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Sanchez is headed to Cleveland if they sign Pujols.
Book it.
Book it.
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
- Start date
- Status
- 10,371
- 653
Sanchez is headed to Cleveland if they sign Pujols.
Book it.
Book it.
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- 653
Heyman just tweeted that the Marlins offered him ten years...
I am obviously rooting for it to happen because I think the Sanchez to Cleveland idea is very plausible, but that's awesome for comedic purposes alone.
I am obviously rooting for it to happen because I think the Sanchez to Cleveland idea is very plausible, but that's awesome for comedic purposes alone.
- 10,371
- 653
Heyman just tweeted that the Marlins offered him ten years...
I am obviously rooting for it to happen because I think the Sanchez to Cleveland idea is very plausible, but that's awesome for comedic purposes alone.
I am obviously rooting for it to happen because I think the Sanchez to Cleveland idea is very plausible, but that's awesome for comedic purposes alone.
- 23,405
- 5,511
The Marlins are idiots of that's true
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The Marlins are idiots of that's true
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Wow. Clearly a case of having more money than good sense. If true, they'll be quite lucky if he performs at an elite level for half that contract.
Side note: Heyman has zero journalistic integrity. Just another Boras tool.
Side note: Heyman has zero journalistic integrity. Just another Boras tool.
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- 141
Wow. Clearly a case of having more money than good sense. If true, they'll be quite lucky if he performs at an elite level for half that contract.
Side note: Heyman has zero journalistic integrity. Just another Boras tool.
Side note: Heyman has zero journalistic integrity. Just another Boras tool.
Originally Posted by Periwinkle
Marlins are going to be stacked if they get Pujols. Reyes, Ramirez, Stanton, Pujols, Sanchez, Bonifacioall that speed and power.
No way they keep Sanchez, he can't play anywhere else but first base. And I still think Hanley's year last season is more because of him declining than just a fluke. Who knows. I'd love to see them wrap Stanton up with a Upton-esque type of contract. This is A-Rod to the Rangers all over again.
Kev, always thought if you needed a 1B that Alonso would be a perfect fit.
Originally Posted by Periwinkle
Marlins are going to be stacked if they get Pujols. Reyes, Ramirez, Stanton, Pujols, Sanchez, Bonifacioall that speed and power.
No way they keep Sanchez, he can't play anywhere else but first base. And I still think Hanley's year last season is more because of him declining than just a fluke. Who knows. I'd love to see them wrap Stanton up with a Upton-esque type of contract. This is A-Rod to the Rangers all over again.
Kev, always thought if you needed a 1B that Alonso would be a perfect fit.
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As a fish fan I do not want pujols
- 706
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As a fish fan I do not want pujols
- 706
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As a fish fan I do not want pujols
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As a fish fan I do not want pujols
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12:37 p.m. ET
FoxSports' Ken Rosenthal tweets that sources tell him the Marlins will not completely relent on a no-trade clause for Albert Pujols. A compromise is possible, tweets Rosenthal, but Pujols will want a significant deterrent.
Read more: http://sportsillustrated....index.html#ixzz1fmIF5kgN
FoxSports' Ken Rosenthal tweets that sources tell him the Marlins will not completely relent on a no-trade clause for Albert Pujols. A compromise is possible, tweets Rosenthal, but Pujols will want a significant deterrent.
Read more: http://sportsillustrated....index.html#ixzz1fmIF5kgN
- 761
- 109
12:37 p.m. ET
FoxSports' Ken Rosenthal tweets that sources tell him the Marlins will not completely relent on a no-trade clause for Albert Pujols. A compromise is possible, tweets Rosenthal, but Pujols will want a significant deterrent.
Read more: http://sportsillustrated....index.html#ixzz1fmIF5kgN
FoxSports' Ken Rosenthal tweets that sources tell him the Marlins will not completely relent on a no-trade clause for Albert Pujols. A compromise is possible, tweets Rosenthal, but Pujols will want a significant deterrent.
Read more: http://sportsillustrated....index.html#ixzz1fmIF5kgN
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Pujols wanted 10 years and Miami is offering it up, adios Albert.
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Pujols wanted 10 years and Miami is offering it up, adios Albert.
Pujols, Age and the Midwest League.
Hanley Ramirez not likely to succeed at third base.
Hideki Matsui, projecting 2012.
Spoiler [+]
Down here in Dallas, speculation about Albert Pujols‘ future has hit a fever pitch. The Marlins have apparently offered a 10 year contract, and are pushing for a decision in the not too distant future. You’ll probably be reading a lot more about Pujols in next few days.
But, for now, I want to address one lingering question about him that hangs over the question of how many years is too many years for a guy in his early thirties, and that’s whether we should buy into the speculation that Pujols fudged his birthday and is actually older than he claims. This rumor has been around forever, as Pujols didn’t look anything like a 21-year-old when he broke into the game back in 2001. If you combine his appearance and his early development into one of the game’s best hitters with a somewhat unorthodox background, you have a prime recipe for age-related speculation.
