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Blackout policy should end. What a way to **** the consumer.
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
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I don't know what the distributions of households in Philly that get CSN. But I would say that if you live in the Philly area, South NJ, and Delaware, and you have cable you get CSN. Only DirecTV and Dish users don't get it as of yet.
mr marcus
Banned
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Speaking of Philly, what a dirty organization for reporting those kids to the NCAA because they were butthurt that they didn't sign
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2014 Top 10 Prospects: Texas Rangers.
A Few Thoughts on the Orioles and their Window.
Homer Bailey and His Peers.
The Best Transactions of the 2014 Off-Season.
Stealing Success Against Pitch Speeds and Pitch Heights.
What Can Toronto Do To Fix That Second Base Problem?
The Rangers’ reliance on the minor league system to fill holes at the big league level has ensured that the depth is not quite as deep as it used to be. However, the organization still has an enviable system and some exciting talent on the way — especially in the infield.
#1 Rougned Odor (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 569 156 41 11 35 91 32 .305 .365 .474 .378
The Year in Review: Odor definitely didn’t stink in 2013; in fact, he had a breakout season by hitting .305 with an .839 OPS as a teenager combined between High-A ball and Double-A. The left-handed hitter showed good line-drive pop and hit 41 doubles and 11 home runs. He also swiped 32 bases in 42 attempts. Odor received some additional experience during the off-season by seeing 32 games of action in the Venezuelan Winter League.
The Scouting Report: The Rangers graduated one outstanding middle infield prospect in 2013 in Jurickson Profar, but another one is on the way. Odor, who recently turned 20, has an advanced hitting approach for his age and his above-average bat speed helps him hit balls with authority into the gaps. I’d like to see him be a little more selective at the plate. He’ll likely never hit for big home run power and his speed on the bases is just average. The Venezuela native still has work to do to polish his game at second base but he has the athletic ability to be average or better.
The Year Ahead: Odor will almost certainly return to Double-A to open the 2014 season. With Elvis Andrus and Jurickson Profar at the MLB level there is no reason to rush the young second base prospect.
The Career Outlook: The Venezuela native looks like a future impact offensive player at second base for the Rangers, which could force the club to once again relocate Profar.
#2 Jorge Alfaro (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 539 134 30 18 37 139 20 .283 .360 .468 .381
The Year in Review: Alfaro spent the majority of 2013 in Low-A ball where he slugged 39 extra base hits, including 16 homers, in 104 games. He had some issues at the plate with 111 strikeouts and just 28 walks but he showed his above-average athleticism (for a catcher) by nabbing 16 bases in 19 attempts. He hit very well in the Arizona Fall League (.938 OPS) despite further contact issues (17 Ks in 19 games).
The Scouting Report: Alfaro didn’t start catching until shortly before signing his first pro contract and also missed valuable development time in 2012 thanks to injuries so he’s still raw behind the plate. He shows enough athletic ability to suggest he’ll eventually improve his receiving to the point where he can be an average or better defender. Alfaro, 20, has a strong arm that should allow him to control the running game in the Majors. His naturally-aggressive nature at the plate hinders his offensive tools and he may not hit for a great average due to his high strikeout totals. Alfaro has above-average power potential.
The Year Ahead: Aflaro spent three games in High-A in 2013 and he should return there for much of ’14 while he looks to polish his defense. He could be ready to supplant the questionable Geovany Soto/J.P. Arencibia catching tandem (or whoever else shows up in the interim) late 2015 or mid-2016.
The Career Outlook: Athletic for a catcher, Alfaro could handle another position if needed but a move will hinder his value and he’s shown enough improvement to date that a move likely won’t be necessary. He projects as a solid all-around catcher capable of hitting bombs with aplomb.
#3 Luis Sardinas (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 573 149 19 2 36 75 32 .288 .340 .347 .321
The Year in Review: Speaking of infield depth, Sardinas is another talented middle infield prospect — although he receives most of his accolades for his work with the glove. Like Rougned Odor, the young shortstop split the 2013 season between High-A and Double-A. He hit a combined .288 with 32 steals in 42 attempts. He also spent time in the Venezuelan Winter League and hit .354 in 31 games.
The Scouting Report: The slick-fielding Sardinas is often overlooked in an organization brimming with young infielders. The young athlete isn’t as gifted offensively as the likes of Jurickson Profar and Rougned Odor but he is a skilled defender at shortstop with an above-average arm, plus range and good actions. At the plate, Sardinas understands his strengths and doesn’t try to muscle the ball, instead focusing on an all-fields approach and hitting the ball where it’s pitched. He also has above-average speed that should allow him to steal 20+ bases in a full big league season.
The Year Ahead: Sardinas will likely pair with Odor to form a talented double-play combo in the Texas League. He’ll likely spend a full year in the minors but could reach Triple-A in the second half.
The Career Outlook: Sardinas could develop into a solid, but unspectacular, hitter but he has a chance to be a plus fielder at a key defensive position.
#4 Luke Jackson (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 25 23 128.0 92 6 9.42 4.15 2.04 3.17
The Year in Review: Jackson had a successful season in 2013 from a statistical standpoint with just 92 hits allowed and 134 strikeouts in 128.0 innings. He spent the majority of the season in High-A but also made six appearances (four starts) in Double-A. He allowed just six home runs on the season despite a fairly average fly-ball rate.
The Scouting Report: Trades and promotions have robbed the organization of a lot of its pitching depth but Jackson continues to get better and is now the most talented pitching prospect in the system — although questions remain about his future role. The right-hander has a strong pitcher’s frame but everything that comes out of his hand is hard — a fastball that touches 95-96 mph, as well as a curveball. He has a changeup in his arsenal but it’s rarely used. Jackson also struggles with both his command and control but when he finds the strike zone he can be hard to hit.
The Year Ahead: The late season taste of Double-A should prepare him well to return to that level in 2014. He needs polish but he might see the Majors before the year is out.
The Career Outlook: Jackson has the ceiling of a solid No. 3 starter if he can improve in a few of the areas listed above. Some contacts feel he’d be better-served by a move to the bullpen where he could potentially dominate as a high-leverage reliever.
#5 Chi-Chi Gonzalez (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 14 14 42.2 45 2 7.38 3.38 3.80 3.36
The Year in Review: The Florida native was selected 23rd overall in the 2013 amateur draft out of Oral Roberts University. Gonzalez made 14 starts after turning pro while splitting his time between short-season ball and High-A ball. He struggled against southpaws, especially with his command and control, but he produced an excellent ground-ball rate and showed an advanced feel for pitching.
The Scouting Report: Gonzalez is an advanced college product that shouldn’t need much seasoning in the minors. He produces strong ground-ball numbers with a fastball that shows plenty of movement and enough velocity to make things interesting. He also flashes a plus slider and a developing changeup. His command and control were both inconsistent in his debut but project as average or better with further polish.
The Year Ahead: Gonzalez’s performance in the spring time will likely help decide if he opens the year in High-A ball or Double-A, but he should see the latter league at some point in 2014.
The Career Outlook: Gonzalez looks like a future No. 3 starter capable of keeping the ball on the ground while piling up innings.
#6 Joey Gallo (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 467 103 23 40 50 172 15 .251 .338 .623 .425
The Year in Review: The Nevada slugger did just that — slug — in 2013 by sending 40 balls over the outfield fences in 111 games. He even added 14 stolen bases in 15 tries. Unfortunately, he hit just .245 with a .334 on-base percentage and stuck out a whopping 165 times.
The Scouting Report: Gallo possesses plus-plus power and has one of the most potent bats in the minors in terms of home run potential. Unfortunately, he invokes comparisons to former Indians slugger Russell Branyan for the boom-or-bust, swing-and-miss tendencies. He struck out almost 40% of the time in 2013. In the field, Gallo shows a very strong arm but his range and foot work are both below average and he may end up in right field (first base is also an option but would negate part of his defensive value).
The Year Ahead: Gallo will move up to High-A ball in 2014 where he’ll look to continue hitting bombs while trimming his legendary strikeout rate.
The Career Outlook: As mentioned above, Gallo runs the risk of developing into a Branyan type of player or a future MVP of the Japanese league. If he makes enough contact, though, he could be a special player on this side of the ocean.
#7 Michael Choice (OF)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
23 19 5.3 % 31.6 % .278 .316 .333 .290 83 -0.4 0.0 0.0
The Year in Review: Since slugging 30 home runs over 467 at-bats in the California League (High-A) in 2011, Choice has produced two disappointing seasons in terms of power — including a combined 24 home runs over 869 at-bats. On the plus side, he hit .302 in Triple-A last year and backed that up with a .390 on-base percentage. He was traded from Oakland to Texas in the offseason during the Craig Gentry swap.
The Scouting Report: Choice has plus raw power but he doesn’t always tap into it in game situations. He hit for a strong average in 2013 but the strikeout totals (although improved) will likely prevent him from hitting more than .270-.280 in a big league season. He has a patient approach and should produce strong on-base rates. Defensively, Choice has played centre field but is better suited to a corner where he shows respectable range and a strong arm.
The Year Ahead: The Texas native may have to open the year back at Triple-A for a second year because he doesn’t really have a shot at a starting gig and would make a poor choice for the fourth outfielder’s role (mainly because it might stunt his development).
The Career Outlook: Choice’s future likely hinges on his ability to tap into his raw power on a more consistent basis.
#8 Nick Williams (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 404 110 19 17 15 110 8 .293 .337 .543 .395
The Year in Review: Williams’ 2013 numbers look fairly decent on the surface — including a .293 batting average and .879 OPS — but dig a little deeper and you’ll find 110 strikeouts and just 15 walks in 95 games. The left-handed hitter did a nice job of handling southpaws (.798 OPS). He clearly tired in August and September during his first full pro season and saw his OPS dip well below .700 for that period; he also struck out 34 times in his final 22 games.
The Scouting Report: Williams does have the swing-and-miss tendencies that Joey Gallo and Lewis Brinson have but he is aggressive at the plate and needs to improve his pitch recognition. The ball jumps off his bat when he makes contact and he should be capable of at least 15-20 home runs at the big league level. He lacks first-step quickness but he’s a good runner. Williams played the corner outfield in 2013 in deference to Brinson but he has the potential to play center field despite a modest throwing arm.
The Year Ahead: The young outfielder will move up to High-A ball and look to remain strong for the entire five month season while also becoming more patient at the plate in an effort to boost his on-base percentage.
The Career Outlook: A Texas native, Williams has an intriguing multifaceted tool set but he still has a lot of polishing to do with his game.
#9 Lewis Brinson (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 503 106 18 21 48 191 24 .237 .322 .427 .347
The Year in Review: Brinson’s final line on the season wasn’t terrible but his 191 strikeouts in 122 games — including in almost half of his at-bats against right-handed pitching — certainly limited his effectiveness. The fact that he was able to produce a 20-20 season as a teenager says a lot about his potential.
The Scouting Report: Brinson was one of my favorite athletes available in the 2012 draft but his approach at the plate has taken a step back in pro ball and he’s become a prolific hacker at the plate, as witnessed by his strikeout rate of 38%. His long swing doesn’t do him any favors. Surrounded by power-hitting prospects in Low-A ball (Nick Williams, Joey Gallo), became homer-happy even though he possesses five-tool (albeit raw) potential. Brinson has plus potential on the base paths as well as in centre field.
The Year Ahead: Brinson will likely move up to High-A ball along with Nick Williams and Joey Gallo. His athleticism and overall potential is exciting but he has a long, long way to go in terms of realizing his full potential.
The Career Outlook: Unless he trims the strikeout rate, Brinson is going to burn out before he even hits Triple-A. If the light clicks on, though, he could be a solid big league performer.
#10 Chris Bostick (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 555 138 25 14 51 122 25 .282 .354 .452 .368
The Year in Review: Bostick produce surprising pop in 2013 and went deep 14 times; his slugging percentage went up almost .100 points over his previous season. The infielder hit .282 but he struck out a lot. He was a threat on the base paths with 25 steals in 33 tries. Bostick arrived in Texas from Oakland along with fellow Top 10 prospect Michael Choice.
The Scouting Report: The Rangers may have pulled off a real steal with the addition of both Michael Choice and Bostick from the A’s for a fourth outfielder in Craig Gentry and a middle reliever in Josh Lindblom. The young infielder isn’t overly physical but he improved his strength in 2013 and started hitting the ball with more authority, although he’ll never be a big home run hitter. He has enough speed and base running acumen to nab 15+ bases in a season. He’s shown an ability to handle both shortstop and second base but his future is probably at the keystone.
The Year Ahead: Bostick will move from Low-A to High-A ball in 2014 and if he continues to hit well (and possibly trim the strikeouts) he could see Double-A late in the year.
The Career Outlook: Bostick could develop into a solid big league second baseman — which is just what Texas needed, right?
The Next Five:
11. Nomar Mazara, OF: Given a massive bonus to sign out of the Dominican Republic in 2011 as a 16 year old, Mazara spent ’13 in Low-A ball at the age of 18. He was a little overwhelmed at times — which is understandable — but he showed flashes of why he was so heavily coveted. When he can make contact, the ball goes a long way. The left-handed hitter struggled against southpaws and hit just .165 against them. In total, he struck out 131 times in 126 games.
12. David Ledbetter, RHP: David and his twin brother Ryan were both drafted (and signed) by the Rangers in 2013. The more talented of the two, David had a strong pro debut in the Northwest League and struck out 51 batters in 58.1 innings while also producing a solid ground-ball rate. He has a four-pitch repertoire that includes an 89-94 mph fastball with good sink, a curveball, a slider and a changeup.
13. Travis Demeritte, SS/3B: An athletic infielder, Demeritte played shortstop as an amateur but also spent some time at third during his debut. He has as strong arm but his range is hindered by his modest speed so the hot corner is likely his long-term destination. Demeritte is a bit of an inconsistent hitter but he had a strong debut with an .856 OPS. The strikeouts — 49 in 39 games — were an issue and he needs to make more consistent contact.
14. Ronald Guzman, 1B: Signed the same year as Mazara, Guzman’s 2013 season was interrupted by a knee injury. He flashes plus raw power but has yet to fully tap into it. He struggled mightily against southpaws in 2013 with a .496 OPS compared to .778 against righties. Guzman, 19 has limited defensive value.
15. Jairo Beras, OF: Beras appeared in just 17 games due to a broken hamate bone but he showed flashes of what made him such a highly-sought-after commodity on the international free agent market. The 18-year-old showed good power for his young age — not surprising given his frame and he also showed a good eye considering his limited playing time over the past year and a half. He possesses a very strong arm in the outfield.
#1 Rougned Odor (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 569 156 41 11 35 91 32 .305 .365 .474 .378
The Year in Review: Odor definitely didn’t stink in 2013; in fact, he had a breakout season by hitting .305 with an .839 OPS as a teenager combined between High-A ball and Double-A. The left-handed hitter showed good line-drive pop and hit 41 doubles and 11 home runs. He also swiped 32 bases in 42 attempts. Odor received some additional experience during the off-season by seeing 32 games of action in the Venezuelan Winter League.
The Scouting Report: The Rangers graduated one outstanding middle infield prospect in 2013 in Jurickson Profar, but another one is on the way. Odor, who recently turned 20, has an advanced hitting approach for his age and his above-average bat speed helps him hit balls with authority into the gaps. I’d like to see him be a little more selective at the plate. He’ll likely never hit for big home run power and his speed on the bases is just average. The Venezuela native still has work to do to polish his game at second base but he has the athletic ability to be average or better.
The Year Ahead: Odor will almost certainly return to Double-A to open the 2014 season. With Elvis Andrus and Jurickson Profar at the MLB level there is no reason to rush the young second base prospect.
The Career Outlook: The Venezuela native looks like a future impact offensive player at second base for the Rangers, which could force the club to once again relocate Profar.
#2 Jorge Alfaro (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 539 134 30 18 37 139 20 .283 .360 .468 .381
The Year in Review: Alfaro spent the majority of 2013 in Low-A ball where he slugged 39 extra base hits, including 16 homers, in 104 games. He had some issues at the plate with 111 strikeouts and just 28 walks but he showed his above-average athleticism (for a catcher) by nabbing 16 bases in 19 attempts. He hit very well in the Arizona Fall League (.938 OPS) despite further contact issues (17 Ks in 19 games).
The Scouting Report: Alfaro didn’t start catching until shortly before signing his first pro contract and also missed valuable development time in 2012 thanks to injuries so he’s still raw behind the plate. He shows enough athletic ability to suggest he’ll eventually improve his receiving to the point where he can be an average or better defender. Alfaro, 20, has a strong arm that should allow him to control the running game in the Majors. His naturally-aggressive nature at the plate hinders his offensive tools and he may not hit for a great average due to his high strikeout totals. Alfaro has above-average power potential.
The Year Ahead: Aflaro spent three games in High-A in 2013 and he should return there for much of ’14 while he looks to polish his defense. He could be ready to supplant the questionable Geovany Soto/J.P. Arencibia catching tandem (or whoever else shows up in the interim) late 2015 or mid-2016.
The Career Outlook: Athletic for a catcher, Alfaro could handle another position if needed but a move will hinder his value and he’s shown enough improvement to date that a move likely won’t be necessary. He projects as a solid all-around catcher capable of hitting bombs with aplomb.
#3 Luis Sardinas (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 573 149 19 2 36 75 32 .288 .340 .347 .321
The Year in Review: Speaking of infield depth, Sardinas is another talented middle infield prospect — although he receives most of his accolades for his work with the glove. Like Rougned Odor, the young shortstop split the 2013 season between High-A and Double-A. He hit a combined .288 with 32 steals in 42 attempts. He also spent time in the Venezuelan Winter League and hit .354 in 31 games.
The Scouting Report: The slick-fielding Sardinas is often overlooked in an organization brimming with young infielders. The young athlete isn’t as gifted offensively as the likes of Jurickson Profar and Rougned Odor but he is a skilled defender at shortstop with an above-average arm, plus range and good actions. At the plate, Sardinas understands his strengths and doesn’t try to muscle the ball, instead focusing on an all-fields approach and hitting the ball where it’s pitched. He also has above-average speed that should allow him to steal 20+ bases in a full big league season.
The Year Ahead: Sardinas will likely pair with Odor to form a talented double-play combo in the Texas League. He’ll likely spend a full year in the minors but could reach Triple-A in the second half.
The Career Outlook: Sardinas could develop into a solid, but unspectacular, hitter but he has a chance to be a plus fielder at a key defensive position.
#4 Luke Jackson (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 25 23 128.0 92 6 9.42 4.15 2.04 3.17
The Year in Review: Jackson had a successful season in 2013 from a statistical standpoint with just 92 hits allowed and 134 strikeouts in 128.0 innings. He spent the majority of the season in High-A but also made six appearances (four starts) in Double-A. He allowed just six home runs on the season despite a fairly average fly-ball rate.
The Scouting Report: Trades and promotions have robbed the organization of a lot of its pitching depth but Jackson continues to get better and is now the most talented pitching prospect in the system — although questions remain about his future role. The right-hander has a strong pitcher’s frame but everything that comes out of his hand is hard — a fastball that touches 95-96 mph, as well as a curveball. He has a changeup in his arsenal but it’s rarely used. Jackson also struggles with both his command and control but when he finds the strike zone he can be hard to hit.
The Year Ahead: The late season taste of Double-A should prepare him well to return to that level in 2014. He needs polish but he might see the Majors before the year is out.
The Career Outlook: Jackson has the ceiling of a solid No. 3 starter if he can improve in a few of the areas listed above. Some contacts feel he’d be better-served by a move to the bullpen where he could potentially dominate as a high-leverage reliever.
#5 Chi-Chi Gonzalez (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 14 14 42.2 45 2 7.38 3.38 3.80 3.36
The Year in Review: The Florida native was selected 23rd overall in the 2013 amateur draft out of Oral Roberts University. Gonzalez made 14 starts after turning pro while splitting his time between short-season ball and High-A ball. He struggled against southpaws, especially with his command and control, but he produced an excellent ground-ball rate and showed an advanced feel for pitching.
The Scouting Report: Gonzalez is an advanced college product that shouldn’t need much seasoning in the minors. He produces strong ground-ball numbers with a fastball that shows plenty of movement and enough velocity to make things interesting. He also flashes a plus slider and a developing changeup. His command and control were both inconsistent in his debut but project as average or better with further polish.
The Year Ahead: Gonzalez’s performance in the spring time will likely help decide if he opens the year in High-A ball or Double-A, but he should see the latter league at some point in 2014.
The Career Outlook: Gonzalez looks like a future No. 3 starter capable of keeping the ball on the ground while piling up innings.
#6 Joey Gallo (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 467 103 23 40 50 172 15 .251 .338 .623 .425
The Year in Review: The Nevada slugger did just that — slug — in 2013 by sending 40 balls over the outfield fences in 111 games. He even added 14 stolen bases in 15 tries. Unfortunately, he hit just .245 with a .334 on-base percentage and stuck out a whopping 165 times.
The Scouting Report: Gallo possesses plus-plus power and has one of the most potent bats in the minors in terms of home run potential. Unfortunately, he invokes comparisons to former Indians slugger Russell Branyan for the boom-or-bust, swing-and-miss tendencies. He struck out almost 40% of the time in 2013. In the field, Gallo shows a very strong arm but his range and foot work are both below average and he may end up in right field (first base is also an option but would negate part of his defensive value).
The Year Ahead: Gallo will move up to High-A ball in 2014 where he’ll look to continue hitting bombs while trimming his legendary strikeout rate.
The Career Outlook: As mentioned above, Gallo runs the risk of developing into a Branyan type of player or a future MVP of the Japanese league. If he makes enough contact, though, he could be a special player on this side of the ocean.
#7 Michael Choice (OF)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
23 19 5.3 % 31.6 % .278 .316 .333 .290 83 -0.4 0.0 0.0
The Year in Review: Since slugging 30 home runs over 467 at-bats in the California League (High-A) in 2011, Choice has produced two disappointing seasons in terms of power — including a combined 24 home runs over 869 at-bats. On the plus side, he hit .302 in Triple-A last year and backed that up with a .390 on-base percentage. He was traded from Oakland to Texas in the offseason during the Craig Gentry swap.
The Scouting Report: Choice has plus raw power but he doesn’t always tap into it in game situations. He hit for a strong average in 2013 but the strikeout totals (although improved) will likely prevent him from hitting more than .270-.280 in a big league season. He has a patient approach and should produce strong on-base rates. Defensively, Choice has played centre field but is better suited to a corner where he shows respectable range and a strong arm.
The Year Ahead: The Texas native may have to open the year back at Triple-A for a second year because he doesn’t really have a shot at a starting gig and would make a poor choice for the fourth outfielder’s role (mainly because it might stunt his development).
The Career Outlook: Choice’s future likely hinges on his ability to tap into his raw power on a more consistent basis.
#8 Nick Williams (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 404 110 19 17 15 110 8 .293 .337 .543 .395
The Year in Review: Williams’ 2013 numbers look fairly decent on the surface — including a .293 batting average and .879 OPS — but dig a little deeper and you’ll find 110 strikeouts and just 15 walks in 95 games. The left-handed hitter did a nice job of handling southpaws (.798 OPS). He clearly tired in August and September during his first full pro season and saw his OPS dip well below .700 for that period; he also struck out 34 times in his final 22 games.
The Scouting Report: Williams does have the swing-and-miss tendencies that Joey Gallo and Lewis Brinson have but he is aggressive at the plate and needs to improve his pitch recognition. The ball jumps off his bat when he makes contact and he should be capable of at least 15-20 home runs at the big league level. He lacks first-step quickness but he’s a good runner. Williams played the corner outfield in 2013 in deference to Brinson but he has the potential to play center field despite a modest throwing arm.
The Year Ahead: The young outfielder will move up to High-A ball and look to remain strong for the entire five month season while also becoming more patient at the plate in an effort to boost his on-base percentage.
The Career Outlook: A Texas native, Williams has an intriguing multifaceted tool set but he still has a lot of polishing to do with his game.
#9 Lewis Brinson (OF)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 503 106 18 21 48 191 24 .237 .322 .427 .347
The Year in Review: Brinson’s final line on the season wasn’t terrible but his 191 strikeouts in 122 games — including in almost half of his at-bats against right-handed pitching — certainly limited his effectiveness. The fact that he was able to produce a 20-20 season as a teenager says a lot about his potential.
The Scouting Report: Brinson was one of my favorite athletes available in the 2012 draft but his approach at the plate has taken a step back in pro ball and he’s become a prolific hacker at the plate, as witnessed by his strikeout rate of 38%. His long swing doesn’t do him any favors. Surrounded by power-hitting prospects in Low-A ball (Nick Williams, Joey Gallo), became homer-happy even though he possesses five-tool (albeit raw) potential. Brinson has plus potential on the base paths as well as in centre field.
The Year Ahead: Brinson will likely move up to High-A ball along with Nick Williams and Joey Gallo. His athleticism and overall potential is exciting but he has a long, long way to go in terms of realizing his full potential.
The Career Outlook: Unless he trims the strikeout rate, Brinson is going to burn out before he even hits Triple-A. If the light clicks on, though, he could be a solid big league performer.
#10 Chris Bostick (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 555 138 25 14 51 122 25 .282 .354 .452 .368
The Year in Review: Bostick produce surprising pop in 2013 and went deep 14 times; his slugging percentage went up almost .100 points over his previous season. The infielder hit .282 but he struck out a lot. He was a threat on the base paths with 25 steals in 33 tries. Bostick arrived in Texas from Oakland along with fellow Top 10 prospect Michael Choice.
The Scouting Report: The Rangers may have pulled off a real steal with the addition of both Michael Choice and Bostick from the A’s for a fourth outfielder in Craig Gentry and a middle reliever in Josh Lindblom. The young infielder isn’t overly physical but he improved his strength in 2013 and started hitting the ball with more authority, although he’ll never be a big home run hitter. He has enough speed and base running acumen to nab 15+ bases in a season. He’s shown an ability to handle both shortstop and second base but his future is probably at the keystone.
The Year Ahead: Bostick will move from Low-A to High-A ball in 2014 and if he continues to hit well (and possibly trim the strikeouts) he could see Double-A late in the year.
The Career Outlook: Bostick could develop into a solid big league second baseman — which is just what Texas needed, right?
The Next Five:
11. Nomar Mazara, OF: Given a massive bonus to sign out of the Dominican Republic in 2011 as a 16 year old, Mazara spent ’13 in Low-A ball at the age of 18. He was a little overwhelmed at times — which is understandable — but he showed flashes of why he was so heavily coveted. When he can make contact, the ball goes a long way. The left-handed hitter struggled against southpaws and hit just .165 against them. In total, he struck out 131 times in 126 games.
12. David Ledbetter, RHP: David and his twin brother Ryan were both drafted (and signed) by the Rangers in 2013. The more talented of the two, David had a strong pro debut in the Northwest League and struck out 51 batters in 58.1 innings while also producing a solid ground-ball rate. He has a four-pitch repertoire that includes an 89-94 mph fastball with good sink, a curveball, a slider and a changeup.
13. Travis Demeritte, SS/3B: An athletic infielder, Demeritte played shortstop as an amateur but also spent some time at third during his debut. He has as strong arm but his range is hindered by his modest speed so the hot corner is likely his long-term destination. Demeritte is a bit of an inconsistent hitter but he had a strong debut with an .856 OPS. The strikeouts — 49 in 39 games — were an issue and he needs to make more consistent contact.
14. Ronald Guzman, 1B: Signed the same year as Mazara, Guzman’s 2013 season was interrupted by a knee injury. He flashes plus raw power but has yet to fully tap into it. He struggled mightily against southpaws in 2013 with a .496 OPS compared to .778 against righties. Guzman, 19 has limited defensive value.
15. Jairo Beras, OF: Beras appeared in just 17 games due to a broken hamate bone but he showed flashes of what made him such a highly-sought-after commodity on the international free agent market. The 18-year-old showed good power for his young age — not surprising given his frame and he also showed a good eye considering his limited playing time over the past year and a half. He possesses a very strong arm in the outfield.
A Few Thoughts on the Orioles and their Window.
Recently, the Orioles have finally gotten active with regard to improving their ballclub. Such behavior was long overdue, because inactivity was likely to leave the Orioles in a non-competitive place despite a roster littered with upper-level talent. Their offseason, for a while, was as disappointing as Cincinnati’s, and on the heels of the Ubaldo Jimenez acquisition, writers all over the place have emphasized that the Orioles are working with a short-term window. That is, the Orioles need to win in 2014 or 2015, because after that, they could easily be without both Matt Wieters and Chris Davis.
Wieters is good, and next year is his last year of team control, and he’s represented by Scott Boras. Davis is good, and next year is his last year of team control, and he’s represented by Scott Boras as well. Certainly, the Orioles would rather have more good players than fewer good players, and if they do lose these two, they’ll have to work hard to make up for it. But I want to talk about the Orioles’ perceived window, just as I talked some time ago about the Royals’ perceived window, because the actual reality is always more complicated than the sound-byte reality. For Baltimore, it doesn’t have to be two years or bust.
The first thing to talk about: how good are the Orioles, actually? Like, right this second? Is this even really a good window for them? They have won 178 games over two years. Much of that talent is still around. And yet, they aren’t quite projection-system darlings. Steamer has them as the worst team in the AL East. PECOTA also has them as the worst team in the AL East. ZiPS doesn’t seem to think they’re very different from the Blue Jays. One message: the Orioles aren’t bad. A second message: the Orioles, at least this year, will have an uphill battle. For a team supposedly with a short-term window, the shortest term is less than encouraging.
Some young talent could and should arrive down the stretch. It could and should be in place for 2015, so maybe next year would be when the Orioles are at their best. Some of that depends on how good Davis and Wieters actually are. Wieters hasn’t shown much improvement, and Davis looks like a regression candidate, if only because his most recent numbers were so insane. I think if you’re going to talk about a team with a window, it should at least be clear that they’re a real contender during. The Orioles simply might be. The teams around them are also pretty good.
