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Originally Posted by h3at23
SamAmicoNBA
Word is Cavs beat reporter Brian Windhorst is leaving Plain Dealer to cover Heat for ESPN.com.
ANOTHER L
* Offiical NBA Off-Season Thread: I'll give one of my damn kidney's for these Melo rumors to stop *
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by jpzx,
- Start date
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Melo is smiling like he knows something we don'tOriginally Posted by h3at23
shoeking2101
Banned
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For those that don't know, real training camp La lakers is on NBA.Com right now streaming
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[h1][/h1]
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Carmelo gonna stay in Denver. He aint going nowhere
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alanhahn
Cavs fans burning his press credential RT @SamAmicoNBA: Brian Windhorst (@PDcavsinsider) is leaving Plain Dealer to cover Heat for ESPN.com.
Cavs fans burning his press credential RT @SamAmicoNBA: Brian Windhorst (@PDcavsinsider) is leaving Plain Dealer to cover Heat for ESPN.com.
clevelandsprince23
Banned
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Now that's a simp. What a lame haha
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Melo needs to come to the bulls.
rose at pg
brewer at sg
melo at sf
boozer at pf
noah at c
SOLID TEAM
rose at pg
brewer at sg
melo at sf
boozer at pf
noah at c
SOLID TEAM
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sorry on the double
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Are you serious?Originally Posted by h3at23
alanhahn
Cavs fans burning his press credential RT @SamAmicoNBA: Brian Windhorst (@PDcavsinsider) is leaving Plain Dealer to cover Heat for ESPN.com.
[h1]
[/h1]
Spoiler [+]
Lisa Blumenfeld/Getty ImagesWhen not driving to the hole, Rajon Rondo is the best defensive point guard in the game.GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 50-32 (Pythagorean W-L: 53-29)
Offensive Efficiency: 105.4 (13th)
Defensive Efficiency: 93.8 (23rd)
Pace Factor: 92.5 (27th)
Highest PER: Kevin Garnett (19.51)
We're not exactly sure what the Celtics were last season, which makes it that much harder to predict what they'll be this coming season. Were they the team that raced out of the gate 23-5? Were they the weary group that limped through a 54-game season-ending stretch of mediocrity, going 27-27? Or perhaps they're the one that rebounded with a vengeance in the playoffs, defeating two of the league's three best teams in succession while coming within a quarter of stealing an unlikely championship.
Glass-half-full types take encouragement from the most recent body of work, as Boston's aging vets looked surprisingly hearty and hale during the playoffs. Boston shocked Cleveland, bullied Orlando and had the Lakers with one foot in the grave before the Celtics' biggest Achilles' heel -- a lack of offensive firepower -- came back to bite them in the second half of Game 7 in the Finals.
That run to the Finals had important implications for this season. Instead of rebuilding the roster, which Boston might have done had it petered out in the first round, the Celtics brought nearly all the key pieces back and added a couple more ancient warriors to the mix. Unfortunately, the deep playoff run will cost them their center for about half the season. Kendrick Perkins hurt his knee in Game 6 and underwent surgery after the season, a development that led to a wholesale redevelopment of the frontcourt.
[h4]2-Point FG%, 2009-10 Leaders[/h4]
| Boston | 52.2 |
| Orlando | 52.1 |
| Phoenix | 52.0 |
| Cleveland | 52.0 |
| Utah | 51.9 |
| League average | 49.2 |
The end result is that this season's Celtics will look a lot like last season's, which was one of the most distinctive in basketball on several fronts. For starters, their periodic offensive struggles didn't emanate from an inability to make shots -- instead, it was an inability to take them that was the problem. Boston led the NBA in 2-point field goal percentage (see chart), but was so anemic on the boards and so prone to turnovers that it took fewer shots per possessions than any other team (with "shots" defined to include free throw attempts times 0.44).
[h4]Fewest Shots* Per Poss., 2009-10[/h4]
| Boston | 93.5 |
| Charlotte | 94.4 |
| Indiana | 94.5 |
| Golden State | 94.7 |
| Utah | 95.3 |
| League average | 95.9 |
| * Shots = FGA + (FTA * 0.44) |
Given that record, it stands to reason the Celtics could trade a bit more volume for a bit less accuracy, and they've made a couple of moves in that direction. For example, there was Boston's late-season deal of Eddie House for Nate Robinson. It looked like a dud until Robinson basically won Game 6 of the Orlando series for them; he also proved huge in Game 4 of the Finals. Going forward, his shot-creating abilities should give a big boost to a flagging second unit.