I see two significant problems that prevent me from buying into the speculation, however.
First, there’s simply the matter of incentives. International prospects have historically hidden their actual birth dates from MLB organizations in order to extract larger signing bonuses, as teams will pay a lot more for a projectable 16-year-old than a similarly skilled player who is already 18 or 19. In many cases, the players who misrepresented their age gained hundreds of thousands of dollars in bonus money that they wouldn’t have otherwise received, so the financial incentive to lie was remarkably high, especially considering the standard of living in many of the countries where these prospects are being scouted.
Pujols’ situation was remarkably different, however. His incentive to lie about his age after arriving in the United States was not to receive significant financial gain, but instead to qualify for high school baseball. He spent two years playing for Fort Osage High in Independence, Missouri, and then went on to spend a year at Maple Woods Community College – presumably, if Pujols was a few years older than he’s led everyone to believe, he wouldn’t have been able to do any of those things, and lost out on three years of baseball development.
However, it’s not like that deception led to financial riches for Pujols. As you’re almost certainly aware, the Cardinals took him in the 13th round of the 2000 draft and offered him $10,000 to sign, only upping that to $60,000 after an impressive performance in the JayHawk Summer League. If we believe that Pujols was several years older than he claims, he essentially delayed his entry into professional baseball by three years for a final payoff of $20,000 per year, which wasn’t guaranteed to begin with. From a financial perspective, he actually could have done better by just getting a job and playing independent league ball in his spare time.
If Pujols did lie about his age, it didn’t result in any kind of financial benefit, and it delayed his entry into professional baseball. From a motivational standpoint, it’s hard to see why Pujols would choose to take that path.
Beyond just the incentive issue, however, there’s an issue of his performance in the Midwest League in 2000. If you assume that Pujols is several years older than he claims, then you believe that he spent his one minor league season in low-A ball playing at age 22 or 23, facing pitchers that are three or four years younger and far inferior in terms of stage of development. In general, a player who is already in his early twenties and is still in the Midwest League is behind the development curve, and needs to demolish his competition and force the organization to promote him rapidly.
Pujols was the best prospect in the Midwest League in 2000, but his .324/.389/.565 line wasn’t historically dominating or anything – Austin Kearns hit .306/.415/.558 as a known 20-year-old that same year in that same league, for instance. Pujols managed just 17 home runs in 109 games, in fact, and then dropped off to just .284/.341/.481 in 21 games after a late-season promotion to high-A ball. This was not the performance of a man-child destroying inferior competition – it was right in line with what other good prospects had achieved at similar stages of their career against similar competition.
That Pujols hit .329/.403/.610 in 2001 often causes people to believe that he was well ahead of the normal development curve, but in reality, if Pujols is several years older than he claims, then his minor league performance (relative to his level of competition) didn’t suggest stardom at all. In fact, it would have suggested that he was an inferior prospect to a guy like Hee-Seop Choi, who had put up better numbers in the Midwest League the year before.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Pujols is one of the great hitters in the history of the sport. It strains credibility to suggest that one of the all-time greats could get sent to the lowest level of full-season minor league baseball in his prime and still get outhit by Austin Kearns. In fact, in looking at Pujols’ power development between 2000 and 2001, the much more logical explanation for the explosion is that he actually was 20-years-old and got naturally stronger, which is a pretty common observation with players of that age.
Could Pujols be older than he claims? Sure – none of this is definitive. However, considering the general lack of evidence supporting the rumors, the fact that there’s also any real lack of incentive for Pujols to lie about his age and the fact that his minor league performance makes more sense if he didn’t lie about his age, I find it hard to come down on the side of fraud here. The whispers and innuendo will always be there, but in terms of facts, I just don’t see many to suggest that Pujols is actually older than he claims.
But, for now, I want to address one lingering question about him that hangs over the question of how many years is too many years for a guy in his early thirties, and that’s whether we should buy into the speculation that Pujols fudged his birthday and is actually older than he claims. This rumor has been around forever, as Pujols didn’t look anything like a 21-year-old when he broke into the game back in 2001. If you combine his appearance and his early development into one of the game’s best hitters with a somewhat unorthodox background, you have a prime recipe for age-related speculation.
I see two significant problems that prevent me from buying into the speculation, however.
First, there’s simply the matter of incentives. International prospects have historically hidden their actual birth dates from MLB organizations in order to extract larger signing bonuses, as teams will pay a lot more for a projectable 16-year-old than a similarly skilled player who is already 18 or 19. In many cases, the players who misrepresented their age gained hundreds of thousands of dollars in bonus money that they wouldn’t have otherwise received, so the financial incentive to lie was remarkably high, especially considering the standard of living in many of the countries where these prospects are being scouted.
Pujols’ situation was remarkably different, however. His incentive to lie about his age after arriving in the United States was not to receive significant financial gain, but instead to qualify for high school baseball. He spent two years playing for Fort Osage High in Independence, Missouri, and then went on to spend a year at Maple Woods Community College – presumably, if Pujols was a few years older than he’s led everyone to believe, he wouldn’t have been able to do any of those things, and lost out on three years of baseball development.