Now, let’s say that Wieters and Davis both walk after 2015. It’s the current course of things, and let’s say they become highly sought-after free agents. Lose Wieters and the Orioles are down, say, 3-4 wins. Lose Davis and they’re down, I don’t know, 3-5 wins. The specific numbers aren’t important — what’s important is that they’re big losses. But those aren’t just losses of wins; they also represent cleared payroll. Wieters might easily end up making about $10 million in 2015. Davis could earn upwards of $15 million. This is the easy part to forget about — when you lose a highly-paid star, you lose a star, but you also gain some flexibility.
Of course, Wieters will probably be more valuable than $10 million, and Davis will probably be more valuable than $15 million. Those are estimated third-year arbitration figures, and you can’t use that money to buy the same wins back on the open market. But then, there’s also the Nick Markakis factor. Markakis will make $15 million this season. Then there’s a bigger club option, with a $2-million buyout. Markakis has been worth 7.5 WAR over five years, and his most recent year was his worst, and he’s entered his 30s.
Unless Markakis turns things around, the Orioles will happily clear that money, and then they’ll be able to re-invest it, probably better. Between Markakis, Wieters, and Davis, the Orioles could lose a lot of talent over two years, but that talent would’ve come at a cost of tens of millions of dollars, and dollars are basically wins without a corporeal form. Even if they can’t totally make up the gap in lost wins, they can get a lot of the way there.
And now’s when we consider the potential long-term assets. If the talk is about the Orioles losing Wieters and Davis, the talk should also be about the players the Orioles would have left. Because every baseball team is bigger than one or two players, and though you can never be confident in projections a few years off, the Orioles have reason to hope they could still have a pretty strong core a few seasons down the road.
Adam Jones is there for a while. He’s locked in and he’s good. Manny Machado‘s there for a while. He’s under club control, and he’s good. The Orioles just signed Ubaldo Jimenez for four years. Chris Tillman isn’t arbitration-eligible until 2015. Less sexily, Miguel Gonzalez isn’t arbitration-eligible until 2015. Hell, the Orioles signed Suk-min Yoon for three years, whatever he might be, and that contract’s interesting. It’s looking like the front office could sign J.J. Hardy to a long-term extension.
And what the Orioles have is a top-heavy farm system, which means it’s light on depth, but big on potential impact talent. Our own Marc Hulet put five Orioles prospect in the top 100. Keith Law put the same five in the top 100. Baseball Prospectus put the same five in the top 101. Those five are real good and, for the most part, they’re close to being major leaguers.
Dylan Bundy is on the other side of Tommy John surgery, now, and he’s an operation removed from being baseball’s consensus top pitching prospect. He’s 21 years old. Kevin Gausman is 23 years old, and he’s had few problems in the minors, and while his big-league cup of coffee featured a near-6 ERA, it also featured a near-3 xFIP, with a strikeout an inning. Eduardo Rodriguez is 20 years old, and he just struck out a batter an inning in his first exposure to Double-A. Jonathan Schoop is 22 years old, and he’s thought to be close to a big-league infield provided he’s over a 2013 back injury. Rounding things out, Hunter Harvey was just drafted 22nd overall, and he’s 19, and while he’s a few years away, he’s also a potential fast riser. Hulet has given him a high ceiling, albeit shy of ace-level.
Odds are, not all those guys will work out. Bundy’s already been hurt. Harvey’s a low-minors prep arm, and Schoop hasn’t hit a whole lot for a while. But some of those guys should work out, and if, say, Bundy and Gausman succeed, they could be impact starters real soon under cheap team control for several seasons. And there’s absolutely nothing more valuable to a big-league franchise than a good young player making a tiny fraction of his market-value salary.
Jones, Machado, and Tillman are already good and in place. Jimenez is something of a mystery, and Hardy is a different sort of mystery, but there could be value there, too, and then you throw in the prospects, who could make significant impacts. Mix that together and it’s not unreasonable to think that the Orioles could still be pretty good in 2016 and beyond. If Bundy and Gausman deliver in the nearer term, the 2015 O’s could be a force, but a force without Matt Wieters and Chris Davis is still a force with some money to spend. So, you can paint a hopeful picture.
You can also paint a depressing picture. A lot depends on a group of young arms, and there’s no less-reliable set of players in baseball. If the pitchers bust, the Orioles would need new pitchers, non-busted pitchers, and those pitchers would cost them money, and they’d run out of money fast. But Bundy could be real good. Gausman could be real good. Rodriguez could be real good, and Schoop could at least be an all-right infielder for cheap, and so on. Life for the Orioles doesn’t have to end after 2015, even if Wieters and Davis both leave. Solutions could be found from within the system, because a system’s the real key to sustainable winning.
Wieters is good, and next year is his last year of team control, and he’s represented by Scott Boras. Davis is good, and next year is his last year of team control, and he’s represented by Scott Boras as well. Certainly, the Orioles would rather have more good players than fewer good players, and if they do lose these two, they’ll have to work hard to make up for it. But I want to talk about the Orioles’ perceived window, just as I talked some time ago about the Royals’ perceived window, because the actual reality is always more complicated than the sound-byte reality. For Baltimore, it doesn’t have to be two years or bust.
The first thing to talk about: how good are the Orioles, actually? Like, right this second? Is this even really a good window for them? They have won 178 games over two years. Much of that talent is still around. And yet, they aren’t quite projection-system darlings. Steamer has them as the worst team in the AL East. PECOTA also has them as the worst team in the AL East. ZiPS doesn’t seem to think they’re very different from the Blue Jays. One message: the Orioles aren’t bad. A second message: the Orioles, at least this year, will have an uphill battle. For a team supposedly with a short-term window, the shortest term is less than encouraging.
Some young talent could and should arrive down the stretch. It could and should be in place for 2015, so maybe next year would be when the Orioles are at their best. Some of that depends on how good Davis and Wieters actually are. Wieters hasn’t shown much improvement, and Davis looks like a regression candidate, if only because his most recent numbers were so insane. I think if you’re going to talk about a team with a window, it should at least be clear that they’re a real contender during. The Orioles simply might be. The teams around them are also pretty good.
Now, let’s say that Wieters and Davis both walk after 2015. It’s the current course of things, and let’s say they become highly sought-after free agents. Lose Wieters and the Orioles are down, say, 3-4 wins. Lose Davis and they’re down, I don’t know, 3-5 wins. The specific numbers aren’t important — what’s important is that they’re big losses. But those aren’t just losses of wins; they also represent cleared payroll. Wieters might easily end up making about $10 million in 2015. Davis could earn upwards of $15 million. This is the easy part to forget about — when you lose a highly-paid star, you lose a star, but you also gain some flexibility.
Of course, Wieters will probably be more valuable than $10 million, and Davis will probably be more valuable than $15 million. Those are estimated third-year arbitration figures, and you can’t use that money to buy the same wins back on the open market. But then, there’s also the Nick Markakis factor. Markakis will make $15 million this season. Then there’s a bigger club option, with a $2-million buyout. Markakis has been worth 7.5 WAR over five years, and his most recent year was his worst, and he’s entered his 30s.
Unless Markakis turns things around, the Orioles will happily clear that money, and then they’ll be able to re-invest it, probably better. Between Markakis, Wieters, and Davis, the Orioles could lose a lot of talent over two years, but that talent would’ve come at a cost of tens of millions of dollars, and dollars are basically wins without a corporeal form. Even if they can’t totally make up the gap in lost wins, they can get a lot of the way there.
And now’s when we consider the potential long-term assets. If the talk is about the Orioles losing Wieters and Davis, the talk should also be about the players the Orioles would have left. Because every baseball team is bigger than one or two players, and though you can never be confident in projections a few years off, the Orioles have reason to hope they could still have a pretty strong core a few seasons down the road.
Adam Jones is there for a while. He’s locked in and he’s good. Manny Machado‘s there for a while. He’s under club control, and he’s good. The Orioles just signed Ubaldo Jimenez for four years. Chris Tillman isn’t arbitration-eligible until 2015. Less sexily, Miguel Gonzalez isn’t arbitration-eligible until 2015. Hell, the Orioles signed Suk-min Yoon for three years, whatever he might be, and that contract’s interesting. It’s looking like the front office could sign J.J. Hardy to a long-term extension.
And what the Orioles have is a top-heavy farm system, which means it’s light on depth, but big on potential impact talent. Our own Marc Hulet put five Orioles prospect in the top 100. Keith Law put the same five in the top 100. Baseball Prospectus put the same five in the top 101. Those five are real good and, for the most part, they’re close to being major leaguers.
Dylan Bundy is on the other side of Tommy John surgery, now, and he’s an operation removed from being baseball’s consensus top pitching prospect. He’s 21 years old. Kevin Gausman is 23 years old, and he’s had few problems in the minors, and while his big-league cup of coffee featured a near-6 ERA, it also featured a near-3 xFIP, with a strikeout an inning. Eduardo Rodriguez is 20 years old, and he just struck out a batter an inning in his first exposure to Double-A. Jonathan Schoop is 22 years old, and he’s thought to be close to a big-league infield provided he’s over a 2013 back injury. Rounding things out, Hunter Harvey was just drafted 22nd overall, and he’s 19, and while he’s a few years away, he’s also a potential fast riser. Hulet has given him a high ceiling, albeit shy of ace-level.
Odds are, not all those guys will work out. Bundy’s already been hurt. Harvey’s a low-minors prep arm, and Schoop hasn’t hit a whole lot for a while. But some of those guys should work out, and if, say, Bundy and Gausman succeed, they could be impact starters real soon under cheap team control for several seasons. And there’s absolutely nothing more valuable to a big-league franchise than a good young player making a tiny fraction of his market-value salary.
Jones, Machado, and Tillman are already good and in place. Jimenez is something of a mystery, and Hardy is a different sort of mystery, but there could be value there, too, and then you throw in the prospects, who could make significant impacts. Mix that together and it’s not unreasonable to think that the Orioles could still be pretty good in 2016 and beyond. If Bundy and Gausman deliver in the nearer term, the 2015 O’s could be a force, but a force without Matt Wieters and Chris Davis is still a force with some money to spend. So, you can paint a hopeful picture.
You can also paint a depressing picture. A lot depends on a group of young arms, and there’s no less-reliable set of players in baseball. If the pitchers bust, the Orioles would need new pitchers, non-busted pitchers, and those pitchers would cost them money, and they’d run out of money fast. But Bundy could be real good. Gausman could be real good. Rodriguez could be real good, and Schoop could at least be an all-right infielder for cheap, and so on. Life for the Orioles doesn’t have to end after 2015, even if Wieters and Davis both leave. Solutions could be found from within the system, because a system’s the real key to sustainable winning.
Homer Bailey and His Peers.
Extension season continued today, with the Reds announcing the six year, $105 million contract for Homer Bailey that’s been rumored for the better part of the last week or so. Jeff already wrote up Bailey’s 2013 improvements, and there’s no question he was a significantly better pitcher last year than he had been previously. If those improvements are real and sustainable, Bailey won’t have any problem justifying this extension, and he certainly would have landed a much larger deal as a free agent next winter. There’s certainly upside here if he continues to pitch as he did last year.
That said, it’s also a pretty big bet on what amounts to one year’s performance at this level, and we can’t ignore what Bailey was before 2013 in projecting what he’ll do going forward. Using forecasts that account for multiple years of performance, Steamer projects Bailey as a +2.5 WAR pitcher in 2014, while ZIPS is a little more optimistic, coming in at +3.5 WAR. The always optimistic FANS projections are agree more with ZIPS, but they’ve generally been 15-20% too high across on the board — rose colored glasses and all that — and if you adjust all the FANS projections down to a more reasonable baseline, Bailey would come out at +2.9 WAR. I think it’s fair to say that Bailey is roughly a +3 WAR pitcher at the moment.
But this winter, we’ve seen a bunch of +3 WAR starters hit the free agent market, and none of them got anywhere close to $105 million over six years. One could certainly make the case that Bailey is more attractive than pitchers like Matt Garza (health concerns), Ubaldo Jimenez (lack of consistency), Ervin Santana (ditto), and Ricky Nolasco (ERA/FIP differentials), each of whom have signed — or in Santana’s case, are likely to sign — for roughly 4/$50M. The Reds essentially bought five of Bailey’s free agent years for an AAV of $19 million per season, while similar-if-not-quite-as-attractive actual free agents were only able to command $12 or $13 million per year with one fewer guaranteed year. Even if you prefer Bailey to these free agents — I do too, for the record — I’m not sure how to justify the gap at $6-$7 million per season, plus an extra guaranteed year, especially considering Bailey wasn’t actually a free agent yet.
This contract basically says that Bailey is a full win per season better than these guys going forward, and that the extra leverage that the Reds had of forcing him to wait an additional year to hit the open market had little or no value. Even if you think Bailey’s a +3.5 WAR guy going forward, you have to be fairly down on all of the Garza/Santana/Nolasco/Jimenez group to make that case. Which isn’t totally crazy, as they each have their own issues, but of course, it’s not like Bailey has been a dependable model of excellence either. Just as the Reds are betting on Bailey’s upside, the Orioles on bidding on Jimenez’s upside, and both have established similar top-end performances over the last few years. Maybe Bailey comes with less downside, but I don’t know that it’s significantly less, and the Orioles bet is less than half of the guaranteed money that the Reds just gave Bailey.
Clearly, Walt Jocketty knows more about the trade value of trying to sell teams on acquiring Bailey on a one year, $10 million contract, especially since trading him now would essentially have been an admission that the Reds didn’t think Bailey was worth the price he was asking for. It’s tough to ask an opposing GM to give up a bunch of talent in return for a single year rental of a player that you yourself won’t extend at the price he’s asking. So maybe the Reds wouldn’t have gotten much for Bailey’s walk year.
But given the other options available for $10M in salary — that’s Dan Haren/Bartolo Colon/Josh Johnson territory, essentially — it’s hard for me to imagine that the Reds couldn’t have extracted some real value in return, especially since the acquiring team would know that they could at least use a qualifying offer next winter to regain some future value even if they weren’t going to extend him themselves. Could the Reds really not have talked the Yankees into doing some version of the Bailey for Brett Gardner rumor that kicked around all winter? Or what about sending him to Seattle for displaced 2B prospect Nick Franklin, giving themselves an in-house replacement for when they eventually give Brandon Phillips away?
Maybe there wasn’t that kind of interest in Bailey from other GMs. Maybe the Reds really were best off keeping him at $19 million per year rather than spending $12 or $13 million on an inferior pitcher, even if the gap isn’t that huge. Free agents who change teams regularly underperform their projections, so maybe the available hurlers are more likely to be +2 WAR pitchers than +3 WAR pitchers going forward, and the Reds will be better off with a younger, better hurler than the free agent alternatives. There are plenty of scenarios where this deal works out just fine, and even if the Reds decide in a year that $19 million per year might not be such a bargain after all, it’s not such an egregious overpay that he wouldn’t still be movable if need be.
Given what we know about Bailey and about what the free agent market just said about good-not-great hurlers with some inconsistencies in their track records, this feels like a pretty steep price to pay, however. Maybe it was the best path forward for the Reds, but I wonder if in a year’s time, they don’t look back and wonder why they paid $100 million for their above average starter when everyone else was paying $50 million for theirs.
That said, it’s also a pretty big bet on what amounts to one year’s performance at this level, and we can’t ignore what Bailey was before 2013 in projecting what he’ll do going forward. Using forecasts that account for multiple years of performance, Steamer projects Bailey as a +2.5 WAR pitcher in 2014, while ZIPS is a little more optimistic, coming in at +3.5 WAR. The always optimistic FANS projections are agree more with ZIPS, but they’ve generally been 15-20% too high across on the board — rose colored glasses and all that — and if you adjust all the FANS projections down to a more reasonable baseline, Bailey would come out at +2.9 WAR. I think it’s fair to say that Bailey is roughly a +3 WAR pitcher at the moment.
But this winter, we’ve seen a bunch of +3 WAR starters hit the free agent market, and none of them got anywhere close to $105 million over six years. One could certainly make the case that Bailey is more attractive than pitchers like Matt Garza (health concerns), Ubaldo Jimenez (lack of consistency), Ervin Santana (ditto), and Ricky Nolasco (ERA/FIP differentials), each of whom have signed — or in Santana’s case, are likely to sign — for roughly 4/$50M. The Reds essentially bought five of Bailey’s free agent years for an AAV of $19 million per season, while similar-if-not-quite-as-attractive actual free agents were only able to command $12 or $13 million per year with one fewer guaranteed year. Even if you prefer Bailey to these free agents — I do too, for the record — I’m not sure how to justify the gap at $6-$7 million per season, plus an extra guaranteed year, especially considering Bailey wasn’t actually a free agent yet.
This contract basically says that Bailey is a full win per season better than these guys going forward, and that the extra leverage that the Reds had of forcing him to wait an additional year to hit the open market had little or no value. Even if you think Bailey’s a +3.5 WAR guy going forward, you have to be fairly down on all of the Garza/Santana/Nolasco/Jimenez group to make that case. Which isn’t totally crazy, as they each have their own issues, but of course, it’s not like Bailey has been a dependable model of excellence either. Just as the Reds are betting on Bailey’s upside, the Orioles on bidding on Jimenez’s upside, and both have established similar top-end performances over the last few years. Maybe Bailey comes with less downside, but I don’t know that it’s significantly less, and the Orioles bet is less than half of the guaranteed money that the Reds just gave Bailey.
Clearly, Walt Jocketty knows more about the trade value of trying to sell teams on acquiring Bailey on a one year, $10 million contract, especially since trading him now would essentially have been an admission that the Reds didn’t think Bailey was worth the price he was asking for. It’s tough to ask an opposing GM to give up a bunch of talent in return for a single year rental of a player that you yourself won’t extend at the price he’s asking. So maybe the Reds wouldn’t have gotten much for Bailey’s walk year.
But given the other options available for $10M in salary — that’s Dan Haren/Bartolo Colon/Josh Johnson territory, essentially — it’s hard for me to imagine that the Reds couldn’t have extracted some real value in return, especially since the acquiring team would know that they could at least use a qualifying offer next winter to regain some future value even if they weren’t going to extend him themselves. Could the Reds really not have talked the Yankees into doing some version of the Bailey for Brett Gardner rumor that kicked around all winter? Or what about sending him to Seattle for displaced 2B prospect Nick Franklin, giving themselves an in-house replacement for when they eventually give Brandon Phillips away?
Maybe there wasn’t that kind of interest in Bailey from other GMs. Maybe the Reds really were best off keeping him at $19 million per year rather than spending $12 or $13 million on an inferior pitcher, even if the gap isn’t that huge. Free agents who change teams regularly underperform their projections, so maybe the available hurlers are more likely to be +2 WAR pitchers than +3 WAR pitchers going forward, and the Reds will be better off with a younger, better hurler than the free agent alternatives. There are plenty of scenarios where this deal works out just fine, and even if the Reds decide in a year that $19 million per year might not be such a bargain after all, it’s not such an egregious overpay that he wouldn’t still be movable if need be.
Given what we know about Bailey and about what the free agent market just said about good-not-great hurlers with some inconsistencies in their track records, this feels like a pretty steep price to pay, however. Maybe it was the best path forward for the Reds, but I wonder if in a year’s time, they don’t look back and wonder why they paid $100 million for their above average starter when everyone else was paying $50 million for theirs.
The Best Transactions of the 2014 Off-Season.
Yes, there are still free agents on the market, but with Spring Training officially underway, I think it’s fair to say that the off-season is over. From November through the first half of February, we’ve seen over $2.2 billion handed out in free agent contracts, and that doesn’t even account for the big money being thrown around in contract extensions for players who weren’t yet up for open bidding. We also saw several notable trades, with some big names and big contracts changing cities over the winter.
So, let’s go ahead and do a little recapping, starting off with my 10 favorite moves of the last three and a half months. This is the third year I’ve done this here on FanGraphs, with the 2012 list working out a little better (in retrospect) than the 2013 version, which included praise for deals like the Melky Cabrera and Scott Baker signings. We’ll aim for better results this year.
Keep in mind, just because a trade is listed here as a win for one franchise doesn’t mean that I think the decision was necessarily a poor one for the other side. There are several deals below that I think served both teams interest because I think both teams got exactly what they needed in the transaction. There are win-win deals, so the support for one side of a transaction should not be read as condemnation of the other side. We’ll look at the worst transactions of the winter tomorrow, and it won’t simply be the flip side of the trades listed below.
Also, we’re evaluating not just the deal’s impact on 2014, but the longer term ramifications as well, so larger, more impactful deals will generally get more weight than good deals that only last a year. Short term moves aren’t excluded from the analysis, but it would be easy to create a list of low-risk, short term commitments that could work out wonderfully for the signing team, but the moves that end up having the biggest impacts on a franchise are the ones that have an impact beyond just the upcoming season. There are a few one year deals on this list, but overall, the attempt is to acknowledge teams that made significant acquisitions that will move the needle for their franchise, and not just provide a short term boost.
Before we get to my favorite 10 deals, here are a few that just missed the cut, but I still like quite a bit:
Honoroable Mentions: Mets sign Chris Young, Dodgers sign Paul Maholm, Indians sign David Murphy, Royals sign Omar Infante, Rays acquire Ryan Hanigan, Yankees sign Kelly Johnson, White Sox acquire Matt Davidson.
And now, on to what I view as the 10 best transactions made this winter
10. The Padres sign Josh Johnson.
Cost: One year, $8 million.
Like Scott Baker last year, this is an example of a deal that will probably either be a big win or a big nothing, as Johnson’s value depends almost entirely on whether or not he’s physically capable of taking the mound. If his forearm problem from 2013 is a thing of the past, the the Padres may have signed the most effective free agent hurler on the market, and if it doesn’t work, well, they’re out a little more than what Jason Hammel cost the Cubs. And even on a one year deal, this deal has real potential long term benefits for San Diego, because a bounce back season makes Johnson an easy qualifying offer target next winter, setting the Padres up to either re-sign him at a discount or get a draft pick if he walks. The amount of risk the Padres took on was pretty minimal, but they got a lot of upside in return.
9. The Dodgers sign Dan Haren.
Cost: One year, $10 million.
The Dodgers are making a similar bet on Haren as the Padres are on Johnson, only Haren’s downside is even lower, since he’s been one of the most durable pitchers in baseball over the past decade. Even if his recent home run problem persist, Haren’s likely to be something like an average innings eater, and that alone is worth the $10 million investment, but there’s a good chance that Haren doesn’t keep up giving up home runs at the rate he has lately, and he returns to being an above average starter for the Dodgers. Like with Johnson, the qualifying offer is certainly in play if the rebound happens, so this deal has 2015 value even with only a one year commitment.
8. The A’s sign Scott Kazmir.
Cost: Two years, $22 million.
You may be getting the feeling that I like short-term, moderate cost deals for pitchers with upside. You are correct, and while the A’s took on a bit more risk in betting on Kazmir’s rebirth, I think there is real value in locking in his 2015 season rather than trying to use the qualifying offer to get him to stick around another year. This kind of deal not only gives the A’s a boost in 2014, but if they’re right about his resurgence — and I think they are — it will give them a highly valuable trade chip should they want to shop him around next winter. A bunch of pitchers signed contracts in the 2/$20M range this winter, but for me, Kazmir’s deal was easily the best of the bunch.
7. The Astros acquire Dexter Fowler.
Cost: Brandon Barnes and Jordan Lyles.
It’s easy to rattle off Fowler’s flaws, ranging from his big home/road splits to his propensity for striking out without offsetting it with a ton of power. However, even with his warts, Fowler has been an above average outfielder for the last three years running, and is just 28 years old, so a short term spike can’t be ruled out. In exchange for two reasonably priced arbitration years of a quality player with remaining upside, the Astros gave up two fringe talents that they won’t miss in any real way. This move flew under the radar because it was completed during the busiest day of the off-season, but the Astros picked up a ton of value in this deal.
6. The White Sox acquire Adam Eaton.
Cost: Hector Santiago and Brandon Jacobs.
In an era where teams are putting a higher value than ever on young, cost-controlled talent, the White Sox still managed to pick up a 25 year old center fielder who they control for the next five years, and they did it without giving up anything of serious value. Santiago is a major regression candidate who probably fits better in the bullpen than the rotation, and Rick Hahn managed to sell high on his artificially low ERA and turn that into a guy who could be a quality regular for the rest of the decade. This is perhaps the very best example of buying low and selling high of any trade this winter.
5. The Yankees sign Brian McCann.
Cost: Five years, $85 million.
Of the big splashy free agent signings this off-season, this is the one that I think has the best chance of working. McCann is an underrated player whose core skills have showed few signs of decline, and his left-handed pull power should play extremely well in Yankee Stadium. Even if he’s only a catcher for the next few years before moving to 1B/DH as he gets older, he’ll accumulate a ton of value in the first few years of the contract, and is a good enough hitter to provide some value at the end of the deal, Victor Martinez style. Similarly valuable players were going for $50M to $100M more this winter, so $85 million for McCann looks like a great price compared to other premium free agents.
4. The White Sox sign Jose Abreu.
Cost: Six years, $68 million.
Yes, another White Sox deal. I really liked their off-season, if you haven’t noticed. And I think this is the deal that has the potential to turn out to be the best move any team made all winter, even though it comes with some pretty decent sized risk. $68 million in guaranteed money is a lot for a bat-only guy who has never played in the U.S., but if the White Sox are right about his offensive potential, this deal will be a massive bargain over the long term. Rather than just focusing on the $68 million, keep in mind that the White Sox just signed up for an $11 million AAV, which in today’s dollars gets you in the bidding for a guy like Bronson Arroyo. Even if Abreu is just an average first baseman, this contract probably works for Chicago, and if he turns into a monster, they’ll be one of the few teams with a locked-in bargain rate on premium power.
3. The Tigers dump Prince Fielder.
Cost: $30 million, plus Ian Kinsler‘s remaining $62 million.
While the Prince Fielder era in Detroit wasn’t a total disaster, it was clearly time for the experiment to end, and Dave Dombrowski did a great job of not only getting out of the worst years of one of baseball’s worst free agent signings in recent years, but of acquiring a similarly valuable player in return. There’s a pretty good case to be made that Kinsler is likely to be more valuable over the next four years than Fielder is, and the Tigers managed to drop $70 million in committed salary while getting a player that isn’t a demonstrable downgrade, and allows them to move Miguel Cabrera back to first base. I didn’t love the rest of their off-season, but this move was a great one for the Tigers.
2. The Cardinals acquire Peter Bourjos and Randal Grichuk.
Cost: David Freese and Fernando Salas.
While Jon Jay isn’t a bad player, watching him try to run down balls in the post-season was pretty painful, and the Cardinals correctly identified their outfield defense as an area where they could make a major improvement. In landing Bourjos, they now have one of baseball’s truly elite fly catchers, and a guy who is a better offensive player than he’s given credit for. Like with Eaton, the Cardinals didn’t just acquire a quality upgrade for 2014, but also multiple years of team control over an underrated player who probably won’t be properly compensated by the arbitration process. And by keeping Jay around, the Cardinals aren’t counting on Bourjos to play 160 games, so his injury issues aren’t the liability they would be for a team with less depth. Freese had some real value, so they didn’t get Bourjos for free, but this move allowed them to get Kolton Wong into the line-up and improve their outfield at the same time. Big win for St. Louis.
1. The Nationals acquire Doug Fister.
Cost: Robbie Ray, Steve Lombardozzi, and Ian Krol.
You probably knew this was coming. I’m going to guess that this move will show up at the top of every best-transactions-of-2014 list, as the Nationals basically stole Doug Fister from the Tigers in a trade that no one still understands very well. When you look at the prices being commanded for quality starting pitchers, getting Fister — who will make less than $20 million over the next two years, most likely — for a trio of bit pieces is a huge theft. We haven’t seen a player this good get traded for this little in years, and it’s mystifying how Mike Rizzo managed to get Fister for this price. This deal put the Nationals right back in playoff contention, and it did so for such a low cost that I still haven’t found anyone who thinks the Tigers made a good trade. When a deal is universally accepted as a heist, you’ve done something very right.
So, let’s go ahead and do a little recapping, starting off with my 10 favorite moves of the last three and a half months. This is the third year I’ve done this here on FanGraphs, with the 2012 list working out a little better (in retrospect) than the 2013 version, which included praise for deals like the Melky Cabrera and Scott Baker signings. We’ll aim for better results this year.
Keep in mind, just because a trade is listed here as a win for one franchise doesn’t mean that I think the decision was necessarily a poor one for the other side. There are several deals below that I think served both teams interest because I think both teams got exactly what they needed in the transaction. There are win-win deals, so the support for one side of a transaction should not be read as condemnation of the other side. We’ll look at the worst transactions of the winter tomorrow, and it won’t simply be the flip side of the trades listed below.
Also, we’re evaluating not just the deal’s impact on 2014, but the longer term ramifications as well, so larger, more impactful deals will generally get more weight than good deals that only last a year. Short term moves aren’t excluded from the analysis, but it would be easy to create a list of low-risk, short term commitments that could work out wonderfully for the signing team, but the moves that end up having the biggest impacts on a franchise are the ones that have an impact beyond just the upcoming season. There are a few one year deals on this list, but overall, the attempt is to acknowledge teams that made significant acquisitions that will move the needle for their franchise, and not just provide a short term boost.
Before we get to my favorite 10 deals, here are a few that just missed the cut, but I still like quite a bit:
Honoroable Mentions: Mets sign Chris Young, Dodgers sign Paul Maholm, Indians sign David Murphy, Royals sign Omar Infante, Rays acquire Ryan Hanigan, Yankees sign Kelly Johnson, White Sox acquire Matt Davidson.
And now, on to what I view as the 10 best transactions made this winter
10. The Padres sign Josh Johnson.
Cost: One year, $8 million.
Like Scott Baker last year, this is an example of a deal that will probably either be a big win or a big nothing, as Johnson’s value depends almost entirely on whether or not he’s physically capable of taking the mound. If his forearm problem from 2013 is a thing of the past, the the Padres may have signed the most effective free agent hurler on the market, and if it doesn’t work, well, they’re out a little more than what Jason Hammel cost the Cubs. And even on a one year deal, this deal has real potential long term benefits for San Diego, because a bounce back season makes Johnson an easy qualifying offer target next winter, setting the Padres up to either re-sign him at a discount or get a draft pick if he walks. The amount of risk the Padres took on was pretty minimal, but they got a lot of upside in return.