Boston also lost two of its most turnover-prone players with the free-agent departure of Tony Allen and the injury to Perkins. Replacing them are the two O'Neals, Jermaine and Shaquille; Jermaine in particular has been able to create shots without high turnover levels, so he should help Boston on that front. He'll have to, as that was also a specialty of the now-retired Rasheed Wallace.
In the meantime, Boston has to maintain its high standards on defense. Boston rated fifth in regular-season defensive efficiency and took it to another level in the playoffs, finishing second in playoff defensive efficiency despite facing the murderers row of Cleveland, Orlando and the Lakers.
The Celtics placed second in the NBA in forcing turnovers (see chart), with only the reckless Warriors finishing ahead of them. Rajon Rondo and Tony Allen were the primary disruptors -- in fact, those two finished first and second in the NBA in steals per minute. Allen's role in that department will be taken over by rookie ballhawk Avery Bradley, but otherwise the Celtics will line up the same.
[h4]Most Opponent Turnovers, 2009-10[/h4]
| Golden State | 17.1 |
| Boston | 16.6 |
| Charlotte | 16.4 |
| Milwaukee | 16.1 |
| Detroit | 15.7 |
| League average | 15.4 |
In fact, they could be more formidable than they were last season if Kevin Garnett keeps feeling spry. He was clearly off his game during the middle part of the season but recovered down the stretch when Doc Rivers cut his minutes, which is one reason Boston's defense was so much stingier in the playoffs.
Losing both Perkins and Wallace is a concern, but the O'Neals should mostly offset them -- Jermaine is a quality defender, while Shaq is the antidote needed against Orlando's Dwight Howard should the teams renew acquaintances in the playoffs.
The biggest threat to Boston's defensive integrity may be on the bench. The architect of the defense, assistant Tom Thibodeau, left to become coach of the Chicago Bulls.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Boston had an interesting offseason because it passed on an opportunity to completely reshape the roster. This was probably the appropriate choice -- for heaven's sake, the Celtics were 18 minutes from winning the title -- but Boston could have gone in a very different direction by letting the contracts of Paul Pierce, Ray Allen and Robinson expire and then plunging into free agency.
Instead, they've signed up for a two-year commitment with a grizzled group and surprisingly yanked Rivers from the jaws of retirement to stay on the sideline for another year. Dormer Nets coach Lawrence Frank -- a pretty solid defensive tactician in his own right -- succeeded Tom Thibodeau and, perhaps, has first dibs on the head job after Doc rides off into the sunset.
Rasheed Wallace retired; Signed Jermaine O'Neal for two years, $11 million. Boston used its entire midlevel exception on O'Neal, and the more I look at this deal, the more I like it. It's only for two years so the risk is very small, plus O'Neal is only 31 and quietly played very well last season. He won't be the floor spacer Wallace was, but he'll replace Perkins' post defense and he'll score enough to help offensively.
Signed Shaquille O'Neal for two years, $2.8 million. This was a real coup given Perkins' knee injury, as Shaq defends Orlando's Dwight Howard nearly as effectively as Perkins does -- a matchup that basically won the conference finals for the Celtics. Shaq has his limitations and his prima donna act can rub people the wrong way, but the Big Limerick was a good risk at this price.
Re-signed Nate Robinson for two years, $9 million. Robinson demonstrated his value late in the postseason, as the Celtics desperately needed a bench player who could create shots and he delivered. I expect him to have a much more prominent role this season as a sixth man, and he could pair with Rondo in the backcourt at times.
Re-signed Ray Allen for two years, $20 million. Are you noticing a pattern? Boston signed Allen, Robinson and the two O'Neals to two-year deals, coinciding with the time that Garnett's $23 million per annum comes off the books. They've smartly positioned this veteran team for a two-year run at another title, and after that they're reaching for the dynamite. This was a clever piece of salary cap construction by general manager Danny Ainge, offering a pretty even balance between the risk of being old and capped out and the reward of grabbing another ring. The fact he pulled this off while so many other teams were signing wacky deals for twice the money makes it an even more impressive accomplishment.
As for Allen, this deal was par for the course -- on a per-year basis Boston probably overpaid, but by guaranteeing only two years, the Celtics have maintained maximum flexibility. Because they're willing to pay luxury tax, the second consideration far outweighs the first.
Let Tony Allen go, drafted Avery Bradley and Luke Harangody. It was a big surprise to see Allen walk given how well he played at the end of last season, but Bradley may have usurped his role by the end of this season anyway. While he has offensive limitations, he's a better ballhandler than Allen, and by all accounts he's a suffocating defender.
