but they aren’t even last in their own division, and they’re merely within the range of other bad teams, as opposed to drifting on their own private island of awful.
But despite some on-field positives, it’s still been a tough few weeks for the organization. The leaked Ground Control files were an embarrassment. Stories began to pop up about potential hits to the organization’s reputation thanks to their non-traditional methods. 2012 top pick Carlos Correa had a successful season cut short by a broken leg. 2013 top pick Mark Appel has struggled badly in A-ball. Now, there’s this: Casey Close, the agent for 2014 top overall pick Brady Aiken, is criticizing the Astros for how they’ve handled negotiations with both Aiken and another of his Astros-drafted clients, fifth-round high school pitcher Jacob Nix.
To catch you up for those just joining us:
On June 7, two days after the draft, Jim Callis reported that the Astros and Aiken had agreed to terms including a $6.5 million bonus, tying Jameson Taillon for the largest bonus ever given to a high school pitcher, but still under the $7,922,710 slot for the 1-1 pick.
On July 7, Jon Heyman reported that an “elbow ligment” issue had been discovered by the Astros in a pre-deal medical exam, and that since the contract hadn’t been officially finalized, they’d lowered their offer to $5m. (Some reports dispute whether a $5m option was offered, but it no longer seems on the table.)
Tuesday, Ken Rosenthal had Close’s reaction, expressing his displeasure with how the Astros are “conducting business in this manner with a complete disregard for the rules governing the draft and the 29 other clubs who have followed those same rules,” and noting that a revised offer for $3.16m was extended to make sure Houston would get a compensation pick next year.
Needless to say, it’s getting ugly, and with a Friday afternoon deadline looming to finalize the contract, all sides are in a tough position.
Most of the public opinion seems to be anti-Astros, and it’s not hard to see why. A huge company and a teenager who just graduated high school had a handshake agreement, and the agreement is coming apart not because the teenager changed his mind, but because the huge company is going back on their word. Absent any further facts, most people are going to take the side of the teen — two teens, really, because Nix has gotten caught up in this mess as well. Specific to the Astros, there’s obviously plenty of people in and outside the game who would be all too happy to see their unprecedented “tear it down” strategy fail, and especially to see the self-described nerds in the organization exit the game with their tails between their legs, properly shamed for trying to change the way things are done.
Maybe the Astros really are being underhanded here, as many seem to think, using the flimsiest excuse possible to save a few bucks. It’s certainly a difficult sell to claim that Aiken’s elbow is unhealthy, considering that he struck out 14 and hit 98 mph in his final appearance of the season and never reported any pain. If there was something in the exam that seems unusual, well, find any pitcher of any skill level that won’t have something odd you could point to on a scan. Aiken and his camp are extremely unhappy, and they’re absolutely right to feel that way.
Without knowing the facts, we can’t say for sure. Anyone who isn’t a medical doctor who hasn’t examined Aiken themselves can offer only speculation, and that Aiken’s high school coach and personal trainer both claim he’s healthy doesn’t really add anything to the conversation. Nor does Close’s word carry a lot of weight here, and that has nothing to do with his integrity, as he’s very well-respected. It has everything to do with the fact that his job is to get two of his clients paid, and anything he says that admits a problem with Aiken’s arm goes directly against that goal. Besides, there’s obviously different ways to read arm problems; it may be that the Astros have found something they consider to be a problem in the near future, if not immediately. One source told the Houston Chronicle that “he may have some of the UCL, but not much,” which is absolutely terrifying. It’s interesting to note that Rosenthal’s piece describes Close as saying that Aiken is asymptomatic and ready to pitch, which is not the same thing as refuting the Astros’ supposed findings.
It’s also not as though teams have never dropped agreed-upon offers upon finding issues in exams. Remember Barret Loux? He was the No. 6 overall pick by Arizona in 2010, and the sides agreed to a $2m signing bonus. After finding what they considered severe arm problems in a pre-draft exam, they withdrew the offer, preferring to take a compensation pick the next season instead. (They got Archie Bradley with the compensation pick. That worked out well.) Declared a free agent, Loux pitched three minor league seasons with the Rangers and Cubs, and, as Arizona feared, he blew out his arm and underwent Tommy John surgery in March. In 1996, R.A. Dickey‘s bonus was reduced by more than $700,000 after an exam revealed he had no UCL. Seven years later, Tim Stauffer‘s bonus dropped from $2.6m to $750,000 after a report of shoulder weakness. Teams can’t get their doctors to give full examinations until after a player has been drafted, so until there’s more of an NFL combine type of situation, this sort of thing happens.