9. The Dodgers sign Dan Haren.
Cost: One year, $10 million.
The Dodgers are making a similar bet on Haren as the Padres are on Johnson, only Haren’s downside is even lower, since he’s been one of the most durable pitchers in baseball over the past decade. Even if his recent home run problem persist, Haren’s likely to be something like an average innings eater, and that alone is worth the $10 million investment, but there’s a good chance that Haren doesn’t keep up giving up home runs at the rate he has lately, and he returns to being an above average starter for the Dodgers. Like with Johnson, the qualifying offer is certainly in play if the rebound happens, so this deal has 2015 value even with only a one year commitment.
8. The A’s sign Scott Kazmir.
Cost: Two years, $22 million.
You may be getting the feeling that I like short-term, moderate cost deals for pitchers with upside. You are correct, and while the A’s took on a bit more risk in betting on Kazmir’s rebirth, I think there is real value in locking in his 2015 season rather than trying to use the qualifying offer to get him to stick around another year. This kind of deal not only gives the A’s a boost in 2014, but if they’re right about his resurgence — and I think they are — it will give them a highly valuable trade chip should they want to shop him around next winter. A bunch of pitchers signed contracts in the 2/$20M range this winter, but for me, Kazmir’s deal was easily the best of the bunch.
7. The Astros acquire Dexter Fowler.
Cost: Brandon Barnes and Jordan Lyles.
It’s easy to rattle off Fowler’s flaws, ranging from his big home/road splits to his propensity for striking out without offsetting it with a ton of power. However, even with his warts, Fowler has been an above average outfielder for the last three years running, and is just 28 years old, so a short term spike can’t be ruled out. In exchange for two reasonably priced arbitration years of a quality player with remaining upside, the Astros gave up two fringe talents that they won’t miss in any real way. This move flew under the radar because it was completed during the busiest day of the off-season, but the Astros picked up a ton of value in this deal.
6. The White Sox acquire Adam Eaton.
Cost: Hector Santiago and Brandon Jacobs.
In an era where teams are putting a higher value than ever on young, cost-controlled talent, the White Sox still managed to pick up a 25 year old center fielder who they control for the next five years, and they did it without giving up anything of serious value. Santiago is a major regression candidate who probably fits better in the bullpen than the rotation, and Rick Hahn managed to sell high on his artificially low ERA and turn that into a guy who could be a quality regular for the rest of the decade. This is perhaps the very best example of buying low and selling high of any trade this winter.
5. The Yankees sign Brian McCann.
Cost: Five years, $85 million.
Of the big splashy free agent signings this off-season, this is the one that I think has the best chance of working. McCann is an underrated player whose core skills have showed few signs of decline, and his left-handed pull power should play extremely well in Yankee Stadium. Even if he’s only a catcher for the next few years before moving to 1B/DH as he gets older, he’ll accumulate a ton of value in the first few years of the contract, and is a good enough hitter to provide some value at the end of the deal, Victor Martinez style. Similarly valuable players were going for $50M to $100M more this winter, so $85 million for McCann looks like a great price compared to other premium free agents.
4. The White Sox sign Jose Abreu.
Cost: Six years, $68 million.
Yes, another White Sox deal. I really liked their off-season, if you haven’t noticed. And I think this is the deal that has the potential to turn out to be the best move any team made all winter, even though it comes with some pretty decent sized risk. $68 million in guaranteed money is a lot for a bat-only guy who has never played in the U.S., but if the White Sox are right about his offensive potential, this deal will be a massive bargain over the long term. Rather than just focusing on the $68 million, keep in mind that the White Sox just signed up for an $11 million AAV, which in today’s dollars gets you in the bidding for a guy like Bronson Arroyo. Even if Abreu is just an average first baseman, this contract probably works for Chicago, and if he turns into a monster, they’ll be one of the few teams with a locked-in bargain rate on premium power.
3. The Tigers dump Prince Fielder.
Cost: $30 million, plus Ian Kinsler‘s remaining $62 million.
While the Prince Fielder era in Detroit wasn’t a total disaster, it was clearly time for the experiment to end, and Dave Dombrowski did a great job of not only getting out of the worst years of one of baseball’s worst free agent signings in recent years, but of acquiring a similarly valuable player in return. There’s a pretty good case to be made that Kinsler is likely to be more valuable over the next four years than Fielder is, and the Tigers managed to drop $70 million in committed salary while getting a player that isn’t a demonstrable downgrade, and allows them to move Miguel Cabrera back to first base. I didn’t love the rest of their off-season, but this move was a great one for the Tigers.
2. The Cardinals acquire Peter Bourjos and Randal Grichuk.
Cost: David Freese and Fernando Salas.
While Jon Jay isn’t a bad player, watching him try to run down balls in the post-season was pretty painful, and the Cardinals correctly identified their outfield defense as an area where they could make a major improvement. In landing Bourjos, they now have one of baseball’s truly elite fly catchers, and a guy who is a better offensive player than he’s given credit for. Like with Eaton, the Cardinals didn’t just acquire a quality upgrade for 2014, but also multiple years of team control over an underrated player who probably won’t be properly compensated by the arbitration process. And by keeping Jay around, the Cardinals aren’t counting on Bourjos to play 160 games, so his injury issues aren’t the liability they would be for a team with less depth. Freese had some real value, so they didn’t get Bourjos for free, but this move allowed them to get Kolton Wong into the line-up and improve their outfield at the same time. Big win for St. Louis.
1. The Nationals acquire Doug Fister.
Cost: Robbie Ray, Steve Lombardozzi, and Ian Krol.
You probably knew this was coming. I’m going to guess that this move will show up at the top of every best-transactions-of-2014 list, as the Nationals basically stole Doug Fister from the Tigers in a trade that no one still understands very well. When you look at the prices being commanded for quality starting pitchers, getting Fister — who will make less than $20 million over the next two years, most likely — for a trio of bit pieces is a huge theft. We haven’t seen a player this good get traded for this little in years, and it’s mystifying how Mike Rizzo managed to get Fister for this price. This deal put the Nationals right back in playoff contention, and it did so for such a low cost that I still haven’t found anyone who thinks the Tigers made a good trade. When a deal is universally accepted as a heist, you’ve done something very right.
Stealing Success Against Pitch Speeds and Pitch Heights.
Sometimes there just isn’t a way to sex up a headline. The other day I tried to sate my own curiosity by looking at what happens to the called strike zone when there’s a runner on the move. The results supported what I expected to be the case, but the data’s also incomplete, so it’s not like anything could be proven one way or another. Ultimately it turned out to be half study and half idea-introduction. There’s not a lot I can do about it now.
The post was powered by the searchable Baseball Savant, which somewhat recently added a “stolen base attempt” check box. This time around, I want to do something a little more obvious with the data, since it’s data I’ve never played with before. There’s information for more than 14,000 stolen-base attempts in the past four seasons, which doesn’t cover all the stolen-base attempts, but does cover most of them. Let’s assume, for the moment, the data that’s available is accurate. How do stolen-base rates change by pitch velocity? How do stolen-base rates change by pitch height? Do the trends follow the patterns we’d expect?
I probably shouldn’t need to tell you the patterns we’d expect. In theory, success rate goes down the faster the pitch. In theory, success rate goes down the higher the pitch (to a point). We might as well just dive into the numbers. First, the velocity table, broken into somewhat arbitrary groups:
Speed SB CS Attempts SB% Avg. Speed
95+ 609 175 784 77.7% 96.2
90-94 3699 1319 5018 73.7% 92.2
85-89 2815 1050 3865 72.8% 87.7
80-84 2128 623 2751 77.4% 82.6
75-79 1026 308 1334 76.9% 78.0
Under 75 308 74 382 80.6% 71.9
Immediately, something interesting stands out. Yes, the highest success rate comes against the slowest pitches, which is one of the things we’re looking for. But there’s no clear trend, and the second-highest success rate comes against the fastest pitches. Runners had a better-than-average success rate trying to steal against pitches that averaged 96.2 miles per hour. The sample is small, but not so small it can be dismissed.
Here’s what I suspect: We could be observing the results of selection bias. The pitcher on the mound doesn’t have any secrets. If that guy has a big fastball, everybody knows about it. The guy who’s reached base knows about it. The guy who’s reached base knows that, because of the velocity, the ball will arrive to the catcher faster. So runners might take off only when they feel more certain. More significantly, this could be selecting for better runners overall, where worse runners don’t even try to take the chance. It could be that mostly only premium runners try to steal against the hardest-throwing pitchers. This is one potential explanation of several.
It’s worth noting we don’t have a breakdown of attempts at second and attempts at third. It’s worth noting that, between groups, we’re talking about differences of only some hundredths of a second that the pitch is in flight. It’s worth noting that the hardest-throwing pitchers might just be below-average at holding runners on, perhaps because they haven’t had to worry about it; perhaps because they throw so hard. All groups here aren’t even, so it’s interesting to think about why we might see the things we see in these numbers.
Similarly, runners are a little more successful in group No. 2 than they are in group No. 3. Also, they’re a little more successful in group No. 4 than they are in group No. 5. I don’t think the message is pitch velocity is irrelevant. I think the message is pitch velocity is only a small factor. A steal takes place in three to four seconds. The difference between a fast pitch and a slow pitch might be between 2% and 3% of that.
Now let’s look at steal success rates against pitch height, again broken into somewhat arbitrary groups:
Height SB CS Attempts SB%
4.5+ 282 154 436 64.7%
4.0-4.4 369 210 579 63.7%
3.5-3.9 799 339 1138 70.2%
3.0-3.4 1284 518 1802 71.3%
2.5-2.9 1722 639 2361 72.9%
2.0-2.4 1940 636 2576 75.3%
1.5-1.9 1750 507 2257 77.5%
1.0-1.4 1347 337 1684 80.0%
0.0-0.9 962 189 1151 83.6%
Under 0 130 20 150 86.7%
Height is feet above the ground at the front of home plate, as determined by PITCHf/x. A negative height would refer to a pitch that bounced in the dirt in front of the plate. Apparently some runners have been thrown out stealing even after a dirt ball. It’s uncommon, but it’s happened, and it’s probably embarrassing.
Here, I’d say we see the trend we’d expect. Generally, a throw to a base is made from a standing position. A standing position is a higher position, so the higher a pitch, the easier it is for a catcher to receive it and get rid of the ball quickly. If a pitch is down, a catcher either has to wait to get up, he has to drop back down again or he has to suck it up and throw from his knees. The trend is nice and consistent, and the success rate changes from below- to above-average between groups No. 5 and No. 6. With the highest pitches, runners aren’t even successful 70% of the time.
Yet it’s probably worth adjusting to remove designated pitchouts from the sample. Pitchouts are successful at nailing runners on the basepaths, but they’re also sort of their own beast, and they kind of skew the data. Pitchouts are mostly thrown high, and removing them only meaningfully changes the data for the first two groups. The changes:
Group 1: 64.7% –> 75.1%
Group 2: 63.7% –> 68.4%
Here, runners start to look successful against the highest pitches. Some of these pitches were simply too high, getting by the catcher or at least causing him to jump and end up out of position. From the catcher’s perspective, pitchouts excluded, the sweet spot is more between 3.5 feet and 4.4 feet above the ground. These pitches will drop a little more as they go from the front plane of the plate to the glove, and they’ll allow the catcher to almost immediately transfer the ball to his bare hand. At that point, all else being equal, the catcher has about a three-in-10 chance.
There are probably more things that could be done with this data. I’ll note there’s no real difference at all by horizontal pitch location. You’d expect there would be a difference by horizontal pitch location against intended horizontal pitch location, but we can’t measure that so we can’t speak to it. And honestly, I’m content for now. This is data I’ve never investigated before, so it’s nice just to have it, even if it doesn’t reveal anything groundbreaking. And it might still do that, given further study.
The post was powered by the searchable Baseball Savant, which somewhat recently added a “stolen base attempt” check box. This time around, I want to do something a little more obvious with the data, since it’s data I’ve never played with before. There’s information for more than 14,000 stolen-base attempts in the past four seasons, which doesn’t cover all the stolen-base attempts, but does cover most of them. Let’s assume, for the moment, the data that’s available is accurate. How do stolen-base rates change by pitch velocity? How do stolen-base rates change by pitch height? Do the trends follow the patterns we’d expect?
I probably shouldn’t need to tell you the patterns we’d expect. In theory, success rate goes down the faster the pitch. In theory, success rate goes down the higher the pitch (to a point). We might as well just dive into the numbers. First, the velocity table, broken into somewhat arbitrary groups:
Speed SB CS Attempts SB% Avg. Speed
95+ 609 175 784 77.7% 96.2
90-94 3699 1319 5018 73.7% 92.2
85-89 2815 1050 3865 72.8% 87.7
80-84 2128 623 2751 77.4% 82.6
75-79 1026 308 1334 76.9% 78.0
Under 75 308 74 382 80.6% 71.9
Immediately, something interesting stands out. Yes, the highest success rate comes against the slowest pitches, which is one of the things we’re looking for. But there’s no clear trend, and the second-highest success rate comes against the fastest pitches. Runners had a better-than-average success rate trying to steal against pitches that averaged 96.2 miles per hour. The sample is small, but not so small it can be dismissed.
Here’s what I suspect: We could be observing the results of selection bias. The pitcher on the mound doesn’t have any secrets. If that guy has a big fastball, everybody knows about it. The guy who’s reached base knows about it. The guy who’s reached base knows that, because of the velocity, the ball will arrive to the catcher faster. So runners might take off only when they feel more certain. More significantly, this could be selecting for better runners overall, where worse runners don’t even try to take the chance. It could be that mostly only premium runners try to steal against the hardest-throwing pitchers. This is one potential explanation of several.
It’s worth noting we don’t have a breakdown of attempts at second and attempts at third. It’s worth noting that, between groups, we’re talking about differences of only some hundredths of a second that the pitch is in flight. It’s worth noting that the hardest-throwing pitchers might just be below-average at holding runners on, perhaps because they haven’t had to worry about it; perhaps because they throw so hard. All groups here aren’t even, so it’s interesting to think about why we might see the things we see in these numbers.
Similarly, runners are a little more successful in group No. 2 than they are in group No. 3. Also, they’re a little more successful in group No. 4 than they are in group No. 5. I don’t think the message is pitch velocity is irrelevant. I think the message is pitch velocity is only a small factor. A steal takes place in three to four seconds. The difference between a fast pitch and a slow pitch might be between 2% and 3% of that.
Now let’s look at steal success rates against pitch height, again broken into somewhat arbitrary groups:
Height SB CS Attempts SB%
4.5+ 282 154 436 64.7%
4.0-4.4 369 210 579 63.7%
3.5-3.9 799 339 1138 70.2%
3.0-3.4 1284 518 1802 71.3%
2.5-2.9 1722 639 2361 72.9%
2.0-2.4 1940 636 2576 75.3%
1.5-1.9 1750 507 2257 77.5%
1.0-1.4 1347 337 1684 80.0%
0.0-0.9 962 189 1151 83.6%
Under 0 130 20 150 86.7%
Height is feet above the ground at the front of home plate, as determined by PITCHf/x. A negative height would refer to a pitch that bounced in the dirt in front of the plate. Apparently some runners have been thrown out stealing even after a dirt ball. It’s uncommon, but it’s happened, and it’s probably embarrassing.
Here, I’d say we see the trend we’d expect. Generally, a throw to a base is made from a standing position. A standing position is a higher position, so the higher a pitch, the easier it is for a catcher to receive it and get rid of the ball quickly. If a pitch is down, a catcher either has to wait to get up, he has to drop back down again or he has to suck it up and throw from his knees. The trend is nice and consistent, and the success rate changes from below- to above-average between groups No. 5 and No. 6. With the highest pitches, runners aren’t even successful 70% of the time.
Yet it’s probably worth adjusting to remove designated pitchouts from the sample. Pitchouts are successful at nailing runners on the basepaths, but they’re also sort of their own beast, and they kind of skew the data. Pitchouts are mostly thrown high, and removing them only meaningfully changes the data for the first two groups. The changes:
Group 1: 64.7% –> 75.1%
Group 2: 63.7% –> 68.4%
Here, runners start to look successful against the highest pitches. Some of these pitches were simply too high, getting by the catcher or at least causing him to jump and end up out of position. From the catcher’s perspective, pitchouts excluded, the sweet spot is more between 3.5 feet and 4.4 feet above the ground. These pitches will drop a little more as they go from the front plane of the plate to the glove, and they’ll allow the catcher to almost immediately transfer the ball to his bare hand. At that point, all else being equal, the catcher has about a three-in-10 chance.
There are probably more things that could be done with this data. I’ll note there’s no real difference at all by horizontal pitch location. You’d expect there would be a difference by horizontal pitch location against intended horizontal pitch location, but we can’t measure that so we can’t speak to it. And honestly, I’m content for now. This is data I’ve never investigated before, so it’s nice just to have it, even if it doesn’t reveal anything groundbreaking. And it might still do that, given further study.
What Can Toronto Do To Fix That Second Base Problem?
Look at our depth charts, please. Go ahead, look! If you sort by position, ascending from worst to best, you’ll see a few spots that are projected to be just awful, by which I mean, “1 WAR or less.” That’s close enough to zero WAR that we can safely describe them as “replacement-level,” and that’s not a situation any contender wants to be in. Of course, many of those spots — Marlins shortstop, Brewers first base, etc. — don’t belong to likely contenders, which I will completely arbitrarily define as having playoff odds of at least 30 percent on our Cool Standings page.
That still leaves a few potential contenders with a big problem, but none more so than second base in Toronto, where the Blue Jays are apparently actually planning to give Ryan Goins a crack at second base, if for no other reason than that Maicer Izturis was atrocious last year. Between Goins, Izturis, Munenori Kawasaki, Chris Getz, and Steve Tolleson, the Jays keystone crew ranks dead last in our second base projections, and no, newcomer Brett Morel‘s attempt to move from third isn’t changing that needle.
If anything, that combined projection of 0.4 WAR seems possibly high, because it partially depends on Izturis being somewhat less miserable than he was last season. If Goins can even manage to be replacement-level, that will be something, because he’s coming off a Triple-A debut in which he hit just .257/.311/.369, followed by a .252/.264/.345 line (and a 1.7% walk rate!) in 121 plate appearances after the Jays after Izturis injured his ankle and Emilio Bonifacio was traded. The Fans, Steamer, and Oliver all think he’ll put up a wRC+ in the 60-69 range, which is of course terrible, no matter how good the glove is, and for a team that still has a chance to contend, that’s just not going to work.
But of course, no one expects this to go on long enough to have a chance to fail. The point of this post isn’t to point out how poor the Toronto second base situation is, it’s to answer the question: What can they do about it? With Ubaldo Jimenez now off to Baltimore and Ervin Santana seemingly like a terribly poor fit for the Rogers Centre — no matter how badly they need rotation depth — the Jays have yet to make their moves this winter, having added only catcher Dioner Navarro. A Toronto move to add a second baseman seems like the most obvious trade to happen of the spring, if only because one nearly already happened, or at least it would have if Ian Kinsler hadn’t reportedly planned to veto the deal.
So where do they go? We can take a look at Steamer’s second base projections and see that there’s 116 options, but of course most of those aren’t realistic. They aren’t getting Robinson Cano or Dustin Pedroia or Ben Zobrist, and guys at the other end like Tony Abreu aren’t really worth the effort.
The name everyone wants but doesn’t really fit
Pretty much every time this discussion comes up, Nick Franklin‘s name appears as well. After all, he’s a well-regarded prospect who just lost his spot in Seattle for the next million years thanks to Robinson Cano, and as much as Lloyd McClendon wants to pay lip service to Franklin competing with Brad Miller at shortstop, absolutely no one expects it to happen. So he’s as good as out the door, right?
Maybe so, but that doesn’t mean that Toronto matches up particularly well, because even though Franklin wasn’t especially impressive in his 2013 debut, he still doesn’t turn 23 for another two weeks, and Seattle isn’t letting a young talent with five controllable years remaining go easily. What the Mariners need more than anything is a starter to fill out a rotation that’s already dealing with an injury to Hisashi Iwakuma.
Meanwhile, this is the rotation the Jays currently have:
R.A. Dickey
Mark Buehrle
Brandon Morrow, for the 10 minutes he’s healthy
J.A. Happ, see above
Esmil Rogers, maybe? Marcus Stroman, at some point
The Jays needed Jimenez, didn’t get him, and still need a starter. There’s not exactly much here they can offer Seattle for Franklin, and they aren’t dipping into the minors to send Aaron Sanchez west, either. The Mariners probably trade Franklin sooner than later, but other teams match up better.
The trade route, buying low division
Franklin doesn’t fit, but would Dustin Ackley? At the moment, he’s penciled in to be Seattle’s primary center fielder, but if and when they go out and sign Nelson Cruz, as we all expect them to do, they’re going to have to find a place for him to play. Assuming he’s spending at least half of his time, if not more, in right field, that pushes Michael Saunders back to left, and Logan Morrison and Corey Hart into some kind of first base / DH situation with Justin Smoak. Maybe that inevitably ends with Smoak being traded to Pittsburgh, but maybe it means that Saunders returns to center, where he has over 2,000 innings of experience, and Ackley gets moved.
Though Seattle sees him as a center fielder now, he did start eight games at second over the final two months last year, where he still grades out well defensively, and he has enough in his bat to be worth a win or two more than Goins. That doesn’t mean that Toronto suddenly has a starter to trade to Seattle, but Ackley’s trade value is far lower than Franklin’s.
Far less exciting is Danny Espinosa, who was just atrocious last year in Washington – .158/.193/.272! — and ended up back in the minors, though he’s being given a chance to beat out Anthony Rendon for his job this spring. That’s unlikely to happen, but while he may just end up in Triple-A, he’s also a guy who was worth three wins in both 2011 and ’12, combining good power with solid defense, and his 2013 struggles can at least partially be chalked up to his wrist and shoulder. Espinosa might be done entering his age-27 season, or he might be worth taking a buy-low shot on.
There’s also Rickie Weeks, who is less a “buy low” than he is a “please, please take him” at this point after hitting .209/.306/.357 for Milwaukee, all but certainly losing his job to Scooter Gennett. It’s almost hard to believe he was worth 10 wins in 2010-11 considering how far he’s declined on both sides of the ball, and he’s still owed $11.5m for his age-31 season in 2014. If the Jays wanted to take a chance, Milwaukee would surely jump to clear any of that salary. You can swap out “Rickie Weeks” for “Dan Uggla” in most of this paragraph, too.
The trade route, bigger name division
Brandon Phillips is declining and absolutely won’t top 100 RBI again now that Shin-Soo Choo is gone, but he’s still good for two to three WAR. That said, while the Reds have an obvious need in the outfield to hedge against Billy Hamilton and Ryan Ludwick, Toronto doesn’t have an equally obvious piece to send back. Either way, the Reds think they can win and aren’t likely to move Phillips when they have only Skip Schumaker, who may be less valuable than Goins, to replace him.
Whether or not Daniel Murphy is a “bigger name” is arguable, but despite being a below-average second baseman, he’s valuable enough with the bat that he was worth three wins last year, and is a reasonably solid bet to do the same in 2013. Eric Young can’t really play second base, but the Mets seem fascinated with having him in the lineup, and opening up the keystone for him would at least let Juan Lagares continue to bring his fantastic defense to center. New York won’t let Murphy go lightly, but a decent-yet-far-from-elite second baseman headed into the expensive part of arbitration isn’t going to command a monster return, either.
The unlikely free agent route
Stephen Drew is another popular name here, particularly because with two protected first round picks, the qualifying offer anchor hurts the Jays less than most, and his price can’t be high at this point. Even so, the fit isn’t great, because Drew isn’t going to displace Jose Reyes, and while he’s potentially willing to move to second base, the fact that he’d now be trying to do so without even a full spring training, much less a full winter in front of it, makes it somewhat worrisome. Besides, for whatever reason — different country, brutal division, the turf — Toronto has had difficulty convincing free agents to come.
That might be a problem for Cuban defector Aledmys Diaz, who is now eligible to sign with a team and had Toronto scouts in attendance at his workout last week. Would Diaz be willing to go to Canada and to a team that would ask him to move off of shortstop? It’s easy to see him looking elsewhere.
***
Toronto has various options, but none perfect. Perhaps the Jays try to make several moving parts happen at once, using their protected first rounders as a way to trade Adam Lind to a team that needs help and doesn’t want to lose a pick, then signing Kendrys Morales. Either way, the fans are getting restless. If starting pitching help isn’t coming, a second base upgrade has to be. Otherwise, Navarro is all that’s happened this winter, and even a projected improvement from simply having Reyes and Melky Cabrera healthier than last year won’t help the Jays in what should once again be the toughest division in baseball.
That still leaves a few potential contenders with a big problem, but none more so than second base in Toronto, where the Blue Jays are apparently actually planning to give Ryan Goins a crack at second base, if for no other reason than that Maicer Izturis was atrocious last year. Between Goins, Izturis, Munenori Kawasaki, Chris Getz, and Steve Tolleson, the Jays keystone crew ranks dead last in our second base projections, and no, newcomer Brett Morel‘s attempt to move from third isn’t changing that needle.
If anything, that combined projection of 0.4 WAR seems possibly high, because it partially depends on Izturis being somewhat less miserable than he was last season. If Goins can even manage to be replacement-level, that will be something, because he’s coming off a Triple-A debut in which he hit just .257/.311/.369, followed by a .252/.264/.345 line (and a 1.7% walk rate!) in 121 plate appearances after the Jays after Izturis injured his ankle and Emilio Bonifacio was traded. The Fans, Steamer, and Oliver all think he’ll put up a wRC+ in the 60-69 range, which is of course terrible, no matter how good the glove is, and for a team that still has a chance to contend, that’s just not going to work.
But of course, no one expects this to go on long enough to have a chance to fail. The point of this post isn’t to point out how poor the Toronto second base situation is, it’s to answer the question: What can they do about it? With Ubaldo Jimenez now off to Baltimore and Ervin Santana seemingly like a terribly poor fit for the Rogers Centre — no matter how badly they need rotation depth — the Jays have yet to make their moves this winter, having added only catcher Dioner Navarro. A Toronto move to add a second baseman seems like the most obvious trade to happen of the spring, if only because one nearly already happened, or at least it would have if Ian Kinsler hadn’t reportedly planned to veto the deal.
So where do they go? We can take a look at Steamer’s second base projections and see that there’s 116 options, but of course most of those aren’t realistic. They aren’t getting Robinson Cano or Dustin Pedroia or Ben Zobrist, and guys at the other end like Tony Abreu aren’t really worth the effort.
The name everyone wants but doesn’t really fit
Pretty much every time this discussion comes up, Nick Franklin‘s name appears as well. After all, he’s a well-regarded prospect who just lost his spot in Seattle for the next million years thanks to Robinson Cano, and as much as Lloyd McClendon wants to pay lip service to Franklin competing with Brad Miller at shortstop, absolutely no one expects it to happen. So he’s as good as out the door, right?
Maybe so, but that doesn’t mean that Toronto matches up particularly well, because even though Franklin wasn’t especially impressive in his 2013 debut, he still doesn’t turn 23 for another two weeks, and Seattle isn’t letting a young talent with five controllable years remaining go easily. What the Mariners need more than anything is a starter to fill out a rotation that’s already dealing with an injury to Hisashi Iwakuma.
Meanwhile, this is the rotation the Jays currently have:
R.A. Dickey
Mark Buehrle
Brandon Morrow, for the 10 minutes he’s healthy
J.A. Happ, see above
Esmil Rogers, maybe? Marcus Stroman, at some point
The Jays needed Jimenez, didn’t get him, and still need a starter. There’s not exactly much here they can offer Seattle for Franklin, and they aren’t dipping into the minors to send Aaron Sanchez west, either. The Mariners probably trade Franklin sooner than later, but other teams match up better.
The trade route, buying low division
Franklin doesn’t fit, but would Dustin Ackley? At the moment, he’s penciled in to be Seattle’s primary center fielder, but if and when they go out and sign Nelson Cruz, as we all expect them to do, they’re going to have to find a place for him to play. Assuming he’s spending at least half of his time, if not more, in right field, that pushes Michael Saunders back to left, and Logan Morrison and Corey Hart into some kind of first base / DH situation with Justin Smoak. Maybe that inevitably ends with Smoak being traded to Pittsburgh, but maybe it means that Saunders returns to center, where he has over 2,000 innings of experience, and Ackley gets moved.
Though Seattle sees him as a center fielder now, he did start eight games at second over the final two months last year, where he still grades out well defensively, and he has enough in his bat to be worth a win or two more than Goins. That doesn’t mean that Toronto suddenly has a starter to trade to Seattle, but Ackley’s trade value is far lower than Franklin’s.
Far less exciting is Danny Espinosa, who was just atrocious last year in Washington – .158/.193/.272! — and ended up back in the minors, though he’s being given a chance to beat out Anthony Rendon for his job this spring. That’s unlikely to happen, but while he may just end up in Triple-A, he’s also a guy who was worth three wins in both 2011 and ’12, combining good power with solid defense, and his 2013 struggles can at least partially be chalked up to his wrist and shoulder. Espinosa might be done entering his age-27 season, or he might be worth taking a buy-low shot on.
There’s also Rickie Weeks, who is less a “buy low” than he is a “please, please take him” at this point after hitting .209/.306/.357 for Milwaukee, all but certainly losing his job to Scooter Gennett. It’s almost hard to believe he was worth 10 wins in 2010-11 considering how far he’s declined on both sides of the ball, and he’s still owed $11.5m for his age-31 season in 2014. If the Jays wanted to take a chance, Milwaukee would surely jump to clear any of that salary. You can swap out “Rickie Weeks” for “Dan Uggla” in most of this paragraph, too.
The trade route, bigger name division
Brandon Phillips is declining and absolutely won’t top 100 RBI again now that Shin-Soo Choo is gone, but he’s still good for two to three WAR. That said, while the Reds have an obvious need in the outfield to hedge against Billy Hamilton and Ryan Ludwick, Toronto doesn’t have an equally obvious piece to send back. Either way, the Reds think they can win and aren’t likely to move Phillips when they have only Skip Schumaker, who may be less valuable than Goins, to replace him.
