pre-break sox are back
Scored all there runs lastnight aha
Trying to enjoy this phillies game somewhat it's been awhile since I actually sat down in front TV and watched a game just been looking up scores by SportCenter app/espn
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
- Start date
- Status
Scored all there runs lastnight aha
Trying to enjoy this phillies game somewhat it's been awhile since I actually sat down in front TV and watched a game just been looking up scores by SportCenter app/espn
- 23,412
- 5,523
Learn how to hit the other way, don't blame the shift
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
- 25,730
- 2,900
Brad Pit said it best "Adapt or Die"
- 20,396
- 14,184
O's, man. 
Adam Jones won't win the MVP, but he should get plenty of consideration.
Not sure how Buck is doing it, but he's doing as good of a managerial job as I've seen during his stint in B-More.
Adam Jones won't win the MVP, but he should get plenty of consideration.
Not sure how Buck is doing it, but he's doing as good of a managerial job as I've seen during his stint in B-More.
Maybe he'll win a Gold Glove he actually might deserve this year
BTW, I don't want to hear about the Royals ever again as sleepers or anything of that sort. Or any of their prospects as can't miss. Aoki was supposed to be some great pickup, another overrated player. Infante was supposed to be some great deal, another overrated player. Hosmer supposed to be some can't miss hitting prospect, has no line drive power. Moustakas supposed to be some powerful prototypical 3rd baseman, the guy can barely recognize fastballs off of righties. It speaks volumes that he's leading them in HR's
They have HORRIFIC management and coaches from A ball all the way to the majors but every year, everyone ignores it and says they'll challenge Detroit. The only two guys worth a damn are Gordon and Perez and you never hear anyone talking about them.
/rant
BTW, I don't want to hear about the Royals ever again as sleepers or anything of that sort. Or any of their prospects as can't miss. Aoki was supposed to be some great pickup, another overrated player. Infante was supposed to be some great deal, another overrated player. Hosmer supposed to be some can't miss hitting prospect, has no line drive power. Moustakas supposed to be some powerful prototypical 3rd baseman, the guy can barely recognize fastballs off of righties. It speaks volumes that he's leading them in HR's
They have HORRIFIC management and coaches from A ball all the way to the majors but every year, everyone ignores it and says they'll challenge Detroit. The only two guys worth a damn are Gordon and Perez and you never hear anyone talking about them.
/rant
- 7,842
- 4,878
We also see how the Royals' power situation is going :x
Butler, Gordon, and Hosmer currently have 18 combined Home Runs in 1,222 plate appearances.
AL Team Home Runs
2014
12. 78 - Red Sox
13. 73 - Twins
14. 71 - Rangers
15. 57 - Royals
2013
13. 148 - White Sox
13. 148 - Astros
14. 144 - Yankees
15. 112 - Royals
2012
11. 149 - Mariners
12. 136 - Indians
14. 131 - Twins
14. 131 - Royals
Butler, Gordon, and Hosmer currently have 18 combined Home Runs in 1,222 plate appearances.
AL Team Home Runs
2014
12. 78 - Red Sox
13. 73 - Twins
14. 71 - Rangers
15. 57 - Royals
2013
13. 148 - White Sox
13. 148 - Astros
14. 144 - Yankees
15. 112 - Royals
2012
11. 149 - Mariners
12. 136 - Indians
14. 131 - Twins
14. 131 - Royals
- 28,043
- 10,466
Did I accidentally jinx?pre-break sox are back
Hosmer always turns up second-half.
IDK why it annoys me so much but maybe it goes back to like 07/08 when they got crowned with the best minors and everyone was fawning over them
They're not going anywhere with Dayton Moore there but they refuse to change anything at all. Ned Yost should have been gone a while ago.
Gordon won't give you power but he's a really good line drive hitter and gives you a lot of value with his glove/arm in left.
They're not going anywhere with Dayton Moore there but they refuse to change anything at all. Ned Yost should have been gone a while ago.
Gordon won't give you power but he's a really good line drive hitter and gives you a lot of value with his glove/arm in left.
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- 74,934
- 24,348
illegal defense would be dumb. i like the shift. forces the hitter to adapt. learn how to go the other way or bunt.
- 20,396
- 14,184
Then you'll have dummies like Colby Lewis complain
- 74,934
- 24,348
i'd tell colby to stop being a ***** and out pitch them. he's a clown for those comments. some unwritten rules i get but that's not one of them
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For Lee's trade value, it's all about now.
Prospect Watch: Angels System Is Not Empty… Yet.
Midseason Pick-Ups and Fighting Regression.
The Top 10 Prospects Currently by Projected WAR.
Padres Finally Trade Chase Headley Two Years Too Late.
What Jhonny Peralta Tells Us About Defensive Metrics.
Huston Street Deal: A Good Omen for the Sellers.
There are two windows in every baseball calendar year in which small sample size really matters. In October, of course; as Bucky Dent, Aaron Boone and Dave Roberts can attest, bits and pieces of success can live forever.
The other time frame in which one game or one week can make a difference -- really good or really bad -- is just before the trade deadline. Multiple scouts were dispatched to watch Cliff Lee in his return to the rotation Monday, the 322nd regular-season start of his career. Rival executives are well aware of all that Lee had accomplished before Monday’s game, with the Cy Young Award and the four All-Star appearances and the postseason dominance, but all they wanted to know was how is Lee throwing the ball right now, in this moment of his career, as they assess whether to pursue a deal with the Phillies.
Everything he had done before that game is really irrelevant; the only thing that really matters is what he’s capable of, relative to the $48 million or so still guaranteed to him for the next 1 1/3 seasons, and the prevailing opinion after the game among rival officials is that Lee was really bad against the Giants.
Here’s the beauty of this time of year, however. When Lee makes his next start Saturday against the Diamondbacks, he could change that perception dramatically with one dominant start. Look, the Phillies will be lucky to get out from underneath the contract between now and July 31 unless they make it a priority to move on and demonstrate a willingness to eat a lot of money and take a lesser prospect. But Lee could help their effort to trade him by pitching well in four days.
For other teams and players, small sample size will mean something:
The Tampa Bay Rays: At a time when they’re evaluating what to do with David Price, Ben Zobrist, et al, they just keep winning, day after day; after beating Adam Wainwright and the Cardinals on Tuesday night, they are 24-11 since June 10, and now just 5.5 games out of the wild card race, playing better than any AL team.
Along the way Tuesday, Joe Maddon yelled at Wainwright, who had yelled at him, and Maddon got ejected because of a misunderstanding.
Jake Peavy: He is 1-9 with a 4.72 ERA, but what will matter to interested teams -- and he’d be a great fit for the Giants and his former manager Bruce Bochy, who need to find somebody to step into Matt Cain’s spot in the rotation -- is how he’s throwing the ball lately. He pitched through some physical trouble earlier this season, but has been better over the last month, generally. Peavy allowed five runs in 6 1/3 innings Tuesday night, and in his previous three starts, he had surrendered six earned runs in 19 innings, with five walks and 19 strikeouts. It makes all the sense in the world for the Red Sox to move Peavy and clear a spot for a younger starter, and for the Giants or the Cardinals to add him, if the price is right.
• Peavy ranks 89 among 94 qualified starters in run support. (Incidentally: three of the bottom four pitchers in run support wear the same uniform.)
Most consecutive decisions lost
*Single season by a former Cy Young winner
Pitcher Losses Season
Jake Peavy 9 2014
Barry Zito 9 2010
Denny McLain 9 1971
Warren Spahn 9 1965
From the Elias Sports Bureau: Peavy is 0-9 over his last 15 starts. That ties the most consecutive losses (in decisions) in a single season by a pitcher who previously won the Cy Young award.
Peavy represents changes this year, as he did last year, writes Rob Bradford. Boston’s five-game winning streak is over.
Chase Headley: His small sample size with the Yankees so far is pretty good. Brian Cashman explained that the Yankees liked what they saw in the velocity readings of balls that Headley had hit following the epidural he received for a back issue.
Headley finished fifth in the MVP voting in 2012 after not putting up numbers anything close to that beforehand, and because of that, the Padres waited and waited to see if he could repeat that performance -- and dangled moderate offers. Headley rejected the proposals, preferring to also wait to post similar numbers to 2012. It didn’t happen, and now Headley has about two months in a hitters’ park to rebuild his value in free agency for the fall.
The Minnesota Twins: They went into the All-Star break on the buy/sell fence, but probably leaning toward selling -- and since then, they just keep losing.
Kurt Suzuki might be a one-of-a-kind item in the trade market -- a good everyday catcher having a good year. He will have value, particularly for a contender that sees a frontline catcher go down over the next week.
The New York Mets: They really don’t have much going in the way of trade stuff right now, according to MLB officials, although they would like to shed Bartolo Colon’s contract. Daniel Murphy just made the All-Star team and is an interesting player because he’s a sound hitter, but any team that wanted to acquire him would not only have to pay the Mets for Murphy’s value as a player, but what he represents to the Mets’ franchise -- which has some evaluators very skeptical that the team will trade him in the next eight days.
• Murphy might be someone who interests the Reds, writes John Fay.
Aaron Hill: At a time when the Yankees, Oakland and Giants are considering upgrades at second base, he is playing better, as Zach Buchanan writes.
But remember: Hill is owed about $4 million for the rest of this year, as well as $12 million for 2015 and $12 million for 2016. Presumably, other teams would want the Diamondbacks to eat some of that salary.
Trade stuff
1. Analytics contributed to the acquisition of Headley, writes John Harper.
2. Derrick Goold fields with trade-related questions, re: the Cardinals.
3. There’s no rush for the Phillies to make trades, writes David Murphy.
4. Antonio Bastardo's trade value is at its highest, writes Ryan Lawrence.
5. The Pirates and A.J. Burnett could join forces again.
6. The Cubs designated Darwin Barney for assignment. They’ve tried to trade him in the past.
7. The Tigers’ need in the bullpen continues to be an issue. It’s hard to imagine Detroit -- a team constructed to win the World Series -- will get past the deadline without adding Joaquin Benoit, Joakim Soria or a comparable reliever. Tuesday’s loss highlighted the need for relief help, writes Lynn Henning. Personally, I think Soria fits the best.
8. The Royals won’t be deadline sellers, says GM Dayton Moore.
9. You have to wonder if the Cardinals might be open to moving Randy Choate, given that Kevin Siegrist is coming back today and Choate is pitching rarely. Choate is under contract for $3 million for this year, and for $3 million for next year.
10. The Marlins remain interested in Jim Johnson.
11. Tommy Milone’s trade request has probably gotten more play than he expected, says Bob Melvin. Yep, undoubtedly. Would’ve been a much better career move to lay low and wait for the next opportunity. A lot of organizations in the position that Oakland is in now would entrench -- not respond, in other words, so that this sort of request is not rewarded and leads to similar requests from other players. Milone isn’t even eligible for arbitration yet. It’s too bad that someone didn’t get to him to have him to back off before this became public.
Ryan Zimmerman
Greg Fiume/Getty Images
Ryan Zimmerman left Tuesday's game against the Rockies with a strained right hamstring.
12. The Padres got a couple of journeymen in return for Chase Headley, but nobody should be surprised; that’s a fair deal for a struggling veteran only two-plus months away from becoming a free agent.
• Ryan Zimmerman appears to have suffered a significant injury.
• The Orioles are responding to the challenge coming out of the All-Star break.
• Gregory Polanco had a great at-bat right in the middle of the Pirates’ win over the Dodgers.
Dings and dents
1. Manny Machado was scratched with back spasms.
2. Drew VerHagen went on the disabled list.
3. Joel Peralta landed on the disabled list.
4. George Springer is dealing with some injury issues.
5. Geovany Soto landed on the disabled list.
6. Troy Tulowitzki landed on the disabled list again. You assume that at least some of his many injuries have been related to the effects of playing all of his home games in thin air.
Moves, deals and decisions
1. Aaron Sanchez was promoted and will pitch out of the Toronto bullpen.
Tuesday’s games
1. Jacob deGrom was dealing.
2. Adam Eaton extended his hitting streak.
3. The Brewers are having a good week.
4. For the Reds, the losing continues.
5. The Indians had another good night.
6. The Royals continue to be the strangest team in baseball, losing when they are under the most pressure and winning whenever we’re about to dismiss them.
7. Control problems hurt Adam Wainwright.
8. A Braves rally fell short.
9. The Jays bounced back.
10. The Giants had a great win, with help from Buster Posey, Brandon Crawford and Tim Lincecum.
11. Josh Hamilton has been losing his clout in the cleanup spot.
12. The Mariners got a good start but lost.
AL West
• The Athletics lost to the Astros, but Scott Kazmir lowered his season ERA to 2.32.
From the Elias Sports Bureau: Kazmir is the first Athletics pitcher with an ERA that low through 20 starts since Mike Moore (2.12) in 1989 (the Athletics won the World Series that season). Kazmir has allowed 1 earned run or fewer in four straight starts, posting an ERA of just 1.03 in that span (the Athletics have lost two of those four starts).
• The Rangers are improving, writes Jeff Wilson.
AL Central
• Justin Masterson was kicking around a soccer ball.
NL West
• Yasiel Puig as a center fielder might not be the best thing, writes Steve Dilbeck.