Now in those situations, there seemed to be less conflict about the accuracy of the medical report, making them not fully applicable here. (To use a non-draft scenario, look at Baltimore backing out of a deal with Grant Balfour last winter over medical concerns that the pitcher disagreed with; Balfour landed in Tampa Bay, where his velocity has been down and he’s been awful.) But if the Astros truly believe that there’s a problem, then what they’re doing is not unprecedented — and if Aiken’s camp believes he’s fully healthy, then they should rightfully be infuriated by the sudden decrease of millions of dollars after an agreement was reached. None of us know the truth about the medical exams, so we can’t speculate. Here’s what we can do, though: point yet another accusatory finger at the broken system that has brought us here.
* * *
Think about why the Astros would drop their offer and potentially damage their relationship with a player who hopefully should be a big part of their organization for years to come. When you hear terms like “lowball,” as this San Diego Union-Tribune article from last week says multiple times with apparently no understanding of how baseball negotiating works or that Nix was offered a deal nearly five times above slot, you think they’re being cheap. You think they’re trying to pocket the money, as so many have accused them of doing over the past few years rather than spending on big league talent.
Now think about just how little $1.5m — the difference between the agreed-upon deal and the reported discounted offer — or even $3.4m, which is the difference between the first deal and the reported $3.1m offer, is. In baseball terms, it’s absolutely nothing. It’s a half-season of a backup outfielder. Even within the context of a 17-year-old who has a long way to go before he’s a big leaguer, it’s very, very little. Unless they were convinced that Aiken was so injured that he could not be a productive asset, there’s no reason for the Astros to not just stick to the agreement and avoid all the terrible PR this is bringing. A few million isn’t nothing, but it’s not worth this, either.
Of course, that not how this works. It’s not about taking money from the hands of a teenager and putting it back into the owner’s pockets, as seems to be insinuated in some of these stories. It’s about allocating the limited dollars they have available, because as we can very clearly see in Rosenthal’s article, the effects that the Aiken disagreement is having on Nix is part of what’s making Close and the player’s union unhappy:
Close and the union are particularly upset that the Astros have tied the signing of Aiken to the signing of Nix, who remains in limbo despite passing his physical.
If we can all agree on anything, it’s that this stinks for Nix, who agreed to sign and now can’t, pending the resolution of something that has nothing to do with him. That’s going to be a theme, because this is also due in no small part to a system that he had no say in shaping, but that is considerably affecting his ability to enter the professional ranks.
When the new CBA was agreed to following the 2011 season, baseball fans celebrated the fact that the game would continue uninterrupted, but perhaps not enough understood just how much it restricted the freedom to spend on the draft. Teams now had to stick to draft pools for their top-10 selections, with severe penalties should they go over. For the Astros this year, that number for 10 players is a total of $13,362,200, with the No.1 slot valued at $7.9 million. When you hear that a team “lowballed” a top pick by not offering him the full slot, it’s actually a strategy to be able to spend that money elsewhere — say, for example, giving a later-round player an above-slot deal to convince him to forgo college. (It’s also why the conversation about how much more Aiken would make as a free agent seems misguided, because this system artificially depresses the free market, meaning while that’s true for Aiken, it’s also true for dozens of other highly-regarded draftees.)
At the time, Dave Cameron summed up how awful it looked like it would be:
These penalties are so severe that they essentially eliminate any benefit a team would get from signing a player for more than the slot recommendation, so they equate to de facto hard slotting. Teams no longer have the ability to spend heavily to convince players who were strongly committed to colleges (or other sports) to forego those options and begin a career as a professional.
More or less, that’s what’s happened. With the institution of the draft pools, teams have to consider how some deals affect other deals. Despite Close’s assertion that “if every player was contingent on another player, we would have no draft, we would have no draft pool, we would have no signings,” we see it all the time. Just last week, the White Sox signed No. 2 pick Carlos Rodon for an over-slot $6.5m bonus, basically using up their draft pool elsewhere and saying “that’s what’s left.” (Reportedly, it was just $585 under what the Sox could pay without going over and being penalized.) If baseball and the union don’t like that every draftee can’t negotiate with absolutely no impact from other draftees, perhaps they shouldn’t have agreed to a system where there’s a single pool of money for multiple players.
So sure, the Astros could simply pay Aiken full price, keep a player with a potential injury problem, and maybe miss out on Nix. Or, they could pay him full price, get Nix and 21st-rounder Mac Marshall (another player with a tough college commitment), and be penalized for it. Or, they could cut Aiken down and use that money to sign Nix and Marshall.