Whether or not Daniel Murphy is a “bigger name” is arguable, but despite being a below-average second baseman, he’s valuable enough with the bat that he was worth three wins last year, and is a reasonably solid bet to do the same in 2013. Eric Young can’t really play second base, but the Mets seem fascinated with having him in the lineup, and opening up the keystone for him would at least let Juan Lagares continue to bring his fantastic defense to center. New York won’t let Murphy go lightly, but a decent-yet-far-from-elite second baseman headed into the expensive part of arbitration isn’t going to command a monster return, either.
The unlikely free agent route
Stephen Drew is another popular name here, particularly because with two protected first round picks, the qualifying offer anchor hurts the Jays less than most, and his price can’t be high at this point. Even so, the fit isn’t great, because Drew isn’t going to displace Jose Reyes, and while he’s potentially willing to move to second base, the fact that he’d now be trying to do so without even a full spring training, much less a full winter in front of it, makes it somewhat worrisome. Besides, for whatever reason — different country, brutal division, the turf — Toronto has had difficulty convincing free agents to come.
That might be a problem for Cuban defector Aledmys Diaz, who is now eligible to sign with a team and had Toronto scouts in attendance at his workout last week. Would Diaz be willing to go to Canada and to a team that would ask him to move off of shortstop? It’s easy to see him looking elsewhere.
***
Toronto has various options, but none perfect. Perhaps the Jays try to make several moving parts happen at once, using their protected first rounders as a way to trade Adam Lind to a team that needs help and doesn’t want to lose a pick, then signing Kendrys Morales. Either way, the fans are getting restless. If starting pitching help isn’t coming, a second base upgrade has to be. Otherwise, Navarro is all that’s happened this winter, and even a projected improvement from simply having Reyes and Melky Cabrera healthier than last year won’t help the Jays in what should once again be the toughest division in baseball.
Ryan Dempster Sort of Retires But Not Really.
Derek Jeter, Offensive Shortstop.
Patience Is a Vice.
The Strike Zone With the Runner on the Move.
The Orioles Bet on the New Ubaldo Jimenez.
2014 Top 10 Prospects: Atlanta Braves.
The Difference for Homer Bailey.
On Craig Kimbrel and Committing to a Closer.
Michael Pineda And Trying To Make It Back.
The Pitcher Who Did the Most With the Least.
From just missing out on the Marlins’ first World Series title to being a member of the Red Sox’s eighth, Ryan Dempster has experienced plenty in his big league career. He might have just had his final experiences as a player however, as the 36-year-old Canadian native announced on Sunday morning that he will be sitting out the 2014 season. If this is the end, it has been a good run for Dempster, who has achieved some notable things in his career. And while the announcement comes at the dawn of spring training, his retirement doesn’t create a panicked situation for Boston in a vacuum, as the team has several pitchers ready (or close) to graduate to major league duty.
Dempster certainly isn’t going to be mistaken for one of the greatest pitchers of all-time, but in a way, he was. Using our leaderboards, we can see the following:
- 8,811 people have pitched in a professional baseball game since 1876.
- 7,160 people have pitched at least 10 innings.
- 4,404 people have pitched at least 100 innings.
- 2,177 people have pitched at least 500 innings.
- 1,179 people have pitched at least 1,000 innings.
- 425 people have pitched at least 2,000 innings.
That Dempster has crossed that 2,000 innings threshold puts him in the top five percent of pitchers all-time in terms of innings pitched. And, as we have seen countless times before, it is that longevity that teams really value. Dempster had that. He wasn’t the beastiest of the beasties, but he did post seven 200-inning seasons. That ties him for 182nd place all-time in terms of 200-inning seasons. And that’s not really fair to him, either, because if it were up to him, he probably would have notched a couple more such seasons, since he wasn’t even a starting pitcher for his entire career.
Here we see the terrible wrath of Dusty Baker taking the starch out of a player’s career. Dempster, who had signed with the Cubs following his Tommy John surgery in 2003, had appeared solely out of the bullpen for the 2004 Cubs squad while working his way back into form late in the season. No harm, no foul there. Makes sense to work a guy back in slowly from surgery. When 2005 started, Dempster worked three good starts and three bad starts, but after the third bad start he was summarily dismissed to the bullpen. The last start wasn’t even that appalling. He didn’t do great, mind you, but he left in the seventh inning having only allowed three runs. His Game Score was 51. The Cubs would lose on a walk-off hit, and Dempster didn’t factor in the decision. Still, out went Dempster.
Baker didn’t even really have a replacement for him. Kerry Wood had recently landed on the shelf, and he and Dempster were replaced by Glendon Rusch for a few weeks. Baker gave Jon Leicester a spot start on May 9th, and then went with a four-man rotation of Greg Maddux, Carlos Zambrano, Mark Prior and Rusch for a couple times through the rotation before adding Sergio Mitre to the mix on May 24. This way all in the name of replacing LaTroy Hawkins as closer. As we’ve seen, Hawkins has kept on, kept trucking ever since. As always, Baker did a lot of odd things. This is just one in a long line of them.
In any case, it presented Dempster with the unique opportunity to become one of the rare pitchers to excel as both a closer and a starting pitcher. He is one of just 20 pitchers in major league history to start 200 or more games and save 50 or more. And the majority of the pitchers on this list come from a time when the closer wasn’t as big of a thing. There’s only a few from these grand modern times, where the closer is in vogue.
There are just six who played in the Wild Card era who find themselves on the list — Dennis Eckersley, Kelvim Escobar, Tom Gordon, John Smoltz, Derek Lowe and Dempster. That’s some pretty decent company. As we can see in this custom leaderboard, Dempster finds himself the poor man of the group both a WAR and RA-9 WAR perspective, but it’s still a pretty nifty list on which to find yourself.
Still, all those accomplishments weren’t going to vault him into Boston’s starting rotation on Opening Day. He would have likely been the de facto sixth starter, which in reality meant he probably would have started the season as the long man in the bullpen, firmly behind the break in case of emergency safety glass. This is the role in which he finished the 2013 season. Had Clay Buchholz been healthy in the second half, Dempster might have lost his spot right when the team acquired Jake Peavy, who was acquired in part because Dempster had been so ineffective in the first half.
Dempster even managed to hold down his spot for two turns through the rotation once Buchholz did return in September, as the team gave Felix Doubront a little bit of a breather. But eventually, Dempster would find himself in the bullpen. He didn’t do that badly out the ‘pen either. In six outings from the ‘pen in September and October, he only allowed one run, and he struck out Matt Adams swinging to put the wraps on Game 1 of the World Series. That pitch, a 91-mph fastball on the outside half of the plate, currently stands as his last pitch in a major league uniform:
As he alluded to in his press conference on Sunday, if that’s the way he goes out, that’s not a bad capper to a great career. And while Dempster’s decision to sit out the season came as a surprise to the Red Sox, they won’t be lacking for options. In addition to Brandon Workman, who probably now assumes the sixth-starter/long man mantle, the team has three top prospects who should be able to contribute this year at the major league level in Allen Webster, Anthony Ranaudo and Matt Barnes, and another in Henry Owens who isn’t far behind them. Barnes and Owens both landed on Marc Hulet’s 2014 top 100 prospect list. That’s a plethora of arms, and with Chris Capuano and Ervin Santana still on the market, among others, the team could still take its $13.25 million and put the full-court press on one of them if they really felt that was warranted. It probably isn’t, but they have the option…which is nice.
Ryan Dempster wasn’t the best pitcher ever, but he was pretty good, and his longevity should count for something. He started 29 games for a team that went on to win the World Series in his (as of now) final season in the Show, and struck out the final batter he ever faced to finish a World Series game. That’s pretty nice. And while it’s disappointing that he is going to sit this season out, he isn’t leaving the Red Sox in an inescapable bind, which is also nice.
Dempster certainly isn’t going to be mistaken for one of the greatest pitchers of all-time, but in a way, he was. Using our leaderboards, we can see the following:
- 8,811 people have pitched in a professional baseball game since 1876.
- 7,160 people have pitched at least 10 innings.
- 4,404 people have pitched at least 100 innings.
- 2,177 people have pitched at least 500 innings.
- 1,179 people have pitched at least 1,000 innings.
- 425 people have pitched at least 2,000 innings.
That Dempster has crossed that 2,000 innings threshold puts him in the top five percent of pitchers all-time in terms of innings pitched. And, as we have seen countless times before, it is that longevity that teams really value. Dempster had that. He wasn’t the beastiest of the beasties, but he did post seven 200-inning seasons. That ties him for 182nd place all-time in terms of 200-inning seasons. And that’s not really fair to him, either, because if it were up to him, he probably would have notched a couple more such seasons, since he wasn’t even a starting pitcher for his entire career.
Here we see the terrible wrath of Dusty Baker taking the starch out of a player’s career. Dempster, who had signed with the Cubs following his Tommy John surgery in 2003, had appeared solely out of the bullpen for the 2004 Cubs squad while working his way back into form late in the season. No harm, no foul there. Makes sense to work a guy back in slowly from surgery. When 2005 started, Dempster worked three good starts and three bad starts, but after the third bad start he was summarily dismissed to the bullpen. The last start wasn’t even that appalling. He didn’t do great, mind you, but he left in the seventh inning having only allowed three runs. His Game Score was 51. The Cubs would lose on a walk-off hit, and Dempster didn’t factor in the decision. Still, out went Dempster.
Baker didn’t even really have a replacement for him. Kerry Wood had recently landed on the shelf, and he and Dempster were replaced by Glendon Rusch for a few weeks. Baker gave Jon Leicester a spot start on May 9th, and then went with a four-man rotation of Greg Maddux, Carlos Zambrano, Mark Prior and Rusch for a couple times through the rotation before adding Sergio Mitre to the mix on May 24. This way all in the name of replacing LaTroy Hawkins as closer. As we’ve seen, Hawkins has kept on, kept trucking ever since. As always, Baker did a lot of odd things. This is just one in a long line of them.
In any case, it presented Dempster with the unique opportunity to become one of the rare pitchers to excel as both a closer and a starting pitcher. He is one of just 20 pitchers in major league history to start 200 or more games and save 50 or more. And the majority of the pitchers on this list come from a time when the closer wasn’t as big of a thing. There’s only a few from these grand modern times, where the closer is in vogue.
There are just six who played in the Wild Card era who find themselves on the list — Dennis Eckersley, Kelvim Escobar, Tom Gordon, John Smoltz, Derek Lowe and Dempster. That’s some pretty decent company. As we can see in this custom leaderboard, Dempster finds himself the poor man of the group both a WAR and RA-9 WAR perspective, but it’s still a pretty nifty list on which to find yourself.
Still, all those accomplishments weren’t going to vault him into Boston’s starting rotation on Opening Day. He would have likely been the de facto sixth starter, which in reality meant he probably would have started the season as the long man in the bullpen, firmly behind the break in case of emergency safety glass. This is the role in which he finished the 2013 season. Had Clay Buchholz been healthy in the second half, Dempster might have lost his spot right when the team acquired Jake Peavy, who was acquired in part because Dempster had been so ineffective in the first half.
Dempster even managed to hold down his spot for two turns through the rotation once Buchholz did return in September, as the team gave Felix Doubront a little bit of a breather. But eventually, Dempster would find himself in the bullpen. He didn’t do that badly out the ‘pen either. In six outings from the ‘pen in September and October, he only allowed one run, and he struck out Matt Adams swinging to put the wraps on Game 1 of the World Series. That pitch, a 91-mph fastball on the outside half of the plate, currently stands as his last pitch in a major league uniform:
As he alluded to in his press conference on Sunday, if that’s the way he goes out, that’s not a bad capper to a great career. And while Dempster’s decision to sit out the season came as a surprise to the Red Sox, they won’t be lacking for options. In addition to Brandon Workman, who probably now assumes the sixth-starter/long man mantle, the team has three top prospects who should be able to contribute this year at the major league level in Allen Webster, Anthony Ranaudo and Matt Barnes, and another in Henry Owens who isn’t far behind them. Barnes and Owens both landed on Marc Hulet’s 2014 top 100 prospect list. That’s a plethora of arms, and with Chris Capuano and Ervin Santana still on the market, among others, the team could still take its $13.25 million and put the full-court press on one of them if they really felt that was warranted. It probably isn’t, but they have the option…which is nice.
Ryan Dempster wasn’t the best pitcher ever, but he was pretty good, and his longevity should count for something. He started 29 games for a team that went on to win the World Series in his (as of now) final season in the Show, and struck out the final batter he ever faced to finish a World Series game. That’s pretty nice. And while it’s disappointing that he is going to sit this season out, he isn’t leaving the Red Sox in an inescapable bind, which is also nice.
Derek Jeter, Offensive Shortstop.
As you might have heard, Derek Jeter is set to take his final lap around the major leagues. I have always found Jeter fascinating, for many reasons. Obviously, he was the key defining link – along with Mariano Rivera – among the Yankees’ five World Series champion clubs over the last 20 years. He was the centerpiece of the simultaneously most beloved and hated franchise in the game. If at all possible, Jeter has been, quite paradoxically, one of the most overrated and underrated players in baseball throughout his career. There is no disputing Jeter’s status as one of the greats of his era, and as a certain first-time Hall of Famer, due to one simple fact – he is one of the premier offensive shortstops of all time.
Overrated? Some Jeter aficionados claim that he is one of the top 10 players of all time, and might even belong on a Mount Rushmore of the game’s legends. That is beyond the pale, based on a closer examination of the facts. Many believe that he should be the first guy to earn 100% of the Hall of Fame vote. While I would certainly vote for him on the first try, even with the current crowded ballot, why should he be more worthy of an honor that escaped Willie Mays, Hank Aaron, etc., not to mention the even brighter stars of a more recent vintage who have been tainted with the brush of steroids?
Underrated? There are those who point to his obvious defensive deficiencies and state that he gave back too big of a portion of the offensive value he provided. Just a singles hitter, some say. Amazingly, with the so-called New York media bias that has supposedly favored him, Jeter won exactly zero MVP awards. For all of his on-base prowess, he never won a batting or OBP title.
Today, let’s throw away the perceptions, the narratives, the championships, and for the most part, the defense, and focus on the words “offensive shortstop”. The offensive shortstop has been one of the single most rare and valuable commodities in the game, both today and in the past. Since 1901, there have been 2334 individual player-seasons that can be classified as regular shortstop seasons. Those 2334 seasons resulted in a cumulative slash line of .259-.317-.358, with an average OPS+ of 86.5. Only 605 (25.9%) of those seasons resulted in an OPS+ of 100 or better. Obviously, throughout most of the game’s history, offense has been a secondary consideration for the position – but the player who can both meet the defensive requirements of the position while also adding offensive punch adds massive value.
Only 62 players in the game’s history have been regular shortstops for 10 seasons or more. Only one player, Luis Aparicio with 18 seasons, tops Jeter’s mark of 17 years as a regular shortstop entering 2014. The vast majority of these 62 were well below average offensive players. For each of these shortstops, the number of cumulative standard deviations above or below league average for their seasons as a starting shortstop were measured. Only 14 of these 62 players had a positive combined cumulative total of standard deviations in OBP and SLG for their career. These players appear below:
OBP-SLG OPS+
LAST FIRST SS YRS AGE LAST REL OBP REL SLG SS OPS+ YRS > AVG YRS > AVG
Wagner Honus 15 42 22.93 30.72 151 14 14
Vaughan Arky 11 31 19.55 9.70 136 11 11
Jeter Derek 17 38 18.81 1.75 117 15 15
Cronin Joe 12 34 8.84 6.68 119 11 12
Larkin Barry 15 40 11.06 4.38 116 12 13
Stephens Vern 10 31 2.20 12.28 122 9 9
Appling Luke 16 42 16.44 -4.65 113 12 12
Boudreau Lou 10 31 8.84 3.65 120 8 9
Ripken Cal 15 35 3.18 7.98 118 9 12
Trammell Alan 16 36 7.14 1.53 110 8 8
Tejada Miguel 12 35 -1.37 4.37 112 9 9
Reese Pee Wee 14 37 8.35 -5.62 101 10 9
Yount Robin 11 28 -1.57 3.69 113 6 6
Wallace Bobby 12 38 1.47 -1.41 105 7 8
For each player, the following info is listed, from left to right: number of years as a regular shortstop, the age at which each played his last year as a regular shortstop, each player’s cumulative career total of standard deviations above/below league average in OBP and SLG compiled through his last year as a regular shortstop, his career OPS+ through his last season as a regular shortstop, and his number of seasons with positive combined standard deviations above league average OBP and SLG, and above 100 OPS+, respectively. For purposes of this exercise, only seasons dating back to 1901 were included in the seasonal count columns.
Measuring players’ offensive contributions using standard deviations above/below league average is a somewhat inexact science, but it does afford the ability to split production into its on-base and slugging components. It measures players relative to league average instead of replacement level, which makes it poor at measuring average players, but pretty good at measuring really good ones. In this case, it also successfully shows how high a bar it represents to A) be a regular shortstop for 10 or more years, and B) be a league average or better offensive performer.
Some observations about the list above – Honus Wagner is in a class by himself. This is a guy who just might be included on a Mount Rushmore of the game’s greats, and would have a 100% chance if a second mountain was annexed. Arky Vaughan is a very interesting case. The only lefthanded hitter on the list, he is clearly the second best hitter above on a per at bat basis. His OPS+ of 190 in 1935, with a .385-.491-.607 line, is the only season ever posted by another shortstop that wouldn’t look out of place in Wagner’s prime. After tearing apart the NL as a Pirate in the 1930′s, Vaughan went to Brooklyn, never got along with Leo Durocher, and was basically done as a shortstop at age 31. He then drowned at age 40, and has largely been forgotten. Jeter has Vaughan on longevity, but the latter was clearly a much better offensive player qualitatively.
The rest of the listed shortstops, with the exception of somewhat lesser threats Reese and Wallace – both Hall of Famers – were similarly productive on a per at-bat basis. This is where Jeter’s career bulk sets him apart. Vern Stephens‘ peak period occurred during wartime, and he barely met the 10-season minimum criteria. Robin Yount moved to center field after his age 28 season, and continued the offensive uptick in his game that had only recently begun. Lou Boudreau, like Vaughan and Stephens, hit the wall in his early thirties.
Alan Trammell and Barry Larkin‘s offensive profiles were similar to Jeter’s, but the former was a better than league average offensive performer in only half of his seasons, while the latter’s injury problems kept his counting numbers and number of regular shortstop seasons down. Joe Cronin, qualitatively, was very similar to Jeter, but had a much shorter career. Luke Appling had the career length, but wasn’t quite the equal with the bat of Jeter or most of the others on a per at bat basis.
One argument against Jeter that some will try to make is his lack of a particularly exceptional career peak. Let’s look at these 14 one more time, focusing on their three-year peak period:
LAST FIRST PEAK AGE PEAK YRS REL OBP REL SLG PEAK OPS+
Wagner Honus 33-35 07-09 7.02 10.24 190
Vaughan Arky 22-24 34-36 8.52 5.04 161
Yount Robin 26-28 82-84 3.44 4.25 147
Jeter Derek 24-26 98-00 4.98 2.13 136
Larkin Barry 27-29 91-93 3.90 2.78 133
Ripken Cal 22-24 83-85 2.66 3.92 138
Stephens Vern 22-24 43-45 1.55 4.98 134
Trammell Alan 28-30 86-88 3.08 3.25 138
Boudreau Lou 25-27 43-45 4.10 1.98 138
Appling Luke 28-30 35-37 5.40 0.11 121
Cronin Joe 31-33 38-40 3.03 2.46 128
Tejada Miguel 30-32 04-06 1.81 3.39 128
Reese Pee Wee 28-30 47-49 3.15 -0.18 111
Wallace Bobby 30-32 04-06 1.66 0.83 120
It turns out that Jeter’s peak period actually matches up almost equally as well as does his entire career with this group. Wagner and Vaughan are on another plane, and Yount’s offensive explosion in his last three years as a shortstop also outstrips Jeter, but his peak is as good or better than that of any of the others.
At this point, let’s revisit the term “offensive shortstop”. To be a truly exceptional offensive shortstop, by definition, you have to provide offense, and you have to be able to remain a shortstop. Ernie Banks was an exceptional offensive shortstop – for eight seasons. Then he moved to first base. Alex Rodriguez was an even better offensive shortstop for eight years – and then moved to third base, in deference to Jeter. At the time, many – including myself – thought the Yanks moved the wrong guy to third. In the short term, perhaps they did, but by 2010 at the very latest, it was clear that the Yanks were right.
While Rodriguez was becoming an increasingly stationary, one-dimensional player, Jeter had remained athletic enough to meet the demands of a full-time shortstop position, new-age defensive metrics notwithstanding. He remained a viable shortstop option, and as Jeff Sullivan’s excellent recent article on the topic stated, the worst defensive shortstops still provide value solely by their virtue of playing a very demanding defensive position.
On a per at bat basis, Jeter has provided offensive at a level equal to the second or third best, depending on your feelings about Arky Vaughan, offensive player ever at his position. Who is the second best bat at very other position on the diamond? Inner circle Hall of Famers, that’s who. Even at the other more defensive-oriented positions, your second-best offensive second baseman would likely be Eddie Collins, your second-best offensive catcher might be Gabby Hartnett. In either case, those are clear Hall of Famers, regardless of their respective defensive prowess. This would also seem to help make a clear case for Mike Piazza‘s Hall of Fame candidacy, as a solid argument can be made that he is the very best offensive catcher of all time.
Let’s take away the barrier of defensive position now, and look at Jeter’s standing among all hitters. His combined number of career standard deviations above or below league average in OBP and SLG of 18.81 + 1.75 = 20.56 ranks him 136th of all time, with no adjustment for position. Of the 135 players ahead of him, only two have a lower SLG component – Rickey Henderson and Pete Rose. Henderson is a substantially better offensive player (39.09 + 1.36 = 40.45, #5 OBP component of all time, #36 overall) who provided solid defensive value farther toward the easy side of the defensive spectrum. As an all-around player, Henderson trumps Jeter. Rose (25.71 + 1.41 = 27.12, #77) played a bunch of positions at a league-averageish level, and spread his value over an amazing 23 seasons as a regular.
I would submit that Jeter was a better all-around player than Rose when all factors are taken into consideration. Only 50 players had a higher career OBP component than Jeter’s 18.81, and most of them are clear all-time greats with superior power, though they played “easier” defensive positions than Jeter. There is also a lesser number of players with a lower OBP component than Jeter whose power is so extreme that on an all-around basis they belong ahead of Jeter, regardless of defensive position. Without pitting these players against one other tournament-bracket style, I would estimate that 50 position players would possess more all-around value than Jeter, and wouldn’t you know that he ranks #45 in WAR according to Fangraphs, and #58 according to Baseball Reference.
Derek Jeter is going to the Hall of Fame the second he is eligible, and deservedly so. He doesn’t need the championships to buttress his argument. In fact, one could argue that he was the best player on at most two of those five teams, with the criminally underrated Bernie Williams and Rodriguez his strongest competition. Jeter was great because he established a high level of performance at a very young age at the position farthest to the difficult side of the defensive spectrum, and maintained both that level and that position for a very long time. That is historic stuff. He might not belong on Mount Rushmore, but he is an inner circle Hall of Famer, an all-time great that we were all privileged to watch play. May his last season be a healthy, above average one.
Overrated? Some Jeter aficionados claim that he is one of the top 10 players of all time, and might even belong on a Mount Rushmore of the game’s legends. That is beyond the pale, based on a closer examination of the facts. Many believe that he should be the first guy to earn 100% of the Hall of Fame vote. While I would certainly vote for him on the first try, even with the current crowded ballot, why should he be more worthy of an honor that escaped Willie Mays, Hank Aaron, etc., not to mention the even brighter stars of a more recent vintage who have been tainted with the brush of steroids?
Underrated? There are those who point to his obvious defensive deficiencies and state that he gave back too big of a portion of the offensive value he provided. Just a singles hitter, some say. Amazingly, with the so-called New York media bias that has supposedly favored him, Jeter won exactly zero MVP awards. For all of his on-base prowess, he never won a batting or OBP title.
Today, let’s throw away the perceptions, the narratives, the championships, and for the most part, the defense, and focus on the words “offensive shortstop”. The offensive shortstop has been one of the single most rare and valuable commodities in the game, both today and in the past. Since 1901, there have been 2334 individual player-seasons that can be classified as regular shortstop seasons. Those 2334 seasons resulted in a cumulative slash line of .259-.317-.358, with an average OPS+ of 86.5. Only 605 (25.9%) of those seasons resulted in an OPS+ of 100 or better. Obviously, throughout most of the game’s history, offense has been a secondary consideration for the position – but the player who can both meet the defensive requirements of the position while also adding offensive punch adds massive value.
Only 62 players in the game’s history have been regular shortstops for 10 seasons or more. Only one player, Luis Aparicio with 18 seasons, tops Jeter’s mark of 17 years as a regular shortstop entering 2014. The vast majority of these 62 were well below average offensive players. For each of these shortstops, the number of cumulative standard deviations above or below league average for their seasons as a starting shortstop were measured. Only 14 of these 62 players had a positive combined cumulative total of standard deviations in OBP and SLG for their career. These players appear below:
OBP-SLG OPS+
LAST FIRST SS YRS AGE LAST REL OBP REL SLG SS OPS+ YRS > AVG YRS > AVG
Wagner Honus 15 42 22.93 30.72 151 14 14
Vaughan Arky 11 31 19.55 9.70 136 11 11
Jeter Derek 17 38 18.81 1.75 117 15 15
Cronin Joe 12 34 8.84 6.68 119 11 12
Larkin Barry 15 40 11.06 4.38 116 12 13
Stephens Vern 10 31 2.20 12.28 122 9 9
Appling Luke 16 42 16.44 -4.65 113 12 12
Boudreau Lou 10 31 8.84 3.65 120 8 9
Ripken Cal 15 35 3.18 7.98 118 9 12
Trammell Alan 16 36 7.14 1.53 110 8 8
Tejada Miguel 12 35 -1.37 4.37 112 9 9
Reese Pee Wee 14 37 8.35 -5.62 101 10 9
Yount Robin 11 28 -1.57 3.69 113 6 6
Wallace Bobby 12 38 1.47 -1.41 105 7 8
For each player, the following info is listed, from left to right: number of years as a regular shortstop, the age at which each played his last year as a regular shortstop, each player’s cumulative career total of standard deviations above/below league average in OBP and SLG compiled through his last year as a regular shortstop, his career OPS+ through his last season as a regular shortstop, and his number of seasons with positive combined standard deviations above league average OBP and SLG, and above 100 OPS+, respectively. For purposes of this exercise, only seasons dating back to 1901 were included in the seasonal count columns.
Measuring players’ offensive contributions using standard deviations above/below league average is a somewhat inexact science, but it does afford the ability to split production into its on-base and slugging components. It measures players relative to league average instead of replacement level, which makes it poor at measuring average players, but pretty good at measuring really good ones. In this case, it also successfully shows how high a bar it represents to A) be a regular shortstop for 10 or more years, and B) be a league average or better offensive performer.
Some observations about the list above – Honus Wagner is in a class by himself. This is a guy who just might be included on a Mount Rushmore of the game’s greats, and would have a 100% chance if a second mountain was annexed. Arky Vaughan is a very interesting case. The only lefthanded hitter on the list, he is clearly the second best hitter above on a per at bat basis. His OPS+ of 190 in 1935, with a .385-.491-.607 line, is the only season ever posted by another shortstop that wouldn’t look out of place in Wagner’s prime. After tearing apart the NL as a Pirate in the 1930′s, Vaughan went to Brooklyn, never got along with Leo Durocher, and was basically done as a shortstop at age 31. He then drowned at age 40, and has largely been forgotten. Jeter has Vaughan on longevity, but the latter was clearly a much better offensive player qualitatively.
The rest of the listed shortstops, with the exception of somewhat lesser threats Reese and Wallace – both Hall of Famers – were similarly productive on a per at-bat basis. This is where Jeter’s career bulk sets him apart. Vern Stephens‘ peak period occurred during wartime, and he barely met the 10-season minimum criteria. Robin Yount moved to center field after his age 28 season, and continued the offensive uptick in his game that had only recently begun. Lou Boudreau, like Vaughan and Stephens, hit the wall in his early thirties.
Alan Trammell and Barry Larkin‘s offensive profiles were similar to Jeter’s, but the former was a better than league average offensive performer in only half of his seasons, while the latter’s injury problems kept his counting numbers and number of regular shortstop seasons down. Joe Cronin, qualitatively, was very similar to Jeter, but had a much shorter career. Luke Appling had the career length, but wasn’t quite the equal with the bat of Jeter or most of the others on a per at bat basis.
One argument against Jeter that some will try to make is his lack of a particularly exceptional career peak. Let’s look at these 14 one more time, focusing on their three-year peak period:
LAST FIRST PEAK AGE PEAK YRS REL OBP REL SLG PEAK OPS+
Wagner Honus 33-35 07-09 7.02 10.24 190
Vaughan Arky 22-24 34-36 8.52 5.04 161
Yount Robin 26-28 82-84 3.44 4.25 147
Jeter Derek 24-26 98-00 4.98 2.13 136
Larkin Barry 27-29 91-93 3.90 2.78 133
Ripken Cal 22-24 83-85 2.66 3.92 138
Stephens Vern 22-24 43-45 1.55 4.98 134
Trammell Alan 28-30 86-88 3.08 3.25 138
Boudreau Lou 25-27 43-45 4.10 1.98 138
Appling Luke 28-30 35-37 5.40 0.11 121
Cronin Joe 31-33 38-40 3.03 2.46 128
Tejada Miguel 30-32 04-06 1.81 3.39 128
Reese Pee Wee 28-30 47-49 3.15 -0.18 111
Wallace Bobby 30-32 04-06 1.66 0.83 120
It turns out that Jeter’s peak period actually matches up almost equally as well as does his entire career with this group. Wagner and Vaughan are on another plane, and Yount’s offensive explosion in his last three years as a shortstop also outstrips Jeter, but his peak is as good or better than that of any of the others.