Lastly
• For MLB pitchers, a question about protective headgear is vanity or sanity.
• Tony La Russa needs to overhaul the Diamondbacks, writes Dan Bickley.
• Derek Jeter reached a milestone.
• Bud Selig was lauded.
And today will be better than yesterday.
The other time frame in which one game or one week can make a difference -- really good or really bad -- is just before the trade deadline. Multiple scouts were dispatched to watch Cliff Lee in his return to the rotation Monday, the 322nd regular-season start of his career. Rival executives are well aware of all that Lee had accomplished before Monday’s game, with the Cy Young Award and the four All-Star appearances and the postseason dominance, but all they wanted to know was how is Lee throwing the ball right now, in this moment of his career, as they assess whether to pursue a deal with the Phillies.
Everything he had done before that game is really irrelevant; the only thing that really matters is what he’s capable of, relative to the $48 million or so still guaranteed to him for the next 1 1/3 seasons, and the prevailing opinion after the game among rival officials is that Lee was really bad against the Giants.
Here’s the beauty of this time of year, however. When Lee makes his next start Saturday against the Diamondbacks, he could change that perception dramatically with one dominant start. Look, the Phillies will be lucky to get out from underneath the contract between now and July 31 unless they make it a priority to move on and demonstrate a willingness to eat a lot of money and take a lesser prospect. But Lee could help their effort to trade him by pitching well in four days.
For other teams and players, small sample size will mean something:
The Tampa Bay Rays: At a time when they’re evaluating what to do with David Price, Ben Zobrist, et al, they just keep winning, day after day; after beating Adam Wainwright and the Cardinals on Tuesday night, they are 24-11 since June 10, and now just 5.5 games out of the wild card race, playing better than any AL team.
Along the way Tuesday, Joe Maddon yelled at Wainwright, who had yelled at him, and Maddon got ejected because of a misunderstanding.
Jake Peavy: He is 1-9 with a 4.72 ERA, but what will matter to interested teams -- and he’d be a great fit for the Giants and his former manager Bruce Bochy, who need to find somebody to step into Matt Cain’s spot in the rotation -- is how he’s throwing the ball lately. He pitched through some physical trouble earlier this season, but has been better over the last month, generally. Peavy allowed five runs in 6 1/3 innings Tuesday night, and in his previous three starts, he had surrendered six earned runs in 19 innings, with five walks and 19 strikeouts. It makes all the sense in the world for the Red Sox to move Peavy and clear a spot for a younger starter, and for the Giants or the Cardinals to add him, if the price is right.
• Peavy ranks 89 among 94 qualified starters in run support. (Incidentally: three of the bottom four pitchers in run support wear the same uniform.)
Most consecutive decisions lost
*Single season by a former Cy Young winner
Pitcher Losses Season
Jake Peavy 9 2014
Barry Zito 9 2010
Denny McLain 9 1971
Warren Spahn 9 1965
From the Elias Sports Bureau: Peavy is 0-9 over his last 15 starts. That ties the most consecutive losses (in decisions) in a single season by a pitcher who previously won the Cy Young award.
Peavy represents changes this year, as he did last year, writes Rob Bradford. Boston’s five-game winning streak is over.
Chase Headley: His small sample size with the Yankees so far is pretty good. Brian Cashman explained that the Yankees liked what they saw in the velocity readings of balls that Headley had hit following the epidural he received for a back issue.
Headley finished fifth in the MVP voting in 2012 after not putting up numbers anything close to that beforehand, and because of that, the Padres waited and waited to see if he could repeat that performance -- and dangled moderate offers. Headley rejected the proposals, preferring to also wait to post similar numbers to 2012. It didn’t happen, and now Headley has about two months in a hitters’ park to rebuild his value in free agency for the fall.
The Minnesota Twins: They went into the All-Star break on the buy/sell fence, but probably leaning toward selling -- and since then, they just keep losing.
Kurt Suzuki might be a one-of-a-kind item in the trade market -- a good everyday catcher having a good year. He will have value, particularly for a contender that sees a frontline catcher go down over the next week.
The New York Mets: They really don’t have much going in the way of trade stuff right now, according to MLB officials, although they would like to shed Bartolo Colon’s contract. Daniel Murphy just made the All-Star team and is an interesting player because he’s a sound hitter, but any team that wanted to acquire him would not only have to pay the Mets for Murphy’s value as a player, but what he represents to the Mets’ franchise -- which has some evaluators very skeptical that the team will trade him in the next eight days.
• Murphy might be someone who interests the Reds, writes John Fay.
Aaron Hill: At a time when the Yankees, Oakland and Giants are considering upgrades at second base, he is playing better, as Zach Buchanan writes.
But remember: Hill is owed about $4 million for the rest of this year, as well as $12 million for 2015 and $12 million for 2016. Presumably, other teams would want the Diamondbacks to eat some of that salary.
Trade stuff
1. Analytics contributed to the acquisition of Headley, writes John Harper.
2. Derrick Goold fields with trade-related questions, re: the Cardinals.
3. There’s no rush for the Phillies to make trades, writes David Murphy.
4. Antonio Bastardo's trade value is at its highest, writes Ryan Lawrence.
5. The Pirates and A.J. Burnett could join forces again.
6. The Cubs designated Darwin Barney for assignment. They’ve tried to trade him in the past.
7. The Tigers’ need in the bullpen continues to be an issue. It’s hard to imagine Detroit -- a team constructed to win the World Series -- will get past the deadline without adding Joaquin Benoit, Joakim Soria or a comparable reliever. Tuesday’s loss highlighted the need for relief help, writes Lynn Henning. Personally, I think Soria fits the best.
8. The Royals won’t be deadline sellers, says GM Dayton Moore.
9. You have to wonder if the Cardinals might be open to moving Randy Choate, given that Kevin Siegrist is coming back today and Choate is pitching rarely. Choate is under contract for $3 million for this year, and for $3 million for next year.
10. The Marlins remain interested in Jim Johnson.
11. Tommy Milone’s trade request has probably gotten more play than he expected, says Bob Melvin. Yep, undoubtedly. Would’ve been a much better career move to lay low and wait for the next opportunity. A lot of organizations in the position that Oakland is in now would entrench -- not respond, in other words, so that this sort of request is not rewarded and leads to similar requests from other players. Milone isn’t even eligible for arbitration yet. It’s too bad that someone didn’t get to him to have him to back off before this became public.
Ryan Zimmerman
Greg Fiume/Getty Images
Ryan Zimmerman left Tuesday's game against the Rockies with a strained right hamstring.
12. The Padres got a couple of journeymen in return for Chase Headley, but nobody should be surprised; that’s a fair deal for a struggling veteran only two-plus months away from becoming a free agent.
• Ryan Zimmerman appears to have suffered a significant injury.
• The Orioles are responding to the challenge coming out of the All-Star break.
• Gregory Polanco had a great at-bat right in the middle of the Pirates’ win over the Dodgers.
Dings and dents
1. Manny Machado was scratched with back spasms.
2. Drew VerHagen went on the disabled list.
3. Joel Peralta landed on the disabled list.
4. George Springer is dealing with some injury issues.
5. Geovany Soto landed on the disabled list.
6. Troy Tulowitzki landed on the disabled list again. You assume that at least some of his many injuries have been related to the effects of playing all of his home games in thin air.
Moves, deals and decisions
1. Aaron Sanchez was promoted and will pitch out of the Toronto bullpen.
Tuesday’s games
1. Jacob deGrom was dealing.
2. Adam Eaton extended his hitting streak.
3. The Brewers are having a good week.
4. For the Reds, the losing continues.
5. The Indians had another good night.
6. The Royals continue to be the strangest team in baseball, losing when they are under the most pressure and winning whenever we’re about to dismiss them.
7. Control problems hurt Adam Wainwright.
8. A Braves rally fell short.
9. The Jays bounced back.
10. The Giants had a great win, with help from Buster Posey, Brandon Crawford and Tim Lincecum.
11. Josh Hamilton has been losing his clout in the cleanup spot.
12. The Mariners got a good start but lost.
AL West
• The Athletics lost to the Astros, but Scott Kazmir lowered his season ERA to 2.32.
From the Elias Sports Bureau: Kazmir is the first Athletics pitcher with an ERA that low through 20 starts since Mike Moore (2.12) in 1989 (the Athletics won the World Series that season). Kazmir has allowed 1 earned run or fewer in four straight starts, posting an ERA of just 1.03 in that span (the Athletics have lost two of those four starts).
• The Rangers are improving, writes Jeff Wilson.
AL Central
• Justin Masterson was kicking around a soccer ball.
NL West
• Yasiel Puig as a center fielder might not be the best thing, writes Steve Dilbeck.
Lastly
• For MLB pitchers, a question about protective headgear is vanity or sanity.
• Tony La Russa needs to overhaul the Diamondbacks, writes Dan Bickley.
• Derek Jeter reached a milestone.
• Bud Selig was lauded.
And today will be better than yesterday.
Prospect Watch: Angels System Is Not Empty… Yet.
Victor Alcantara, RHP, Los Angeles Angels (Profile)
Level: Low-A Age: 21 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 87.0 IP, 48-79 BB-K, 64 H, 4.03 ERA
With the recent trade for the Padres’ Huston Street, the Angels all but emptied their minor league system.
The deal can be categorized as “quantity over quality” due to the lack of ceiling for many players in the system but the club still surrendered four prospects that likely would have landed on the post-season Top 15 prospects list (shortstop Jose Rondon, second baseman Taylor Lindsey as well as pitchers Elliot Morris and R.J. Alvarez).
In the wake of the trade, the Angels’ best prospects are low-level lottery tickets, recent draftees and a couple players with modest ceilings. Victor Alcantara — the organization’s most intriguing arm behind 17-year-old Ricardo Sanchez — falls into the first category.
The Dominican-born right-hander recently appeared in the MiLB Futures Game and is now in his third pro season — his first in full-season ball. At this point in his career he’s more of a “thrower than a “pitcher” but he tantalizes prospect evaluators with a mid-90s fastball that can tickle the upper levels. He’s pitched 87.0 innings in 2014 while allowing just 64 hits and whiffing 79, but his walk total of 48 shows how volatile his control is. Alcantara routinely struggles to command his fastball.
He’s interesting because he occasionally flashes a better-than-average breaking ball that causes hitters to look foolish. Other times, though, he drops his elbow and the pitch takes off on him and flatten out. The break is inconsistent at the best of times, going from loopy to tight with the drop of a hat.
Rarely does Alcantara throw a changeup. For that reason, combined with his stiff delivery, the young pitcher looks headed for a future role in the bullpen. He even throws exclusively from the stretch when he starts. Don’t get me wrong, Alcantara has a time to iron out the wrinkles in his game and settle into a permanent starter’s role but I truly think the cards are stacked against him.
And with his powerful heater (generated in part by his strong lower half), impressive ground-ball rates and durable frame he could develop into a key back-of-the-bullpen arm — especially if he can improve his command and control a full grade over the next few years. If not, he could still be a strong seventh inning reliever, or back-of-the-rotation innings-eater.
* * *
Ryan Rua, IF/OF, Texas Rangers (Profile)
Level: Double-A/Triple-A Age: 24 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 377 PA, .299/.369/.488, 15 HR, 5 SB, 37-73 BB-K
Hitting 32 home runs in 2013 was both a blessing and a curse for Ryan Rua. On one hand, the versatile fielder landed on prospect evaluators’ “must watch” list. On the other, though, the unexpected offensive barrage set unrealistic expectations for future production (just ask Mitch Einertson).
The 24-year-old Rangers prospect produced those power numbers split between (mostly) Low-A ball and Double-A ball — after he skipped High-A ball entirely. While producing those numbers both his batting average (.247) and, more importantly, his on-base percentage (.347) struggled and gave him the appearance of a one-dimensional player.
Fast-forward a year, though, and Rua is showing signs of becoming a more complete player while splitting time between Double-A and Triple-A. He’s still hit 15 home runs in 92 games but he’s hitting just below .300 and his on-base percentage is up to .369 — numbers more in line with his first two pro seasons.
The big issue for Rua is where he’s going to play on a baseball field. The majority of his experience has come at the hot corner but his results have been just so-so… a sentiment that can be shared during his time at second base. He’s dabbled at first base, as well as in the corner outfield slots. He’s likely headed for a future as an offensive-minded utility player capable of playing four to five times a week if needed.
Now in his fourth pro season, the former 17th round pick is due to be added to the 40-man roster by November (at the latest) or he’ll be exposed to the Rule 5 draft. The Rangers will most likely protect him so don’t be surprised to see him added to the roster in September for a brief taste of The Show.
Level: Low-A Age: 21 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 87.0 IP, 48-79 BB-K, 64 H, 4.03 ERA
With the recent trade for the Padres’ Huston Street, the Angels all but emptied their minor league system.
The deal can be categorized as “quantity over quality” due to the lack of ceiling for many players in the system but the club still surrendered four prospects that likely would have landed on the post-season Top 15 prospects list (shortstop Jose Rondon, second baseman Taylor Lindsey as well as pitchers Elliot Morris and R.J. Alvarez).
In the wake of the trade, the Angels’ best prospects are low-level lottery tickets, recent draftees and a couple players with modest ceilings. Victor Alcantara — the organization’s most intriguing arm behind 17-year-old Ricardo Sanchez — falls into the first category.