However, it’s not like that deception led to financial riches for Pujols. As you’re almost certainly aware, the Cardinals took him in the 13th round of the 2000 draft and offered him $10,000 to sign, only upping that to $60,000 after an impressive performance in the JayHawk Summer League. If we believe that Pujols was several years older than he claims, he essentially delayed his entry into professional baseball by three years for a final payoff of $20,000 per year, which wasn’t guaranteed to begin with. From a financial perspective, he actually could have done better by just getting a job and playing independent league ball in his spare time.
If Pujols did lie about his age, it didn’t result in any kind of financial benefit, and it delayed his entry into professional baseball. From a motivational standpoint, it’s hard to see why Pujols would choose to take that path.
Beyond just the incentive issue, however, there’s an issue of his performance in the Midwest League in 2000. If you assume that Pujols is several years older than he claims, then you believe that he spent his one minor league season in low-A ball playing at age 22 or 23, facing pitchers that are three or four years younger and far inferior in terms of stage of development. In general, a player who is already in his early twenties and is still in the Midwest League is behind the development curve, and needs to demolish his competition and force the organization to promote him rapidly.
Pujols was the best prospect in the Midwest League in 2000, but his .324/.389/.565 line wasn’t historically dominating or anything – Austin Kearns hit .306/.415/.558 as a known 20-year-old that same year in that same league, for instance. Pujols managed just 17 home runs in 109 games, in fact, and then dropped off to just .284/.341/.481 in 21 games after a late-season promotion to high-A ball. This was not the performance of a man-child destroying inferior competition – it was right in line with what other good prospects had achieved at similar stages of their career against similar competition.
That Pujols hit .329/.403/.610 in 2001 often causes people to believe that he was well ahead of the normal development curve, but in reality, if Pujols is several years older than he claims, then his minor league performance (relative to his level of competition) didn’t suggest stardom at all. In fact, it would have suggested that he was an inferior prospect to a guy like Hee-Seop Choi, who had put up better numbers in the Midwest League the year before.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Pujols is one of the great hitters in the history of the sport. It strains credibility to suggest that one of the all-time greats could get sent to the lowest level of full-season minor league baseball in his prime and still get outhit by Austin Kearns. In fact, in looking at Pujols’ power development between 2000 and 2001, the much more logical explanation for the explosion is that he actually was 20-years-old and got naturally stronger, which is a pretty common observation with players of that age.
Could Pujols be older than he claims? Sure – none of this is definitive. However, considering the general lack of evidence supporting the rumors, the fact that there’s also any real lack of incentive for Pujols to lie about his age and the fact that his minor league performance makes more sense if he didn’t lie about his age, I find it hard to come down on the side of fraud here. The whispers and innuendo will always be there, but in terms of facts, I just don’t see many to suggest that Pujols is actually older than he claims.
Hanley Ramirez not likely to succeed at third base.
Spoiler [+]
Over six seasons with the (now) Miami Marlins, Hanley Ramirez proved to be a mediocre defensive shortstop. If history is any guide, he will likely be a worse defender at third base.
With the Marlins signing Jose Reyes to a six-year contract worth $106 million, Ramirez will no longer be the Marlins shortstop. Every indication is that he will be moved to third base, although Ramirez is expressing his extreme displeasure with the move.
Reyes is by far the better defender at short. In more than 8,800 innings at short, Reyes has a cumulative UZR/150 of 2.1, with 8 Defensive Runs Saved. Ramirez, by contrast, has logged more than 7,150 innings at short, amassing a cumulative UZR/150 of -9.1, with -49 Defensive Runs Saved.
Reyes is six months older than Ramirez — Reyes turned 28 in June and Ramirez will turn 28 at the end of this month. But Reyes has maintained more of a shortstop’s physique. He’s 6-1/200 pounds. Ramirez is 6-3/229 pounds.
For these reasons, playing Reyes at short makes the most sense for the Marlins. The question is what kind of defense they’ll get out of Ramirez at third.
If history is any guide, Ramirez will be an even weaker defender at third than he was at short.
The two most notable examples of everyday shortstops moving over to play third are Cal Ripken, Jr. and Alex Rodriguez. Meausred by the metrics available at time, Ripken played a much better shortstop than third base. Over 15 seasons and more than 20,200 innings, Ripken had a .979 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 176. Ripken moved to third at the beginning of the 1997 season, and over the next five seasons, had a .958 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 0. Of course, Ripken’s defensive downgrade may have had as much to do with age than a change of position, but the numbers still show a decline.
A-Rod moved to third at a younger age than Ripken did, but still showed a defensive decline after the move. With the Seattle Mariners and Texas Rangers, Rodriguez logged nearly 11,000 innings at short and flashed a .977 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 18. Using the same metrics, Rodriguez has had a .965 fielding percentage over nearly 9,300 innings at third base and a -40 Total Zone rating.