Harangody was a late second-round pick who had a productive career at Notre Dame but offers little in the way of upside. He played well enough in summer league to earn a contract but won't be cracking this frontcourt rotation.
Signed Paul Pierce for four years, $61 million. While Pierce gave the Celtics a fairly significant hometown discount, he also was the one exception to Boston's two-year cap-management strategy -- simply because he was way too good to expect to retain with such a short deal. The tail end of this contract might be distasteful, but given the Celtics' goals, they really had no choice but to re-sign Pierce. The fourth year is only partially guaranteed, and there's a chance he'll retire before then anyway.
Re-signed Marquis Daniels for one year, $2.5 million. Daniels hasn't been good in three years and hasn't been healthy in about 30, so I didn't really see the urgency in bringing him back. However, Boston was in a position cap-wise where re-signing its own player was much easier than getting somebody else's.
Signed Von Wafer for one-year, minimum. Wafer is a talented offensive player but another one with a "difficult" reputation, something the Celtics have accumulated in waves over the past two years. Between Shaq, Robinson and Wafer, they're definitely testing the limits of the "Ubuntu" thing here. He's also had some health problems, but if he's in shape he can score, and Boston needs somebody like that on the wing.
Signed Semih Erden for two years, minimum. A second-round pick in 2008 from Turkey, Erden gives Boston another frontcourt body in case things get dire. I really don't think he can play, but it's a low-risk proposition.
Signed Delonte West for one year, veteran's minimum. The Celtics are familiar with West so one can argue it's less risk than it would be for other teams, and the price is certainly right. If he keeps his head on straight he'll provide a wing defender and shot creator to replace Tony Allen. As noted above, however, the Celtics' bench is now awash in questionable characters. That's the tradeoff for acquiring players like West, Wafer, Robinson and Shaq so cheaply.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Defense[/h3]
No big secret here, but it's going to be crucial to the Celtics' success again this season. Boston has two factors working against it in this department: first, the departure of defensive guru Thibodeau, who orchestrated a frustrating scheme that loaded up on the strong side of the floor and made life difficult for one-on-one scorers; and second, the injury to low-post defensive ace Kendrick Perkins. At a lower level, losing Wallace and Tony Allen means the second unit may lose a notch on D.
Fortunately, the Celtics have plenty where that came from. Rondo is hands down the best defensive point guard in basketball, with his fast hands and long arms constantly poking balls loose and preventing other passes and shots from being made. Garnett showed much more activity in the second half of last season, and while he's not the dominant force he was three years ago, he's still a major factor with his length and intensity. Pierce and Jermaine O'Neal are significantly underrated defensively, and Bradley could be a major presence too.
That said, the biggest factor of all for Boston has always been that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. New players like the two O'Neals and Nate Robinson will have to show they can fit into that system.
Finally, if Delonte West stays on the straight and narrow he can replace 90 percent of what Tony Allen did as a wing defender.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Age[/h3]
All these guys were good last season. How many of them will still be good in 2010-11? With so many players in their mid-30s, the risk of collapse shouldn't be dismissed. Boston will start a 32-year-old, a 33-year-old, a 34-year-old and a 35-year-old; two of those four have been in the NBA since they were 18 and thus have played more minutes (and taken more pounding) than nearly any similar-aged player in history. The bench isn't exactly a bunch of spring chickens either, with a 38-year-old Shaq the most likely sixth man.
Boston has some youth if you look hard enough -- Rondo and Davis are 24, and Perkins is 25. Bradley, obviously, skews the average down at just 19. Additionally, Boston's older players are regarded as some of the league's most dedicated and best-conditioned, Shaq excepted.
Nonetheless, the vast majority of the minutes will come from players that are very long in the tooth, and Boston's chances of repeating as conference champion depends almost entirely on those players maintaining their levels of production. They appeared to lag badly in that department a year ago before rallying in the postseason. Can they pull off an encore?
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
It was going to be hard for the Celtics to repeat as conference champions regardless of what else happened around the league. For starters, we have to remember how unlikely their run to the Finals was last season and how rare it is for teams to catch lightning in a bottle in consecutive springs. The most similar recent example, for instance, was the 1994-95 Rockets; the next year they won 48 games and were swept in the second round.
Additionally, Boston's neighborhood just became dramatically more difficult with Miami's additions of http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=1966LeBron James and http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=1977Chris Bosh. It was much more plausible to see the Celtics winning the conference if the other stars had stayed put.