The Dominican-born right-hander recently appeared in the MiLB Futures Game and is now in his third pro season — his first in full-season ball. At this point in his career he’s more of a “thrower than a “pitcher” but he tantalizes prospect evaluators with a mid-90s fastball that can tickle the upper levels. He’s pitched 87.0 innings in 2014 while allowing just 64 hits and whiffing 79, but his walk total of 48 shows how volatile his control is. Alcantara routinely struggles to command his fastball.
He’s interesting because he occasionally flashes a better-than-average breaking ball that causes hitters to look foolish. Other times, though, he drops his elbow and the pitch takes off on him and flatten out. The break is inconsistent at the best of times, going from loopy to tight with the drop of a hat.
Rarely does Alcantara throw a changeup. For that reason, combined with his stiff delivery, the young pitcher looks headed for a future role in the bullpen. He even throws exclusively from the stretch when he starts. Don’t get me wrong, Alcantara has a time to iron out the wrinkles in his game and settle into a permanent starter’s role but I truly think the cards are stacked against him.
And with his powerful heater (generated in part by his strong lower half), impressive ground-ball rates and durable frame he could develop into a key back-of-the-bullpen arm — especially if he can improve his command and control a full grade over the next few years. If not, he could still be a strong seventh inning reliever, or back-of-the-rotation innings-eater.
* * *
Ryan Rua, IF/OF, Texas Rangers (Profile)
Level: Double-A/Triple-A Age: 24 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 377 PA, .299/.369/.488, 15 HR, 5 SB, 37-73 BB-K
Hitting 32 home runs in 2013 was both a blessing and a curse for Ryan Rua. On one hand, the versatile fielder landed on prospect evaluators’ “must watch” list. On the other, though, the unexpected offensive barrage set unrealistic expectations for future production (just ask Mitch Einertson).
The 24-year-old Rangers prospect produced those power numbers split between (mostly) Low-A ball and Double-A ball — after he skipped High-A ball entirely. While producing those numbers both his batting average (.247) and, more importantly, his on-base percentage (.347) struggled and gave him the appearance of a one-dimensional player.
Fast-forward a year, though, and Rua is showing signs of becoming a more complete player while splitting time between Double-A and Triple-A. He’s still hit 15 home runs in 92 games but he’s hitting just below .300 and his on-base percentage is up to .369 — numbers more in line with his first two pro seasons.
The big issue for Rua is where he’s going to play on a baseball field. The majority of his experience has come at the hot corner but his results have been just so-so… a sentiment that can be shared during his time at second base. He’s dabbled at first base, as well as in the corner outfield slots. He’s likely headed for a future as an offensive-minded utility player capable of playing four to five times a week if needed.
Now in his fourth pro season, the former 17th round pick is due to be added to the 40-man roster by November (at the latest) or he’ll be exposed to the Rule 5 draft. The Rangers will most likely protect him so don’t be surprised to see him added to the roster in September for a brief taste of The Show.
Midseason Pick-Ups and Fighting Regression.
I remember… some of the details about the clearest time regression to the mean was ever explained to me. It wasn’t explained to me personally; it was a blog post somewhere, or maybe a print-published article, and it simply showed league-leading batting averages, and then the batting averages for the same players the next season. If you’re familiar with the concept of regression, of course you know that, the next season, the batting averages were pretty much all down. It couldn’t have been more simple, and it couldn’t have been more helpful, and regression is so common a term now within baseball analysis that we all get to feel like part-time mathematicians. Especially around here, most people are smart enough to factor regression into almost everything.
It applies between seasons, and it applies within seasons. It’s a little like gravity — it’s always a factor, whether you like it or not, and it’s built into good player projections. It’s built into good standings projections. If a player has been really good for a time, odds are, going forward, he’s going to be less good. If a team has been really good for a time, odds are, the same thing. Regression is among the more powerful forces, but there is some evidence of teams being able to fight it off. Let’s talk about midseason trades.
Trade talk is all the rage right now, with the soft deadline coming up in just over a week. It’s possible there could be some true blockbusters, if the Rays decide to move David Price, or if the Royals decide to move James Shields, or if the Red Sox decide to move Jon Lester. It’s also possible it could be a real boring pile of crap, if teams on the fringes decide they’re still in the hunt. For all I know, we’ve already seen all the big moves we’re going to see. But in theory, anything’s possible, and I found myself wondering about the history of teams who’ve made significant midseason acquisitions. How much did those acquisitions actually help? I wasn’t necessarily going for anything with the research; I just wanted to have an answer.
So I examined the wild-card era, between 1995 – 2013. Using the FanGraphs leaderboards, I found qualified position players and starting pitchers who changed teams in those seasons. I set a minimum season threshold of 2 WAR, having determined that a player worth more than that can be called a significant pick-up. Checking with Baseball-Reference for every single player, I confirmed trades and trade dates, and I narrowed the list to players added by contending teams. I made sure that the teams had at least 40 games played prior to the acquisition, and at least 40 games played following the acquisition. I was left with a sample numbering 128. Not too big, not too small; enough to conclude, I don’t know, something.
So we’ve got 128 significant midseason pick-ups by contending teams. This ignores relievers and guys who got hurt, but, oh well. Now, at the time of the pick-ups, the teams all had an average winning percentage of .541. They had a median winning percentage of .535. That translates to either about 88 wins over a full season, or about 87. That makes perfect sense — they’re good, contending teams doing the adding, because they want to improve their standing in the race.
Forget about the additions for a moment. Now remember what you know about regression to the mean. We’re looking at a sample of teams, much of the way through the season, on pace to win 87 – 88 games. The rest of the way, then, you’d expect them to regress, perhaps to an 85-win pace, or 84. That is, without any extraordinary moves being made. Success generally equals success plus luck, and so on and so forth, you know these principles by now.
Back to the additions. All the 128 players, by the way, averaged 3.4 WAR. Before the additions, the teams had an average winning percentage of .541, and a median winning percentage of .535. After the additions, the teams had an average winning percentage of .553, and an identical median. Over a full season, that would be a 90-win pace. So not only did the teams not regress; they actually improved, which of course was sort of the point. But when I was gathering these numbers, I expected for the teams after the additions to play maybe just as well as they already had. I didn’t think they’d step up. I thought the additions might just somewhat counter the coming regression, evening things out.
I don’t know how much to make of this, and of course every situation is different for every team and every transaction, but remember also that those added players probably aren’t replacing replacement-level players, exactly. They likely would’ve been replacing below-average players, and that’s different. By overall average, the teams improved from an 88-win pace to a 90-win pace. Using the medians, they improved from an 87-win pace to a 90-win pace. There’s plenty of noise in either direction, but the sample isn’t small.
The numbers aren’t statistically significantly different, so I suppose it’s possible this means nothing. Also, sometimes contending teams make multiple upgrades in the middle of the year, so as to have the best stretch run they can. They try to fill all the holes somehow, and those little additions can add up. But, the idea behind a significant midseason addition is to improve, and that’s by and large what’s happened, with teams fighting off regression to the mean. They haven’t just improved their levels of true talent. They’ve improved their levels of performance, and that’s not an easy thing for teams already performing quite well.
It applies between seasons, and it applies within seasons. It’s a little like gravity — it’s always a factor, whether you like it or not, and it’s built into good player projections. It’s built into good standings projections. If a player has been really good for a time, odds are, going forward, he’s going to be less good. If a team has been really good for a time, odds are, the same thing. Regression is among the more powerful forces, but there is some evidence of teams being able to fight it off. Let’s talk about midseason trades.
Trade talk is all the rage right now, with the soft deadline coming up in just over a week. It’s possible there could be some true blockbusters, if the Rays decide to move David Price, or if the Royals decide to move James Shields, or if the Red Sox decide to move Jon Lester. It’s also possible it could be a real boring pile of crap, if teams on the fringes decide they’re still in the hunt. For all I know, we’ve already seen all the big moves we’re going to see. But in theory, anything’s possible, and I found myself wondering about the history of teams who’ve made significant midseason acquisitions. How much did those acquisitions actually help? I wasn’t necessarily going for anything with the research; I just wanted to have an answer.
So I examined the wild-card era, between 1995 – 2013. Using the FanGraphs leaderboards, I found qualified position players and starting pitchers who changed teams in those seasons. I set a minimum season threshold of 2 WAR, having determined that a player worth more than that can be called a significant pick-up. Checking with Baseball-Reference for every single player, I confirmed trades and trade dates, and I narrowed the list to players added by contending teams. I made sure that the teams had at least 40 games played prior to the acquisition, and at least 40 games played following the acquisition. I was left with a sample numbering 128. Not too big, not too small; enough to conclude, I don’t know, something.
So we’ve got 128 significant midseason pick-ups by contending teams. This ignores relievers and guys who got hurt, but, oh well. Now, at the time of the pick-ups, the teams all had an average winning percentage of .541. They had a median winning percentage of .535. That translates to either about 88 wins over a full season, or about 87. That makes perfect sense — they’re good, contending teams doing the adding, because they want to improve their standing in the race.
Forget about the additions for a moment. Now remember what you know about regression to the mean. We’re looking at a sample of teams, much of the way through the season, on pace to win 87 – 88 games. The rest of the way, then, you’d expect them to regress, perhaps to an 85-win pace, or 84. That is, without any extraordinary moves being made. Success generally equals success plus luck, and so on and so forth, you know these principles by now.
Back to the additions. All the 128 players, by the way, averaged 3.4 WAR. Before the additions, the teams had an average winning percentage of .541, and a median winning percentage of .535. After the additions, the teams had an average winning percentage of .553, and an identical median. Over a full season, that would be a 90-win pace. So not only did the teams not regress; they actually improved, which of course was sort of the point. But when I was gathering these numbers, I expected for the teams after the additions to play maybe just as well as they already had. I didn’t think they’d step up. I thought the additions might just somewhat counter the coming regression, evening things out.
I don’t know how much to make of this, and of course every situation is different for every team and every transaction, but remember also that those added players probably aren’t replacing replacement-level players, exactly. They likely would’ve been replacing below-average players, and that’s different. By overall average, the teams improved from an 88-win pace to a 90-win pace. Using the medians, they improved from an 87-win pace to a 90-win pace. There’s plenty of noise in either direction, but the sample isn’t small.
The numbers aren’t statistically significantly different, so I suppose it’s possible this means nothing. Also, sometimes contending teams make multiple upgrades in the middle of the year, so as to have the best stretch run they can. They try to fill all the holes somehow, and those little additions can add up. But, the idea behind a significant midseason addition is to improve, and that’s by and large what’s happened, with teams fighting off regression to the mean. They haven’t just improved their levels of true talent. They’ve improved their levels of performance, and that’s not an easy thing for teams already performing quite well.
The Top 10 Prospects Currently by Projected WAR.
Recently, in these pages, Marc Hulet released his midseason top-25 prospect list — designed, that particular post, to sort out the best prospects in baseball according to overall future potential. What follows is a different thing than that — designed to identify not baseball’s top prospects, but rather the rookie-eligible players* who are most ready to produce wins at the major-league level (regardless of whether they’re likely to receive the opportunity to do so). What it is not is an attempt to account for any kind of future value — for which reason it’s unlikely to resemble very closely those prospect lists such as that recently released by Hulet.
*In this case, defined as any player who’s recorded fewer than 130 at-bats or 50 innings — which is to say, there’s been no attempt to identify each player’s time spent on the active roster, on account of that’s a super tedious endeavor.
To assemble the following collection of 10 prospects, what I’ve done first is to calculate prorated rest-of-season WAR figures for all players for whom either the Steamer or ZiPS projection systems have produced such a forecast. Hitters’ numbers are normalized to 550 plate appearances; starting pitchers’, to 150 innings — i.e. the playing-time thresholds at which a league-average player would produce approximately a 2.0 WAR. Catcher projections are prorated to 415 plate appearances to account for their reduced playing time.
Owing to how the two systems are structured, the majority of the numbers which follow represent only the relevant prospect’s Steamer projection. Players eligible for the list either (a) enter their age-26 season or lower in 2014 or, alternatively, (b) were signed as international free agents this offseason.
Finally, note that, in many cases, defensive value has been calculated entirely by positional adjustment based on the relevant player’s minor-league defensive starts — which is to say, there has been no attempt to account for the runs a player is likely to save in the field. As a result, players with an impressive offensive profile relative to their position are sometimes perhaps overvalued — that is, in such cases where their actual defensive skills are sub-par.
10. Jose Pirela, 2B/SS, New York AL (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 5.8% 12.7% 10 .305 1.7
Based on his defensive history, Pirela is regarded as a second baseman-cum-shortstop — this, despite having played much of the former, almost none of the latter, and a considerable amount of left field in 2014. All things being equal, a defensively average shortstop is about 1.5 wins more valuable over the course of a season than a defensively average left fielder, so it’s likely that Pirela’s current and future utility depends on his capacity to occupy that space towards the more demanding end of the defensive spectrum.