Not available to them is the best option: Sign all three at negotiated prices, value pools be damned, without fear of being penalized in next year’s draft.
* * *
I’m not apologizing for the Astros here, because we don’t know what their thinking is, and we can’t say with utmost certainty that they’re acting ethically. It’s not out of the question that they agreed with Aiken, then saw an unexpected chance to sign Nix and Marshall, who many thought couldn’t be bought out of college commitments, and scrambled at the last minute to find a way to knock Aiken down enough to afford all three. With the numbers perhaps working out just a little too well there, it’s easy to think it’s a conspiracy.
But think about how bad this has become. Now, the Astros have a No. 1 pick who has to wonder what’s going on in his arm and may be poisoned towards the idea of ever being an Astro. They have to worry that Aiken could just walk away and take a huge chunk of Houston’s available draft pool with him — remember, if Aiken goes, his $7.9m pool allocation goes with him — and perhaps most importantly, they have to deal with another hit to their reputation, and at least one agent who probably won’t be taking his clients to Houston any time soon. That’s really worth a few million bucks? Of course not, and so it’s hard to see this being done without a very valid concern about Aiken’s health. It’s a bad look, to be sure, and potentially not worth it even if Houston is squeaky-clean in all of this. I just haven’t seen evidence that it’s an unethical path, with the exception of the impact this has on Nix.
Close claims that no other team would act like this, though MLB has confirmed that Houston has broken no rules and GM Jeff Luhnow claims he’s abided both by baseball rules and federal HIPAA regulations. If that’s the case, then perhaps the problem isn’t with the Astros. It’s with the system that seemed like a bad idea from the second it was put into place.
But despite some on-field positives, it’s still been a tough few weeks for the organization. The leaked Ground Control files were an embarrassment. Stories began to pop up about potential hits to the organization’s reputation thanks to their non-traditional methods. 2012 top pick Carlos Correa had a successful season cut short by a broken leg. 2013 top pick Mark Appel has struggled badly in A-ball. Now, there’s this: Casey Close, the agent for 2014 top overall pick Brady Aiken, is criticizing the Astros for how they’ve handled negotiations with both Aiken and another of his Astros-drafted clients, fifth-round high school pitcher Jacob Nix.
To catch you up for those just joining us:
On June 7, two days after the draft, Jim Callis reported that the Astros and Aiken had agreed to terms including a $6.5 million bonus, tying Jameson Taillon for the largest bonus ever given to a high school pitcher, but still under the $7,922,710 slot for the 1-1 pick.
On July 7, Jon Heyman reported that an “elbow ligment” issue had been discovered by the Astros in a pre-deal medical exam, and that since the contract hadn’t been officially finalized, they’d lowered their offer to $5m. (Some reports dispute whether a $5m option was offered, but it no longer seems on the table.)
Tuesday, Ken Rosenthal had Close’s reaction, expressing his displeasure with how the Astros are “conducting business in this manner with a complete disregard for the rules governing the draft and the 29 other clubs who have followed those same rules,” and noting that a revised offer for $3.16m was extended to make sure Houston would get a compensation pick next year.
Needless to say, it’s getting ugly, and with a Friday afternoon deadline looming to finalize the contract, all sides are in a tough position.
Most of the public opinion seems to be anti-Astros, and it’s not hard to see why. A huge company and a teenager who just graduated high school had a handshake agreement, and the agreement is coming apart not because the teenager changed his mind, but because the huge company is going back on their word. Absent any further facts, most people are going to take the side of the teen — two teens, really, because Nix has gotten caught up in this mess as well. Specific to the Astros, there’s obviously plenty of people in and outside the game who would be all too happy to see their unprecedented “tear it down” strategy fail, and especially to see the self-described nerds in the organization exit the game with their tails between their legs, properly shamed for trying to change the way things are done.
Maybe the Astros really are being underhanded here, as many seem to think, using the flimsiest excuse possible to save a few bucks. It’s certainly a difficult sell to claim that Aiken’s elbow is unhealthy, considering that he struck out 14 and hit 98 mph in his final appearance of the season and never reported any pain. If there was something in the exam that seems unusual, well, find any pitcher of any skill level that won’t have something odd you could point to on a scan. Aiken and his camp are extremely unhappy, and they’re absolutely right to feel that way.