At this point, let’s revisit the term “offensive shortstop”. To be a truly exceptional offensive shortstop, by definition, you have to provide offense, and you have to be able to remain a shortstop. Ernie Banks was an exceptional offensive shortstop – for eight seasons. Then he moved to first base. Alex Rodriguez was an even better offensive shortstop for eight years – and then moved to third base, in deference to Jeter. At the time, many – including myself – thought the Yanks moved the wrong guy to third. In the short term, perhaps they did, but by 2010 at the very latest, it was clear that the Yanks were right.
While Rodriguez was becoming an increasingly stationary, one-dimensional player, Jeter had remained athletic enough to meet the demands of a full-time shortstop position, new-age defensive metrics notwithstanding. He remained a viable shortstop option, and as Jeff Sullivan’s excellent recent article on the topic stated, the worst defensive shortstops still provide value solely by their virtue of playing a very demanding defensive position.
On a per at bat basis, Jeter has provided offensive at a level equal to the second or third best, depending on your feelings about Arky Vaughan, offensive player ever at his position. Who is the second best bat at very other position on the diamond? Inner circle Hall of Famers, that’s who. Even at the other more defensive-oriented positions, your second-best offensive second baseman would likely be Eddie Collins, your second-best offensive catcher might be Gabby Hartnett. In either case, those are clear Hall of Famers, regardless of their respective defensive prowess. This would also seem to help make a clear case for Mike Piazza‘s Hall of Fame candidacy, as a solid argument can be made that he is the very best offensive catcher of all time.
Let’s take away the barrier of defensive position now, and look at Jeter’s standing among all hitters. His combined number of career standard deviations above or below league average in OBP and SLG of 18.81 + 1.75 = 20.56 ranks him 136th of all time, with no adjustment for position. Of the 135 players ahead of him, only two have a lower SLG component – Rickey Henderson and Pete Rose. Henderson is a substantially better offensive player (39.09 + 1.36 = 40.45, #5 OBP component of all time, #36 overall) who provided solid defensive value farther toward the easy side of the defensive spectrum. As an all-around player, Henderson trumps Jeter. Rose (25.71 + 1.41 = 27.12, #77) played a bunch of positions at a league-averageish level, and spread his value over an amazing 23 seasons as a regular.
I would submit that Jeter was a better all-around player than Rose when all factors are taken into consideration. Only 50 players had a higher career OBP component than Jeter’s 18.81, and most of them are clear all-time greats with superior power, though they played “easier” defensive positions than Jeter. There is also a lesser number of players with a lower OBP component than Jeter whose power is so extreme that on an all-around basis they belong ahead of Jeter, regardless of defensive position. Without pitting these players against one other tournament-bracket style, I would estimate that 50 position players would possess more all-around value than Jeter, and wouldn’t you know that he ranks #45 in WAR according to Fangraphs, and #58 according to Baseball Reference.
Derek Jeter is going to the Hall of Fame the second he is eligible, and deservedly so. He doesn’t need the championships to buttress his argument. In fact, one could argue that he was the best player on at most two of those five teams, with the criminally underrated Bernie Williams and Rodriguez his strongest competition. Jeter was great because he established a high level of performance at a very young age at the position farthest to the difficult side of the defensive spectrum, and maintained both that level and that position for a very long time. That is historic stuff. He might not belong on Mount Rushmore, but he is an inner circle Hall of Famer, an all-time great that we were all privileged to watch play. May his last season be a healthy, above average one.
Patience Is a Vice.
The emotions that surround a player’s promotion to the big leagues are intense. Dealing with the realization of a lifelong dream coming true, sharing the moment with friends, family and loved ones, and putting on that uniform for the first time in a 24-hour span takes a special mindset to separate the emotions from the moment. Even veterans still talk about having butterflies on opening day, or the start of a postseason series.
When a prospect gets to the major leagues, they want to do everything they can do to stay there. Sometimes, they know up front they are only up for a specific assignment and will be sent back down at a later date, but everyone gets one chance to make a first impression. Often, that impression is made with the bat and players will try to force that issue.
Josh Donaldson had a successful 2013 season that saw him finish fourth in the AL MVP voting, building upon the success he had late in 2012 as he hit .290/.356/.489 after his final recall from the minor leagues. Donaldson has hit .298/.377/.497 since returning from the minor leagues, which allows many to forget that he hit .154/.172/.246 in his first 130 at bats at the major league level walking just three times. Yasiel Puig‘s debut last season generated as many comments about his skills as it did his impatience as he walked just 7 times from his call-up date through the middle of July over 161 plate appearances.
Conversely, you get call-ups like Robbie Grossman with the Astros. Grossman was traded to his hometown team by the Pirates in 2012 as part of the Wandy Rodriguez trade. Grossman made his major league debut on April 24th, and was given 131 plate appearances before being sent back to Oklahoma City. That sample size was enough to look at Grossman’s strikeout rate as well as his walk rate, which were 23.7% and 12.2% respectively. Grossman had posted double-digit walk rates throughout the minor leagues, and his strikeout rate was in-line with what he demonstrated in the minors as well. What did not mesh up with his previous performance was an empty slash line as he hit .198/.310/.243 with just five extra base hits.
Grossman’s .310 on base percentage was due to his willingness to work counts. His 3.72 pitches per plate appearance during his first call-up was better than the likes of David Ortiz, Robinson Cano, and Ben Zobrist during the same time. The problem was that accepting a walk quickly became Grossman’s best chance to get on base, and to his credit, he maximized those chances by swinging at a low 36.5% of pitches thrown his way. Only Jose Bautista swung at a lower percentage of pitches during Grossman’s first call-up (min 100 PA). He returned to Triple-A Oklahoma City in late May and remained there for 226 plate appearances, where he posted a more traditional .265/.374/.368 line with a 14.2% walk rate and a 20.4% strikeout rate. He also made some changes during his demotion.
Prior to his demotion, Grossman had a slightly crouched posture, with a more open stance, and started his swing with his hands level to his chest as shown in the image below from a game in early May.
The changes Grossman made in his stance were quickly evident when he returned to Houston on a homestand in early August against the Boston Red Sox. Here is Grossman at the plate against Boston as he prepares to hit a home run off Ryan Dempster.
There are several noticeable changes to Grossman’s stance at the plate. His stance is more closed, he is closer to the plate and his posture is more upright than it was in May. Grossman’s hands have a higher starting position and his bat starts at a lower angle.
The changes allowed Grossman to hit the ball with more authority, as the average distance on his flyballs increased 13 feet from the first half to the second half and hit 13 extra base hits in 157 plate appearances before being shelved with an oblique injury just after Labor Day. Earlier in the season, Grossman was unable to drive mistakes in the strike zone, such as this hanging 86mph changeup from Anibal Sanchez.
The adjustments to his swing allowed him to take advantage of those types of mistakes with more authority as he did with Dempster’s fastball in early August.
The improved production at the plate led to Grossman becoming more aggressive as he re-gained his confidence at the plate. His walk rate declined dramatically as he became more aggressive at swinging at pitches both within and outside of the strike zone.
Split PA BA OBP SLG K% BB% BABIP Swing% O-Sw% P/PA
Apr-May 131 0.198 0.310 0.243 23.7% 12.2% 0.275 36.5% 14.8% 3.72
July-Sep 157 0.322 0.351 0.466 24.8% 4.5% 0.413 44.2% 23.6% 3.67
Grossman’s improvements last season allowed him to make a better first impression the second time around. The Astros believe they have found their starting left fielder for 2014 to add to their growing list of improving young players that are key to their rebuilding process.
When a prospect gets to the major leagues, they want to do everything they can do to stay there. Sometimes, they know up front they are only up for a specific assignment and will be sent back down at a later date, but everyone gets one chance to make a first impression. Often, that impression is made with the bat and players will try to force that issue.
Josh Donaldson had a successful 2013 season that saw him finish fourth in the AL MVP voting, building upon the success he had late in 2012 as he hit .290/.356/.489 after his final recall from the minor leagues. Donaldson has hit .298/.377/.497 since returning from the minor leagues, which allows many to forget that he hit .154/.172/.246 in his first 130 at bats at the major league level walking just three times. Yasiel Puig‘s debut last season generated as many comments about his skills as it did his impatience as he walked just 7 times from his call-up date through the middle of July over 161 plate appearances.
Conversely, you get call-ups like Robbie Grossman with the Astros. Grossman was traded to his hometown team by the Pirates in 2012 as part of the Wandy Rodriguez trade. Grossman made his major league debut on April 24th, and was given 131 plate appearances before being sent back to Oklahoma City. That sample size was enough to look at Grossman’s strikeout rate as well as his walk rate, which were 23.7% and 12.2% respectively. Grossman had posted double-digit walk rates throughout the minor leagues, and his strikeout rate was in-line with what he demonstrated in the minors as well. What did not mesh up with his previous performance was an empty slash line as he hit .198/.310/.243 with just five extra base hits.
Grossman’s .310 on base percentage was due to his willingness to work counts. His 3.72 pitches per plate appearance during his first call-up was better than the likes of David Ortiz, Robinson Cano, and Ben Zobrist during the same time. The problem was that accepting a walk quickly became Grossman’s best chance to get on base, and to his credit, he maximized those chances by swinging at a low 36.5% of pitches thrown his way. Only Jose Bautista swung at a lower percentage of pitches during Grossman’s first call-up (min 100 PA). He returned to Triple-A Oklahoma City in late May and remained there for 226 plate appearances, where he posted a more traditional .265/.374/.368 line with a 14.2% walk rate and a 20.4% strikeout rate. He also made some changes during his demotion.
Prior to his demotion, Grossman had a slightly crouched posture, with a more open stance, and started his swing with his hands level to his chest as shown in the image below from a game in early May.
The changes Grossman made in his stance were quickly evident when he returned to Houston on a homestand in early August against the Boston Red Sox. Here is Grossman at the plate against Boston as he prepares to hit a home run off Ryan Dempster.
There are several noticeable changes to Grossman’s stance at the plate. His stance is more closed, he is closer to the plate and his posture is more upright than it was in May. Grossman’s hands have a higher starting position and his bat starts at a lower angle.
The changes allowed Grossman to hit the ball with more authority, as the average distance on his flyballs increased 13 feet from the first half to the second half and hit 13 extra base hits in 157 plate appearances before being shelved with an oblique injury just after Labor Day. Earlier in the season, Grossman was unable to drive mistakes in the strike zone, such as this hanging 86mph changeup from Anibal Sanchez.
The adjustments to his swing allowed him to take advantage of those types of mistakes with more authority as he did with Dempster’s fastball in early August.
The improved production at the plate led to Grossman becoming more aggressive as he re-gained his confidence at the plate. His walk rate declined dramatically as he became more aggressive at swinging at pitches both within and outside of the strike zone.
Split PA BA OBP SLG K% BB% BABIP Swing% O-Sw% P/PA
Apr-May 131 0.198 0.310 0.243 23.7% 12.2% 0.275 36.5% 14.8% 3.72
July-Sep 157 0.322 0.351 0.466 24.8% 4.5% 0.413 44.2% 23.6% 3.67
Grossman’s improvements last season allowed him to make a better first impression the second time around. The Astros believe they have found their starting left fielder for 2014 to add to their growing list of improving young players that are key to their rebuilding process.
The Strike Zone With the Runner on the Move.
I’m pretty fascinated by the strike zone. More specifically, while the strike zone is supposed to be laid out in black-and-white in the rules, I’m fascinated by the fact that the strike zone changes. It’s there, at the very heart of the game, and it’s inconsistent. It always has been, and that’s something people just deal with. I’m fascinated by the documented realities of pitch-framing. I’m fascinated by the zone changes with the count. I’m fascinated by bad calls, in both directions.
In the past, I’ve looked up a bunch of should-be strikes that were called balls. In each case, I was searching for some kind of explanation. I noticed that on a handful of occasions, there was a runner on base and he had taken off for the next one with the pitch on the way. So the catcher would’ve prepared himself to throw, taking him out of ordinary pitch-receiving position. This got me wondering what happens to the strike zone when there’s a runner on the move. Not long ago, Baseball Savant added a “stolen base attempt” check box to its PITCHf/x search. So now you know where this is going.
In short, my hypothesis is that there are fewer strikes called when a runner is going. Part would be due to the fact that the home-plate umpire would be distracted by seeing a runner take off. More would be due to the fact that the catcher would have to prepare to throw, meaning they wouldn’t exactly be receiving balls quietly. They’d be pulling the balls back to their bare hands, in theory, costing out-of-zone strikes and some more fringy in-zone strikes. Maybe the simplest way to put it is that, according to my theory, a runner taking off turns the average pitch-receiver into Ryan Doumit.
Baseball Savant makes this pretty easy to research. The site allows you to filter by pitches inside the PITCHf/x strike zone and outside the PITCHf/x strike zone. It also allows you to filter by pitch result. I decided to examine called pitches both inside and outside the zone for 2013, while also covering the whole PITCHf/x era. I think that’s actually all the explanation I need. So now here are statistical results.
2013 season, in-zone
Overall: 90% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 88%
Runner(s) going: 85%
2013 season, out-of-zone
Overall: 14% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 13%
Runner(s) going: 10%
2008-2013 seasons, in-zone
Overall: 87% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 85%
Runner(s) going: 83%
2008-2013 seasons, out-of-zone
Overall: 15% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 14%
Runner(s) going: 10%
What’s observed? Sure enough, in each case, there’s the lowest called-strike rate when a runner’s on the move. The zone is already smaller with runners on base, but it’s even smaller with runners in motion. My best-guess explanation is the one I’ve already offered: It’s harder to get a strike called in the zone, because as a catcher, you’re simultaneously catching and turning your shoulders. For the same reason, it’s harder to sell a strike outside the zone. If umpires can be influenced by little motions when a guy’s receiving a pitch, it stands to reason they can be influenced by other motions when a guy’s getting ready to throw to a base. There’s no such thing as receiving with a still, quiet body when someone’s trying to move up 90 feet.
Just to give you some visual sense of what I’m talking about:
I don’t think “ball” is necessarily the default call, and as we’ve seen, most pitches in the zone are called strikes even with a runner in motion. Still, I suspect if there’s any doubt, a ball call becomes more likely. In an ideal world, umpires would consider only the location of a pitch when it’s around the plate, but framing research shows we don’t live in an ideal world. There are other considerations, which is why the strike zone can dip and shimmy depending on the circumstances.
In case you’re curious, the differences look a little bigger if you eliminate pitches in the middle of the zone, since those are basically always gimmes. The differences are never dramatic, but it’s enough to see they’re there. It’s enough to see a suggestion that something is going on.
I think there are two interpretations, and they’re not contradictory. The first is that umpires call a slightly different strike zone when a runner’s on the move, probably — but not definitely — because of the way the catcher has to react. This suggests the movement of the catcher influences the umpire’s decision. The second is that, while the zones are different, the differences are small, and it’s not like runner activity indirectly makes a mockery of the zone. Umpires are mostly consistent in this regard, with room for just a little external influence. It seems true they call fewer strikes when the catcher’s getting ready to throw, but not by enough to complain about. By only enough to think, “Sure, that could be a thing.”
Unfortunately it’s just dawning on me that the data’s imperfect. If a runner takes off for second, but there’s a called ball four, that won’t show up in the spreadsheet. Apparently it also won’t show up if a runner takes off and there’s a called strike three. PITCHf/x tracks steals and steal attempts, but it doesn’t always designate a runner in motion, so I’m now more frustrated than I was 20 minutes ago. I also don’t know what the next step might be, so I’m content to leave it here, if nothing else as an introduction to an idea. I’ve long wanted to know what happens to the called strike zone when a runner is going. I don’t have all the data I want, but at least I’m not completely empty handed. Intuitively, it seems there are going to be fewer called strikes. I don’t yet have a reason not to believe that.
In the past, I’ve looked up a bunch of should-be strikes that were called balls. In each case, I was searching for some kind of explanation. I noticed that on a handful of occasions, there was a runner on base and he had taken off for the next one with the pitch on the way. So the catcher would’ve prepared himself to throw, taking him out of ordinary pitch-receiving position. This got me wondering what happens to the strike zone when there’s a runner on the move. Not long ago, Baseball Savant added a “stolen base attempt” check box to its PITCHf/x search. So now you know where this is going.
In short, my hypothesis is that there are fewer strikes called when a runner is going. Part would be due to the fact that the home-plate umpire would be distracted by seeing a runner take off. More would be due to the fact that the catcher would have to prepare to throw, meaning they wouldn’t exactly be receiving balls quietly. They’d be pulling the balls back to their bare hands, in theory, costing out-of-zone strikes and some more fringy in-zone strikes. Maybe the simplest way to put it is that, according to my theory, a runner taking off turns the average pitch-receiver into Ryan Doumit.
Baseball Savant makes this pretty easy to research. The site allows you to filter by pitches inside the PITCHf/x strike zone and outside the PITCHf/x strike zone. It also allows you to filter by pitch result. I decided to examine called pitches both inside and outside the zone for 2013, while also covering the whole PITCHf/x era. I think that’s actually all the explanation I need. So now here are statistical results.
2013 season, in-zone
Overall: 90% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 88%
Runner(s) going: 85%
2013 season, out-of-zone
Overall: 14% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 13%
Runner(s) going: 10%
2008-2013 seasons, in-zone
Overall: 87% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 85%
Runner(s) going: 83%
2008-2013 seasons, out-of-zone
Overall: 15% called strikes
Runner(s) on: 14%
Runner(s) going: 10%
What’s observed? Sure enough, in each case, there’s the lowest called-strike rate when a runner’s on the move. The zone is already smaller with runners on base, but it’s even smaller with runners in motion. My best-guess explanation is the one I’ve already offered: It’s harder to get a strike called in the zone, because as a catcher, you’re simultaneously catching and turning your shoulders. For the same reason, it’s harder to sell a strike outside the zone. If umpires can be influenced by little motions when a guy’s receiving a pitch, it stands to reason they can be influenced by other motions when a guy’s getting ready to throw to a base. There’s no such thing as receiving with a still, quiet body when someone’s trying to move up 90 feet.
Just to give you some visual sense of what I’m talking about:
I don’t think “ball” is necessarily the default call, and as we’ve seen, most pitches in the zone are called strikes even with a runner in motion. Still, I suspect if there’s any doubt, a ball call becomes more likely. In an ideal world, umpires would consider only the location of a pitch when it’s around the plate, but framing research shows we don’t live in an ideal world. There are other considerations, which is why the strike zone can dip and shimmy depending on the circumstances.
In case you’re curious, the differences look a little bigger if you eliminate pitches in the middle of the zone, since those are basically always gimmes. The differences are never dramatic, but it’s enough to see they’re there. It’s enough to see a suggestion that something is going on.
I think there are two interpretations, and they’re not contradictory. The first is that umpires call a slightly different strike zone when a runner’s on the move, probably — but not definitely — because of the way the catcher has to react. This suggests the movement of the catcher influences the umpire’s decision. The second is that, while the zones are different, the differences are small, and it’s not like runner activity indirectly makes a mockery of the zone. Umpires are mostly consistent in this regard, with room for just a little external influence. It seems true they call fewer strikes when the catcher’s getting ready to throw, but not by enough to complain about. By only enough to think, “Sure, that could be a thing.”
Unfortunately it’s just dawning on me that the data’s imperfect. If a runner takes off for second, but there’s a called ball four, that won’t show up in the spreadsheet. Apparently it also won’t show up if a runner takes off and there’s a called strike three. PITCHf/x tracks steals and steal attempts, but it doesn’t always designate a runner in motion, so I’m now more frustrated than I was 20 minutes ago. I also don’t know what the next step might be, so I’m content to leave it here, if nothing else as an introduction to an idea. I’ve long wanted to know what happens to the called strike zone when a runner is going. I don’t have all the data I want, but at least I’m not completely empty handed. Intuitively, it seems there are going to be fewer called strikes. I don’t yet have a reason not to believe that.
The Orioles Bet on the New Ubaldo Jimenez.
Ubaldo Jimenez isn’t what he used to be. His pitches have all declined in velocity and bite since his peak in Colorado, and his Cleveland numbers, both superficial and underlying, look pale in comparison. And this with a move out of one of the most extreme hitter’s parks in the big leagues to one more friendly to pitchers.
But 2013 was a story of redemption for Jimenez, and his adjustment to the current state of his stuff was a big part of that. The Orioles believe in that adjustment, hoping it will stick enough to make the four-year, $50 million investment they made in him look wise.
First, let’s look at how stark the decline in his stuff had become. Starting with his age-25 season in 2009, here are the swinging strike metrics on his primary pitches over the past few seasons.
Pitch Type Four-Seam Sinker Change Slider Curve
2009 0.087 0.094 0.092 0.052 0.083
2010 0.094 0.065 0.18 0.123 0.089
2011 0.092 0.056 0.168 0.096 0.058
2012 0.052 0.045 0.129 0.1 0.095
The underlying cause may have been velocity drop. All of his pitches generally dropped in velocity over the same time period, most notably his four-seamer, which dropped from 96+ to 91+. Command of those pitches is always an issue with Jimenez, but that seems come and go as it pleases, and there’s no linear loss of command as there is with swinging strike stuff.
Pitchers sometimes regain stuff and velocity, but at 30, that seems unlikely for Ubaldo going forward. So it’s probably good news that the change in Ubaldo last season was *not* one about regaining stuff or velocity. His change-up (14% whiffs), slider (11%) and curve (7%) — all pitches that used to be plus in terms of whiffs — are still all below average when compared to the league.
Somehow Jimenez arrested a three-year decline in swinging strike and strikeout rates last season, though. Without regaining velocity or bite on his arsenal. Hey look at that, he threw his split-finger more than ever. Maybe we should all learn the split-finger like Jimenez did.
The narrative isn’t super clean. Jimenez has had a split-finger for a long time. But he hasn’t used it like he did in 2013 ever before. Over his career going into 2013, he’d thrown the pitch 3% of the time according to BrooksBaseball. Last year that number was 14%. Add a pitch with a 17% whiff rate, even if that whiff rate is basically league average, and you’ll see more strikeouts.
It’s a trend you’ll see across his arsenal. By any classification system on this site, he’s thrown the fastball less as he’s aged. We know there’s some evidence pitchers use their fastball less as they age, and Jimenez puts this into focus — as the fastball becomes less effective, you have to throw your junk more.
Of course there’s evidence that heavy breaking pitch usage leads to more injuries, but when you’re buying a 30-year-old pitcher, that’s just part of the price. If this new version of Jimenez sticks, he is a pitcher that has manged 30+ starts since he became a regular. And past disabled list stints are still the best predictor of future disabled list stints.
There’s some evidence that this will be a good fit for the Orioles. Recently, Jimenez’ ground-ball rates have been mediocre, but his career number (47.6%) and increased reliance on off-speed stuff suggest that there’s some bounce in those numbers. If he can garner grounders, the Orioles are ready. They had the fourth-best batting average on balls in play allowed and the second-best team Ultimate Zone Rating in the American league. They shifted their infield defense more than anyone last year with 470 shifts according to Jeff Zimmerman‘s piece in The Hardball Times Annual. Once Manny Machado is healthy again, this is a defense that can gobble up ground balls.
With a little bit of help from his defenders, and perhaps even more split-fingers in the future, this new Ubaldo Jimenez could easily put up a 2014 season similar to the one he had in 2013. Even with aggressive aging projections, that probably makes this contract a value. And maybe all it took was throwing the fastball less and the split-finger more.
But 2013 was a story of redemption for Jimenez, and his adjustment to the current state of his stuff was a big part of that. The Orioles believe in that adjustment, hoping it will stick enough to make the four-year, $50 million investment they made in him look wise.
First, let’s look at how stark the decline in his stuff had become. Starting with his age-25 season in 2009, here are the swinging strike metrics on his primary pitches over the past few seasons.
Pitch Type Four-Seam Sinker Change Slider Curve
2009 0.087 0.094 0.092 0.052 0.083
2010 0.094 0.065 0.18 0.123 0.089
2011 0.092 0.056 0.168 0.096 0.058
2012 0.052 0.045 0.129 0.1 0.095
The underlying cause may have been velocity drop. All of his pitches generally dropped in velocity over the same time period, most notably his four-seamer, which dropped from 96+ to 91+. Command of those pitches is always an issue with Jimenez, but that seems come and go as it pleases, and there’s no linear loss of command as there is with swinging strike stuff.
Pitchers sometimes regain stuff and velocity, but at 30, that seems unlikely for Ubaldo going forward. So it’s probably good news that the change in Ubaldo last season was *not* one about regaining stuff or velocity. His change-up (14% whiffs), slider (11%) and curve (7%) — all pitches that used to be plus in terms of whiffs — are still all below average when compared to the league.
Somehow Jimenez arrested a three-year decline in swinging strike and strikeout rates last season, though. Without regaining velocity or bite on his arsenal. Hey look at that, he threw his split-finger more than ever. Maybe we should all learn the split-finger like Jimenez did.
The narrative isn’t super clean. Jimenez has had a split-finger for a long time. But he hasn’t used it like he did in 2013 ever before. Over his career going into 2013, he’d thrown the pitch 3% of the time according to BrooksBaseball. Last year that number was 14%. Add a pitch with a 17% whiff rate, even if that whiff rate is basically league average, and you’ll see more strikeouts.
It’s a trend you’ll see across his arsenal. By any classification system on this site, he’s thrown the fastball less as he’s aged. We know there’s some evidence pitchers use their fastball less as they age, and Jimenez puts this into focus — as the fastball becomes less effective, you have to throw your junk more.
Of course there’s evidence that heavy breaking pitch usage leads to more injuries, but when you’re buying a 30-year-old pitcher, that’s just part of the price. If this new version of Jimenez sticks, he is a pitcher that has manged 30+ starts since he became a regular. And past disabled list stints are still the best predictor of future disabled list stints.
There’s some evidence that this will be a good fit for the Orioles. Recently, Jimenez’ ground-ball rates have been mediocre, but his career number (47.6%) and increased reliance on off-speed stuff suggest that there’s some bounce in those numbers. If he can garner grounders, the Orioles are ready. They had the fourth-best batting average on balls in play allowed and the second-best team Ultimate Zone Rating in the American league. They shifted their infield defense more than anyone last year with 470 shifts according to Jeff Zimmerman‘s piece in The Hardball Times Annual. Once Manny Machado is healthy again, this is a defense that can gobble up ground balls.
With a little bit of help from his defenders, and perhaps even more split-fingers in the future, this new Ubaldo Jimenez could easily put up a 2014 season similar to the one he had in 2013. Even with aggressive aging projections, that probably makes this contract a value. And maybe all it took was throwing the fastball less and the split-finger more.
2014 Top 10 Prospects: Atlanta Braves.
Some weak draft results and limited international budgets have hindered Atlanta’s ability to build depth throughout the minor leagues. Some interesting names are beginning to bubble to the surface although most of the key names are still in the low minors.
#1 Lucas Sims | 60/A- (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 28 18 116.2 83 3 10.34 3.55 2.62 2.81
The Year in Review: Atlanta limited Sims’ innings in 2013 by starting him off in the bullpen in April and May. He dominated Low-A as a teenager and struck out 134 batters in 116.2 innings. Sims held left-handed hitters to a .190 average and did not allow a home run to them.
The Scouting Report: A lot of prep draft picks struggle to maintain their stuff during their first full pro season but Sims was the exception, as he got stronger as the year progressed. The righty possesses a low-to-mid-90s fastball and backs it up with a potentially-plus curveball. His changeup gives him a third offering that could become above-average in time. Sims has good control but his command wavers at times when he battles his arm slot.
The Year Ahead: Sims could see his value skyrocket in 2014 and become one of the top ranked arms in the minors. He’ll open the season in High-A ball but, depending on how aggressive Atlanta wants to be with him, he could see Double-A in the second half of the year.
The Career Outlook: Sims has all the ingredients necessary to develop into a No. 2 starter but I’d like to see the Georgia native induce more ground balls.
#2 Christian Bethancourt | 55/MLB (PH/PR)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
21 1 0.0 % 100.0 % .000 .000 .000 .000 -100 -0.2 0.0 0.0
The Year in Review: A return trip to Double-A in 2013 revitalized Bethancourt’s offensive game. His OPS jumped from .566 in 2012 to .741 in ’13 and he hit double-digit home runs (12) for the first time in his career. Despite the improvements, he continued to be a free swinger and walked just 16 times in 90 games.
The Scouting Report: What a difference a year makes. After a limp offensive performance in 2012, Bethancourt rebounded with a much better output that saw his OPS jump almost .200 points. With that said, he still produces a dismal on-base percentage but the increased pop helps compensate to a degree. Really, Bethancourt only has to produce fringe-average offense to be a starter in the Majors based on his plus defensive work that includes an excellent control over the running game, good blocking and otherworldly receiving.
The Year Ahead: The addition of veteran Ryan Doumit, who may or may not occasionally wear the tools or ignorance, and the presence of both Gerald Laird and Evan Gattis muddies the waters for Bethancourt in 2014 even though his defense alone could make him more valuable than any member of that big league trio.
The Career Outlook: Bethancourt could eventually become the second-best defense catcher in the National League (behind St. Louis’ Yadier Molina) and should earn a starting gig for years to come based on his glove.
#3 Jose Peraza | 60/A- (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 504 129 18 1 34 64 64 .288 .341 .371 .331
The Year in Review: Peraza’s first full season in pro ball included 64 steals in 79 attempts. He produced OK at the plate, given his age, but struggled in the first half before turning things on in the second half.
The Scouting Report: Peraza’s offense if built around above-average speed and excellent base running abilities. He has a solid line-drive swing and makes good contact but he could stand to be a little more patient. The young infielder might generate more power if he were to use his legs a little more in his swing. Defensively, he has a chance to stick at shortstop despite an average-ish arm because he has good range and solid actions.
The Year Ahead: The young middle infielder will move up to High-A ball in 2014 and will look to get stronger at the plate.
The Career Outlook: The chance that Peraza might play shortstop on an everyday basis in Atlanta is slim to none based on the presence of incumbent and plus-plus defender Andrelton Simmons. However, Peraza has a shot at developing into the Braves’ second baseman of the future.