Finally, there's the age issue. Rondo is ascending but nearly all the other key players are well into their decline phase. Perkins will miss half the season and may not be the same when he comes back, and we still don't know what Thibodeau's departure will mean at the defensive end. Pierce's numbers are likely to dip too.
Boston will be a huge favorite to win the division -- it might be the only team over .500, in fact -- and still has the trump card that it matches up so well with Orlando. Unfortunately, the Celtics are unlikely to get to the point where it's just them and the Magic left standing, and they still have uppity rivals like the Bulls, Bucks and Hawks nipping at their heels. The Celtics' defense and chemistry will keep them near the top, but I'm not seeing enough firepower to provide a repeat of last season's run. At the end of the day, I think they'll be exactly what they were a year ago from November to April. It's the ending that I see changing.
[h3]Prediction: 51-31, 1st in Atlantic Division, 3rd in Eastern Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Let's start with the good news: The only place they can go is up.
Beset by injuries that exposed a multiyear plague of terrible personnel decisions, New Jersey set a league record by losing its first 18 games and had to rally in the final weeks to avoid setting the mark for the worst record in history.
New Jersey's 12-win squad was awful in a great many respects, but the worst was its simple inability to score points. New Jersey finished last in offensive efficiency, shooting percentage, 2-point shooting percentage, and TS percentage (see chart). By comparison, the Nets were downright frisky on defense, where they managed to beat out five teams in the efficiency tables.
[h4]Offensive Efficiency, 2009-10's Worst[/h4]
| New Jersey | 98.1 |
| Minnesota | 98.9 |
| Chicago | 100.8 |
| LA Clippers | 100.9 |
| Indiana | 101.3 |
| League average | 104.9 |
Look at the roster and it's not a big surprise. The Nets had two decent offensive players -- Devin Harris and Brook Lopez -- courtesy, it should be said, of the only two moves in the last half-decade that worked out well for the Nets.
Outside of that pair, they were tragicomic. New Jersey's forwards, in particular, may have been the worst in the history of basketball. Yi Jianlian, Bobby Simmons, Trenton Hassell and Jarvis Hayes all were key members of the Nets' forward rotation last season; of the four, only Yi managed to remain in the league for 2010-11; he'll serve as a backup for another bad team (although this didn't stop the Nets from freezing out Lopez to get Yi more touches ... brilliant). Rookie Terrence Williams was even worse for much of the season before rallying late, keeping hope alive that the Nets will salvage something from their 2009 first-round pick.
They certainly won't salvage anything from their picks in 2003-07: Antoine Wright, Marcus Williams, Josh Boone and Zoran Planinic. Those and a few dreadful contract decisions from earlier in the decade -- most notably a six-year, $84 million deal for Richard Jefferson -- started the Nets down the road to nowhere.
What finished it off, however, was the disastrous ownership reign of Bruce Ratner. He initiated the process of moving the team to Brooklyn but didn't have the dough to see it through; in between, he had the Nets cutting every financial corner they could find in order to make ends meet. This had the predictable outcome of making bad fan support even worse, engendering a vicious cycle of declining revenue and further cost cuts.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 12-70 (Pythagorean W-L: 14-6
Offensive Efficiency: 98.1 (30th)
Defensive Efficiency: 108.0 (25th)
Pace Factor:93.6 (24th)
Highest PER: Brook Lopez (20.11)
Ratner's sale of the team to Russian businessman Mikhail Prokhorov at least brings some deep pockets back into ownership. Ground has been broken on the arena in Brooklyn and the Nets are acting more like a real NBA franchise in funding the operation.
It also started sugar-plum visions of an overnight renaissance in New Jersey built on the back of free-agent-to-be LeBron James. But despite the oft-cited connection between James and Nets part-owner Jay-Z, the Nets never appeared to be a serious player for his services.
Prokhorov has run a basketball team before, owning the CSKA Moscow club, but in interviews he appeared to have little clue about the NBA or how the Nets might go about winning. This didn't stop him from bravely announcing a five-year window for the Nets to win a championship, one that certainly would be lightning-quick compared to the current 34-year window.
He made other bizarre moves along the way, offhandedly telling media that general manager Kiki Vandeweghe wouldn't return (something he might have mentioned to Vandeweghe first) and making the classic new-owner mistake of hiring his head coach prior to naming a general manager.