Without knowing the facts, we can’t say for sure. Anyone who isn’t a medical doctor who hasn’t examined Aiken themselves can offer only speculation, and that Aiken’s high school coach and personal trainer both claim he’s healthy doesn’t really add anything to the conversation. Nor does Close’s word carry a lot of weight here, and that has nothing to do with his integrity, as he’s very well-respected. It has everything to do with the fact that his job is to get two of his clients paid, and anything he says that admits a problem with Aiken’s arm goes directly against that goal. Besides, there’s obviously different ways to read arm problems; it may be that the Astros have found something they consider to be a problem in the near future, if not immediately. One source told the Houston Chronicle that “he may have some of the UCL, but not much,” which is absolutely terrifying. It’s interesting to note that Rosenthal’s piece describes Close as saying that Aiken is asymptomatic and ready to pitch, which is not the same thing as refuting the Astros’ supposed findings.
It’s also not as though teams have never dropped agreed-upon offers upon finding issues in exams. Remember Barret Loux? He was the No. 6 overall pick by Arizona in 2010, and the sides agreed to a $2m signing bonus. After finding what they considered severe arm problems in a pre-draft exam, they withdrew the offer, preferring to take a compensation pick the next season instead. (They got Archie Bradley with the compensation pick. That worked out well.) Declared a free agent, Loux pitched three minor league seasons with the Rangers and Cubs, and, as Arizona feared, he blew out his arm and underwent Tommy John surgery in March. In 1996, R.A. Dickey‘s bonus was reduced by more than $700,000 after an exam revealed he had no UCL. Seven years later, Tim Stauffer‘s bonus dropped from $2.6m to $750,000 after a report of shoulder weakness. Teams can’t get their doctors to give full examinations until after a player has been drafted, so until there’s more of an NFL combine type of situation, this sort of thing happens.
Now in those situations, there seemed to be less conflict about the accuracy of the medical report, making them not fully applicable here. (To use a non-draft scenario, look at Baltimore backing out of a deal with Grant Balfour last winter over medical concerns that the pitcher disagreed with; Balfour landed in Tampa Bay, where his velocity has been down and he’s been awful.) But if the Astros truly believe that there’s a problem, then what they’re doing is not unprecedented — and if Aiken’s camp believes he’s fully healthy, then they should rightfully be infuriated by the sudden decrease of millions of dollars after an agreement was reached. None of us know the truth about the medical exams, so we can’t speculate. Here’s what we can do, though: point yet another accusatory finger at the broken system that has brought us here.
* * *
Think about why the Astros would drop their offer and potentially damage their relationship with a player who hopefully should be a big part of their organization for years to come. When you hear terms like “lowball,” as this San Diego Union-Tribune article from last week says multiple times with apparently no understanding of how baseball negotiating works or that Nix was offered a deal nearly five times above slot, you think they’re being cheap. You think they’re trying to pocket the money, as so many have accused them of doing over the past few years rather than spending on big league talent.
Now think about just how little $1.5m — the difference between the agreed-upon deal and the reported discounted offer — or even $3.4m, which is the difference between the first deal and the reported $3.1m offer, is. In baseball terms, it’s absolutely nothing. It’s a half-season of a backup outfielder. Even within the context of a 17-year-old who has a long way to go before he’s a big leaguer, it’s very, very little. Unless they were convinced that Aiken was so injured that he could not be a productive asset, there’s no reason for the Astros to not just stick to the agreement and avoid all the terrible PR this is bringing. A few million isn’t nothing, but it’s not worth this, either.
Of course, that not how this works. It’s not about taking money from the hands of a teenager and putting it back into the owner’s pockets, as seems to be insinuated in some of these stories. It’s about allocating the limited dollars they have available, because as we can very clearly see in Rosenthal’s article, the effects that the Aiken disagreement is having on Nix is part of what’s making Close and the player’s union unhappy:
Close and the union are particularly upset that the Astros have tied the signing of Aiken to the signing of Nix, who remains in limbo despite passing his physical.
If we can all agree on anything, it’s that this stinks for Nix, who agreed to sign and now can’t, pending the resolution of something that has nothing to do with him. That’s going to be a theme, because this is also due in no small part to a system that he had no say in shaping, but that is considerably affecting his ability to enter the professional ranks.
When the new CBA was agreed to following the 2011 season, baseball fans celebrated the fact that the game would continue uninterrupted, but perhaps not enough understood just how much it restricted the freedom to spend on the draft. Teams now had to stick to draft pools for their top-10 selections, with severe penalties should they go over. For the Astros this year, that number for 10 players is a total of $13,362,200, with the No.1 slot valued at $7.9 million. When you hear that a team “lowballed” a top pick by not offering him the full slot, it’s actually a strategy to be able to spend that money elsewhere — say, for example, giving a later-round player an above-slot deal to convince him to forgo college. (It’s also why the conversation about how much more Aiken would make as a free agent seems misguided, because this system artificially depresses the free market, meaning while that’s true for Aiken, it’s also true for dozens of other highly-regarded draftees.)