UZR information is available for 2002-2003, A-Rod’s final two years as a shortstop with the Rangers. In 2002, he had a UZR/150 of 12.7, the best among American League shortstops that year. In 2003, he was second-best in the American League behind Jose Valentin of the Chicago White Sox with a UZR/150 of 11.2. He also had 8 Defensive Runs Saved in 2003, the first year that informationis available.
In eight seasons at third for the New York Yankees, A-Rod has a cumulative UZR/150 of -1.0, although that number would be much lower if not for a UZR/150 of 20.2 this season for the 762 innings he played at third. Injuries kept him out for a big chunk of the season. He also amassed -11 Defensive Runs Saved in his time with the Yankees.
There are additional examples of players shifiting from shortstop to third and seeing their defense suffer. Rich Aurilia was the every day shortstop for the San Francisco Giants from 1998-2003. Over 9000+ innings, he had a .974 fielding percentage. In 2002 and 2003, the first two years of UZR data, Aurilia posted UZR/150 numbers of 8.9 and 4.2, respectively. Not a defensive whiz, but better numbers than Hanley Ramirez has posted in any one season playing shortstop. After he left the Giants after the 2003 season, Aurilia converted to a utility infielder, playing mostly first, short and third. In nearly 1,400 innings at third, Aurilia posted a -2.3 UZR/150 and had -9 DRS. Again, age almost certainly was a fact or, but switching positions did not work well for Aurilia defensively.
The silver lining for Hanley? Believe it or not — Miguel Tejada. From 1998 to 2009, Tejada was the everyday shortstop for the Athletics, Orioles and Astros and amassed a Total Zone rating of -58 in those seasons. His best UZR/150 rating was 10.1 with the Astros in 2008 but he posted negative UZR/150 numbers in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Not good numbers. In 2010, the Astros moved Tejada to third and he’s played just under 1,200 innings at third over the last two seasons. His UZR/150 over that time is -.6 but he has 1 DRS. Essentially, he played poorly at third in 2010 but played well there in 2011, albeit only in 372 innings. Not much of a silver lining perhaps, but some slim hope that Hanley can turn it around defensively at third base.
But skills, age and history are not on his side.
With the Marlins signing Jose Reyes to a six-year contract worth $106 million, Ramirez will no longer be the Marlins shortstop. Every indication is that he will be moved to third base, although Ramirez is expressing his extreme displeasure with the move.
Reyes is by far the better defender at short. In more than 8,800 innings at short, Reyes has a cumulative UZR/150 of 2.1, with 8 Defensive Runs Saved. Ramirez, by contrast, has logged more than 7,150 innings at short, amassing a cumulative UZR/150 of -9.1, with -49 Defensive Runs Saved.
Reyes is six months older than Ramirez — Reyes turned 28 in June and Ramirez will turn 28 at the end of this month. But Reyes has maintained more of a shortstop’s physique. He’s 6-1/200 pounds. Ramirez is 6-3/229 pounds.
For these reasons, playing Reyes at short makes the most sense for the Marlins. The question is what kind of defense they’ll get out of Ramirez at third.
If history is any guide, Ramirez will be an even weaker defender at third than he was at short.
The two most notable examples of everyday shortstops moving over to play third are Cal Ripken, Jr. and Alex Rodriguez. Meausred by the metrics available at time, Ripken played a much better shortstop than third base. Over 15 seasons and more than 20,200 innings, Ripken had a .979 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 176. Ripken moved to third at the beginning of the 1997 season, and over the next five seasons, had a .958 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 0. Of course, Ripken’s defensive downgrade may have had as much to do with age than a change of position, but the numbers still show a decline.
A-Rod moved to third at a younger age than Ripken did, but still showed a defensive decline after the move. With the Seattle Mariners and Texas Rangers, Rodriguez logged nearly 11,000 innings at short and flashed a .977 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 18. Using the same metrics, Rodriguez has had a .965 fielding percentage over nearly 9,300 innings at third base and a -40 Total Zone rating.
UZR information is available for 2002-2003, A-Rod’s final two years as a shortstop with the Rangers. In 2002, he had a UZR/150 of 12.7, the best among American League shortstops that year. In 2003, he was second-best in the American League behind Jose Valentin of the Chicago White Sox with a UZR/150 of 11.2. He also had 8 Defensive Runs Saved in 2003, the first year that informationis available.
In eight seasons at third for the New York Yankees, A-Rod has a cumulative UZR/150 of -1.0, although that number would be much lower if not for a UZR/150 of 20.2 this season for the 762 innings he played at third. Injuries kept him out for a big chunk of the season. He also amassed -11 Defensive Runs Saved in his time with the Yankees.