9. Robert Kral, C, San Diego (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
415 10.9% 20.4% 11 .300 1.8
Kral’s July has been a microcosm of his entire season, really. Over 26 plate appearances this month, he’s recorded a walk-to-strikeout ratio of 5:4. Which, that’s good. What else he’s done is produce a .118 BABIP and overall line of .095/.269/.095. Not as good, that. Steamer appears to weigh the above-average plate-discipline figures much more heavily than dismal batted-ball numbers, however — which fact, in conjunction with Kral’s catcher positional adjustment and historical batting record, conspires to create a more optimistic projection than one might otherwise suppose.
8. Shawn Zarraga, C, Milwaukee (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
415 7.6% 12.4% 5 .309 1.8
Zarraga’s profile is nearly identical to Kral’s insofar as he (a) has been slightly old for his levels, (b) has recorded excellent plate-discipline figures, and (c) benefits from the catcher’s positional adjustment in terms of projected value. One difference is this: while Kral’s slash stats are unsightly, Zarraga has actually helped the case for some kind of future in the majors. To wit: in 235 plate appearances between Double- and Triple-A, the 25-year-old possesses a line of .358/.453/.458. The Pacific Coast League has posed a greater challenge for Zarraga; his season as a while, however, has been a success.
7. Miguel Sano, 3B, Minnesota (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 8.2% 28.0% 22 .313 1.8
Despite a Tommy John procedure which will prevent him from recording a single plate appearance this season, Sano still appeared 12th and 9th on Marc Hulet’s and Baseball America’s midseason prospect lists. The projections suggest that, in addition his considerable future value, that Sano also possesses quite a bit in terms of present value, as well. For example: his projected wOBA according to Steamer (.313) is almost precisely the figure which that same projection has produced for current Twins third baseman Trevor Plouffe (.314).
6. Andrew Susac, C, San Francisco (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
415 9.6% 22.2% 10 .297 1.8
Given a choice, there are likely other organizations for which a catching prospect would choose to play than San Francisco — which parent club features in Buster Posey the best catcher in the majors according both to Steamer and ZiPS. After a promising 2013 campaign at Double-A Richmond, however, Susac has almost exactly replicated that performance this season with Triple-A Fresno, recording walk and strikeout rates of 13.6% and 20.7%, respectively, and a slash line of .265/.376/.456 in 242 plate appearances.
5. Kris Bryant, 3B, Chicago NL (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 7.8% 29.3% 25 .320 1.9
It’s difficult for a player to produce much value at the major-league level while striking out 30% of the time without also hitting about a billion homers per year. Fortunately, both scouting reports and also the projections suggest that Bryant is capable of hitting about a billion home runs per year.
4. Arismendy Alcantara, 2B/OF, Chicago NL (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 6.4% 24.3% 12 .310 2.0
The newly promoted Alcantara differs from a number of other players on this list insofar as he’s ever exhibited what might be considered elite, or even above-average, plate-discipline numbers. Over nearly 2,000 plate appearances as a minor leaguer, the 22-year-old has produced walk and strikeout rates of just 6.8% and 20.9%, respectively. What he does well, though, is almost every other baseball thing, including (but not limited to): hit for reasonable power, play above-average defense, and steal bases with considerable efficiency.
3. Kyle Zimmer, RHP, Kansas City (Profile)
IP K/9 BB/9 HR/9 FIP WAR
150 8.0 3.4 0.99 4.08 2.0
Zimmer appeared on both the May and June editions of this same thing — and now appears here in July — despite having recorded zero appearances all season. According to Pete Grathhoffte of the Kansas City Star, however, the right-handed Zimmer was scheduled to begin throwing on whatever the first Monday was after July 12th. Presumably, he’s done that now. Steamer doesn’t know about all that, really. What it knows is that Zimmer throws hard and has produced excellent professional numbers.
2. Chris Taylor, SS, Seattle (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 7.7% 20.5% 6 .306 2.1
The lack of enthusiasm for Taylor is a bit mysterious. He’s only 23 years old, appears to possess shortstop-type defensive skills, and is slashing .329/.400/.500 at Triple-A. Neverthless, he’s absent from Baseball America’s top-50 midseason prospect list (among others). In any case, the computer math which informs Jared Cross’s Steamer projection system regards the Virginia product much more favorably.
1. Ty Kelly, 2B/3B, Seattle (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 11.2% 15.5% 8 .321 2.1
Kelly bears some resemblance to the player who appears 10th on this list, Yankees prospect Jose Pirela — insofar, that is, as he’s historically played only within the infield but has been deployed much more frequently as an outfielder in the high minors. He’s recorded walk and strikeout rates of 16.9% and 16.7%, respectively, with Triple-A Tacoma this year, though — and that sort of plate discipline combined with reasonable power and the capacity to play second or third conspires to produce a league-average ballplayer.
***
Three Brief Comments:
The assembly of this list was performed, in part, by hand. While the author has attempted to remain vigilant, he is also notoriously incompetent. The reader is invited to raise any relevant concerns in the comments section.
The players who’ve become ineligible for this list since the June edition are as follows: Tommy La Stella and Marcus Stroman and Gregory Polanco.
Still eligible for this list is Mookie Betts, although his combined projection (1.708 WAR per 550 PA) leaves him just behind Pirela (1.7416 WAR per 550 PA).
*In this case, defined as any player who’s recorded fewer than 130 at-bats or 50 innings — which is to say, there’s been no attempt to identify each player’s time spent on the active roster, on account of that’s a super tedious endeavor.
To assemble the following collection of 10 prospects, what I’ve done first is to calculate prorated rest-of-season WAR figures for all players for whom either the Steamer or ZiPS projection systems have produced such a forecast. Hitters’ numbers are normalized to 550 plate appearances; starting pitchers’, to 150 innings — i.e. the playing-time thresholds at which a league-average player would produce approximately a 2.0 WAR. Catcher projections are prorated to 415 plate appearances to account for their reduced playing time.
Owing to how the two systems are structured, the majority of the numbers which follow represent only the relevant prospect’s Steamer projection. Players eligible for the list either (a) enter their age-26 season or lower in 2014 or, alternatively, (b) were signed as international free agents this offseason.
Finally, note that, in many cases, defensive value has been calculated entirely by positional adjustment based on the relevant player’s minor-league defensive starts — which is to say, there has been no attempt to account for the runs a player is likely to save in the field. As a result, players with an impressive offensive profile relative to their position are sometimes perhaps overvalued — that is, in such cases where their actual defensive skills are sub-par.
10. Jose Pirela, 2B/SS, New York AL (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 5.8% 12.7% 10 .305 1.7
Based on his defensive history, Pirela is regarded as a second baseman-cum-shortstop — this, despite having played much of the former, almost none of the latter, and a considerable amount of left field in 2014. All things being equal, a defensively average shortstop is about 1.5 wins more valuable over the course of a season than a defensively average left fielder, so it’s likely that Pirela’s current and future utility depends on his capacity to occupy that space towards the more demanding end of the defensive spectrum.
9. Robert Kral, C, San Diego (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
415 10.9% 20.4% 11 .300 1.8
Kral’s July has been a microcosm of his entire season, really. Over 26 plate appearances this month, he’s recorded a walk-to-strikeout ratio of 5:4. Which, that’s good. What else he’s done is produce a .118 BABIP and overall line of .095/.269/.095. Not as good, that. Steamer appears to weigh the above-average plate-discipline figures much more heavily than dismal batted-ball numbers, however — which fact, in conjunction with Kral’s catcher positional adjustment and historical batting record, conspires to create a more optimistic projection than one might otherwise suppose.
8. Shawn Zarraga, C, Milwaukee (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
415 7.6% 12.4% 5 .309 1.8
Zarraga’s profile is nearly identical to Kral’s insofar as he (a) has been slightly old for his levels, (b) has recorded excellent plate-discipline figures, and (c) benefits from the catcher’s positional adjustment in terms of projected value. One difference is this: while Kral’s slash stats are unsightly, Zarraga has actually helped the case for some kind of future in the majors. To wit: in 235 plate appearances between Double- and Triple-A, the 25-year-old possesses a line of .358/.453/.458. The Pacific Coast League has posed a greater challenge for Zarraga; his season as a while, however, has been a success.
7. Miguel Sano, 3B, Minnesota (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 8.2% 28.0% 22 .313 1.8
Despite a Tommy John procedure which will prevent him from recording a single plate appearance this season, Sano still appeared 12th and 9th on Marc Hulet’s and Baseball America’s midseason prospect lists. The projections suggest that, in addition his considerable future value, that Sano also possesses quite a bit in terms of present value, as well. For example: his projected wOBA according to Steamer (.313) is almost precisely the figure which that same projection has produced for current Twins third baseman Trevor Plouffe (.314).
6. Andrew Susac, C, San Francisco (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
415 9.6% 22.2% 10 .297 1.8
Given a choice, there are likely other organizations for which a catching prospect would choose to play than San Francisco — which parent club features in Buster Posey the best catcher in the majors according both to Steamer and ZiPS. After a promising 2013 campaign at Double-A Richmond, however, Susac has almost exactly replicated that performance this season with Triple-A Fresno, recording walk and strikeout rates of 13.6% and 20.7%, respectively, and a slash line of .265/.376/.456 in 242 plate appearances.
5. Kris Bryant, 3B, Chicago NL (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 7.8% 29.3% 25 .320 1.9
It’s difficult for a player to produce much value at the major-league level while striking out 30% of the time without also hitting about a billion homers per year. Fortunately, both scouting reports and also the projections suggest that Bryant is capable of hitting about a billion home runs per year.
4. Arismendy Alcantara, 2B/OF, Chicago NL (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 6.4% 24.3% 12 .310 2.0
The newly promoted Alcantara differs from a number of other players on this list insofar as he’s ever exhibited what might be considered elite, or even above-average, plate-discipline numbers. Over nearly 2,000 plate appearances as a minor leaguer, the 22-year-old has produced walk and strikeout rates of just 6.8% and 20.9%, respectively. What he does well, though, is almost every other baseball thing, including (but not limited to): hit for reasonable power, play above-average defense, and steal bases with considerable efficiency.
3. Kyle Zimmer, RHP, Kansas City (Profile)
IP K/9 BB/9 HR/9 FIP WAR
150 8.0 3.4 0.99 4.08 2.0
Zimmer appeared on both the May and June editions of this same thing — and now appears here in July — despite having recorded zero appearances all season. According to Pete Grathhoffte of the Kansas City Star, however, the right-handed Zimmer was scheduled to begin throwing on whatever the first Monday was after July 12th. Presumably, he’s done that now. Steamer doesn’t know about all that, really. What it knows is that Zimmer throws hard and has produced excellent professional numbers.
2. Chris Taylor, SS, Seattle (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 7.7% 20.5% 6 .306 2.1
The lack of enthusiasm for Taylor is a bit mysterious. He’s only 23 years old, appears to possess shortstop-type defensive skills, and is slashing .329/.400/.500 at Triple-A. Neverthless, he’s absent from Baseball America’s top-50 midseason prospect list (among others). In any case, the computer math which informs Jared Cross’s Steamer projection system regards the Virginia product much more favorably.
1. Ty Kelly, 2B/3B, Seattle (Profile)
PA BB% K% HR wOBA WAR
550 11.2% 15.5% 8 .321 2.1
Kelly bears some resemblance to the player who appears 10th on this list, Yankees prospect Jose Pirela — insofar, that is, as he’s historically played only within the infield but has been deployed much more frequently as an outfielder in the high minors. He’s recorded walk and strikeout rates of 16.9% and 16.7%, respectively, with Triple-A Tacoma this year, though — and that sort of plate discipline combined with reasonable power and the capacity to play second or third conspires to produce a league-average ballplayer.
***
Three Brief Comments:
The assembly of this list was performed, in part, by hand. While the author has attempted to remain vigilant, he is also notoriously incompetent. The reader is invited to raise any relevant concerns in the comments section.
The players who’ve become ineligible for this list since the June edition are as follows: Tommy La Stella and Marcus Stroman and Gregory Polanco.
Still eligible for this list is Mookie Betts, although his combined projection (1.708 WAR per 550 PA) leaves him just behind Pirela (1.7416 WAR per 550 PA).
Padres Finally Trade Chase Headley Two Years Too Late.
In 2012, 28-year-old Chase Headley put up one of the five best seasons in the history of the Padres franchise, a 7.2 WAR year that made him one of the six most valuable hitters in baseball that year. He had two years of team control remaining, he was on the right side of 30 and he was playing a position that is always difficult to fill ably. His value was through the roof; the Padres could have had almost anything they wanted for him. Preferring to try to win, they made a few extension offers that didn’t pan out, and kept him around to go 119-141 since the end of 2012.
Less than two years later, he’s been traded to the Yankees for a 27-year-old infielder who was a minor league free agent last winter (Yangervis Solarte), an inconsistent (though talented) 23-year-old A-ball pitcher who wasn’t on anyone’s top-100 list (Rafael De Paula), the loss of the option to give Headley a qualifying offer if they wanted, and they even had to kick in a million dollars to the Yankees to make it happen. When you talk about holding on to an asset too long, well, this is the prime example right here. Headley is no longer part of the Padres’ future, and he didn’t turn into anything that is very likely to be a big part of that future.
While the return is pretty disappointing, it’s less about thinking the Padres got taken — it’s pretty safe to assume they didn’t currently have offers better than Solarte/De Paula on the table, or else they would have accepted them — and more about showing just how far Headley’s value had dropped. Since the end of that magical 2012, in which he went deep 31 times and had a line of .286/.376/.498, Headley had hit a mere .243/.330/.384 with 20 homers.