At the time, Dave Cameron summed up how awful it looked like it would be:
These penalties are so severe that they essentially eliminate any benefit a team would get from signing a player for more than the slot recommendation, so they equate to de facto hard slotting. Teams no longer have the ability to spend heavily to convince players who were strongly committed to colleges (or other sports) to forego those options and begin a career as a professional.
More or less, that’s what’s happened. With the institution of the draft pools, teams have to consider how some deals affect other deals. Despite Close’s assertion that “if every player was contingent on another player, we would have no draft, we would have no draft pool, we would have no signings,” we see it all the time. Just last week, the White Sox signed No. 2 pick Carlos Rodon for an over-slot $6.5m bonus, basically using up their draft pool elsewhere and saying “that’s what’s left.” (Reportedly, it was just $585 under what the Sox could pay without going over and being penalized.) If baseball and the union don’t like that every draftee can’t negotiate with absolutely no impact from other draftees, perhaps they shouldn’t have agreed to a system where there’s a single pool of money for multiple players.
So sure, the Astros could simply pay Aiken full price, keep a player with a potential injury problem, and maybe miss out on Nix. Or, they could pay him full price, get Nix and 21st-rounder Mac Marshall (another player with a tough college commitment), and be penalized for it. Or, they could cut Aiken down and use that money to sign Nix and Marshall.
Not available to them is the best option: Sign all three at negotiated prices, value pools be damned, without fear of being penalized in next year’s draft.
* * *
I’m not apologizing for the Astros here, because we don’t know what their thinking is, and we can’t say with utmost certainty that they’re acting ethically. It’s not out of the question that they agreed with Aiken, then saw an unexpected chance to sign Nix and Marshall, who many thought couldn’t be bought out of college commitments, and scrambled at the last minute to find a way to knock Aiken down enough to afford all three. With the numbers perhaps working out just a little too well there, it’s easy to think it’s a conspiracy.
But think about how bad this has become. Now, the Astros have a No. 1 pick who has to wonder what’s going on in his arm and may be poisoned towards the idea of ever being an Astro. They have to worry that Aiken could just walk away and take a huge chunk of Houston’s available draft pool with him — remember, if Aiken goes, his $7.9m pool allocation goes with him — and perhaps most importantly, they have to deal with another hit to their reputation, and at least one agent who probably won’t be taking his clients to Houston any time soon. That’s really worth a few million bucks? Of course not, and so it’s hard to see this being done without a very valid concern about Aiken’s health. It’s a bad look, to be sure, and potentially not worth it even if Houston is squeaky-clean in all of this. I just haven’t seen evidence that it’s an unethical path, with the exception of the impact this has on Nix.
Close claims that no other team would act like this, though MLB has confirmed that Houston has broken no rules and GM Jeff Luhnow claims he’s abided both by baseball rules and federal HIPAA regulations. If that’s the case, then perhaps the problem isn’t with the Astros. It’s with the system that seemed like a bad idea from the second it was put into place.
- 27,329
- 64,568
No Wonder JJs hasn't been giving us daily "Crush" Davis updates this season
. I knew he had fallen back down to earth but I didn't know he was below .200 
- 20,396
- 14,184
Meh...Davis has been awful this year, but I think he'll snap out of it. He's due. He'll finish the year around .220.
For everything that has gone wrong for the O's, Buck has done a hell of a job managing. Kinda improbable that they're in 1st and they have a HUGE test coming up w/ their WC road trip. We'll see if they're a contender or pretender.
For everything that has gone wrong for the O's, Buck has done a hell of a job managing. Kinda improbable that they're in 1st and they have a HUGE test coming up w/ their WC road trip. We'll see if they're a contender or pretender.
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
- 25,730
- 2,900
Last edited:
- 2,663
- 152
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
- 25,730
- 2,900
Rumor is that Sacramento is going to be SFG & Fresno will be Oakland's Triple A. Why they want to be affiliated with the Giants terrible farm system is beyond me
- 21,784
- 2,957
I think Triple A is going to be in Nashville.
- 48,653
- 28,915
gotta be some broken bones in there
- 19,563
- 6,839
From my understanding breaks don't swell up. I'm no doctor though
elpablo21
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