There are additional examples of players shifiting from shortstop to third and seeing their defense suffer. Rich Aurilia was the every day shortstop for the San Francisco Giants from 1998-2003. Over 9000+ innings, he had a .974 fielding percentage. In 2002 and 2003, the first two years of UZR data, Aurilia posted UZR/150 numbers of 8.9 and 4.2, respectively. Not a defensive whiz, but better numbers than Hanley Ramirez has posted in any one season playing shortstop. After he left the Giants after the 2003 season, Aurilia converted to a utility infielder, playing mostly first, short and third. In nearly 1,400 innings at third, Aurilia posted a -2.3 UZR/150 and had -9 DRS. Again, age almost certainly was a fact or, but switching positions did not work well for Aurilia defensively.
The silver lining for Hanley? Believe it or not — Miguel Tejada. From 1998 to 2009, Tejada was the everyday shortstop for the Athletics, Orioles and Astros and amassed a Total Zone rating of -58 in those seasons. His best UZR/150 rating was 10.1 with the Astros in 2008 but he posted negative UZR/150 numbers in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Not good numbers. In 2010, the Astros moved Tejada to third and he’s played just under 1,200 innings at third over the last two seasons. His UZR/150 over that time is -.6 but he has 1 DRS. Essentially, he played poorly at third in 2010 but played well there in 2011, albeit only in 372 innings. Not much of a silver lining perhaps, but some slim hope that Hanley can turn it around defensively at third base.
But skills, age and history are not on his side.
Hideki Matsui, projecting 2012.
Spoiler [+]
Let us know what you think Hideki Matsui can do in 2012! Add your prediction here!
It’s time to ask ourselves:
Last year, in Hideki Matsui‘s offense went from good with the Angels (120 wRC+) to woof with the Athletics (93 wRC+).
Is Hideki Matsui done? Could the 38-year-old be worth another 550 PAs?
I say: uh, yes. Exactly: “Uh, yes.
It’s time to ask ourselves:
Last year, in Hideki Matsui‘s offense went from good with the Angels (120 wRC+) to woof with the Athletics (93 wRC+).
Is Hideki Matsui done? Could the 38-year-old be worth another 550 PAs?
I say: uh, yes. Exactly: “Uh, yes.
Pujols, Age and the Midwest League.
Hanley Ramirez not likely to succeed at third base.
Hideki Matsui, projecting 2012.
Spoiler [+]
Down here in Dallas, speculation about Albert Pujols‘ future has hit a fever pitch. The Marlins have apparently offered a 10 year contract, and are pushing for a decision in the not too distant future. You’ll probably be reading a lot more about Pujols in next few days.
But, for now, I want to address one lingering question about him that hangs over the question of how many years is too many years for a guy in his early thirties, and that’s whether we should buy into the speculation that Pujols fudged his birthday and is actually older than he claims. This rumor has been around forever, as Pujols didn’t look anything like a 21-year-old when he broke into the game back in 2001. If you combine his appearance and his early development into one of the game’s best hitters with a somewhat unorthodox background, you have a prime recipe for age-related speculation.
I see two significant problems that prevent me from buying into the speculation, however.
First, there’s simply the matter of incentives. International prospects have historically hidden their actual birth dates from MLB organizations in order to extract larger signing bonuses, as teams will pay a lot more for a projectable 16-year-old than a similarly skilled player who is already 18 or 19. In many cases, the players who misrepresented their age gained hundreds of thousands of dollars in bonus money that they wouldn’t have otherwise received, so the financial incentive to lie was remarkably high, especially considering the standard of living in many of the countries where these prospects are being scouted.
Pujols’ situation was remarkably different, however. His incentive to lie about his age after arriving in the United States was not to receive significant financial gain, but instead to qualify for high school baseball. He spent two years playing for Fort Osage High in Independence, Missouri, and then went on to spend a year at Maple Woods Community College – presumably, if Pujols was a few years older than he’s led everyone to believe, he wouldn’t have been able to do any of those things, and lost out on three years of baseball development.
However, it’s not like that deception led to financial riches for Pujols. As you’re almost certainly aware, the Cardinals took him in the 13th round of the 2000 draft and offered him $10,000 to sign, only upping that to $60,000 after an impressive performance in the JayHawk Summer League. If we believe that Pujols was several years older than he claims, he essentially delayed his entry into professional baseball by three years for a final payoff of $20,000 per year, which wasn’t guaranteed to begin with. From a financial perspective, he actually could have done better by just getting a job and playing independent league ball in his spare time.
If Pujols did lie about his age, it didn’t result in any kind of financial benefit, and it delayed his entry into professional baseball. From a motivational standpoint, it’s hard to see why Pujols would choose to take that path.
Beyond just the incentive issue, however, there’s an issue of his performance in the Midwest League in 2000. If you assume that Pujols is several years older than he claims, then you believe that he spent his one minor league season in low-A ball playing at age 22 or 23, facing pitchers that are three or four years younger and far inferior in terms of stage of development. In general, a player who is already in his early twenties and is still in the Midwest League is behind the development curve, and needs to demolish his competition and force the organization to promote him rapidly.