He missed the first two weeks of 2013 with a thumb fracture, had left knee surgery that winter — after admitting he’d played through pain all year, just another example of trying to “tough it out” not benefiting anyone — spent two weeks on the DL with a calf strain earlier this year, and missed a few days last month with a sore back.
If seeing his wRC+ drop from 145 to 113 last year was a disappointment, this year has been a disaster. Headley has a .296 OBP and an 88 wRC+, each among the worst marks for regular third basemen in the game, though that’s been somewhat anchored down by an absolutely brutal April (.186/.250/.314). He was never realistically going to repeat that 2012, and you could perhaps assign some blame for the down 2013 to the knee and thumb injuries, but he’s been basically healthy this year.
Season Z-Swing% O-Contact%
2012 67.2% 52.0%
2013 67.2% 54.2%
2014 61.9% 57.7%
Like the rest of the Padres other than Seth Smith, the offense has just completely disappeared, and there’s some pretty disturbing peripherals behind it. He’s striking out about the same as he always has, but his walk rate has dropped from 12.3% to 11.2% to 7.2%, and as you can see at the right, that’s partially because he’s swinging at fewer balls in the zone and connecting with more balls outside the zone. If you want to help a pitcher, offering at more “bad” pitches and fewer “good” ones is a fantastic way to do it.
So why, despite how far Headley has fallen, does this make so much sense for the Yankees? It does, of course, even if they have minimal playoff odds, a ton of holes, and probably have no chance whatsoever if Masahiro Tanaka isn’t able to return healthy and quickly. It’s mostly because the risk here is just so minimal. They owe Headley the remainder of his $10.525 million this year, which is just over $4m at this point — nothing for a team like the Yankees, and partially offset by the $1m San Diego sent over — and they give up very little to see if Headley can regain his lost magic.
Solarte is just a guy, someone who needed seven years just to get to Triple-A, then turned a lucky April (143 wRC+, .349 BABIP) into a good May (120 wRC+, .279) and a disaster June/July (38 wRC+, .188 BABIP) as pitchers got a second look at him, even finding himself back in Triple-A earlier this month. De Paula is described by Jim Callis as a “one pitch reliever,” and wasn’t even ranked in the Yankees’ Top 15 last winter at Minor League Ball. In May, former FG contributor Mike Axisa had him as No. 20 in the Yankees system. From a talent and financial perspective, it’s a no-brainer.
It’s also a good fit because the Yankees’ infield has been a well-known issue, outside of the nice rebound from first baseman Mark Teixeira. Their third basemen haven’t been awful, with a No.15 ranking in both WAR and wRC+, but most of that was from Solarte’s unsustainable first six weeks.
That’s obviously not production they were going to get going forward, and Kelly Johnson and Zelous Wheeler aren’t really ideal solutions for a team that still thinks it can win, thanks to being only four games out of the division lead — nor are either close to Headley’s equal on defense. Neither Steamer nor ZiPS have overreacted to Headley’s poor season, both expecting he can contribute around a 110 wRC+ going forward — which is, it should be noted, just about exactly what he’s had since coming back from the back pain last month.
wRC+ is park-adjusted, of course, so a simple move from Petco to Yankee Stadium isn’t going to explode that number by itself, but it also can’t be ignored how big that is for Headley. In the notoriously unfriendly park in San Diego, his career line is .243/.331/.372; on the road, it’s .286/.360/.444, which is a 118 wRC+. As a lefty hitter pulling the ball to right, it’s .368/.367/.599, and he could hardly be moving to a friendlier park for lefty power. No, we can’t simply double a road line and expect that. No, we have no idea how Headley will respond moving from San Diego to the Bronx.
But based on what we do know, it’s absolutely worth it for the Yankees to find out: As with the Vidal Nuno for Brandon McCarthy deal, Brian Cashman managed to get incremental improvements without giving up much of anything at all. It’s probably not enough to get into the playoffs, and again that’s all dependent on Tanaka. It’s clearly still worth doing, particularly when it prevents a rival like Toronto from doing the same thing.
For the Padres, tomorrow is a full month since GM Josh Byrnes was fired. They’ve now traded Headley and Huston Street, and extended Seth Smith, and those are big moves to be made by placeholders Omar Minaya and A.J. Hinch.
They might not have been able to do better than this right now for Headley; they might have dodged a bullet by not giving him a rich extension a year ago; they might not have wanted to see whether Headley would have become the first player to accept a qualifying offer and have him take up $15 million of their 2015 payroll. Taken together, this all adds up for them. It’s just an incredibly disappointing outcome in a relatively short time, for a franchise that has seen more than its share of disappointment.
Less than two years later, he’s been traded to the Yankees for a 27-year-old infielder who was a minor league free agent last winter (Yangervis Solarte), an inconsistent (though talented) 23-year-old A-ball pitcher who wasn’t on anyone’s top-100 list (Rafael De Paula), the loss of the option to give Headley a qualifying offer if they wanted, and they even had to kick in a million dollars to the Yankees to make it happen. When you talk about holding on to an asset too long, well, this is the prime example right here. Headley is no longer part of the Padres’ future, and he didn’t turn into anything that is very likely to be a big part of that future.
While the return is pretty disappointing, it’s less about thinking the Padres got taken — it’s pretty safe to assume they didn’t currently have offers better than Solarte/De Paula on the table, or else they would have accepted them — and more about showing just how far Headley’s value had dropped. Since the end of that magical 2012, in which he went deep 31 times and had a line of .286/.376/.498, Headley had hit a mere .243/.330/.384 with 20 homers.
He missed the first two weeks of 2013 with a thumb fracture, had left knee surgery that winter — after admitting he’d played through pain all year, just another example of trying to “tough it out” not benefiting anyone — spent two weeks on the DL with a calf strain earlier this year, and missed a few days last month with a sore back.
If seeing his wRC+ drop from 145 to 113 last year was a disappointment, this year has been a disaster. Headley has a .296 OBP and an 88 wRC+, each among the worst marks for regular third basemen in the game, though that’s been somewhat anchored down by an absolutely brutal April (.186/.250/.314). He was never realistically going to repeat that 2012, and you could perhaps assign some blame for the down 2013 to the knee and thumb injuries, but he’s been basically healthy this year.
Season Z-Swing% O-Contact%
2012 67.2% 52.0%
2013 67.2% 54.2%
2014 61.9% 57.7%
Like the rest of the Padres other than Seth Smith, the offense has just completely disappeared, and there’s some pretty disturbing peripherals behind it. He’s striking out about the same as he always has, but his walk rate has dropped from 12.3% to 11.2% to 7.2%, and as you can see at the right, that’s partially because he’s swinging at fewer balls in the zone and connecting with more balls outside the zone. If you want to help a pitcher, offering at more “bad” pitches and fewer “good” ones is a fantastic way to do it.
So why, despite how far Headley has fallen, does this make so much sense for the Yankees? It does, of course, even if they have minimal playoff odds, a ton of holes, and probably have no chance whatsoever if Masahiro Tanaka isn’t able to return healthy and quickly. It’s mostly because the risk here is just so minimal. They owe Headley the remainder of his $10.525 million this year, which is just over $4m at this point — nothing for a team like the Yankees, and partially offset by the $1m San Diego sent over — and they give up very little to see if Headley can regain his lost magic.
Solarte is just a guy, someone who needed seven years just to get to Triple-A, then turned a lucky April (143 wRC+, .349 BABIP) into a good May (120 wRC+, .279) and a disaster June/July (38 wRC+, .188 BABIP) as pitchers got a second look at him, even finding himself back in Triple-A earlier this month. De Paula is described by Jim Callis as a “one pitch reliever,” and wasn’t even ranked in the Yankees’ Top 15 last winter at Minor League Ball. In May, former FG contributor Mike Axisa had him as No. 20 in the Yankees system. From a talent and financial perspective, it’s a no-brainer.
It’s also a good fit because the Yankees’ infield has been a well-known issue, outside of the nice rebound from first baseman Mark Teixeira. Their third basemen haven’t been awful, with a No.15 ranking in both WAR and wRC+, but most of that was from Solarte’s unsustainable first six weeks.
That’s obviously not production they were going to get going forward, and Kelly Johnson and Zelous Wheeler aren’t really ideal solutions for a team that still thinks it can win, thanks to being only four games out of the division lead — nor are either close to Headley’s equal on defense. Neither Steamer nor ZiPS have overreacted to Headley’s poor season, both expecting he can contribute around a 110 wRC+ going forward — which is, it should be noted, just about exactly what he’s had since coming back from the back pain last month.
wRC+ is park-adjusted, of course, so a simple move from Petco to Yankee Stadium isn’t going to explode that number by itself, but it also can’t be ignored how big that is for Headley. In the notoriously unfriendly park in San Diego, his career line is .243/.331/.372; on the road, it’s .286/.360/.444, which is a 118 wRC+. As a lefty hitter pulling the ball to right, it’s .368/.367/.599, and he could hardly be moving to a friendlier park for lefty power. No, we can’t simply double a road line and expect that. No, we have no idea how Headley will respond moving from San Diego to the Bronx.
But based on what we do know, it’s absolutely worth it for the Yankees to find out: As with the Vidal Nuno for Brandon McCarthy deal, Brian Cashman managed to get incremental improvements without giving up much of anything at all. It’s probably not enough to get into the playoffs, and again that’s all dependent on Tanaka. It’s clearly still worth doing, particularly when it prevents a rival like Toronto from doing the same thing.
For the Padres, tomorrow is a full month since GM Josh Byrnes was fired. They’ve now traded Headley and Huston Street, and extended Seth Smith, and those are big moves to be made by placeholders Omar Minaya and A.J. Hinch.
They might not have been able to do better than this right now for Headley; they might have dodged a bullet by not giving him a rich extension a year ago; they might not have wanted to see whether Headley would have become the first player to accept a qualifying offer and have him take up $15 million of their 2015 payroll. Taken together, this all adds up for them. It’s just an incredibly disappointing outcome in a relatively short time, for a franchise that has seen more than its share of disappointment.
What Jhonny Peralta Tells Us About Defensive Metrics.
Five years ago, the Cleveland Indians decided that Jhonny Peralta just wasn’t capable of playing shortstop at the Major League level anymore, shifting him to third base to allow Asdrubal Cabrera to move back from second base to shortstop, the position he had primarily played in the minors. Peralta had never put up particularly good defensive numbers at shortstop, and with a thick lower half, he certainly looked more like a third baseman than a middle infielder.
After roughly a year at third base, while still hitting like a shortstop, Peralta was traded to Detroit. The Indians weren’t going to pick up his $7 million option for 2011, and the Tigers were looking for an infielder to give them some depth on the left side of the infield. Peralta played third base for a week with the Tigers, but then incumbent Brandon Inge returned from the disabled list, and the Tigers moved Peralta back to shortstop.
Since that move, Peralta has played the position exclusively, spending four years at shortstop between Detroit and St. Louis. And along the way, a funny thing happened; UZR fell in love with Jhonny Peralta’s defense.
Over the first 6,000 innings of Peralta’s career at the position, UZR had rated him as a -28 defender, or -6 runs per 150 games. He was decidedly below average, even though he was very good at error avoidance (+8 runs) and turning double plays (+5 runs). Peralta’s lack of range (-41 runs) was a legitimate problem, though, and what got him moved off shortstop to begin with.
In 2010, in his first full year back at shortstop, UZR rated Peralta as an average defensive shortstop. In 2011, that jumped to +10, putting him in the same range as defensive specialists Brendan Ryan and Alexei Ramirez. It was, at this point, that Peralta became something of a poster boy for the flaws of defensive metrics. After all, everyone knew that Peralta was actually not a good defender. The Indians had already moved him off the position. He had no range. Ranking Peralta as an elite defensive shortstop was evidence that UZR was not to be trusted.
Instead of regressing back to his prior mean in 2012, however, his UZR actually got even better, going up to +11.5, and again ranking third best among Major League shortstops. Among others, he rated ahead of Clint Barmes, Brandon Crawford, and Elvis Andrus, each of whom were essentially in the big leagues because of their defensive abilities. Again, the rating was seen as evidence that UZR wasn’t reliable, and Peralta was held up as an example of the system’s limitations. Perhaps playing next to Miguel Cabrera was throwing the system off, giving him credit for making plays that a better third baseman would have gotten to instead.
In 2013, Peralta’s UZR finally did regress some, though the system still thought he was an above average defender, putting him at +5 runs per 150 games. However, a 50 game suspension for his ties to Biogenesis led to the Tigers trading for Jose Iglesias, essentially ending his career as the Tigers shortstop; when he returned for the postseason, they experimented with using him in left field, because no one in their right mind would choose Peralta over Iglesias at shortstop, even though UZR was on year three of ranking Peralta as one of the better defenders in the game at the position.
With Iglesias in the fold, the Tigers bid adieu to Peralta this winter, not even making him a qualifying offer that could have returned a draft pick as compensation for letting him leave. With a poor defensive reputation and the Biogenesis connection hanging over his head, there were low expectations for what the market would offer him; MLBTradeRumors guessed 3/$30M, Jim Bowden guessed 2/$20M, and Jon Heyman guessed 2/$16M, with an agent and GM polled in that same piece only coming in slightly higher. Everyone basically agreed that he’d get something like $10 million a year for two or maybe three years.