[h4]Worst Defensive Rebound Rate, 2009-10[/h4]
| Golden State | 68.5 |
| Phoenix | 70.8 |
| New Jersey | 71.8 |
| New York | 72.1 |
| Denver | 72.4 |
| League average | 73.7 |
In short, while the new Nets management has deeper pockets, we can't say with any confidence yet that it'll prove more adept at running the team. As for Prokhorov's proclamation about winning a title, the fly in the ointment is that he needs some talent. The Nets had two unusually good players for such a bad team -- Harris made the All-Star team in 2009 and Lopez very well may in 2011 -- but otherwise the cupboard is fairly bare. Wings Williams and Courtney Lee were the only other rotation-caliber players on last season's roster.
The Nets did at least kill two birds with one stone by trading Lee for Troy Murphy. Murphy is an elite defensive rebounder; New Jersey was 28th in Defensive Rebound Rate last season (see chart). Additionally, Murphy plays power forward, a slot that was basically a running joke a year ago. No longer will New Jersey pose the triple threat of historically bad owner, terrible forwards and prolific losses; now the Nets are just another run-of-the-mill bad team.
Alas, much more work remains to be done, and an odd 2010 offseason didn't put them much closer to achieving those goals.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Didn't retain Kiki Vandeweghe, hired Avery Johnson. Vandeweghe was shoved from the front office to the sideline last winter because the Nets didn't want to pay a coach to replace the fired Lawrence Frank early in the season. While Vandeweghe was dismissed in about the coldest way possible, he wasn't head coaching material.
The decision to hire Johnson was a defensible one, except that it appears he will have extensive power over personnel decisions too. This rarely works; the fact that the one glaring exception is Johnson's mentor, Gregg Popovich, offers at least a glimmer of hope for Nets fans.
Announced Rod Thorn would not return, hired Billy King as general manager. While it certainly would have been understandable to whack the sole architect of a 12-70 team, it appears that wasn't the case. Reportedly, Thorn chose not to return after disagreeing with Prokhorov, eventually landing in Philadelphia.
Ironically, the Nets turned around and hired King, whose last tenure with the Sixers resulted in an avalanche of bad contracts that buried Philadelphia in the late Allen Iverson years. This was an odd choice, to say the least, but it appears Kings' role here will be much like his last gig. In Philly he was nominally in charge of personnel with Larry Brown making all the important calls; this time it's Johnson who will be doing so.
Drafted Derrick Favors. Surprisingly, New Jersey chose Favors over DeMarcus Cousins, whom I consider the superior talent. However, New Jersey's need was more clear at Favors' power forward position, and scouts are high on his long-term potential. Short-term, he is unlikely to make as immediate an impact as Cousins and will probably come off the bench behind Murphy.
Traded 27th and 31st picks to Atlanta for 24th pick, drafted Damion James. New Jersey's two-for-one move-up deal for James landed it a solid reserve who can swing between the two forward positions, again targeting the Nets' problem area from a year ago. In a few years he'll probably play the 4 exclusively, but in his early 20s he should have enough zip in his step to play on the wing. He'd better, because that's where the playing time will be available this season.
Signed Travis Outlaw to a five-year, $35 million deal. New Jersey whiffed on all the major free agents and basically signed a panic deal with Outlaw, a halfway decent player who isn't worth anywhere near this kind of money. One thing I will say for New Jersey's free-agent strategy, however, is that the Nets were smart enough to go young -- they didn't sign one player older than 25. In a few more years, when New Jersey is ready to do something of consequence, these guys should still be contributors.
Signed Anthony Morrow to a four-year, $12 million offer sheet; executed sign-and-trade with Golden State for a conditional second-round pick. This was easily the best move of New Jersey's summer. Morrow is one-dimensional, but man, what a dimension. He's among the five best shooters in basketball and he provides the Nets with a lights-out floor-spacer that they lacked a year ago. Additionally, this contract was an absolute no-brainer at such a low price. Theoretically New Jersey also gave up a 2011 second-rounder, but there's virtually no chance of delivery; the Nets would have to finish with one of the league's top five records for that to happen.
Traded Chris Douglas-Roberts to Milwaukee for a 2012 second-rounder. New Jersey's other free-agent additions made Douglas-Roberts expendable and added a dollop of extra cap space to allow the Nets to complete their other free-agent deals. Of course, one of them we kind of wish they hadn't ...
Signed Johan Petro for three years, $10 million. This is a brutal contract, not because the Nets committed huge sums of money but because they guaranteed three years to a guy who isn't any good. It's not a big stretch to think five minimum-wage players in the D-League could match or exceed Petro's performance over the next three seasons. Nonetheless, he'll get first dibs at the backup center job.