Pujols was the best prospect in the Midwest League in 2000, but his .324/.389/.565 line wasn’t historically dominating or anything – Austin Kearns hit .306/.415/.558 as a known 20-year-old that same year in that same league, for instance. Pujols managed just 17 home runs in 109 games, in fact, and then dropped off to just .284/.341/.481 in 21 games after a late-season promotion to high-A ball. This was not the performance of a man-child destroying inferior competition – it was right in line with what other good prospects had achieved at similar stages of their career against similar competition.
That Pujols hit .329/.403/.610 in 2001 often causes people to believe that he was well ahead of the normal development curve, but in reality, if Pujols is several years older than he claims, then his minor league performance (relative to his level of competition) didn’t suggest stardom at all. In fact, it would have suggested that he was an inferior prospect to a guy like Hee-Seop Choi, who had put up better numbers in the Midwest League the year before.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Pujols is one of the great hitters in the history of the sport. It strains credibility to suggest that one of the all-time greats could get sent to the lowest level of full-season minor league baseball in his prime and still get outhit by Austin Kearns. In fact, in looking at Pujols’ power development between 2000 and 2001, the much more logical explanation for the explosion is that he actually was 20-years-old and got naturally stronger, which is a pretty common observation with players of that age.
Could Pujols be older than he claims? Sure – none of this is definitive. However, considering the general lack of evidence supporting the rumors, the fact that there’s also any real lack of incentive for Pujols to lie about his age and the fact that his minor league performance makes more sense if he didn’t lie about his age, I find it hard to come down on the side of fraud here. The whispers and innuendo will always be there, but in terms of facts, I just don’t see many to suggest that Pujols is actually older than he claims.
But, for now, I want to address one lingering question about him that hangs over the question of how many years is too many years for a guy in his early thirties, and that’s whether we should buy into the speculation that Pujols fudged his birthday and is actually older than he claims. This rumor has been around forever, as Pujols didn’t look anything like a 21-year-old when he broke into the game back in 2001. If you combine his appearance and his early development into one of the game’s best hitters with a somewhat unorthodox background, you have a prime recipe for age-related speculation.
I see two significant problems that prevent me from buying into the speculation, however.
First, there’s simply the matter of incentives. International prospects have historically hidden their actual birth dates from MLB organizations in order to extract larger signing bonuses, as teams will pay a lot more for a projectable 16-year-old than a similarly skilled player who is already 18 or 19. In many cases, the players who misrepresented their age gained hundreds of thousands of dollars in bonus money that they wouldn’t have otherwise received, so the financial incentive to lie was remarkably high, especially considering the standard of living in many of the countries where these prospects are being scouted.
Pujols’ situation was remarkably different, however. His incentive to lie about his age after arriving in the United States was not to receive significant financial gain, but instead to qualify for high school baseball. He spent two years playing for Fort Osage High in Independence, Missouri, and then went on to spend a year at Maple Woods Community College – presumably, if Pujols was a few years older than he’s led everyone to believe, he wouldn’t have been able to do any of those things, and lost out on three years of baseball development.
However, it’s not like that deception led to financial riches for Pujols. As you’re almost certainly aware, the Cardinals took him in the 13th round of the 2000 draft and offered him $10,000 to sign, only upping that to $60,000 after an impressive performance in the JayHawk Summer League. If we believe that Pujols was several years older than he claims, he essentially delayed his entry into professional baseball by three years for a final payoff of $20,000 per year, which wasn’t guaranteed to begin with. From a financial perspective, he actually could have done better by just getting a job and playing independent league ball in his spare time.
If Pujols did lie about his age, it didn’t result in any kind of financial benefit, and it delayed his entry into professional baseball. From a motivational standpoint, it’s hard to see why Pujols would choose to take that path.
Beyond just the incentive issue, however, there’s an issue of his performance in the Midwest League in 2000. If you assume that Pujols is several years older than he claims, then you believe that he spent his one minor league season in low-A ball playing at age 22 or 23, facing pitchers that are three or four years younger and far inferior in terms of stage of development. In general, a player who is already in his early twenties and is still in the Midwest League is behind the development curve, and needs to demolish his competition and force the organization to promote him rapidly.
Pujols was the best prospect in the Midwest League in 2000, but his .324/.389/.565 line wasn’t historically dominating or anything – Austin Kearns hit .306/.415/.558 as a known 20-year-old that same year in that same league, for instance. Pujols managed just 17 home runs in 109 games, in fact, and then dropped off to just .284/.341/.481 in 21 games after a late-season promotion to high-A ball. This was not the performance of a man-child destroying inferior competition – it was right in line with what other good prospects had achieved at similar stages of their career against similar competition.