Instead, the Cardinals gave him $53 million over four years. The Cardinals, one of baseball’s most respected organizations, bet big on Peralta’s ability to play shortstop. If he was actually a below average defender, or was going to need to move to another position in a couple of years, the deal would have been a ridiculous overpay. The only way to justify that price for Peralta is to argue that the defensive metrics were correct and that the public perception of Peralta’s defensive value was wrong.
So, fast forward to 2014. Peralta is no longer playing next to Cabrera, but is instead lined up besides one of the better defensive third baseman in baseball. He’s no longer playing behind the Tigers dominant pitching staff and weak-contact generators like in-his-prime Justin Verlander. He’s changed leagues, parks, and teammates, and yet again, he’s rated as the third best shortstop in baseball by UZR, second best if you use UZR/150.
Yes, Jhonny Peralta is rated higher by UZR this season than defensive wizard Andrelton Simmons. And that little factoid is an endless source of entertainment for people who want to again remind you to not put too much trust in defensive metrics. After all, no one actually believes that Peralta is a better defender than Simmons, so a result like this makes it easy to question the entire system.
Only the arguments for Peralta actually being a bad defensive shortstop are getting harder and harder to find.
Small sample size? Well, not anymore. We’re now on year four of Peralta being rated as an excellent defensive shortstop by UZR. Since the start of the 2010 season, he’s played over 4,600 innings at the position, and he has a UZR/150 of +10 runs per season over that stretch. Over the entirety of his career, spanning nearly 11,000 innings at shortstop, he’s rated as slightly above average. While defensive metrics absolutely do need larger sample sizes than offensive metrics, Peralta is well out of range of the small sample arguments.
The Cabrera factor? Well, UZR first rated him well while Cabrera was still playing first base, and his rating actually didn’t change much in the first year where he played next to a third baseman who could barely move. And now that he’s playing next to a much better defender, his defensive numbers have actually improved. There’s no real evidence for the idea that playing next to Cabrera artificially inflated Peralta’s defensive numbers.
The Tigers’ pitching staff? Well, nine players have played shortstop for the Tigers since the start of the 2010 season, and of those nine, only two of them have posted better defensive numbers than Peralta. That includes a few months of time from Jose Iglesias, who passes every eye test for elite defensive ability, and yet graded out slightly worse during his few months behind the Tigers pitchers than Peralta did during his tenure at the position. And playing behind a Cardinals pitching staff that has been decimated by injuries, resulting in a carousel of ever-changing arms who do not specialize in weak-contact, has not caused Peralta’s ratings to fall.
Peralta may or not be as much of a defensive asset as UZR claims; the model is still an educated guess, essentially, and it can certainly get things wrong. But the evidence is really starting to stack up against the Peralta-is-a-bad-defender idea. Even if you don’t buy into UZR at all, and you think that more granular measures that incorporate things like batted ball speed and launch angle would prove that UZR was overrating him, then you still have to explain how the Cardinals — one of the most aggressive teams in collecting and analyzing that kind of data — were willing to dramatically outbid the expected price for him as a free agent.
To believe that Jhonny Peralta is a poor defensive shortstop, you have to think that UZR is not just limited in value in smaller samples but completely useless regardless of the amount of data it has, while simultaneously believing that the Cardinals either don’t know how to evaluate defense or don’t know how to properly value free agents. Good luck defending those ideas against the mountains of evidence to the contrary.
So often, defensive data is assailed for not matching what the eye test leads us to believe. Peralta has been the poster boy for this disconnect, but at this point, there’s more evidence that the data was right and the eye test was wrong than vice versa. That doesn’t mean that the data will always be right whenever there’s a disconnect, or that we should just put full faith into single season defensive numbers, but perhaps Peralta can be a reminder that the eye test might be just as flawed as the metrics. There’s nothing wrong with being skeptical of defensive statistics; you should also be skeptical of things that are obviously true even when the data asserts otherwise, however.
UZR is imperfect. It will get things wrong. It might even still be getting Jhonny Peralta wrong, though that’s getting less likely by the day. But Jhonny Peralta should no longer be considered the poster boy for why UZR is unreliable. If anything, he should perhaps be the poster child for why we shouldn’t put unfailing trust in our own abilities to evaluate a player’s defensive value by watching him play.
After roughly a year at third base, while still hitting like a shortstop, Peralta was traded to Detroit. The Indians weren’t going to pick up his $7 million option for 2011, and the Tigers were looking for an infielder to give them some depth on the left side of the infield. Peralta played third base for a week with the Tigers, but then incumbent Brandon Inge returned from the disabled list, and the Tigers moved Peralta back to shortstop.
Since that move, Peralta has played the position exclusively, spending four years at shortstop between Detroit and St. Louis. And along the way, a funny thing happened; UZR fell in love with Jhonny Peralta’s defense.
Over the first 6,000 innings of Peralta’s career at the position, UZR had rated him as a -28 defender, or -6 runs per 150 games. He was decidedly below average, even though he was very good at error avoidance (+8 runs) and turning double plays (+5 runs). Peralta’s lack of range (-41 runs) was a legitimate problem, though, and what got him moved off shortstop to begin with.
In 2010, in his first full year back at shortstop, UZR rated Peralta as an average defensive shortstop. In 2011, that jumped to +10, putting him in the same range as defensive specialists Brendan Ryan and Alexei Ramirez. It was, at this point, that Peralta became something of a poster boy for the flaws of defensive metrics. After all, everyone knew that Peralta was actually not a good defender. The Indians had already moved him off the position. He had no range. Ranking Peralta as an elite defensive shortstop was evidence that UZR was not to be trusted.
Instead of regressing back to his prior mean in 2012, however, his UZR actually got even better, going up to +11.5, and again ranking third best among Major League shortstops. Among others, he rated ahead of Clint Barmes, Brandon Crawford, and Elvis Andrus, each of whom were essentially in the big leagues because of their defensive abilities. Again, the rating was seen as evidence that UZR wasn’t reliable, and Peralta was held up as an example of the system’s limitations. Perhaps playing next to Miguel Cabrera was throwing the system off, giving him credit for making plays that a better third baseman would have gotten to instead.
In 2013, Peralta’s UZR finally did regress some, though the system still thought he was an above average defender, putting him at +5 runs per 150 games. However, a 50 game suspension for his ties to Biogenesis led to the Tigers trading for Jose Iglesias, essentially ending his career as the Tigers shortstop; when he returned for the postseason, they experimented with using him in left field, because no one in their right mind would choose Peralta over Iglesias at shortstop, even though UZR was on year three of ranking Peralta as one of the better defenders in the game at the position.
With Iglesias in the fold, the Tigers bid adieu to Peralta this winter, not even making him a qualifying offer that could have returned a draft pick as compensation for letting him leave. With a poor defensive reputation and the Biogenesis connection hanging over his head, there were low expectations for what the market would offer him; MLBTradeRumors guessed 3/$30M, Jim Bowden guessed 2/$20M, and Jon Heyman guessed 2/$16M, with an agent and GM polled in that same piece only coming in slightly higher. Everyone basically agreed that he’d get something like $10 million a year for two or maybe three years.
Instead, the Cardinals gave him $53 million over four years. The Cardinals, one of baseball’s most respected organizations, bet big on Peralta’s ability to play shortstop. If he was actually a below average defender, or was going to need to move to another position in a couple of years, the deal would have been a ridiculous overpay. The only way to justify that price for Peralta is to argue that the defensive metrics were correct and that the public perception of Peralta’s defensive value was wrong.
So, fast forward to 2014. Peralta is no longer playing next to Cabrera, but is instead lined up besides one of the better defensive third baseman in baseball. He’s no longer playing behind the Tigers dominant pitching staff and weak-contact generators like in-his-prime Justin Verlander. He’s changed leagues, parks, and teammates, and yet again, he’s rated as the third best shortstop in baseball by UZR, second best if you use UZR/150.
Yes, Jhonny Peralta is rated higher by UZR this season than defensive wizard Andrelton Simmons. And that little factoid is an endless source of entertainment for people who want to again remind you to not put too much trust in defensive metrics. After all, no one actually believes that Peralta is a better defender than Simmons, so a result like this makes it easy to question the entire system.
Only the arguments for Peralta actually being a bad defensive shortstop are getting harder and harder to find.
Small sample size? Well, not anymore. We’re now on year four of Peralta being rated as an excellent defensive shortstop by UZR. Since the start of the 2010 season, he’s played over 4,600 innings at the position, and he has a UZR/150 of +10 runs per season over that stretch. Over the entirety of his career, spanning nearly 11,000 innings at shortstop, he’s rated as slightly above average. While defensive metrics absolutely do need larger sample sizes than offensive metrics, Peralta is well out of range of the small sample arguments.
The Cabrera factor? Well, UZR first rated him well while Cabrera was still playing first base, and his rating actually didn’t change much in the first year where he played next to a third baseman who could barely move. And now that he’s playing next to a much better defender, his defensive numbers have actually improved. There’s no real evidence for the idea that playing next to Cabrera artificially inflated Peralta’s defensive numbers.
The Tigers’ pitching staff? Well, nine players have played shortstop for the Tigers since the start of the 2010 season, and of those nine, only two of them have posted better defensive numbers than Peralta. That includes a few months of time from Jose Iglesias, who passes every eye test for elite defensive ability, and yet graded out slightly worse during his few months behind the Tigers pitchers than Peralta did during his tenure at the position. And playing behind a Cardinals pitching staff that has been decimated by injuries, resulting in a carousel of ever-changing arms who do not specialize in weak-contact, has not caused Peralta’s ratings to fall.
Peralta may or not be as much of a defensive asset as UZR claims; the model is still an educated guess, essentially, and it can certainly get things wrong. But the evidence is really starting to stack up against the Peralta-is-a-bad-defender idea. Even if you don’t buy into UZR at all, and you think that more granular measures that incorporate things like batted ball speed and launch angle would prove that UZR was overrating him, then you still have to explain how the Cardinals — one of the most aggressive teams in collecting and analyzing that kind of data — were willing to dramatically outbid the expected price for him as a free agent.
To believe that Jhonny Peralta is a poor defensive shortstop, you have to think that UZR is not just limited in value in smaller samples but completely useless regardless of the amount of data it has, while simultaneously believing that the Cardinals either don’t know how to evaluate defense or don’t know how to properly value free agents. Good luck defending those ideas against the mountains of evidence to the contrary.
So often, defensive data is assailed for not matching what the eye test leads us to believe. Peralta has been the poster boy for this disconnect, but at this point, there’s more evidence that the data was right and the eye test was wrong than vice versa. That doesn’t mean that the data will always be right whenever there’s a disconnect, or that we should just put full faith into single season defensive numbers, but perhaps Peralta can be a reminder that the eye test might be just as flawed as the metrics. There’s nothing wrong with being skeptical of defensive statistics; you should also be skeptical of things that are obviously true even when the data asserts otherwise, however.
UZR is imperfect. It will get things wrong. It might even still be getting Jhonny Peralta wrong, though that’s getting less likely by the day. But Jhonny Peralta should no longer be considered the poster boy for why UZR is unreliable. If anything, he should perhaps be the poster child for why we shouldn’t put unfailing trust in our own abilities to evaluate a player’s defensive value by watching him play.
Huston Street Deal: A Good Omen for the Sellers.
With the trading deadline still 10 days away, there have been, as might be expected, a whole lot more rumors than deals to date. A fairly significant one did take place over the weekend, however, as the Angels acquired RHP Huston Street and minor league RHP Trevor Gott from the Padres in exchange for four prospects – 2B Taylor Lindsey, RHP R.J. Alvarez, SS Jose Rondon and RHP Elliot Morris. The big picture trade market has been slow to develop in part due to the imbalance between a large group of potential buyers and a relatively small – but growing – number of sellers and should-be sellers. This trade should be a reassuring development for those confirmed sellers, and a prod to get the undecideds off of the fence and down to some serious selling.
Ah, relief pitching, and in particular, closers……an enduring battlefield of discussion between traditional talent evaluators and analysts who are more focused on advanced metrics. The traditionalists focus on the extreme importance of the “proven” closer, and assert that the ability to record the last out of a ballgame is an extremely specialized skill possessed by few. The analyst focuses on the overrated nature of the save statistic, and is reluctant to overpay for 60 or fewer innings of relief over a 1450 inning season.
Both sides have valid points. I am all for retaining a truly dominant closer, with traditional closer characteristics – huge K rate, big velocity, a second out pitch if possible. That said, I would prefer that such a closer be used in a non-traditional way, more often late in a tie game, or for more than three outs. I’d also prefer that the closer be used less often with a two or three-run lead, solely to begin the 9th inning. I’d prefer that my closer, being my best relief pitcher, also be my most frequently used relief pitcher, in terms of total innings load. The 60-inning, low-leverage closer concept currently in vogue simply makes no sense.
In the last couple of offseasons, the marketplace has begun to show greater restraint when valuing closers. The WAR statistic is imperfect, but the extremely low totals posted by closers in that category has clearly made an impact on front offices. The day of the $10M per season closer may not be over, though such paydays are now going to be reserved for only the best of the best.