#4 Mauricio Cabrera | 55/A- (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 24 24 131.1 118 3 7.33 4.87 4.18 3.63
The Year in Review: Cabrera struggled to find the plate in 2013 — his first shot at full-season ball — and he walked 71 batters in 131.1 innings. On the plus side, his strong fastball induced a lot of ground balls and he allowed just three home runs on the year. He also handled left-handed hitters quite well (.236 average).
The Scouting Report: Cabrera flashes two potentially-plus offerings in a mid-to-high-90s fastball and a changeup with good movement. He also has a curveball that needs a fair bit of polish but should be an average offering in time. Lack of command and control are the two biggest worries with Cabrera’s development right now, and he may eventually settle into a high-leverage relief role. If he can polish his control, though, he has the frame and delivery to become a durable starter.
The Year Ahead: The right-hander from the Dominican Republic should move up to High-A ball in 2014 where he’ll look to find the plate on a more consistent basis.
The Career Outlook: As mentioned above, Cabrera’s future role is still up in the air but he’ll be given every opportunity to stick in the starting rotation.
#5 J.R. Graham | 55/AA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
23 8 8 35.2 39 0 7.07 2.52 4.04 2.47
The Year in Review: Graham was off to an inconsistent start to the 2013 season when a bum shoulder ended his year in mid-May. Before he went down, though, he showed excellent ground-ball numbers and didn’t allow a home run in 35.2 innings.
The Scouting Report: Graham is a wild card. He suffered a fairly serious shoulder injury in 2013 but decided on rehab over major surgery. It remains to be seen A) How his stuff bounces back, and B) How long his body holds up. He’s not a huge guy but he generates fastball velocity into the 95-96 mph rang. Graham also has a slider and a changeup but he heavily favors the ground-ball-inducing heater.
The Year Ahead: The key for Graham is to hold up over the course of a full season, and he may have to return to Double-A for a third go-around.
The Career Outlook: There were always concerns that his future role was as a reliever and the injury will only help further that belief.
#6 Jason Hursh | 55/R (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 9 9 27.0 20 1 5.00 3.33 0.67 3.79
The Year in Review: The 31st overall selection out of Oklahoma State University in the 2013 draft, Hursh made nine appearances after turning pro and allowed 20 hits in 27.0 innings. He struggled a bit with his control and walked 10. He struck out 15 and induced ground-ball outs at a high rate.
The Scouting Report: Hursh is basically a move physical J.R. Graham. Both have heavy, mid-90s fastballs and both need to polish their secondary stuff, which for the recent draft pick includes a slider and changeup. He underwent Tommy John surgery in college so durability is a minor concern. Hursh’s delivery has some effort to it.
The Year Ahead: After just nine games in Low-A ball, Hursh could be ready for High-A ball, although the Braves minor league development staff is fairly conservative so he’ll likely have to earn the promotion in the spring.
The Career Outlook: There are questions surrounding Hursh’s future role, including: Is he a future mid-rotation starter or is he a high-leverage reliever? Time will tell…
#7 Victor Caratini | 55/R (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 246 58 23 1 39 49 0 .290 .415 .430 .397
The Year in Review: A bit of a surprise selection in the second round of the 2013 draft out of Miami Dade Junior College, Caratini had a strong pro debut. He produced a .415 on-base percentage and 25 of his 58 hits went for extra bases.
The Scouting Report: The key to Caratini’s value as a prospect is tied to his ability to continue developing at his new defensive home behind the plate. Converted to full-time catcher after his first pro season, the young prospect has picked up the basic skills quite quickly. He also has experience at third base but is considered below-average defensively and lacks the power profile to become an elite prospect there. Caratini shows a good swing at the plate as a switch-hitter and isn’t afraid the go the other way from either side of the plate. He also has a solid eye and some patience.
The Year Ahead: Caratini’s bat is probably ready for Low-A ball but he may be held back in extended spring training to continue working on his defensive conversion.
The Career Outlook: A switch-hitting catcher with average defensive skills, strong on-base abilities and gap power carries a ton of value so you can understand why Atlanta would attempt this experiment.
#8 Tommy La Stella | 50/MLB (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
24 430 126 28 6 61 39 9 .345 .443 .488 .428
The Year in Review: Injuries cost La Stella some development time in 2013 but he put up an excellent line in Double-A when he was healthy. He produced a .422 on-base percentage and hit more than .300. He also struck out just 34 times in 81 games. He didn’t have much home-run pop but slugged 21 doubles. The New Jersey native walked 16 times with just four strikeouts during an 18-games stint in the Arizona Fall League.
The Scouting Report: La Stella ranks a little lower than some fans might think because his value is tied entirely to his bat; his defensive skills are fringe-average at second base and he might eventually end up as a utility player and pinch hitter in the mold of former Athletics infielder Scott Spiezio who played first base, second base and third base. Offensively, La Stella has a strong left-handed swing with good bat speed and excellent hand-eye coordination. He has a good eye and a patient approach. He doesn’t have quite as much pop against southpaws but he hits them well.
The Year Ahead: La Stella could see some big league action in 2014 but he’s going to have to wait for an injury to incumbent second baseman Dan Uggla or for an opening on the bench. He’ll likely spend much of the year in Triple-A.
The Career Outlook: The young infielder could develop into an offensive-minded second baseman or a strong bat off the bench.
#9 Johan Camargo | 50/R (3B/SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 256 67 7 0 18 31 3 .294 .359 .360 .342
The Year in Review: Camargo has done nothing but hit since turning pro two years ago. In his first season in North America in 2013, the shortstop batted .294 but failed to hit for much power. He didn’t run much and was successful in just 50% of his six attempts. He showed a solid, but unspectacular, glove.
The Scouting Report: Camargo isn’t flashy and doesn’t have great range but he’s the kind of player that’s going to make all the plays on the balls he can get to — especially as he matures as fielder and cuts out all of the youthful mistakes. However, he may eventually wind up at second base. At the plate, Camargo makes excellent contact and has a good eye but is still learning how to drive the ball.
The Year Ahead: The Panama native likely showed enough during the 2013 season to earn a roster spot on the Low-A ball squad. He’ll look to continue to get stronger.
The Career Outlook: The middle infielder probably won’t end up at shortstop but he has the skills to develop into a solid big league second baseman.
#10 Aaron Northcraft | 50/AA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
23 33 33 155.0 147 9 8.13 3.83 3.95 3.72
The Year in Review: Northcraft produced another solid minor league season — this time in Double-A. The right-hander threw 137 innings and struck out 121 batters. His control wavered a little more than it had in the past but he induced ground ball outs at a rate of 2-to-1 when compared to fly-ball outs. He allowed just seven home runs.
The Scouting Report: Northcraft looks imposing on the mound at 6-4, 220 pounds but he’s a command/control pitcher who relies on location and movement to succeed. What his frame does do, though, is allow him to chew up innings. He pitches in the upper 80s and into the low 90s while backing up the heater with a pair of good secondary offerings in a curveball and changeup.
The Year Ahead: Northcraft should move up to Triple-A and could be one of the first pitchers recalled in the event of an injury or demotion to one of the original five starters.
The Career Outlook: Northcraft projects to develop into a back-of-the-rotation, innings-eating starter for the Braves — perhaps as soon as 2014.
The Next Five:
11. Carlos Perez, LHP: The enigmatic Perez has had an up-and-down career to say the least. Luckily, though, he may have finally found the right role for himself. The starter-turned-reliever struggles with his command and control but has solid velocity for a lefty and flashes a promising changeup. He should return to High-A ball in 2014 but could see Double-A in the second half if he makes further adjustments.
12. Josh Elander, OF: Elander would be much higher on this list if he had stuck at catcher — the position he played when he was selected in the sixth round of the 2012 draft. The young athlete just missed hitting .300 after splitting the year between Low-A and High-A ball and enjoys beating up on left-handed pitching. He also slugged 52 extra base hits. Elander could move up to Double-A with a strong spring but he needs to continue to hit for power if he’s going to play regularly in a big league (corner) outfield.
13. Victor Reyes, OF: Reyes, 19, is a left-handed hitting outfielder who batted more than .340 split between two Rookie ball leagues in 2013. He also struck out just 29 times in 49 games and could eventually develop into a solid No. 2 hitter. Reyes, though, has yet to tap into his raw power and isn’t a prolific base stealer despite solid speed so his value right now is tied almost solely to his ability to hit for average.
14. Wes Parsons, RHP: It’s not often that you find a non-drafted free agent on a Top 10 or 15 list but Parsons is deserving of his rank. The 6-5 right-hander is a strike-throwing, ground-ball inducing machine with solid stuff. Parsons, 21, doesn’t have a huge ceiling but he could develop into a reliable back-of-the-rotation contributor.
15. Cody Martin, RHP: The right-handed Martin doesn’t have stellar stuff but he attacks the strike zone, is durable and took just two full seasons to reach Triple-A. In total, he struck out 137 batters in 136.2 innings during the 2013 season. Standing 6-2, Martin has decent height but he works up in the zone too often, which results in a fly-ball heavy approach. He has the ceiling of an innings-eating, back-of-the-rotation starter.
#1 Lucas Sims | 60/A- (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 28 18 116.2 83 3 10.34 3.55 2.62 2.81
The Year in Review: Atlanta limited Sims’ innings in 2013 by starting him off in the bullpen in April and May. He dominated Low-A as a teenager and struck out 134 batters in 116.2 innings. Sims held left-handed hitters to a .190 average and did not allow a home run to them.
The Scouting Report: A lot of prep draft picks struggle to maintain their stuff during their first full pro season but Sims was the exception, as he got stronger as the year progressed. The righty possesses a low-to-mid-90s fastball and backs it up with a potentially-plus curveball. His changeup gives him a third offering that could become above-average in time. Sims has good control but his command wavers at times when he battles his arm slot.
The Year Ahead: Sims could see his value skyrocket in 2014 and become one of the top ranked arms in the minors. He’ll open the season in High-A ball but, depending on how aggressive Atlanta wants to be with him, he could see Double-A in the second half of the year.
The Career Outlook: Sims has all the ingredients necessary to develop into a No. 2 starter but I’d like to see the Georgia native induce more ground balls.
#2 Christian Bethancourt | 55/MLB (PH/PR)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
21 1 0.0 % 100.0 % .000 .000 .000 .000 -100 -0.2 0.0 0.0
The Year in Review: A return trip to Double-A in 2013 revitalized Bethancourt’s offensive game. His OPS jumped from .566 in 2012 to .741 in ’13 and he hit double-digit home runs (12) for the first time in his career. Despite the improvements, he continued to be a free swinger and walked just 16 times in 90 games.
The Scouting Report: What a difference a year makes. After a limp offensive performance in 2012, Bethancourt rebounded with a much better output that saw his OPS jump almost .200 points. With that said, he still produces a dismal on-base percentage but the increased pop helps compensate to a degree. Really, Bethancourt only has to produce fringe-average offense to be a starter in the Majors based on his plus defensive work that includes an excellent control over the running game, good blocking and otherworldly receiving.
The Year Ahead: The addition of veteran Ryan Doumit, who may or may not occasionally wear the tools or ignorance, and the presence of both Gerald Laird and Evan Gattis muddies the waters for Bethancourt in 2014 even though his defense alone could make him more valuable than any member of that big league trio.
The Career Outlook: Bethancourt could eventually become the second-best defense catcher in the National League (behind St. Louis’ Yadier Molina) and should earn a starting gig for years to come based on his glove.
#3 Jose Peraza | 60/A- (SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 504 129 18 1 34 64 64 .288 .341 .371 .331
The Year in Review: Peraza’s first full season in pro ball included 64 steals in 79 attempts. He produced OK at the plate, given his age, but struggled in the first half before turning things on in the second half.
The Scouting Report: Peraza’s offense if built around above-average speed and excellent base running abilities. He has a solid line-drive swing and makes good contact but he could stand to be a little more patient. The young infielder might generate more power if he were to use his legs a little more in his swing. Defensively, he has a chance to stick at shortstop despite an average-ish arm because he has good range and solid actions.
The Year Ahead: The young middle infielder will move up to High-A ball in 2014 and will look to get stronger at the plate.
The Career Outlook: The chance that Peraza might play shortstop on an everyday basis in Atlanta is slim to none based on the presence of incumbent and plus-plus defender Andrelton Simmons. However, Peraza has a shot at developing into the Braves’ second baseman of the future.
#4 Mauricio Cabrera | 55/A- (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 24 24 131.1 118 3 7.33 4.87 4.18 3.63
The Year in Review: Cabrera struggled to find the plate in 2013 — his first shot at full-season ball — and he walked 71 batters in 131.1 innings. On the plus side, his strong fastball induced a lot of ground balls and he allowed just three home runs on the year. He also handled left-handed hitters quite well (.236 average).
The Scouting Report: Cabrera flashes two potentially-plus offerings in a mid-to-high-90s fastball and a changeup with good movement. He also has a curveball that needs a fair bit of polish but should be an average offering in time. Lack of command and control are the two biggest worries with Cabrera’s development right now, and he may eventually settle into a high-leverage relief role. If he can polish his control, though, he has the frame and delivery to become a durable starter.
The Year Ahead: The right-hander from the Dominican Republic should move up to High-A ball in 2014 where he’ll look to find the plate on a more consistent basis.
The Career Outlook: As mentioned above, Cabrera’s future role is still up in the air but he’ll be given every opportunity to stick in the starting rotation.
#5 J.R. Graham | 55/AA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
23 8 8 35.2 39 0 7.07 2.52 4.04 2.47
The Year in Review: Graham was off to an inconsistent start to the 2013 season when a bum shoulder ended his year in mid-May. Before he went down, though, he showed excellent ground-ball numbers and didn’t allow a home run in 35.2 innings.
The Scouting Report: Graham is a wild card. He suffered a fairly serious shoulder injury in 2013 but decided on rehab over major surgery. It remains to be seen A) How his stuff bounces back, and B) How long his body holds up. He’s not a huge guy but he generates fastball velocity into the 95-96 mph rang. Graham also has a slider and a changeup but he heavily favors the ground-ball-inducing heater.
The Year Ahead: The key for Graham is to hold up over the course of a full season, and he may have to return to Double-A for a third go-around.
The Career Outlook: There were always concerns that his future role was as a reliever and the injury will only help further that belief.
#6 Jason Hursh | 55/R (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
21 9 9 27.0 20 1 5.00 3.33 0.67 3.79
The Year in Review: The 31st overall selection out of Oklahoma State University in the 2013 draft, Hursh made nine appearances after turning pro and allowed 20 hits in 27.0 innings. He struggled a bit with his control and walked 10. He struck out 15 and induced ground-ball outs at a high rate.
The Scouting Report: Hursh is basically a move physical J.R. Graham. Both have heavy, mid-90s fastballs and both need to polish their secondary stuff, which for the recent draft pick includes a slider and changeup. He underwent Tommy John surgery in college so durability is a minor concern. Hursh’s delivery has some effort to it.
The Year Ahead: After just nine games in Low-A ball, Hursh could be ready for High-A ball, although the Braves minor league development staff is fairly conservative so he’ll likely have to earn the promotion in the spring.
The Career Outlook: There are questions surrounding Hursh’s future role, including: Is he a future mid-rotation starter or is he a high-leverage reliever? Time will tell…
#7 Victor Caratini | 55/R (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 246 58 23 1 39 49 0 .290 .415 .430 .397
The Year in Review: A bit of a surprise selection in the second round of the 2013 draft out of Miami Dade Junior College, Caratini had a strong pro debut. He produced a .415 on-base percentage and 25 of his 58 hits went for extra bases.
The Scouting Report: The key to Caratini’s value as a prospect is tied to his ability to continue developing at his new defensive home behind the plate. Converted to full-time catcher after his first pro season, the young prospect has picked up the basic skills quite quickly. He also has experience at third base but is considered below-average defensively and lacks the power profile to become an elite prospect there. Caratini shows a good swing at the plate as a switch-hitter and isn’t afraid the go the other way from either side of the plate. He also has a solid eye and some patience.
The Year Ahead: Caratini’s bat is probably ready for Low-A ball but he may be held back in extended spring training to continue working on his defensive conversion.
The Career Outlook: A switch-hitting catcher with average defensive skills, strong on-base abilities and gap power carries a ton of value so you can understand why Atlanta would attempt this experiment.
#8 Tommy La Stella | 50/MLB (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
24 430 126 28 6 61 39 9 .345 .443 .488 .428
The Year in Review: Injuries cost La Stella some development time in 2013 but he put up an excellent line in Double-A when he was healthy. He produced a .422 on-base percentage and hit more than .300. He also struck out just 34 times in 81 games. He didn’t have much home-run pop but slugged 21 doubles. The New Jersey native walked 16 times with just four strikeouts during an 18-games stint in the Arizona Fall League.
The Scouting Report: La Stella ranks a little lower than some fans might think because his value is tied entirely to his bat; his defensive skills are fringe-average at second base and he might eventually end up as a utility player and pinch hitter in the mold of former Athletics infielder Scott Spiezio who played first base, second base and third base. Offensively, La Stella has a strong left-handed swing with good bat speed and excellent hand-eye coordination. He has a good eye and a patient approach. He doesn’t have quite as much pop against southpaws but he hits them well.
The Year Ahead: La Stella could see some big league action in 2014 but he’s going to have to wait for an injury to incumbent second baseman Dan Uggla or for an opening on the bench. He’ll likely spend much of the year in Triple-A.
The Career Outlook: The young infielder could develop into an offensive-minded second baseman or a strong bat off the bench.
#9 Johan Camargo | 50/R (3B/SS)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
19 256 67 7 0 18 31 3 .294 .359 .360 .342
The Year in Review: Camargo has done nothing but hit since turning pro two years ago. In his first season in North America in 2013, the shortstop batted .294 but failed to hit for much power. He didn’t run much and was successful in just 50% of his six attempts. He showed a solid, but unspectacular, glove.
The Scouting Report: Camargo isn’t flashy and doesn’t have great range but he’s the kind of player that’s going to make all the plays on the balls he can get to — especially as he matures as fielder and cuts out all of the youthful mistakes. However, he may eventually wind up at second base. At the plate, Camargo makes excellent contact and has a good eye but is still learning how to drive the ball.
The Year Ahead: The Panama native likely showed enough during the 2013 season to earn a roster spot on the Low-A ball squad. He’ll look to continue to get stronger.
The Career Outlook: The middle infielder probably won’t end up at shortstop but he has the skills to develop into a solid big league second baseman.
#10 Aaron Northcraft | 50/AA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
23 33 33 155.0 147 9 8.13 3.83 3.95 3.72
The Year in Review: Northcraft produced another solid minor league season — this time in Double-A. The right-hander threw 137 innings and struck out 121 batters. His control wavered a little more than it had in the past but he induced ground ball outs at a rate of 2-to-1 when compared to fly-ball outs. He allowed just seven home runs.
The Scouting Report: Northcraft looks imposing on the mound at 6-4, 220 pounds but he’s a command/control pitcher who relies on location and movement to succeed. What his frame does do, though, is allow him to chew up innings. He pitches in the upper 80s and into the low 90s while backing up the heater with a pair of good secondary offerings in a curveball and changeup.
The Year Ahead: Northcraft should move up to Triple-A and could be one of the first pitchers recalled in the event of an injury or demotion to one of the original five starters.
The Career Outlook: Northcraft projects to develop into a back-of-the-rotation, innings-eating starter for the Braves — perhaps as soon as 2014.
The Next Five:
11. Carlos Perez, LHP: The enigmatic Perez has had an up-and-down career to say the least. Luckily, though, he may have finally found the right role for himself. The starter-turned-reliever struggles with his command and control but has solid velocity for a lefty and flashes a promising changeup. He should return to High-A ball in 2014 but could see Double-A in the second half if he makes further adjustments.
12. Josh Elander, OF: Elander would be much higher on this list if he had stuck at catcher — the position he played when he was selected in the sixth round of the 2012 draft. The young athlete just missed hitting .300 after splitting the year between Low-A and High-A ball and enjoys beating up on left-handed pitching. He also slugged 52 extra base hits. Elander could move up to Double-A with a strong spring but he needs to continue to hit for power if he’s going to play regularly in a big league (corner) outfield.
13. Victor Reyes, OF: Reyes, 19, is a left-handed hitting outfielder who batted more than .340 split between two Rookie ball leagues in 2013. He also struck out just 29 times in 49 games and could eventually develop into a solid No. 2 hitter. Reyes, though, has yet to tap into his raw power and isn’t a prolific base stealer despite solid speed so his value right now is tied almost solely to his ability to hit for average.
14. Wes Parsons, RHP: It’s not often that you find a non-drafted free agent on a Top 10 or 15 list but Parsons is deserving of his rank. The 6-5 right-hander is a strike-throwing, ground-ball inducing machine with solid stuff. Parsons, 21, doesn’t have a huge ceiling but he could develop into a reliable back-of-the-rotation contributor.
15. Cody Martin, RHP: The right-handed Martin doesn’t have stellar stuff but he attacks the strike zone, is durable and took just two full seasons to reach Triple-A. In total, he struck out 137 batters in 136.2 innings during the 2013 season. Standing 6-2, Martin has decent height but he works up in the zone too often, which results in a fly-ball heavy approach. He has the ceiling of an innings-eating, back-of-the-rotation starter.
The Difference for Homer Bailey.
It’s been long enough that I think it’s easy to forget Homer Bailey was a top prospect. Between 2007-2008, Baseball America ranked him No. 9 overall, between Franklin Morales and David Price. A year earlier, he was fifth overall, between Phil Hughes and Cameron Maybin. Hughes was supposed to blossom into a guy who pitched like an ace. He hasn’t yet. Bailey was supposed to blossom into a guy who pitched like an ace. He has, now, having reached a new level with the Cincinnati Reds. Hitters are the ones who’re supposed to peak at 27, but Bailey stole a page out of their book, and now word is he’s on the verge of inking a long-term contract extension to stay where he is in Ohio. A year away from free agency, the talk is that Bailey’s looking at nine guaranteed figures.
Bailey was already a pretty good starting pitcher, before leveling up. He never let anything get out of control, and for a few years he was in the vicinity of league-average. But last season, he dropped his FIP- into the 80s, and he did the same with his xFIP-. Because the Reds aren’t a huge-budget ballclub, it’s a risk for them to attempt this kind of commitment, so they’re rolling the dice as an organization on Bailey being more like his 2013 self going forward. Naturally, then, one gets curious about what changed between seasons. Was there any kind of key to Bailey’s improvement?
His walks hardly budged. His groundball rate hardly budged. In 2012, Bailey struck out 168 batters. In 2013, he struck out 199 batters, despite 25 fewer plate appearances. You don’t have to look further than that — that’s the key, right there. But we can dig deeper.
Bailey didn’t change much about his pitch mix. He didn’t change much about his pitch movement, or his pitch release points. There was, however, a change in his pitch velocities. His fastball gained an average of 1.6 ticks. His slider was up 0.9. His curve was up 1.5. One of the things we’ve learned in recent years is that pitch velocity tends to start gradually declining upon a guy’s promotion to the majors. Bailey had a significant increase, after already having been an established big-league starter.
Again, that would be another potential stopping point. Bailey’s strikeouts went up, and his velocity went up. That’s the story. But we can dig deeper still. Overall he pitched in a pretty similar way, but he dropped his contact rate a little bit, both in the zone and out of it. Sometimes pitching coaches say that they don’t care about velocity. They’re lying, or they’re stupid. Having more velocity lets a pitcher get away with more things.
Here’s where things get particularly interesting. I’m going to show you some splits. First, Bailey’s xFIP against left-handed hitters. Then, his xFIP against right-handed hitters. I know it’s kind of weird to split xFIP by handedness, but it does a good job of distilling the profile into a single telling number.
Bailey vs. LHB
2010: 3.50 xFIP
2011: 3.44
2012: 3.76
2013: 3.61
Bailey vs. RHB
2010: 3.89 xFIP
2011: 4.03
2012: 4.09
2013: 3.10
Against lefties, Bailey didn’t really change at all. His whiff rate stayed about the same, and the other rates stayed about the same. Against righties, Bailey was like a different pitcher. Not only did he keep half the balls in play on the ground — he lifted his strikeout rate from just over 17% to just under 25%. Last season, Homer Bailey improved, and his improvement was almost entirely contained in showdowns against right-handed hitters.
Two years ago, facing Bailey, righties made contact just over 78% of the time. Last year, they made contact just under 73% of the time. His split strikeout rate improved by 7.4 percentage points, which was the seventh-biggest increase in baseball between 2012-2013 among pitchers to collect significant playing time. Only 11 pitchers improved against righties by at least five percentage points. For Bailey, you could make the argument this improvement was overdue.
See, before last season, Bailey was one of the rare pitchers in baseball with a reverse platoon split. He had a 4.26 FIP against righties, and a 4.19 FIP against lefties. He allowed a .329 wOBA to righties, and a .328 wOBA to lefties. Last season, Bailey shut righties down, and in so doing pitched more like a normal righty with normal behavior. Some might refer to that as simple regression, but it appears like meaningful improvement.
Given the velocity uptick, it’s strange to observe a big jump against righties and no jump at all against lefties. This is where I point out that pitching is complicated. But righties might’ve already had a briefer look at the ball, and perhaps they observed a bigger uptick in perceived velocity. The result was that all of Bailey’s pitches were weapons. He had more success avoiding contact up in the zone. With two strikes, he significantly improved his strikeout rate with his fastball, his slider, and his curveball, and he also threw a few extra splitters. I’m very much aware that pinning this on velocity is labeling correlation as causation, but I do feel pretty good about that, pending other explanations.
Let’s say that a huge part of Bailey’s performance improvement was velocity improvement. Then it’s important to try to figure out where the velocity improvement came from. It might be as simple as health. Bailey threw a similar fastball in 2009. In 2010, he went on the disabled list with shoulder inflammation. In 2011, he was on the DL out of camp with a shoulder impingement, and later he was back on the DL with a shoulder sprain. It could just be that Bailey took until 2013 to return to 100%. It could also be that Bailey made a few minor mechanical tweaks that allowed him to convert more energy into velocity, or however it is the experts put it.
Between 2002-2013, I identified 62 starting pitchers who threw at least 50 innings four years in a row, and whose average fastball velocity increased at least one mile per hour between year 2 and year 3. Out of that group, 42 of the pitchers saw their velocities increase right after seeing their velocities decline. Of the remaining 20 pitchers, 17 saw their velocities decrease between year 3 and year 4. They averaged 89.8 miles per hour before the improvement, 91.3 miles per hour after the improvement, and 90.5 miles per hour the year after that. What’s suggested is that Bailey might be in line to give some of his velocity improvement back.
But for one thing, he can afford to give back some of it. And for another thing, what’s true for a group isn’t always necessarily true for the individual, and it all depends on where Bailey’s extra velocity really came from. If the Reds believe that it’s sustainable, and if it is sustainable, then Bailey might well be his new self, for some time. The most recent version of Homer Bailey was a complete version of the top prospect he was just a few years before.
Bailey was already a pretty good starting pitcher, before leveling up. He never let anything get out of control, and for a few years he was in the vicinity of league-average. But last season, he dropped his FIP- into the 80s, and he did the same with his xFIP-. Because the Reds aren’t a huge-budget ballclub, it’s a risk for them to attempt this kind of commitment, so they’re rolling the dice as an organization on Bailey being more like his 2013 self going forward. Naturally, then, one gets curious about what changed between seasons. Was there any kind of key to Bailey’s improvement?
His walks hardly budged. His groundball rate hardly budged. In 2012, Bailey struck out 168 batters. In 2013, he struck out 199 batters, despite 25 fewer plate appearances. You don’t have to look further than that — that’s the key, right there. But we can dig deeper.
Bailey didn’t change much about his pitch mix. He didn’t change much about his pitch movement, or his pitch release points. There was, however, a change in his pitch velocities. His fastball gained an average of 1.6 ticks. His slider was up 0.9. His curve was up 1.5. One of the things we’ve learned in recent years is that pitch velocity tends to start gradually declining upon a guy’s promotion to the majors. Bailey had a significant increase, after already having been an established big-league starter.
Again, that would be another potential stopping point. Bailey’s strikeouts went up, and his velocity went up. That’s the story. But we can dig deeper still. Overall he pitched in a pretty similar way, but he dropped his contact rate a little bit, both in the zone and out of it. Sometimes pitching coaches say that they don’t care about velocity. They’re lying, or they’re stupid. Having more velocity lets a pitcher get away with more things.
Here’s where things get particularly interesting. I’m going to show you some splits. First, Bailey’s xFIP against left-handed hitters. Then, his xFIP against right-handed hitters. I know it’s kind of weird to split xFIP by handedness, but it does a good job of distilling the profile into a single telling number.
Bailey vs. LHB
2010: 3.50 xFIP
2011: 3.44
2012: 3.76
2013: 3.61
Bailey vs. RHB
2010: 3.89 xFIP
2011: 4.03
2012: 4.09
2013: 3.10
Against lefties, Bailey didn’t really change at all. His whiff rate stayed about the same, and the other rates stayed about the same. Against righties, Bailey was like a different pitcher. Not only did he keep half the balls in play on the ground — he lifted his strikeout rate from just over 17% to just under 25%. Last season, Homer Bailey improved, and his improvement was almost entirely contained in showdowns against right-handed hitters.
Two years ago, facing Bailey, righties made contact just over 78% of the time. Last year, they made contact just under 73% of the time. His split strikeout rate improved by 7.4 percentage points, which was the seventh-biggest increase in baseball between 2012-2013 among pitchers to collect significant playing time. Only 11 pitchers improved against righties by at least five percentage points. For Bailey, you could make the argument this improvement was overdue.
See, before last season, Bailey was one of the rare pitchers in baseball with a reverse platoon split. He had a 4.26 FIP against righties, and a 4.19 FIP against lefties. He allowed a .329 wOBA to righties, and a .328 wOBA to lefties. Last season, Bailey shut righties down, and in so doing pitched more like a normal righty with normal behavior. Some might refer to that as simple regression, but it appears like meaningful improvement.