That Pujols hit .329/.403/.610 in 2001 often causes people to believe that he was well ahead of the normal development curve, but in reality, if Pujols is several years older than he claims, then his minor league performance (relative to his level of competition) didn’t suggest stardom at all. In fact, it would have suggested that he was an inferior prospect to a guy like Hee-Seop Choi, who had put up better numbers in the Midwest League the year before.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Pujols is one of the great hitters in the history of the sport. It strains credibility to suggest that one of the all-time greats could get sent to the lowest level of full-season minor league baseball in his prime and still get outhit by Austin Kearns. In fact, in looking at Pujols’ power development between 2000 and 2001, the much more logical explanation for the explosion is that he actually was 20-years-old and got naturally stronger, which is a pretty common observation with players of that age.
Could Pujols be older than he claims? Sure – none of this is definitive. However, considering the general lack of evidence supporting the rumors, the fact that there’s also any real lack of incentive for Pujols to lie about his age and the fact that his minor league performance makes more sense if he didn’t lie about his age, I find it hard to come down on the side of fraud here. The whispers and innuendo will always be there, but in terms of facts, I just don’t see many to suggest that Pujols is actually older than he claims.
Hanley Ramirez not likely to succeed at third base.
Spoiler [+]
Over six seasons with the (now) Miami Marlins, Hanley Ramirez proved to be a mediocre defensive shortstop. If history is any guide, he will likely be a worse defender at third base.
With the Marlins signing Jose Reyes to a six-year contract worth $106 million, Ramirez will no longer be the Marlins shortstop. Every indication is that he will be moved to third base, although Ramirez is expressing his extreme displeasure with the move.
Reyes is by far the better defender at short. In more than 8,800 innings at short, Reyes has a cumulative UZR/150 of 2.1, with 8 Defensive Runs Saved. Ramirez, by contrast, has logged more than 7,150 innings at short, amassing a cumulative UZR/150 of -9.1, with -49 Defensive Runs Saved.
Reyes is six months older than Ramirez — Reyes turned 28 in June and Ramirez will turn 28 at the end of this month. But Reyes has maintained more of a shortstop’s physique. He’s 6-1/200 pounds. Ramirez is 6-3/229 pounds.
For these reasons, playing Reyes at short makes the most sense for the Marlins. The question is what kind of defense they’ll get out of Ramirez at third.
If history is any guide, Ramirez will be an even weaker defender at third than he was at short.
The two most notable examples of everyday shortstops moving over to play third are Cal Ripken, Jr. and Alex Rodriguez. Meausred by the metrics available at time, Ripken played a much better shortstop than third base. Over 15 seasons and more than 20,200 innings, Ripken had a .979 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 176. Ripken moved to third at the beginning of the 1997 season, and over the next five seasons, had a .958 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 0. Of course, Ripken’s defensive downgrade may have had as much to do with age than a change of position, but the numbers still show a decline.
A-Rod moved to third at a younger age than Ripken did, but still showed a defensive decline after the move. With the Seattle Mariners and Texas Rangers, Rodriguez logged nearly 11,000 innings at short and flashed a .977 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 18. Using the same metrics, Rodriguez has had a .965 fielding percentage over nearly 9,300 innings at third base and a -40 Total Zone rating.
UZR information is available for 2002-2003, A-Rod’s final two years as a shortstop with the Rangers. In 2002, he had a UZR/150 of 12.7, the best among American League shortstops that year. In 2003, he was second-best in the American League behind Jose Valentin of the Chicago White Sox with a UZR/150 of 11.2. He also had 8 Defensive Runs Saved in 2003, the first year that informationis available.
In eight seasons at third for the New York Yankees, A-Rod has a cumulative UZR/150 of -1.0, although that number would be much lower if not for a UZR/150 of 20.2 this season for the 762 innings he played at third. Injuries kept him out for a big chunk of the season. He also amassed -11 Defensive Runs Saved in his time with the Yankees.
There are additional examples of players shifiting from shortstop to third and seeing their defense suffer. Rich Aurilia was the every day shortstop for the San Francisco Giants from 1998-2003. Over 9000+ innings, he had a .974 fielding percentage. In 2002 and 2003, the first two years of UZR data, Aurilia posted UZR/150 numbers of 8.9 and 4.2, respectively. Not a defensive whiz, but better numbers than Hanley Ramirez has posted in any one season playing shortstop. After he left the Giants after the 2003 season, Aurilia converted to a utility infielder, playing mostly first, short and third. In nearly 1,400 innings at third, Aurilia posted a -2.3 UZR/150 and had -9 DRS. Again, age almost certainly was a fact or, but switching positions did not work well for Aurilia defensively.
The silver lining for Hanley? Believe it or not — Miguel Tejada. From 1998 to 2009, Tejada was the everyday shortstop for the Athletics, Orioles and Astros and amassed a Total Zone rating of -58 in those seasons. His best UZR/150 rating was 10.1 with the Astros in 2008 but he posted negative UZR/150 numbers in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Not good numbers. In 2010, the Astros moved Tejada to third and he’s played just under 1,200 innings at third over the last two seasons. His UZR/150 over that time is -.6 but he has 1 DRS. Essentially, he played poorly at third in 2010 but played well there in 2011, albeit only in 372 innings. Not much of a silver lining perhaps, but some slim hope that Hanley can turn it around defensively at third base.