This brings us back to Huston Street. The Angels’ primary needs are on the run prevention side of things, and they have made bullpen improvement a major focus throughout the season, getting a boost from the callup of RHP Mike Morin and the swapping out of previous closer Ernesto Frieri for Jason Grilli. Street, clearly, is likely their big trading deadline bullet, as this deal has thinned their stockpile of tradeable assets considerably – we’ll talk more about the package given up for Street later. How good is Huston Street? Is he an impact closer? Is he the type of player a buyer builds a successful trading deadline around?
First, let’s focus on the word “proven” as it relates to closers. Going back to 2012 – just two seasons ago – and going through this weekend, a grand total of only 14 closers have saved 10 or games in each of those three seasons. This means that fully half of the closer population has turned over since then. That gives one pause at defining the “proven” closer. Closers turn over faster than starting pitchers and position players. Their sample sizes are smaller, and they are more prone to wild swings in performance. A bad week, or month, can cost a closer his job, and make an investment go bad in a hurry.
Let’s take a closer look at those 14, including Street, to get a better feel for them, and to identify the group that can be clearly designated as impact closers.
2012-14 PERF AGE IP K % BB % ERA - FIP - WAR SGN THRU 14 SAL NOTES
Kimbrel 26 168.34 43.4% 7.6% 35 37 7.2 2017 $7,000,000 Sign thru 17, tm opt 18
Chapman 26 165.01 45.7% 9.5% 52 44 6.7 2014 $5,000,000 Player opt 15
Holland 28 168.67 36.6% 9.0% 50 46 6.5 2014 $4,680,000 FA in 2017
Jansen 26 180.34 38.4% 7.3% 66 58 5.3 2014 $4,300,000 FA in 2017
Rodney 37 178.67 27.8% 8.6% 50 64 4.7 2015 $7,000,000 Sign thru 15
Perkins 31 172.33 29.9% 5.6% 63 65 4.3 2017 $4,025,000 Sign thru 17, tm opt 18
Nathan 39 163.67 28.4% 7.6% 71 69 4.3 2015 $10,000,000 Sign thru 15, tm opt 16
Papelbon 33 170.00 26.5% 5.5% 61 74 3.3 2015 $13,000,000 Sign thru 15, vst opt 16
R.Soriano 34 171.34 22.7% 7.5% 59 82 2.7 2014 $11,000,000 Tm opt 15
Balfour 36 173.67 25.3% 11.4% 82 89 2.1 2015 $4,000,000 Sign thru 15
A.Reed 25 165.00 24.3% 7.3% 103 91 2.0 2014 $539,000 FA in 2018
Romo 31 153.33 25.3% 5.0% 84 95 1.2 2014 $5,500,000 FA in 2015
Frieri 28 170.67 33.2% 10.0% 104 104 0.7 2014 $3,800,000 FA in 2017
Street 30 129.67 26.2% 6.5% 56 99 0.5 2014 $7,000,000 Tm opt 15
Above you will find the cumulative 2012-14 statistics for the 14 “proven” closers. From left to right, their age, cumulative innings load, K and BB rates, ERA- and FIP-, cumulative WAR and contract status are listed. The players are listed in order by cumulative WAR.
Before going any further, one notices that Street ranks dead last in WAR, but let’s not read too much into that at this point. One very key point with regard to Street is his light innings load. He has had his share of nagging injuries over the years, and has not logged as many as 60 innings in a season since 2009. The other 13 hurlers’ cumulative 2012-14 innings totals are in a fairly narrow band between 153 1/3 and 180 1/3 IP, and Street lags well behind all of them. This is a legitimate major strike against Street and any argument he might have for impact closer status.
Street’s 2012-14 walk rate is the 4th lowest among this group, but his K rate is 5th lowest, and the spread between the two is the 4th lowest. His ERA- is the 5th best, but his FIP- is the 2nd worst. This is largely due to his exceedingly odd 2013 season, when he somehow allowed 12 HR – but only 17 earned runs – in 56 2/3 IP. By comparison, Craig Kimbrel has allowed 11 HR – in his career.
Just by looking at this summary info, it is easy to conclude that Street is not an elite, impact closer. The stratospheric K rates of Kimbrel, Aroldis Chapman, Greg Holland and Kenley Jansen give them extreme margin for error with regard to contact management. How long they will be able to maintain such dominance is another question, but they reside on their own plane for now. Can Street match up with the next group of closers behind them?
It is interesting to note the respective differences between each closer’s ERA- and FIP-. With the exception of Street and Rafael Soriano, the differences are fairly nominal. Street’s is by far the largest. Which is more indicative of Street’s true talent level – his 56 ERA-, or his 99 FIP-? His ability to manage contact should be at the core of the answer. True talent should be the driver of his WAR, so answering this question is a big deal. To this end, let’s take a closer look at his 2013 and 2014 plate appearance outcome frequency and production by BIP type data. First, the frequency information:
FREQ – 2013
Street % REL PCT
K 20.7% 107 48
BB 6.3% 84 46
POP 13.4% 177 99
FLY 38.2% 136 99
LD 19.1% 89 6
GB 29.3% 68 1
FREQ – 2014
Street % REL PCT
K 28.0% 138 93
BB 5.6% 72 20
POP 9.2% 120 86
FLY 34.2% 123 98
LD 21.1% 101 38
GB 35.5% 81 7
Street’s K and BB rate percentile ranks of 48 and 46 in 2013 were quite ordinary, especially for a closer. They have moved in the right direction this season, to 93 and 20, respectively, but still don’t stand out in this population of closers. Street is clearly a popup/fly ball pitcher. His 13.4% popup rate (99 percentile rank) in 2013 was exceptional, and though it has declined a bit in 2014, his percentile rank remains high at 86. His grounder percentile ranks in both seasons have been extremely low, at 1 and 7, respectively. Having such an extreme popup/fly ball tendency can be a positive, but it does come with raised home run risk, which Street bore the brunt of in 2013.
Now let’s take a look at the production by BIP type allowed by Street in 2013-14, both before and after adjustment for context:
PROD – 2013
Street AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD ACT ERA CALC ERA TRU ERA
FLY 0.250 0.783 97 64
LD 0.733 1.133 144 109
GB 0.130 0.130 28 96
ALL BIP 0.273 0.553 93 80
ALL PA 0.213 0.262 0.430 87 76 2.70 3.38 2.94
PROD – 2014
Street AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD ACT ERA CALC ERA TRU ERA
FLY 0.308 0.731 108 97
LD 0.500 0.563 50 88
GB 0.037 0.037 2 59
ALL BIP 0.228 0.380 53 82
ALL PA 0.158 0.207 0.263 44 64 1.06 1.67 2.42
The actual production allowed by Street on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and is converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure is then adjusted for context, such as home park, team defense, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. In the three right-most columns, his actual ERA, his calculated component ERA based on actual production allowed, and his “tru” ERA, which is adjusted for context, are all presented. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.
First, let’s get back to those 12 homers allowed by Street in 2013. Despite that fact, Street allowed lower than MLB average actual fly ball production (97 REL PRD) WITHOUT adjustment for context. Included among that group of homers were a bunch of cheap ones, particularly at home. Recall that Petco’s fences were brought in for the 2013 season, quite significantly. The park inflated homers last season, but for some reason, isn’t doing the same this season. I’ll put that fact into the “requires further study” pile. Anyway, after adjusting for Street’s hard and soft fly rates, his 2013 ADJ PRD on fly balls drops substantially to 64. Interestingly, Street has allowed just three HR so far in 2014, but has allowed harder overall fly ball contact (97 ADJ PRD).
The average authority of the liners allowed by Street was above average in 2013 (109 ADJ PRD) and below average in 2014 (88 ADJ PRD). Let’s call that average, on balance. He has allowed extremely low levels of actual production on grounders in both 2013 (28 REL PRD) and 2014 (2 REL PRD), but those figures move closer to the average range after adjustment for context, to 96 and 59 in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Overall, Street posted relatively uniform ADJ PRD figures on all BIP – or Adjusted Contact Scores – of 80 and 82 in 2013 and 2014. Add back the K’s and BB’s, and Street’s “tru” ERAs for those two seasons are 2.94 and 2.42, or 76 and 64, relative to the league.
First of all, for those of you who consistently defer to FIP rather than ERA when perusing a basic stat line, consider that Street’s 2013 ERA was 2.70, his 2013 FIP was 4.92…..and his “tru” ERA was 2.94. ERA “wins” in this case, as FIP fails to take into consideration that not all home runs are created equal. Going back to the 14-closer table above, this revision of Street’s 2013 ERA/FIP would give him about 1.0 WAR for that season instead of (1.0), and would nudge him ahead of Grant Balfour, Addison Reed, Sergio Romo and Frieri on the list.
Street’s “tru” ERA- for 2013-14 would be about 71, which quality-wise, places him above Soriano and Jonathan Papelbon as well, though quantity-wise, Street suffers and should probably valued overall around their level talent-wise. Street’s contract terms are more favorable than those two, however, so he should return more than Soriano/Papelbon in a trade package.
Let’s get back to what the Angels actually did give up for Street. For argument’s sake, let’s assume Gott and Morris cancel out. That brings us to Street for Lindsey-Alvarez-Rondon. Each year, at mid- and post-season, I compile ordered lists of minor league position player and starting pitcher prospects, based both upon production and age relative to the league. It’s basically a follow list, that isn’t adjusted for position, but the beauty of it is that I now have lists going back to 1993, and can see where every MLB regular ranked during their minor league career.
Lindsey, 22, barely made the list at midseason, ranking #262, but ranked #75 in 2013 and #253 in 2012. His offensive performance has been up and down, but he is a middle infielder, and has always been young for his level. His rankings are roughly comparable to those of Scooter Gennett, D.J. Lemehieu and Derek Dietrich, three incumbent starting MLB second basemen. The latter two also qualified for my minor league list three times, with one Top 100 ranking. Gennett, who has been the best the major leaguer of the three, actually qualified only twice, peaking at #118. Lindsey doesn’t look like an impact talent, but he has a chance to be an average MLB regular 2B.
Rondon, 20, is ranked #107 on my midseason list, pretty impressive for a shortstop in his first year in a full-season league. Most regular MLB shortstops cracked my Top 100 at some point in their minor league careers, and Rondon still has time to do that. Even if he doesn’t, however, his current ranking rivals the peak minor league rankings of Alcides Escobar and Andrelton Simmons. Rondon lacks their fielding chops, but should remain at his current position, and like Lindsey, has a shot to be a solid, non-impact MLB regular. His range of outcomes is wider than Lindsey’s – Rondon has a greater chance to be above average, but a greater chance of washing out as well.
Then there’s Alvarez. He could turn into San Diego’s closer before too long. He just turned 23, throws in the upper 90′s, and has struck out 155 batters in 100 professional innings to date. I don’t rank minor league closers, as the vast majority of them don’t have MLB futures. There are a handful of exceptions at any given time, and Alvarez is one of them. He has had some injury issues, and is far from a sure thing, but the ability is there.
So that’s a pretty sizeable package for any club to give up for a reliable, but non-impact closer with a year-plus of control. For the Angels, however, this represents an extremely large percentage of the Angels’ overall organizational prospect value. Full season minor league position players who project to be MLB regulars? I’m not seeing them, with the possible exception of non-impact 2B Alex Yarbrough, who was a level behind Lindsey, at the same age. Full-season minor league pitchers with the ability to be above average MLB performers? I’m not seeing them, either.
The Angels just cleared out their already weak minor league system to acquire a solid, non-impact closer who might pitch 25 innings for them this season. This does make them better, but at a very substantial cost to this particular organization, at this particular moment in time. The same night this trade was consummated, Erick Aybar pulled up lame running out a grounder. It remains to be seen how much time he will miss, but the asset base from which the Angels can now address this and any other additional needs they might have between now and the finish line has been significantly depleted.
This trade may not have a direct impact on any single other trade made in the coming days, but it does change the trading environment a bit. The sellers woke up on Saturday morning afterward with some additional trade discussion ammunition – the going rate for stretch run help just got a bit more expensive.
Ah, relief pitching, and in particular, closers……an enduring battlefield of discussion between traditional talent evaluators and analysts who are more focused on advanced metrics. The traditionalists focus on the extreme importance of the “proven” closer, and assert that the ability to record the last out of a ballgame is an extremely specialized skill possessed by few. The analyst focuses on the overrated nature of the save statistic, and is reluctant to overpay for 60 or fewer innings of relief over a 1450 inning season.
Both sides have valid points. I am all for retaining a truly dominant closer, with traditional closer characteristics – huge K rate, big velocity, a second out pitch if possible. That said, I would prefer that such a closer be used in a non-traditional way, more often late in a tie game, or for more than three outs. I’d also prefer that the closer be used less often with a two or three-run lead, solely to begin the 9th inning. I’d prefer that my closer, being my best relief pitcher, also be my most frequently used relief pitcher, in terms of total innings load. The 60-inning, low-leverage closer concept currently in vogue simply makes no sense.
In the last couple of offseasons, the marketplace has begun to show greater restraint when valuing closers. The WAR statistic is imperfect, but the extremely low totals posted by closers in that category has clearly made an impact on front offices. The day of the $10M per season closer may not be over, though such paydays are now going to be reserved for only the best of the best.