Given the velocity uptick, it’s strange to observe a big jump against righties and no jump at all against lefties. This is where I point out that pitching is complicated. But righties might’ve already had a briefer look at the ball, and perhaps they observed a bigger uptick in perceived velocity. The result was that all of Bailey’s pitches were weapons. He had more success avoiding contact up in the zone. With two strikes, he significantly improved his strikeout rate with his fastball, his slider, and his curveball, and he also threw a few extra splitters. I’m very much aware that pinning this on velocity is labeling correlation as causation, but I do feel pretty good about that, pending other explanations.
Let’s say that a huge part of Bailey’s performance improvement was velocity improvement. Then it’s important to try to figure out where the velocity improvement came from. It might be as simple as health. Bailey threw a similar fastball in 2009. In 2010, he went on the disabled list with shoulder inflammation. In 2011, he was on the DL out of camp with a shoulder impingement, and later he was back on the DL with a shoulder sprain. It could just be that Bailey took until 2013 to return to 100%. It could also be that Bailey made a few minor mechanical tweaks that allowed him to convert more energy into velocity, or however it is the experts put it.
Between 2002-2013, I identified 62 starting pitchers who threw at least 50 innings four years in a row, and whose average fastball velocity increased at least one mile per hour between year 2 and year 3. Out of that group, 42 of the pitchers saw their velocities increase right after seeing their velocities decline. Of the remaining 20 pitchers, 17 saw their velocities decrease between year 3 and year 4. They averaged 89.8 miles per hour before the improvement, 91.3 miles per hour after the improvement, and 90.5 miles per hour the year after that. What’s suggested is that Bailey might be in line to give some of his velocity improvement back.
But for one thing, he can afford to give back some of it. And for another thing, what’s true for a group isn’t always necessarily true for the individual, and it all depends on where Bailey’s extra velocity really came from. If the Reds believe that it’s sustainable, and if it is sustainable, then Bailey might well be his new self, for some time. The most recent version of Homer Bailey was a complete version of the top prospect he was just a few years before.
On Craig Kimbrel and Committing to a Closer.
The Atlanta Braves are in the news yet again, with yet another long term contract for a member of their young core. After already locking up Freddie Freeman and Julio Teheran, the Braves have now committed $42 million to Craig Kimbrel over the next four years, buying out his three arbitration years and his first year of free agency, while also getting an option for his second FA season. Kimbrel is a dominant closer, and on a per batter faced basis, maybe the most dominant pitcher in the sport right now.
In his career, opposing batters have posted a .212 wOBA against Craig Kimbrel. That’s 40 points better than Aroldis Chapman‘s .253 wOBA against, and Chapman is probably the only guy who one might think could challenge Kimbrel for the most dominating title. Kimbrel has been essentially the perfect closer, putting up some of the best relief pitcher seasons in baseball history, since he debuted back in 2010. And yet I still wonder whether or not the Braves really needed to sign this contract.
The Braves already owned Kimbrel’s rights for 2014 through 2016, and the prices they guaranteed him for his arbitration years aren’t such a steep discount that the deal could be considered a wise investment just on the basis of maybe saving a few million dollars for the next couple of seasons. For the Braves, the value in this deal comes in buying out his 2017 and maybe his 2018 free agent years, and those seasons will now $13 million apiece. That’s a season or two extra that they wouldn’t have been able to control without giving him a long term deal that pushed into his 30s, so even if the salary portion doesn’t look so great, there’s a benefit to adding just one or two seasons extra rather than having to commit to another three or four years after his arbitration seasons are up.
But how likely is it that the Braves will still want to pay Kimbrel $13 million four years from now? It’s no secret that the shelf life of relief pitchers is shorter than players at other positions, and Kimbrel would hardly be the first dominant reliever to show up, dominate for a while, and then hang around as a shell of what he once was. Can we really forecast, right now, that Kimbrel will still be one of the best relievers in baseball in 2017?
For reference, here is a list of every pitcher who posted a +3 WAR season out of the bullpen from 2000 to 2009.
Season Name IP BB% K% HR/9 BABIP LOB% ERA- FIP- WAR RA9-WAR
2003 Eric Gagne 82.1 5% 36% 0.22 0.243 84% 51 44 4.4 3.5
2004 Francisco Rodriguez 84.0 10% 37% 0.21 0.278 78% 41 39 3.8 3.5
2004 Brad Lidge 94.2 8% 43% 0.76 0.292 88% 44 43 3.6 4.2
2007 Rafael Betancourt 79.1 3% 28% 0.45 0.240 86% 33 52 3.5 4.5
2006 J.J. Putz 78.1 4% 34% 0.46 0.306 79% 52 40 3.4 3.3
2006 Jonathan Papelbon 68.1 5% 29% 0.40 0.224 92% 20 46 3.4 4.8
2004 B.J. Ryan 87.0 10% 34% 0.41 0.302 81% 50 48 3.3 3.3
2002 Eric Gagne 82.1 7% 45% 0.66 0.278 85% 30 20 3.3 4.3
2008 Mariano Rivera 70.2 4% 27% 0.51 0.218 88% 53 53 3.3 3.2
2004 Eric Gagne 82.1 7% 35% 0.55 0.267 77% 53 47 3.2 2.8
2000 Gabe White 84.0 5% 26% 0.64 0.262 80% 42 47 3.2 3.8
2004 Joe Nathan 72.1 6% 36% 0.37 0.269 86% 35 39 3.2 3.5
2006 Joe Nathan 68.1 8% 31% 0.40 0.238 85% 35 49 3.2 3.9
2001 Mariano Rivera 80.2 6% 26% 0.56 0.268 75% 32 51 3.2 3.6
2001 Octavio Dotel 84.0 10% 38% 0.32 0.301 80% 43 37 3.1 3.0
2002 Robb Nen 73.2 7% 27% 0.24 0.315 80% 56 48 3.1 2.9
2006 Takashi Saito 78.1 8% 35% 0.34 0.268 79% 47 42 3.1 3.1
2008 Jonathan Papelbon 69.1 3% 28% 0.52 0.293 70% 52 45 3.0 2.1
2005 Mariano Rivera 78.1 2% 30% 0.23 0.238 78% 32 47 3.0 4.2
19 pitcher seasons, but only 13 pitchers, as guys like Gagne, Rivera, and Papelbon all had multiple +3 WAR seasons during the first decade of the 21st century. So let’s look at those 13 guys, and see how effective they were in their fourth season after the year indicated above, to see how well they were able to sustain their dominance over the long term. In chronological order:
Gabe White, 2004: 60 IP, -0.4 WAR, -1.3 RA9/WAR
White’s 2000 season looks like one of the great flukes in baseball history, as he accumulated 75% of his career WAR total in that one season. He’d been pretty mediocre to that point, and then returned to mediocrity immediately afterwards, posting a below replacement level season in 2001. He did have one more solid season in 2002, but but he was out of baseball by 2005. A one year spike guy is probably not a great comparison for Kimbrel, but White is a nice reminder that even mediocre pitchers can look amazing for 70 or 80 innings.
Octavio Dotel, 2005: 15 IP, +0.0 WAR, +0.5 RA9-WAR
Dotel followed up his terrific 2001 season with another great year in 2002 and then two solid years in 2003/2004, remaining of the game’s best relief arms for three years after his best season. But then he got hurt, only pitching a combined 25 innings in 2005 and 2006, and eventually returned as a good-not-great setup guy who had value but wasn’t what he was before.
Mariano Rivera, 2005: 78 IP, +3.0 WAR, +3.6 RA9-WAR
You don’t need much information here. Mo was consistently amazing, year in and year out, and could probably still be one of the best closers in baseball today. The ultimate example of a closer having a long, successful career.
Eric Gagne, 2006: 2 IP, +0.0 WAR, +0.0 RA9-WAR
Gagne is the closest thing we have to a match for Kimbrel, as he destroyed opposing hitters from 2002-2004, posting +3 WAR seasons in each of those three years. And then he fell apart in 2005, missed almost the entire 2006 season, and had only a brief and moderately successful return to the majors in 2007. Perhaps Gagne’s previous work as a starter caught up to him, or his workloads as a reliever finally were too much, but Gagne is the yin to Rivera’s yang, and is a reminder of the risk of betting big on even the very best relievers.
Robb Nen, 2006: Forcibly retired by injury
Nen’s last pitch of his dominant 2002 season turned out to be his last. He tried to help the Giants win a World Series with an arm that needed surgery, and it ended his career. He finally retired in 2005 after several years of rehab.
Joe Nathan, 2008: 68 IP, +2.0 WAR, +3.6 RA9-WAR
Nathan had a great six year run as a dominant closer for the Twins, and is a template for how this deal could work out well for Atlanta. He was still nearly as good in 2008 as he was in 2004, and then continued to pitch well in 2009 as well. Even after an injury in 2010, he’s still pitching well, and hasn’t yet succumbed to age or injuries.
Francisco Rodriguez, 2008: 68 IP, +1.7 WAR, +2.7 RA9-WAR
Rodriguez is often used as a comparison for Kimbrel because he was so good at such a young age, posting his +3 WAR season at age-22, and then establishing himself as a dominant closer in his early-to-mid 20s. By the time he got near free agency, he had declined to good reliever instead of a great one, so the Angels wisely let him go. While he’s never totally imploded, his late-20s and early-30s have been nothing like what he was in his younger days.
Brad Lidge, 2008: 69 IP, +2.2 WAR, +2.7 RA9-WAR
Lidge was up-and-down after his monster 2004 season, mixing in a couple of great years with a couple of mediocre ones, though 2008 was again one of his better seasons, and he provided a lot of value for the Phillies in his first year there. From there, though, it was mostly downhill, and Lidge’s contract with the Phillies proved to be a mistake.
B.J. Ryan, 2008: 59 IP, +0.9 WAR, +1.5 RA9-WAR
Ryan followed up his dominant 2004 season with two more great years before blowing out his arm. He was good but not great in his return, and that only lasted a year, as he was out of baseball after 2009. He had a great three or four year run, but that’s essentially what his career amounted to.
Jonathan Papelbon, 2010: +1.2 WAR, +0.4 RA9-WAR
Papelbon was excellent for almost his entire tenure in Boston, and sustained most of his success for the next three years after his dominant 2006 season. 2010 was a down year, but he bounced back with a great 2011 season, and while the Phillies certanily overpaid him, he’s a check mark in the positive category for Kimbrel, as he’s been pretty consistently good ever since his debut.
Takashi Saito, 2010: 54 IP, +1.4 WAR, +0.8 RA9-WAR
Saito never repeated his remarkable rookie season, but then again, he was 36 when he came over to the U.S., so this isn’t really much of a comparison for Kimbrel, and I don’t think we can say too much about the fact that he had turned into just a good setup man at age-40.
J.J. Putz, 2010: 54 IP, +1.4 WAR, +1.3 RA9-WAR
Putz broke out in a huge way in 2006, learning a split-finger fastball from Eddie Guardado and riding that pitch to becoming one of the game’s best closers. He repeated his dominance in 2007, but then lost velocity and effectiveness and spent a couple of years as a mediocre reliever. The White Sox fixed him up in 2010 and he’s been a quality closer ever since, though not without a few bumps in the road.
Rafael Betancourt, 2011: 62 IP, +1.8 WAR, +1.5 RA9-WAR
Betancourt’s monster season with the Indians in 2007 didn’t carry over into 2008, as he was nearly a replacement level reliever in the season immediately after his breakout. However, he rebounded nicely and returned to excellence in Colorado, consistently providing value out of the Rockies bullpen.
Of the 13 pitchers on the list, three went on to have sustained success over a long period that would easily have justified a similar deal to what the Braves just gave Kimbrel. If he follows in the path of Rivera, Nathan, or Papelbon, this will turn out just fine for Atlanta.
The other 10 names are a pretty big mixed bag, though. There are some pitchers who were still productive four years out from their +3 WAR season, but many of them didn’t do so well in between, and going year to year likely would have been cheaper than buying out their next four years with a long term deal. For these 10, I think the general consensus would be that a long term deal in the immediate aftermath of their +3 WAR season wouldn’t have worked out that well for the team overall.
However, it must be noted that Kimbrel’s track record is far superior to the ones we’re looking at here. He’s not Gabe White, a career mediocrity who had one great year. Even guys like K-Rod or Lidge weren’t as good as Kimbrel is now. Kimbrel has further to fall than the rest, and could decline a lot while still remaining an excellent pitcher. In that way, he’s not that different from Papelbon, who is worse than he was but still quite good.
Is this a risk for the Braves? Absolutely, and I’m not entirely sure that the upside of potentially having him around for one or two extra seasons at $13 million per year is worth the extra money they guaranteed him going forward, but it should also be clear that this isn’t an obvious mistake. As much as relievers are fickle, a significant portion do sustain success for long periods of time, and Kimbrel is good enough that he can get worse and still be worth $13 million in 2017 dollars.
Like the Freeman deal, there’s an argument to be made that perhaps this deal costs Atlanta too much without providing a ton of upside, but like the Freeman deal, the Braves have ensured that they get to keep a high quality talent through his 20s without having to commit to his 30s. Every long term deal has a risk, but the Braves are taking risks on player’s prime years, and that’s a strategy I can’t argue against too strongly.
In his career, opposing batters have posted a .212 wOBA against Craig Kimbrel. That’s 40 points better than Aroldis Chapman‘s .253 wOBA against, and Chapman is probably the only guy who one might think could challenge Kimbrel for the most dominating title. Kimbrel has been essentially the perfect closer, putting up some of the best relief pitcher seasons in baseball history, since he debuted back in 2010. And yet I still wonder whether or not the Braves really needed to sign this contract.
The Braves already owned Kimbrel’s rights for 2014 through 2016, and the prices they guaranteed him for his arbitration years aren’t such a steep discount that the deal could be considered a wise investment just on the basis of maybe saving a few million dollars for the next couple of seasons. For the Braves, the value in this deal comes in buying out his 2017 and maybe his 2018 free agent years, and those seasons will now $13 million apiece. That’s a season or two extra that they wouldn’t have been able to control without giving him a long term deal that pushed into his 30s, so even if the salary portion doesn’t look so great, there’s a benefit to adding just one or two seasons extra rather than having to commit to another three or four years after his arbitration seasons are up.
But how likely is it that the Braves will still want to pay Kimbrel $13 million four years from now? It’s no secret that the shelf life of relief pitchers is shorter than players at other positions, and Kimbrel would hardly be the first dominant reliever to show up, dominate for a while, and then hang around as a shell of what he once was. Can we really forecast, right now, that Kimbrel will still be one of the best relievers in baseball in 2017?
For reference, here is a list of every pitcher who posted a +3 WAR season out of the bullpen from 2000 to 2009.
Season Name IP BB% K% HR/9 BABIP LOB% ERA- FIP- WAR RA9-WAR
2003 Eric Gagne 82.1 5% 36% 0.22 0.243 84% 51 44 4.4 3.5
2004 Francisco Rodriguez 84.0 10% 37% 0.21 0.278 78% 41 39 3.8 3.5
2004 Brad Lidge 94.2 8% 43% 0.76 0.292 88% 44 43 3.6 4.2
2007 Rafael Betancourt 79.1 3% 28% 0.45 0.240 86% 33 52 3.5 4.5
2006 J.J. Putz 78.1 4% 34% 0.46 0.306 79% 52 40 3.4 3.3
2006 Jonathan Papelbon 68.1 5% 29% 0.40 0.224 92% 20 46 3.4 4.8
2004 B.J. Ryan 87.0 10% 34% 0.41 0.302 81% 50 48 3.3 3.3
2002 Eric Gagne 82.1 7% 45% 0.66 0.278 85% 30 20 3.3 4.3
2008 Mariano Rivera 70.2 4% 27% 0.51 0.218 88% 53 53 3.3 3.2
2004 Eric Gagne 82.1 7% 35% 0.55 0.267 77% 53 47 3.2 2.8
2000 Gabe White 84.0 5% 26% 0.64 0.262 80% 42 47 3.2 3.8
2004 Joe Nathan 72.1 6% 36% 0.37 0.269 86% 35 39 3.2 3.5
2006 Joe Nathan 68.1 8% 31% 0.40 0.238 85% 35 49 3.2 3.9
2001 Mariano Rivera 80.2 6% 26% 0.56 0.268 75% 32 51 3.2 3.6
2001 Octavio Dotel 84.0 10% 38% 0.32 0.301 80% 43 37 3.1 3.0
2002 Robb Nen 73.2 7% 27% 0.24 0.315 80% 56 48 3.1 2.9
2006 Takashi Saito 78.1 8% 35% 0.34 0.268 79% 47 42 3.1 3.1
2008 Jonathan Papelbon 69.1 3% 28% 0.52 0.293 70% 52 45 3.0 2.1
2005 Mariano Rivera 78.1 2% 30% 0.23 0.238 78% 32 47 3.0 4.2
19 pitcher seasons, but only 13 pitchers, as guys like Gagne, Rivera, and Papelbon all had multiple +3 WAR seasons during the first decade of the 21st century. So let’s look at those 13 guys, and see how effective they were in their fourth season after the year indicated above, to see how well they were able to sustain their dominance over the long term. In chronological order:
Gabe White, 2004: 60 IP, -0.4 WAR, -1.3 RA9/WAR
White’s 2000 season looks like one of the great flukes in baseball history, as he accumulated 75% of his career WAR total in that one season. He’d been pretty mediocre to that point, and then returned to mediocrity immediately afterwards, posting a below replacement level season in 2001. He did have one more solid season in 2002, but but he was out of baseball by 2005. A one year spike guy is probably not a great comparison for Kimbrel, but White is a nice reminder that even mediocre pitchers can look amazing for 70 or 80 innings.
Octavio Dotel, 2005: 15 IP, +0.0 WAR, +0.5 RA9-WAR
Dotel followed up his terrific 2001 season with another great year in 2002 and then two solid years in 2003/2004, remaining of the game’s best relief arms for three years after his best season. But then he got hurt, only pitching a combined 25 innings in 2005 and 2006, and eventually returned as a good-not-great setup guy who had value but wasn’t what he was before.
Mariano Rivera, 2005: 78 IP, +3.0 WAR, +3.6 RA9-WAR
You don’t need much information here. Mo was consistently amazing, year in and year out, and could probably still be one of the best closers in baseball today. The ultimate example of a closer having a long, successful career.
Eric Gagne, 2006: 2 IP, +0.0 WAR, +0.0 RA9-WAR
Gagne is the closest thing we have to a match for Kimbrel, as he destroyed opposing hitters from 2002-2004, posting +3 WAR seasons in each of those three years. And then he fell apart in 2005, missed almost the entire 2006 season, and had only a brief and moderately successful return to the majors in 2007. Perhaps Gagne’s previous work as a starter caught up to him, or his workloads as a reliever finally were too much, but Gagne is the yin to Rivera’s yang, and is a reminder of the risk of betting big on even the very best relievers.
Robb Nen, 2006: Forcibly retired by injury
Nen’s last pitch of his dominant 2002 season turned out to be his last. He tried to help the Giants win a World Series with an arm that needed surgery, and it ended his career. He finally retired in 2005 after several years of rehab.
Joe Nathan, 2008: 68 IP, +2.0 WAR, +3.6 RA9-WAR
Nathan had a great six year run as a dominant closer for the Twins, and is a template for how this deal could work out well for Atlanta. He was still nearly as good in 2008 as he was in 2004, and then continued to pitch well in 2009 as well. Even after an injury in 2010, he’s still pitching well, and hasn’t yet succumbed to age or injuries.
Francisco Rodriguez, 2008: 68 IP, +1.7 WAR, +2.7 RA9-WAR
Rodriguez is often used as a comparison for Kimbrel because he was so good at such a young age, posting his +3 WAR season at age-22, and then establishing himself as a dominant closer in his early-to-mid 20s. By the time he got near free agency, he had declined to good reliever instead of a great one, so the Angels wisely let him go. While he’s never totally imploded, his late-20s and early-30s have been nothing like what he was in his younger days.
Brad Lidge, 2008: 69 IP, +2.2 WAR, +2.7 RA9-WAR
Lidge was up-and-down after his monster 2004 season, mixing in a couple of great years with a couple of mediocre ones, though 2008 was again one of his better seasons, and he provided a lot of value for the Phillies in his first year there. From there, though, it was mostly downhill, and Lidge’s contract with the Phillies proved to be a mistake.
B.J. Ryan, 2008: 59 IP, +0.9 WAR, +1.5 RA9-WAR
Ryan followed up his dominant 2004 season with two more great years before blowing out his arm. He was good but not great in his return, and that only lasted a year, as he was out of baseball after 2009. He had a great three or four year run, but that’s essentially what his career amounted to.
Jonathan Papelbon, 2010: +1.2 WAR, +0.4 RA9-WAR
Papelbon was excellent for almost his entire tenure in Boston, and sustained most of his success for the next three years after his dominant 2006 season. 2010 was a down year, but he bounced back with a great 2011 season, and while the Phillies certanily overpaid him, he’s a check mark in the positive category for Kimbrel, as he’s been pretty consistently good ever since his debut.
Takashi Saito, 2010: 54 IP, +1.4 WAR, +0.8 RA9-WAR
Saito never repeated his remarkable rookie season, but then again, he was 36 when he came over to the U.S., so this isn’t really much of a comparison for Kimbrel, and I don’t think we can say too much about the fact that he had turned into just a good setup man at age-40.
J.J. Putz, 2010: 54 IP, +1.4 WAR, +1.3 RA9-WAR
Putz broke out in a huge way in 2006, learning a split-finger fastball from Eddie Guardado and riding that pitch to becoming one of the game’s best closers. He repeated his dominance in 2007, but then lost velocity and effectiveness and spent a couple of years as a mediocre reliever. The White Sox fixed him up in 2010 and he’s been a quality closer ever since, though not without a few bumps in the road.
Rafael Betancourt, 2011: 62 IP, +1.8 WAR, +1.5 RA9-WAR
Betancourt’s monster season with the Indians in 2007 didn’t carry over into 2008, as he was nearly a replacement level reliever in the season immediately after his breakout. However, he rebounded nicely and returned to excellence in Colorado, consistently providing value out of the Rockies bullpen.
Of the 13 pitchers on the list, three went on to have sustained success over a long period that would easily have justified a similar deal to what the Braves just gave Kimbrel. If he follows in the path of Rivera, Nathan, or Papelbon, this will turn out just fine for Atlanta.
The other 10 names are a pretty big mixed bag, though. There are some pitchers who were still productive four years out from their +3 WAR season, but many of them didn’t do so well in between, and going year to year likely would have been cheaper than buying out their next four years with a long term deal. For these 10, I think the general consensus would be that a long term deal in the immediate aftermath of their +3 WAR season wouldn’t have worked out that well for the team overall.
However, it must be noted that Kimbrel’s track record is far superior to the ones we’re looking at here. He’s not Gabe White, a career mediocrity who had one great year. Even guys like K-Rod or Lidge weren’t as good as Kimbrel is now. Kimbrel has further to fall than the rest, and could decline a lot while still remaining an excellent pitcher. In that way, he’s not that different from Papelbon, who is worse than he was but still quite good.
Is this a risk for the Braves? Absolutely, and I’m not entirely sure that the upside of potentially having him around for one or two extra seasons at $13 million per year is worth the extra money they guaranteed him going forward, but it should also be clear that this isn’t an obvious mistake. As much as relievers are fickle, a significant portion do sustain success for long periods of time, and Kimbrel is good enough that he can get worse and still be worth $13 million in 2017 dollars.
Like the Freeman deal, there’s an argument to be made that perhaps this deal costs Atlanta too much without providing a ton of upside, but like the Freeman deal, the Braves have ensured that they get to keep a high quality talent through his 20s without having to commit to his 30s. Every long term deal has a risk, but the Braves are taking risks on player’s prime years, and that’s a strategy I can’t argue against too strongly.
Michael Pineda And Trying To Make It Back.
If the last few days of baseball have taught us anything, it’s that the world’s most talented players don’t always receive enough cooperation from their bodies to stay on the field long enough to get the job done. We saw that this weekend when Mark Mulder’s torn Achilles sadly cut short his comeback before it could even begin, and we saw it late last week when Franklin Gutierrez announced he’d be sitting out 2014 due to a recurrence of the intestinal issues that have plagued him for years. If it feels like it’s only a matter of time until we hear about Grady Sizemore’s next injury, well, it probably is.
For the last two years, Michael Pineda has been on that list too. In the 25 months since Seattle traded him to the Yankees as part of a deal for Jesus Montero, Pineda has thrown as many big league pitches as you or I have: zero. He has spent zero days on the active 25-man roster, thanks to a torn shoulder labrum suffered in his first camp with the team, an injury often known as a career killer for pitchers. Considering that Montero is now a Triple-A first baseman, Hector Noesi has been sub-replacement for Seattle, and Jose Campos has been injured and yet to get out of Low-A for the Yankees, this is perhaps the best definition of a lose/lose trade in recent baseball history.
You knew all that, but what’s interesting now is that nearly two-and-a-half years after he last pitched in the bigs, Pineda claims he is “100 percent healthy,” and prepared to battle the likes of Vidal Nuno, Adam Warren and David Phelps for the final spot in the Yankee rotation. With how much uncertainty is ahead of that final group in New York — Masahiro Tanaka is an unknown until he proves he isn’t, Hiroki Kuroda is 39 and CC Sabathia’s 2013 struggles have been well-documented — any boost Pineda can offer at this point will be quite welcome.
We don’t know if he’ll even make it through the spring healthy, much less show enough ability to get hitters out to prove to the Yankees they should let him back on a big league mound in a game that counts. (He does still have a minor league option remaining.) But we do know this:
Pineda was briefly very, very good, and
Very few pitchers have successfully made it back from labrum tears
Remember, for that one season in 2011, Pineda was outstanding. As a 22-year-old rookie, he didn’t look at all out of place alongside Felix Hernandez at the top of Seattle rotation. Among the 94 qualified starters that year, Pineda’s strikeout percentage of 24.9 was better than all but five others, right between Justin Verlander and Tim Lincecum, back when Lincecum was still a stud. He was so good that year that when Seattle flipped him for Montero — who was of course still highly-regarded himself — it was arguably a deal tipped in the favor of the Yankees. 22-year-olds who can miss bats like that don’t come along very often (since the strike, only Kerry Wood, Rick Ankiel and Jose Fernandez had better K/9 marks as a rookie 22 or younger), and when they do, they don’t get traded. Over the last 100 years, exactly one rookie pitcher has thrown at least 150 innings with at least a strikeout per inning and fewer than three walks per nine: Pineda.
Pineda was once a guy who had a fastball that touched the mid-90s and a slider that could make the great Chipper Jones look like this:
Pineda threw the slider 857 times that year, and allowed a line against of just .175/.220/.294 off it when he did.
Of course, that’s all in the past now. After the trade, Pineda arrived at camp overweight before injuring his shoulder, and the history of labrum tears for pitchers is just awful. I was going to investigate just how awful, but I don’t need to — two years ago, my friend Jay Jaffe did just that in the wake of the original news about Pineda. At the time, Jaffe identified 67 pitchers who had similar injuries. (Though not necessarily identical, since every pitcher has their own unique concerns, and some were combined with other woes.) 20 of them never made it back to professional baseball, and several of the ones who made it back to the minors but not the bigs are the who’s-who of names you don’t want your young pitcher to be associated with, like Mark Prior and Brandon Webb. (We’re still waiting to see what becomes of more recent pitchers, like Danny Hultzen.) That said, it’s not impossible. Jaffe found 11 pitchers who had returned well enough to throw at least 400 innings (through 2011), and we’re talking about some big names there — Roger Clemens, Curt Schilling, Chris Carpenter and Anibal Sanchez among them, although as Jaffe noted, Clemens’ injury was slightly different from Pineda’s, and every shoulder injury is of course its own unique animal.
We don’t know what category Pineda will end up falling into, but he did manage to get back into 10 rehab games at three levels last summer, starting just over 13 months following surgery. At the risk of scouting a stat line, a 41/14 K/BB mark in 40.2 innings is certainly encouraging, as were June reports that he was getting his fastball back up to the mid-90s again. We can see how he looked in this clip from a June 25 start for Double-A Trenton against Erie, and while the quality of the competition can’t be ignored, we’re at least seeing some swing-and-misses:
Of course, Pineda left an August 2 start with “shoulder stiffness” and didn’t pitch again, which Brian Cashman explained away as letting Pineda rest after so many months of rehab, while also saying he “finished the year healthy.” Now Pineda is throwing in camp and we should see him on the mound in games in the next few weeks, with an early report from Buster Olney indicating that the Yankees are “quietly encouraged and excited” about Pineda’s velocity, though of course take that for what it’s worth.
Maybe he’s done, doomed to bounce around the minors for years trying to reclaim that past glory with a shoulder that won’t let it happen, although the fact that he didn’t injure his rotator cuff is a mark in his favor . Maybe he’s just done as a starter, and may prove more useful to the Yankees in short stints out of the bullpen. (Even when Pineda was flying high in 2011, the charge against him was that he was a two-pitch pitcher, with a valuable slider and fastball but a poor change.) Either way, Pineda is attempting to do something that very few pitchers have done successfully, and that’s interesting regardless of who is trying it. Considering how great Pineda was in that one healthy season, and how high-profile that failed (to date) trade was, he’s one of the more fascinating stories of the spring, no matter whether you support the Yankees or not.
For the last two years, Michael Pineda has been on that list too. In the 25 months since Seattle traded him to the Yankees as part of a deal for Jesus Montero, Pineda has thrown as many big league pitches as you or I have: zero. He has spent zero days on the active 25-man roster, thanks to a torn shoulder labrum suffered in his first camp with the team, an injury often known as a career killer for pitchers. Considering that Montero is now a Triple-A first baseman, Hector Noesi has been sub-replacement for Seattle, and Jose Campos has been injured and yet to get out of Low-A for the Yankees, this is perhaps the best definition of a lose/lose trade in recent baseball history.