But skills, age and history are not on his side.
With the Marlins signing Jose Reyes to a six-year contract worth $106 million, Ramirez will no longer be the Marlins shortstop. Every indication is that he will be moved to third base, although Ramirez is expressing his extreme displeasure with the move.
Reyes is by far the better defender at short. In more than 8,800 innings at short, Reyes has a cumulative UZR/150 of 2.1, with 8 Defensive Runs Saved. Ramirez, by contrast, has logged more than 7,150 innings at short, amassing a cumulative UZR/150 of -9.1, with -49 Defensive Runs Saved.
Reyes is six months older than Ramirez — Reyes turned 28 in June and Ramirez will turn 28 at the end of this month. But Reyes has maintained more of a shortstop’s physique. He’s 6-1/200 pounds. Ramirez is 6-3/229 pounds.
For these reasons, playing Reyes at short makes the most sense for the Marlins. The question is what kind of defense they’ll get out of Ramirez at third.
If history is any guide, Ramirez will be an even weaker defender at third than he was at short.
The two most notable examples of everyday shortstops moving over to play third are Cal Ripken, Jr. and Alex Rodriguez. Meausred by the metrics available at time, Ripken played a much better shortstop than third base. Over 15 seasons and more than 20,200 innings, Ripken had a .979 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 176. Ripken moved to third at the beginning of the 1997 season, and over the next five seasons, had a .958 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 0. Of course, Ripken’s defensive downgrade may have had as much to do with age than a change of position, but the numbers still show a decline.
A-Rod moved to third at a younger age than Ripken did, but still showed a defensive decline after the move. With the Seattle Mariners and Texas Rangers, Rodriguez logged nearly 11,000 innings at short and flashed a .977 fielding percentage and a Total Zone rating of 18. Using the same metrics, Rodriguez has had a .965 fielding percentage over nearly 9,300 innings at third base and a -40 Total Zone rating.
UZR information is available for 2002-2003, A-Rod’s final two years as a shortstop with the Rangers. In 2002, he had a UZR/150 of 12.7, the best among American League shortstops that year. In 2003, he was second-best in the American League behind Jose Valentin of the Chicago White Sox with a UZR/150 of 11.2. He also had 8 Defensive Runs Saved in 2003, the first year that informationis available.
In eight seasons at third for the New York Yankees, A-Rod has a cumulative UZR/150 of -1.0, although that number would be much lower if not for a UZR/150 of 20.2 this season for the 762 innings he played at third. Injuries kept him out for a big chunk of the season. He also amassed -11 Defensive Runs Saved in his time with the Yankees.
There are additional examples of players shifiting from shortstop to third and seeing their defense suffer. Rich Aurilia was the every day shortstop for the San Francisco Giants from 1998-2003. Over 9000+ innings, he had a .974 fielding percentage. In 2002 and 2003, the first two years of UZR data, Aurilia posted UZR/150 numbers of 8.9 and 4.2, respectively. Not a defensive whiz, but better numbers than Hanley Ramirez has posted in any one season playing shortstop. After he left the Giants after the 2003 season, Aurilia converted to a utility infielder, playing mostly first, short and third. In nearly 1,400 innings at third, Aurilia posted a -2.3 UZR/150 and had -9 DRS. Again, age almost certainly was a fact or, but switching positions did not work well for Aurilia defensively.
The silver lining for Hanley? Believe it or not — Miguel Tejada. From 1998 to 2009, Tejada was the everyday shortstop for the Athletics, Orioles and Astros and amassed a Total Zone rating of -58 in those seasons. His best UZR/150 rating was 10.1 with the Astros in 2008 but he posted negative UZR/150 numbers in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Not good numbers. In 2010, the Astros moved Tejada to third and he’s played just under 1,200 innings at third over the last two seasons. His UZR/150 over that time is -.6 but he has 1 DRS. Essentially, he played poorly at third in 2010 but played well there in 2011, albeit only in 372 innings. Not much of a silver lining perhaps, but some slim hope that Hanley can turn it around defensively at third base.
But skills, age and history are not on his side.
Hideki Matsui, projecting 2012.
Spoiler [+]
Let us know what you think Hideki Matsui can do in 2012! Add your prediction here!
It’s time to ask ourselves:
Last year, in Hideki Matsui‘s offense went from good with the Angels (120 wRC+) to woof with the Athletics (93 wRC+).
Is Hideki Matsui done? Could the 38-year-old be worth another 550 PAs?
I say: uh, yes. Exactly: “Uh, yes.
It’s time to ask ourselves:
Last year, in Hideki Matsui‘s offense went from good with the Angels (120 wRC+) to woof with the Athletics (93 wRC+).
Is Hideki Matsui done? Could the 38-year-old be worth another 550 PAs?
I say: uh, yes. Exactly: “Uh, yes.
- 6,678
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Sign Pujols, trade Lomo and Gaby to Oak for Gio, sign Buerhle. That's what I want to happrn
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