This brings us back to Huston Street. The Angels’ primary needs are on the run prevention side of things, and they have made bullpen improvement a major focus throughout the season, getting a boost from the callup of RHP Mike Morin and the swapping out of previous closer Ernesto Frieri for Jason Grilli. Street, clearly, is likely their big trading deadline bullet, as this deal has thinned their stockpile of tradeable assets considerably – we’ll talk more about the package given up for Street later. How good is Huston Street? Is he an impact closer? Is he the type of player a buyer builds a successful trading deadline around?
First, let’s focus on the word “proven” as it relates to closers. Going back to 2012 – just two seasons ago – and going through this weekend, a grand total of only 14 closers have saved 10 or games in each of those three seasons. This means that fully half of the closer population has turned over since then. That gives one pause at defining the “proven” closer. Closers turn over faster than starting pitchers and position players. Their sample sizes are smaller, and they are more prone to wild swings in performance. A bad week, or month, can cost a closer his job, and make an investment go bad in a hurry.
Let’s take a closer look at those 14, including Street, to get a better feel for them, and to identify the group that can be clearly designated as impact closers.
2012-14 PERF AGE IP K % BB % ERA - FIP - WAR SGN THRU 14 SAL NOTES
Kimbrel 26 168.34 43.4% 7.6% 35 37 7.2 2017 $7,000,000 Sign thru 17, tm opt 18
Chapman 26 165.01 45.7% 9.5% 52 44 6.7 2014 $5,000,000 Player opt 15
Holland 28 168.67 36.6% 9.0% 50 46 6.5 2014 $4,680,000 FA in 2017
Jansen 26 180.34 38.4% 7.3% 66 58 5.3 2014 $4,300,000 FA in 2017
Rodney 37 178.67 27.8% 8.6% 50 64 4.7 2015 $7,000,000 Sign thru 15
Perkins 31 172.33 29.9% 5.6% 63 65 4.3 2017 $4,025,000 Sign thru 17, tm opt 18
Nathan 39 163.67 28.4% 7.6% 71 69 4.3 2015 $10,000,000 Sign thru 15, tm opt 16
Papelbon 33 170.00 26.5% 5.5% 61 74 3.3 2015 $13,000,000 Sign thru 15, vst opt 16
R.Soriano 34 171.34 22.7% 7.5% 59 82 2.7 2014 $11,000,000 Tm opt 15
Balfour 36 173.67 25.3% 11.4% 82 89 2.1 2015 $4,000,000 Sign thru 15
A.Reed 25 165.00 24.3% 7.3% 103 91 2.0 2014 $539,000 FA in 2018
Romo 31 153.33 25.3% 5.0% 84 95 1.2 2014 $5,500,000 FA in 2015
Frieri 28 170.67 33.2% 10.0% 104 104 0.7 2014 $3,800,000 FA in 2017
Street 30 129.67 26.2% 6.5% 56 99 0.5 2014 $7,000,000 Tm opt 15
Above you will find the cumulative 2012-14 statistics for the 14 “proven” closers. From left to right, their age, cumulative innings load, K and BB rates, ERA- and FIP-, cumulative WAR and contract status are listed. The players are listed in order by cumulative WAR.
Before going any further, one notices that Street ranks dead last in WAR, but let’s not read too much into that at this point. One very key point with regard to Street is his light innings load. He has had his share of nagging injuries over the years, and has not logged as many as 60 innings in a season since 2009. The other 13 hurlers’ cumulative 2012-14 innings totals are in a fairly narrow band between 153 1/3 and 180 1/3 IP, and Street lags well behind all of them. This is a legitimate major strike against Street and any argument he might have for impact closer status.
Street’s 2012-14 walk rate is the 4th lowest among this group, but his K rate is 5th lowest, and the spread between the two is the 4th lowest. His ERA- is the 5th best, but his FIP- is the 2nd worst. This is largely due to his exceedingly odd 2013 season, when he somehow allowed 12 HR – but only 17 earned runs – in 56 2/3 IP. By comparison, Craig Kimbrel has allowed 11 HR – in his career.
Just by looking at this summary info, it is easy to conclude that Street is not an elite, impact closer. The stratospheric K rates of Kimbrel, Aroldis Chapman, Greg Holland and Kenley Jansen give them extreme margin for error with regard to contact management. How long they will be able to maintain such dominance is another question, but they reside on their own plane for now. Can Street match up with the next group of closers behind them?
It is interesting to note the respective differences between each closer’s ERA- and FIP-. With the exception of Street and Rafael Soriano, the differences are fairly nominal. Street’s is by far the largest. Which is more indicative of Street’s true talent level – his 56 ERA-, or his 99 FIP-? His ability to manage contact should be at the core of the answer. True talent should be the driver of his WAR, so answering this question is a big deal. To this end, let’s take a closer look at his 2013 and 2014 plate appearance outcome frequency and production by BIP type data. First, the frequency information:
FREQ – 2013
Street % REL PCT
K 20.7% 107 48
BB 6.3% 84 46
POP 13.4% 177 99
FLY 38.2% 136 99
LD 19.1% 89 6
GB 29.3% 68 1
FREQ – 2014
Street % REL PCT
K 28.0% 138 93
BB 5.6% 72 20
POP 9.2% 120 86
FLY 34.2% 123 98
LD 21.1% 101 38
GB 35.5% 81 7
Street’s K and BB rate percentile ranks of 48 and 46 in 2013 were quite ordinary, especially for a closer. They have moved in the right direction this season, to 93 and 20, respectively, but still don’t stand out in this population of closers. Street is clearly a popup/fly ball pitcher. His 13.4% popup rate (99 percentile rank) in 2013 was exceptional, and though it has declined a bit in 2014, his percentile rank remains high at 86. His grounder percentile ranks in both seasons have been extremely low, at 1 and 7, respectively. Having such an extreme popup/fly ball tendency can be a positive, but it does come with raised home run risk, which Street bore the brunt of in 2013.
Now let’s take a look at the production by BIP type allowed by Street in 2013-14, both before and after adjustment for context:
PROD – 2013
Street AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD ACT ERA CALC ERA TRU ERA
FLY 0.250 0.783 97 64
LD 0.733 1.133 144 109
GB 0.130 0.130 28 96
ALL BIP 0.273 0.553 93 80
ALL PA 0.213 0.262 0.430 87 76 2.70 3.38 2.94
PROD – 2014
Street AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD ACT ERA CALC ERA TRU ERA
FLY 0.308 0.731 108 97
LD 0.500 0.563 50 88
GB 0.037 0.037 2 59
ALL BIP 0.228 0.380 53 82
ALL PA 0.158 0.207 0.263 44 64 1.06 1.67 2.42
The actual production allowed by Street on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and is converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure is then adjusted for context, such as home park, team defense, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. In the three right-most columns, his actual ERA, his calculated component ERA based on actual production allowed, and his “tru” ERA, which is adjusted for context, are all presented. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.
First, let’s get back to those 12 homers allowed by Street in 2013. Despite that fact, Street allowed lower than MLB average actual fly ball production (97 REL PRD) WITHOUT adjustment for context. Included among that group of homers were a bunch of cheap ones, particularly at home. Recall that Petco’s fences were brought in for the 2013 season, quite significantly. The park inflated homers last season, but for some reason, isn’t doing the same this season. I’ll put that fact into the “requires further study” pile. Anyway, after adjusting for Street’s hard and soft fly rates, his 2013 ADJ PRD on fly balls drops substantially to 64. Interestingly, Street has allowed just three HR so far in 2014, but has allowed harder overall fly ball contact (97 ADJ PRD).
The average authority of the liners allowed by Street was above average in 2013 (109 ADJ PRD) and below average in 2014 (88 ADJ PRD). Let’s call that average, on balance. He has allowed extremely low levels of actual production on grounders in both 2013 (28 REL PRD) and 2014 (2 REL PRD), but those figures move closer to the average range after adjustment for context, to 96 and 59 in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Overall, Street posted relatively uniform ADJ PRD figures on all BIP – or Adjusted Contact Scores – of 80 and 82 in 2013 and 2014. Add back the K’s and BB’s, and Street’s “tru” ERAs for those two seasons are 2.94 and 2.42, or 76 and 64, relative to the league.
First of all, for those of you who consistently defer to FIP rather than ERA when perusing a basic stat line, consider that Street’s 2013 ERA was 2.70, his 2013 FIP was 4.92…..and his “tru” ERA was 2.94. ERA “wins” in this case, as FIP fails to take into consideration that not all home runs are created equal. Going back to the 14-closer table above, this revision of Street’s 2013 ERA/FIP would give him about 1.0 WAR for that season instead of (1.0), and would nudge him ahead of Grant Balfour, Addison Reed, Sergio Romo and Frieri on the list.
Street’s “tru” ERA- for 2013-14 would be about 71, which quality-wise, places him above Soriano and Jonathan Papelbon as well, though quantity-wise, Street suffers and should probably valued overall around their level talent-wise. Street’s contract terms are more favorable than those two, however, so he should return more than Soriano/Papelbon in a trade package.
Let’s get back to what the Angels actually did give up for Street. For argument’s sake, let’s assume Gott and Morris cancel out. That brings us to Street for Lindsey-Alvarez-Rondon. Each year, at mid- and post-season, I compile ordered lists of minor league position player and starting pitcher prospects, based both upon production and age relative to the league. It’s basically a follow list, that isn’t adjusted for position, but the beauty of it is that I now have lists going back to 1993, and can see where every MLB regular ranked during their minor league career.
Lindsey, 22, barely made the list at midseason, ranking #262, but ranked #75 in 2013 and #253 in 2012. His offensive performance has been up and down, but he is a middle infielder, and has always been young for his level. His rankings are roughly comparable to those of Scooter Gennett, D.J. Lemehieu and Derek Dietrich, three incumbent starting MLB second basemen. The latter two also qualified for my minor league list three times, with one Top 100 ranking. Gennett, who has been the best the major leaguer of the three, actually qualified only twice, peaking at #118. Lindsey doesn’t look like an impact talent, but he has a chance to be an average MLB regular 2B.
Rondon, 20, is ranked #107 on my midseason list, pretty impressive for a shortstop in his first year in a full-season league. Most regular MLB shortstops cracked my Top 100 at some point in their minor league careers, and Rondon still has time to do that. Even if he doesn’t, however, his current ranking rivals the peak minor league rankings of Alcides Escobar and Andrelton Simmons. Rondon lacks their fielding chops, but should remain at his current position, and like Lindsey, has a shot to be a solid, non-impact MLB regular. His range of outcomes is wider than Lindsey’s – Rondon has a greater chance to be above average, but a greater chance of washing out as well.
Then there’s Alvarez. He could turn into San Diego’s closer before too long. He just turned 23, throws in the upper 90′s, and has struck out 155 batters in 100 professional innings to date. I don’t rank minor league closers, as the vast majority of them don’t have MLB futures. There are a handful of exceptions at any given time, and Alvarez is one of them. He has had some injury issues, and is far from a sure thing, but the ability is there.
So that’s a pretty sizeable package for any club to give up for a reliable, but non-impact closer with a year-plus of control. For the Angels, however, this represents an extremely large percentage of the Angels’ overall organizational prospect value. Full season minor league position players who project to be MLB regulars? I’m not seeing them, with the possible exception of non-impact 2B Alex Yarbrough, who was a level behind Lindsey, at the same age. Full-season minor league pitchers with the ability to be above average MLB performers? I’m not seeing them, either.
The Angels just cleared out their already weak minor league system to acquire a solid, non-impact closer who might pitch 25 innings for them this season. This does make them better, but at a very substantial cost to this particular organization, at this particular moment in time. The same night this trade was consummated, Erick Aybar pulled up lame running out a grounder. It remains to be seen how much time he will miss, but the asset base from which the Angels can now address this and any other additional needs they might have between now and the finish line has been significantly depleted.
This trade may not have a direct impact on any single other trade made in the coming days, but it does change the trading environment a bit. The sellers woke up on Saturday morning afterward with some additional trade discussion ammunition – the going rate for stretch run help just got a bit more expensive.
Hasn't he been injured for a lot of the year so far? Dude had pretty good command in college but he's really struggled with that the last couple years. If he finds that and gets aggressive again, solid #2.
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Yep, forearm soreness. Mixes three pitches well. Made his Fort Wayne debut last week.
elpablo21
Supporter
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They got this guy....again
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I love the Royals truth, Bobby. That silly hype has puzzled me for years.
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Never mind my comments about the Brewers finishing fourth. Reds injuries and playing above their level (for the guys that are healthy) finally caught up
I think teams should do more shifting than they currently do. I'm talking every hitter have some sort if movement or shift depending on the numbers. Out of all the current teams Pirates may shift the most
I think teams should do more shifting than they currently do. I'm talking every hitter have some sort if movement or shift depending on the numbers. Out of all the current teams Pirates may shift the most
mr marcus
Banned
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Phillies gunna let AJ throw 150 pitches tonight 
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I hope the Phillies suck for as long as Papelbon is on that team.
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He'll be a Tiger soon enough.
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They just acquired Soria, actually.
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Thanks for the update. Played tennis all day after work. Went out to dinner with my bro and scooped some quality beers.
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