You knew all that, but what’s interesting now is that nearly two-and-a-half years after he last pitched in the bigs, Pineda claims he is “100 percent healthy,” and prepared to battle the likes of Vidal Nuno, Adam Warren and David Phelps for the final spot in the Yankee rotation. With how much uncertainty is ahead of that final group in New York — Masahiro Tanaka is an unknown until he proves he isn’t, Hiroki Kuroda is 39 and CC Sabathia’s 2013 struggles have been well-documented — any boost Pineda can offer at this point will be quite welcome.
We don’t know if he’ll even make it through the spring healthy, much less show enough ability to get hitters out to prove to the Yankees they should let him back on a big league mound in a game that counts. (He does still have a minor league option remaining.) But we do know this:
Pineda was briefly very, very good, and
Very few pitchers have successfully made it back from labrum tears
Remember, for that one season in 2011, Pineda was outstanding. As a 22-year-old rookie, he didn’t look at all out of place alongside Felix Hernandez at the top of Seattle rotation. Among the 94 qualified starters that year, Pineda’s strikeout percentage of 24.9 was better than all but five others, right between Justin Verlander and Tim Lincecum, back when Lincecum was still a stud. He was so good that year that when Seattle flipped him for Montero — who was of course still highly-regarded himself — it was arguably a deal tipped in the favor of the Yankees. 22-year-olds who can miss bats like that don’t come along very often (since the strike, only Kerry Wood, Rick Ankiel and Jose Fernandez had better K/9 marks as a rookie 22 or younger), and when they do, they don’t get traded. Over the last 100 years, exactly one rookie pitcher has thrown at least 150 innings with at least a strikeout per inning and fewer than three walks per nine: Pineda.
Pineda was once a guy who had a fastball that touched the mid-90s and a slider that could make the great Chipper Jones look like this:
Pineda threw the slider 857 times that year, and allowed a line against of just .175/.220/.294 off it when he did.
Of course, that’s all in the past now. After the trade, Pineda arrived at camp overweight before injuring his shoulder, and the history of labrum tears for pitchers is just awful. I was going to investigate just how awful, but I don’t need to — two years ago, my friend Jay Jaffe did just that in the wake of the original news about Pineda. At the time, Jaffe identified 67 pitchers who had similar injuries. (Though not necessarily identical, since every pitcher has their own unique concerns, and some were combined with other woes.) 20 of them never made it back to professional baseball, and several of the ones who made it back to the minors but not the bigs are the who’s-who of names you don’t want your young pitcher to be associated with, like Mark Prior and Brandon Webb. (We’re still waiting to see what becomes of more recent pitchers, like Danny Hultzen.) That said, it’s not impossible. Jaffe found 11 pitchers who had returned well enough to throw at least 400 innings (through 2011), and we’re talking about some big names there — Roger Clemens, Curt Schilling, Chris Carpenter and Anibal Sanchez among them, although as Jaffe noted, Clemens’ injury was slightly different from Pineda’s, and every shoulder injury is of course its own unique animal.
We don’t know what category Pineda will end up falling into, but he did manage to get back into 10 rehab games at three levels last summer, starting just over 13 months following surgery. At the risk of scouting a stat line, a 41/14 K/BB mark in 40.2 innings is certainly encouraging, as were June reports that he was getting his fastball back up to the mid-90s again. We can see how he looked in this clip from a June 25 start for Double-A Trenton against Erie, and while the quality of the competition can’t be ignored, we’re at least seeing some swing-and-misses:
Of course, Pineda left an August 2 start with “shoulder stiffness” and didn’t pitch again, which Brian Cashman explained away as letting Pineda rest after so many months of rehab, while also saying he “finished the year healthy.” Now Pineda is throwing in camp and we should see him on the mound in games in the next few weeks, with an early report from Buster Olney indicating that the Yankees are “quietly encouraged and excited” about Pineda’s velocity, though of course take that for what it’s worth.
Maybe he’s done, doomed to bounce around the minors for years trying to reclaim that past glory with a shoulder that won’t let it happen, although the fact that he didn’t injure his rotator cuff is a mark in his favor . Maybe he’s just done as a starter, and may prove more useful to the Yankees in short stints out of the bullpen. (Even when Pineda was flying high in 2011, the charge against him was that he was a two-pitch pitcher, with a valuable slider and fastball but a poor change.) Either way, Pineda is attempting to do something that very few pitchers have done successfully, and that’s interesting regardless of who is trying it. Considering how great Pineda was in that one healthy season, and how high-profile that failed (to date) trade was, he’s one of the more fascinating stories of the spring, no matter whether you support the Yankees or not.
The Pitcher Who Did the Most With the Least.
I recently dreamed that I hit the comeback trail and was signed to a 10 day contract with a minor league team. With a combination of 77 mph cutters, sub-70′s change-ups, and more than a few knuckle balls, I parlayed my short contract to a major league roster spot. The dream ended, as dreams usually do, but it got me thinking about the minimum talent level necessary to pitch successfully in the majors.
When we analyze pitching talent, we’re mostly referring to a function of velocity, movement, command and control. There is a notable intangible that probably deserves mention. I’ll call it craftiness. Basically, the pitcher’s ability to out-think the hitter. Some pitchers seemingly can outperform the results that we might expect from their speed, movement, and location alone.
In my dream, I was a starting pitcher, so I’m going to take a look at starters only. This is easier, since relievers can have such small samples that the data might not fully reflect the player. I will also filter out relief appearances, since most pitchers are better in the pen and I want to compare apples to apples.
I’ll need to work within the PITCHf/x era. The FanGraphs leaderboard is a good starting place since it lets me filter by velocity and walks per nine. Walk rate isn’t a perfect proxy for command and control, but it’s probably good enough. The leaderboard doesn’t have a handy filter for movement, so I’ll head over to Brooksbaseball.net for that portion of the analysis.
I began with a list of all starter seasons with over 100 innings between 2008 and 2013. I then filtered for all pitchers with a velocity of 90 mph or less and a walk per nine rate above 3.75. That gave me a list of 23 players over 29 seasons. Four pitchers appeared twice and one appeared three times. You can access the initial list here.
The list contains a number of players who were spot starters, had terrible seasons, or otherwise didn’t get the job done. For example, Javier Vazquez had only one season in his career with a velocity under 90 mph and he barely surpassed my arbitrary walk rate cutoff. If you count relief appearances, then his walk rate was better than my cutoff. He also had a 5.32 ERA that year, so he’s off the list.
Garrett Olson never found success at the major league level. He’s out. The same goes for Jeremy Sowers, Brian Tallet, Brandon Backe, and Micah Owings. Jeff Suppan hasn’t been useful by any measure since 2007. Jonathan Sanchez has been terrible since his fastball dipped below 90 mph, so I’m going to cut him too. Kevin Correia and Dillon Gee appear on the list, but both pitchers have found recent success by trimming their walk rate down to about two walks per nine.
After manually filtering the players who don’t pass the smell test, we’re left with this list of 13 pitchers.
Season Name W L GS IP K/9 BB/9 HR/9 BABIP LOB% GB% HR/FB ERA FIP xFIP WAR
2012 Aaron Harang 10 10 31 179.2 6.56 4.26 0.7 0.277 72.3 % 38.6 % 6.3 % 3.61 4.14 4.95 1.6
2009 Aaron Laffey 6 8 19 109.1 4.12 4.36 0.74 0.32 70.0 % 48.8 % 7.4 % 4.53 4.76 5.16 1
2009 Barry Zito 10 13 33 192 7.22 3.8 0.98 0.285 75.0 % 37.9 % 9.5 % 4.03 4.31 4.4 2
2010 Barry Zito 9 13 33 198.1 6.81 3.77 0.91 0.277 72.0 % 36.1 % 7.5 % 4.13 4.24 4.56 1.7
2008 Barry Zito 10 17 32 180 6 5.1 0.8 0.295 65.7 % 36.4 % 6.8 % 5.15 4.72 5.28 1.2
2010 Carlos Zambrano 11 5 20 113 8.2 4.94 0.48 0.287 75.2 % 42.2 % 5.1 % 3.19 3.72 4.31 1.9
2012 Carlos Zambrano 5 9 20 115 6.5 5.24 0.7 0.268 68.7 % 48.7 % 9.2 % 4.54 4.68 4.91 0.6
2008 Chris Young 7 6 18 102.1 8.18 4.22 1.14 0.254 75.8 % 21.7 % 8.7 % 3.96 4.4 4.68 1
2008 Doug Davis 6 8 26 146 6.9 3.95 0.8 0.322 72.5 % 47.0 % 9.2 % 4.32 4.15 4.27 2.3
2009 Doug Davis 9 14 34 203.1 6.46 4.56 1.11 0.291 76.0 % 43.1 % 11.6 % 4.12 4.84 4.63 1.5
2013 Erik Bedard 3 11 26 134 8.73 4.43 1.07 0.317 70.3 % 35.6 % 9.2 % 4.77 4.27 4.48 1.5
2012 Erik Bedard 7 14 24 125.2 8.45 4.01 1 0.314 66.5 % 43.3 % 11.5 % 5.01 4.07 4.05 1.1
2008 Greg Smith 7 16 32 190.1 5.25 4.11 0.99 0.256 72.7 % 34.2 % 7.9 % 4.16 4.82 5.23 1.7
2013 Jake Westbrook 7 7 19 110.2 3.42 3.82 0.49 0.289 71.5 % 56.9 % 6.7 % 3.9 4.51 4.91 -0.1
2013 Jason Marquis 9 5 20 117.2 5.51 5.2 1.38 0.261 77.3 % 52.3 % 18.2 % 4.05 5.65 4.81 -1.6
2013 Ryan Dempster 8 9 29 168.2 8.32 4.16 1.39 0.296 71.8 % 40.9 % 14.0 % 4.64 4.7 4.2 1.2
2010 Tom Gorzelanny 7 9 23 130 7.75 4.29 0.69 0.316 70.5 % 40.8 % 6.6 % 4.22 3.83 4.26 2.1
2008 Tom Gorzelanny 6 9 21 105.1 5.72 5.98 1.71 0.301 68.7 % 40.3 % 13.2 % 6.66 6.35 5.77 -1.1
2013 Trevor Cahill 7 10 25 142.2 6.31 4.04 0.82 0.292 73.1 % 56.8 % 12.4 % 4.1 4.3 4.12 0.8
Let’s see which of these pitchers use movement to get the job done. Brooks Baseball has a handy comparison mode that can convert movement into a 20-80 scouting score. I’ll be looking for pitchers who don’t substantially exceed a 60 rating for any of their most frequently used pitches. I’m going to view each pitcher’s entire sample for the PITCHf/x era, so the movement data won’t correlate perfectly with the samples in question.
Chris Young‘s fastball has vertical movement that grades above 70 on the 20-80 scale. He uses the pitch over 70 percent of the time, so he’s disqualified. When viewing the initial list, I thought he would win this competition since he combines low velocity and middling control with good results. The only thing that kept him from appearing multiple times on the list were his frequent injuries.
Doug Davis is a fringe case, his fastball and change-up grade as slightly above 60, but he only used those pitches a combined 36 percent of the time. The cutter that he used 46 percent of the time had below average movement. Let’s keep him. The story is similar with Barry Zito.
Erik Bedard gets plenty of movement on multiple pitches. He’s disqualified despite appearing on the list twice. The same goes for Tom Gorzelanny. Surprisingly, Greg Smith also received some high grades for movement, so he’s out too. That leaves us with this final list of nine pitchers over 13 player seasons.
Season Name W L GS IP K/9 BB/9 HR/9 BABIP LOB% GB% HR/FB ERA FIP xFIP WAR
2012 Aaron Harang 10 10 31 179.2 6.56 4.26 0.7 0.277 72.3 % 38.6 % 6.3 % 3.61 4.14 4.95 1.6
2009 Aaron Laffey 6 8 19 109.1 4.12 4.36 0.74 0.32 70.0 % 48.8 % 7.4 % 4.53 4.76 5.16 1
2009 Barry Zito 10 13 33 192 7.22 3.8 0.98 0.285 75.0 % 37.9 % 9.5 % 4.03 4.31 4.4 2
2010 Barry Zito 9 13 33 198.1 6.81 3.77 0.91 0.277 72.0 % 36.1 % 7.5 % 4.13 4.24 4.56 1.7
2008 Barry Zito 10 17 32 180 6 5.1 0.8 0.295 65.7 % 36.4 % 6.8 % 5.15 4.72 5.28 1.2
2010 Carlos Zambrano 11 5 20 113 8.2 4.94 0.48 0.287 75.2 % 42.2 % 5.1 % 3.19 3.72 4.31 1.9
2012 Carlos Zambrano 5 9 20 115 6.5 5.24 0.7 0.268 68.7 % 48.7 % 9.2 % 4.54 4.68 4.91 0.6
2008 Doug Davis 6 8 26 146 6.9 3.95 0.8 0.322 72.5 % 47.0 % 9.2 % 4.32 4.15 4.27 2.3
2009 Doug Davis 9 14 34 203.1 6.46 4.56 1.11 0.291 76.0 % 43.1 % 11.6 % 4.12 4.84 4.63 1.5
2013 Jake Westbrook 7 7 19 110.2 3.42 3.82 0.49 0.289 71.5 % 56.9 % 6.7 % 3.9 4.51 4.91 -0.1
2013 Jason Marquis 9 5 20 117.2 5.51 5.2 1.38 0.261 77.3 % 52.3 % 18.2 % 4.05 5.65 4.81 -1.6
2013 Ryan Dempster 8 9 29 168.2 8.32 4.16 1.39 0.296 71.8 % 40.9 % 14.0 % 4.64 4.7 4.2 1.2
2013 Trevor Cahill 7 10 25 142.2 6.31 4.04 0.82 0.292 73.1 % 56.8 % 12.4 % 4.1 4.3 4.12 0.8
These are the pitchers who have accomplished the most success with the least amount of tangible skill. I don’t have an objective way to definitively state which pitcher accomplished the most with the least, but I think one pitcher does stand out as the victor.
Carlos Zambrano is right there at the top, having compiled 30 WAR and 37 RA9-WAR over his career. However, he probably should have been excluded for the same reason as Vazquez. The two seasons Zambrano appeared on this list happen to be the only two seasons where his fastball velocity dipped down to 90 mph.
The other guy at the top is also the pitcher who appeared the most – Zito. He’s compiled 31 WAR and 38 RA9-WAR over his career and may still have a couple passable seasons left in the tank. He does have decent movement on his pitches – he barely passed that particular test. His fastball has never exceeded 87 mph and his walk rate has never strayed below three walks per nine in any of his 14 big league seasons. Perhaps he was able to find some success despite the lack of stuff because he used five different pitches at a roughly uniform rate. His least used pitch, the change-up, was thrown 14.5 percent of the time while his four seam fastball was most frequently used at just 26.7 percent. I’m not surprised to find Zito as the victor. **** Mills, who ran an internet based pitch coaching service frequently used Zito in his examples for how to use tilts and sequences.
Honorable mention goes to Davis, who spun the same no velocity shell game as Zito but never got that huge payday. Davis took longer to establish himself in the majors than Zito and his best seasons were slightly worse than Zito’s. Otherwise, they’re very much cut from the same cloth.
You may have noticed that Trevor Cahill is the only young pitcher on the list. His velocity is barely under the 90 mph cutoff and his walk rate only exceeded 3.75 BB/9 in one of five major league seasons. I’m not sure if this says anything about teams, but it doesn’t look like there are any young Zito’s or Davis’s in the league these days.
When we analyze pitching talent, we’re mostly referring to a function of velocity, movement, command and control. There is a notable intangible that probably deserves mention. I’ll call it craftiness. Basically, the pitcher’s ability to out-think the hitter. Some pitchers seemingly can outperform the results that we might expect from their speed, movement, and location alone.
In my dream, I was a starting pitcher, so I’m going to take a look at starters only. This is easier, since relievers can have such small samples that the data might not fully reflect the player. I will also filter out relief appearances, since most pitchers are better in the pen and I want to compare apples to apples.
I’ll need to work within the PITCHf/x era. The FanGraphs leaderboard is a good starting place since it lets me filter by velocity and walks per nine. Walk rate isn’t a perfect proxy for command and control, but it’s probably good enough. The leaderboard doesn’t have a handy filter for movement, so I’ll head over to Brooksbaseball.net for that portion of the analysis.
I began with a list of all starter seasons with over 100 innings between 2008 and 2013. I then filtered for all pitchers with a velocity of 90 mph or less and a walk per nine rate above 3.75. That gave me a list of 23 players over 29 seasons. Four pitchers appeared twice and one appeared three times. You can access the initial list here.
The list contains a number of players who were spot starters, had terrible seasons, or otherwise didn’t get the job done. For example, Javier Vazquez had only one season in his career with a velocity under 90 mph and he barely surpassed my arbitrary walk rate cutoff. If you count relief appearances, then his walk rate was better than my cutoff. He also had a 5.32 ERA that year, so he’s off the list.
Garrett Olson never found success at the major league level. He’s out. The same goes for Jeremy Sowers, Brian Tallet, Brandon Backe, and Micah Owings. Jeff Suppan hasn’t been useful by any measure since 2007. Jonathan Sanchez has been terrible since his fastball dipped below 90 mph, so I’m going to cut him too. Kevin Correia and Dillon Gee appear on the list, but both pitchers have found recent success by trimming their walk rate down to about two walks per nine.
After manually filtering the players who don’t pass the smell test, we’re left with this list of 13 pitchers.
Season Name W L GS IP K/9 BB/9 HR/9 BABIP LOB% GB% HR/FB ERA FIP xFIP WAR
2012 Aaron Harang 10 10 31 179.2 6.56 4.26 0.7 0.277 72.3 % 38.6 % 6.3 % 3.61 4.14 4.95 1.6
2009 Aaron Laffey 6 8 19 109.1 4.12 4.36 0.74 0.32 70.0 % 48.8 % 7.4 % 4.53 4.76 5.16 1
2009 Barry Zito 10 13 33 192 7.22 3.8 0.98 0.285 75.0 % 37.9 % 9.5 % 4.03 4.31 4.4 2
2010 Barry Zito 9 13 33 198.1 6.81 3.77 0.91 0.277 72.0 % 36.1 % 7.5 % 4.13 4.24 4.56 1.7
2008 Barry Zito 10 17 32 180 6 5.1 0.8 0.295 65.7 % 36.4 % 6.8 % 5.15 4.72 5.28 1.2
2010 Carlos Zambrano 11 5 20 113 8.2 4.94 0.48 0.287 75.2 % 42.2 % 5.1 % 3.19 3.72 4.31 1.9
2012 Carlos Zambrano 5 9 20 115 6.5 5.24 0.7 0.268 68.7 % 48.7 % 9.2 % 4.54 4.68 4.91 0.6
2008 Chris Young 7 6 18 102.1 8.18 4.22 1.14 0.254 75.8 % 21.7 % 8.7 % 3.96 4.4 4.68 1
2008 Doug Davis 6 8 26 146 6.9 3.95 0.8 0.322 72.5 % 47.0 % 9.2 % 4.32 4.15 4.27 2.3
2009 Doug Davis 9 14 34 203.1 6.46 4.56 1.11 0.291 76.0 % 43.1 % 11.6 % 4.12 4.84 4.63 1.5
2013 Erik Bedard 3 11 26 134 8.73 4.43 1.07 0.317 70.3 % 35.6 % 9.2 % 4.77 4.27 4.48 1.5
2012 Erik Bedard 7 14 24 125.2 8.45 4.01 1 0.314 66.5 % 43.3 % 11.5 % 5.01 4.07 4.05 1.1
2008 Greg Smith 7 16 32 190.1 5.25 4.11 0.99 0.256 72.7 % 34.2 % 7.9 % 4.16 4.82 5.23 1.7
2013 Jake Westbrook 7 7 19 110.2 3.42 3.82 0.49 0.289 71.5 % 56.9 % 6.7 % 3.9 4.51 4.91 -0.1
2013 Jason Marquis 9 5 20 117.2 5.51 5.2 1.38 0.261 77.3 % 52.3 % 18.2 % 4.05 5.65 4.81 -1.6
2013 Ryan Dempster 8 9 29 168.2 8.32 4.16 1.39 0.296 71.8 % 40.9 % 14.0 % 4.64 4.7 4.2 1.2
2010 Tom Gorzelanny 7 9 23 130 7.75 4.29 0.69 0.316 70.5 % 40.8 % 6.6 % 4.22 3.83 4.26 2.1
2008 Tom Gorzelanny 6 9 21 105.1 5.72 5.98 1.71 0.301 68.7 % 40.3 % 13.2 % 6.66 6.35 5.77 -1.1
2013 Trevor Cahill 7 10 25 142.2 6.31 4.04 0.82 0.292 73.1 % 56.8 % 12.4 % 4.1 4.3 4.12 0.8
Let’s see which of these pitchers use movement to get the job done. Brooks Baseball has a handy comparison mode that can convert movement into a 20-80 scouting score. I’ll be looking for pitchers who don’t substantially exceed a 60 rating for any of their most frequently used pitches. I’m going to view each pitcher’s entire sample for the PITCHf/x era, so the movement data won’t correlate perfectly with the samples in question.
Chris Young‘s fastball has vertical movement that grades above 70 on the 20-80 scale. He uses the pitch over 70 percent of the time, so he’s disqualified. When viewing the initial list, I thought he would win this competition since he combines low velocity and middling control with good results. The only thing that kept him from appearing multiple times on the list were his frequent injuries.
Doug Davis is a fringe case, his fastball and change-up grade as slightly above 60, but he only used those pitches a combined 36 percent of the time. The cutter that he used 46 percent of the time had below average movement. Let’s keep him. The story is similar with Barry Zito.
Erik Bedard gets plenty of movement on multiple pitches. He’s disqualified despite appearing on the list twice. The same goes for Tom Gorzelanny. Surprisingly, Greg Smith also received some high grades for movement, so he’s out too. That leaves us with this final list of nine pitchers over 13 player seasons.
Season Name W L GS IP K/9 BB/9 HR/9 BABIP LOB% GB% HR/FB ERA FIP xFIP WAR
2012 Aaron Harang 10 10 31 179.2 6.56 4.26 0.7 0.277 72.3 % 38.6 % 6.3 % 3.61 4.14 4.95 1.6
2009 Aaron Laffey 6 8 19 109.1 4.12 4.36 0.74 0.32 70.0 % 48.8 % 7.4 % 4.53 4.76 5.16 1
2009 Barry Zito 10 13 33 192 7.22 3.8 0.98 0.285 75.0 % 37.9 % 9.5 % 4.03 4.31 4.4 2
2010 Barry Zito 9 13 33 198.1 6.81 3.77 0.91 0.277 72.0 % 36.1 % 7.5 % 4.13 4.24 4.56 1.7
2008 Barry Zito 10 17 32 180 6 5.1 0.8 0.295 65.7 % 36.4 % 6.8 % 5.15 4.72 5.28 1.2
2010 Carlos Zambrano 11 5 20 113 8.2 4.94 0.48 0.287 75.2 % 42.2 % 5.1 % 3.19 3.72 4.31 1.9
2012 Carlos Zambrano 5 9 20 115 6.5 5.24 0.7 0.268 68.7 % 48.7 % 9.2 % 4.54 4.68 4.91 0.6
2008 Doug Davis 6 8 26 146 6.9 3.95 0.8 0.322 72.5 % 47.0 % 9.2 % 4.32 4.15 4.27 2.3
2009 Doug Davis 9 14 34 203.1 6.46 4.56 1.11 0.291 76.0 % 43.1 % 11.6 % 4.12 4.84 4.63 1.5
2013 Jake Westbrook 7 7 19 110.2 3.42 3.82 0.49 0.289 71.5 % 56.9 % 6.7 % 3.9 4.51 4.91 -0.1
2013 Jason Marquis 9 5 20 117.2 5.51 5.2 1.38 0.261 77.3 % 52.3 % 18.2 % 4.05 5.65 4.81 -1.6
2013 Ryan Dempster 8 9 29 168.2 8.32 4.16 1.39 0.296 71.8 % 40.9 % 14.0 % 4.64 4.7 4.2 1.2
2013 Trevor Cahill 7 10 25 142.2 6.31 4.04 0.82 0.292 73.1 % 56.8 % 12.4 % 4.1 4.3 4.12 0.8
These are the pitchers who have accomplished the most success with the least amount of tangible skill. I don’t have an objective way to definitively state which pitcher accomplished the most with the least, but I think one pitcher does stand out as the victor.
Carlos Zambrano is right there at the top, having compiled 30 WAR and 37 RA9-WAR over his career. However, he probably should have been excluded for the same reason as Vazquez. The two seasons Zambrano appeared on this list happen to be the only two seasons where his fastball velocity dipped down to 90 mph.
The other guy at the top is also the pitcher who appeared the most – Zito. He’s compiled 31 WAR and 38 RA9-WAR over his career and may still have a couple passable seasons left in the tank. He does have decent movement on his pitches – he barely passed that particular test. His fastball has never exceeded 87 mph and his walk rate has never strayed below three walks per nine in any of his 14 big league seasons. Perhaps he was able to find some success despite the lack of stuff because he used five different pitches at a roughly uniform rate. His least used pitch, the change-up, was thrown 14.5 percent of the time while his four seam fastball was most frequently used at just 26.7 percent. I’m not surprised to find Zito as the victor. **** Mills, who ran an internet based pitch coaching service frequently used Zito in his examples for how to use tilts and sequences.
Honorable mention goes to Davis, who spun the same no velocity shell game as Zito but never got that huge payday. Davis took longer to establish himself in the majors than Zito and his best seasons were slightly worse than Zito’s. Otherwise, they’re very much cut from the same cloth.
You may have noticed that Trevor Cahill is the only young pitcher on the list. His velocity is barely under the 90 mph cutoff and his walk rate only exceeded 3.75 BB/9 in one of five major league seasons. I’m not sure if this says anything about teams, but it doesn’t look like there are any young Zito’s or Davis’s in the league these days.
GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
- 6,596
- 2,147
7 years 58 mil for simmons
- 1,227
- 92
It was really dirty of them. But thats the sort of shady, vindictive thing to expect from a front office thats definitely on the hot seat.
- 827
- 75
Andrelton Simmons 7 year deal 
he had a great season last year it was the right move.
he had a great season last year it was the right move.
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- 2,957
Balfour's truck.
He thinks he's still fighting nature in Australia.
GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
- 6,596
- 2,147
That explains a lot about his personality
- 7,842
- 4,878
LOS ANGELES -- Two men pleaded guilty Thursday to a 2011 beating at Dodger Stadium that left San Francisco Giants fan Bryan Stow brain damaged and disabled.
Defendant Marvin Norwood pleaded guilty to one count of assault likely to produce great bodily injury. Defendant Louie Sanchez, saying he kicked and punched Stow, pleaded guilty to one count of mayhem that disabled and disfigured the victim.
Judge George Lomeli excoriated a smirking Sanchez and handed him an eight-year state prison term, with some credit for time served. Norwood received a four-year sentence and credit for time served.
Stow, a 45-year-old paramedic from Santa Cruz who attended the 2011 Opening Day game in Los Angeles between the Dodgers and Giants, was beaten nearly to death in a parking lot after the game. He requires 24-hour-a-day care. The beating prompted public outrage and led to increased security at Dodgers games. A civil suit by Stow is pending against the Dodgers franchise and former owner Frank McCourt.
Sanchez and Norwood were arrested after a lengthy manhunt that briefly involved the arrest of an innocent man. The two acknowledged their involvement during a series of secretly recorded jailhouse conversations.
Witnesses testified about the parking lot confrontation, saying Stow was jumped from behind and his head crashed to the pavement.
Last spring, Stow returned home after two years in hospitals and rehabilitation centers. His family said he requires constant physical therapy and remains severely disabled.
Defendant Marvin Norwood pleaded guilty to one count of assault likely to produce great bodily injury. Defendant Louie Sanchez, saying he kicked and punched Stow, pleaded guilty to one count of mayhem that disabled and disfigured the victim.
Judge George Lomeli excoriated a smirking Sanchez and handed him an eight-year state prison term, with some credit for time served. Norwood received a four-year sentence and credit for time served.
Stow, a 45-year-old paramedic from Santa Cruz who attended the 2011 Opening Day game in Los Angeles between the Dodgers and Giants, was beaten nearly to death in a parking lot after the game. He requires 24-hour-a-day care. The beating prompted public outrage and led to increased security at Dodgers games. A civil suit by Stow is pending against the Dodgers franchise and former owner Frank McCourt.
Sanchez and Norwood were arrested after a lengthy manhunt that briefly involved the arrest of an innocent man. The two acknowledged their involvement during a series of secretly recorded jailhouse conversations.
Witnesses testified about the parking lot confrontation, saying Stow was jumped from behind and his head crashed to the pavement.
Last spring, Stow returned home after two years in hospitals and rehabilitation centers. His family said he requires constant physical therapy and remains severely disabled.
- 21,784
- 2,957
BIG NEWS:
Ninth Circuit court trial between San Jose and MLB has been expedited. Oral briefing will be conducted in March. Oral arguments likely in the summer. A decision will be rendered late this year.
What this means is that MLB's anti trust exemption is going to be tried in court THIS year. No more delay.
Wow.
Ninth Circuit court trial between San Jose and MLB has been expedited. Oral briefing will be conducted in March. Oral arguments likely in the summer. A decision will be rendered late this year.
What this means is that MLB's anti trust exemption is going to be tried in court THIS year. No more delay.
Wow.
Last edited:
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Amaro and the team are already feeling the heat for this from agents. One agent said, "As of today, Phillies are out. Phillies are not getting into any more of our households. We're shutting down all communications."
And on the Stow case, they beat a guy up and make him brain dead and all they get is 8 years and 4 years.
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Makes me so sad for humanity, I don't understand how people can be like this.
GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
- 6,596
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1 year 8 mil for Cruz.
C'mon billy, I know we could have offered that.
C'mon billy, I know we could have offered that.
lightweight champion
Banned
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And have him platoon with Reddick? I wouldn't want that, not for $8 million at least.
GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
- 6,596
- 2,147
DH?
GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
- 6,596
- 2,147
I don't think he is great, but I still feel is a solid bat and for a one year deal, I would have taken a shot.
Hope you are right though.
Hope you are right though.
- Status