Bought out Keyon Dooling, Sent Yi Jianlian and $3 million to Washington for Quinton Ross. This was more salary-cap housekeeping, generating more room by lowering Dooling's cap number with the buyout and paying the Wizards to take Yi off their hands. Ross is a possible buyout candidate as well. It's hard to remember, but the original idea here was to have enough salary cap room to sign both LeBron James and another max-contract superstar -- say, Chris Bosh. In retrospect this seems comically ridiculous, but considering the Nets gave up nothing of value to create that space, it was worth a shot.
Signed Jordan Farmar for three years, $12 million. Objectively, Farmar's numbers have been poor the past two seasons and his development seems to have ground to a halt. Subjectively, I think the triangle was a terrible system for him and he'll be much more effective in an offense that lets him handle the ball and penetrate more. He'll likely never be more than a very good backup to Harris, but this contract was an acceptable risk.
Traded Courtney Lee to Houston, received Troy Murphy from Indiana in a four-team deal. This was a good use of the Nets' remaining salary cap space after they couldn't find a taker for it in free agency. Murphy solves several needs. I mentioned the rebounding above, but he'll also hold down the power forward slot until Favors is ready.
Moreover, Murphy can produce another asset for New Jersey at the trade deadline if -- as one presumes -- they're out of contention by then. Several contenders should be interested in his expiring contract, allowing the Nets to secure a draft pick for their trouble while preserving an expected $20 million or so in cap space in 2011. For however long he's there, Murphy also might be the first player in team history to publicly admit that he grew up rooting for the Nets -- he's from Sparta, N.J.
Signed Stephen Graham for one year, veteran's minimum. The virtual definition of a replacement-level player, Graham will provide a halfway decent fifth wing at the back end of the rotation. If he plays more than five minutes a game it's a strong sign the rebuilding project has not gone as planned.
Signed Joe Smith for one year, veteran's minimum. Smith had a tough year in Atlanta last season and may be nearing the end of the line, but he was a decent find as a fifth big man. If he plays well, he's likely to be converted into a draft pick at the trade deadline.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Perimeter quickness[/h3]
The most difficult part about playing New Jersey will be stopping their guards from getting to the rim, because they have three with outstanding quickness. The bulk of New Jersey's offense is likely to consist of Harris, Farmar and Williams running high pick-and-rolls with Lopez or Murphy, while the others space the floor around them. Yes, Lopez will get a few play calls on the block too, but in general the action will start on the perimeter.
Harris is likely to be the focal point. He's one of the quickest players in the league and virtually impossible to keep out of the paint off the dribble, but his tendency to look to score can ruffle teammates. He also collided with Johnson when the two were together in Dallas, partly because Johnson's restrictive system didn't give Harris much freedom. That might have been appropriate with a loaded Dallas team, but on this club Johnson needs to give Harris a lot more rope.
The other player to watch is Williams, who looked like a bust for four months before emerging late in the season. He's the opposite of Harris in that he's not a talented scorer but he possesses advanced passing skills. The one disadvantage is that Williams is an inferior outside shooter, which makes it easy for opponents to lay off him and sit on his penetration.
Finally, there's Farmar. Like Harris he looks more to score than to pass, but he's quick off the dribble and can get to the basket in pick-and-rolls. Between those two, New Jersey will always have a point guard on the floor who can create offense.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Frontcourt defense[/h3]
We have much to choose from, but frontcourt defense is likely to be New Jersey's downfall this season. As bad as the combo of Lopez and Yi was last season, Lopez and Murphy might be worse. The problem is that both players share the same weakness -- they're among the slowest players at their respective positions. That shortcoming will make the Nets susceptible to opponent transition plays and compromise their pick-and-roll defense.
Lopez and Murphy do offer strengths -- Lopez is a good shot-blocker when he gets close enough to make a play, whereas Murphy is outstanding on the defensive boards. Unfortunately, their inability to help their teammates is likely to lead to easy penetration opportunities for opposing perimeter players.
Moreover, the duo won't have much help off the bench. Petro, the likely backup center, is adequate at best. Behind Murphy, Favors is likely to take his lumps as a rookie, especially given his lack of strength. There are few other candidates to take additional minutes -- James, another rookie who will be on a learning curve, being the most likely option. Outlaw is another possibility, but his use as a smallball 4 would be strictly for offensive purposes.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
The nice thing about crash-landing at the bottom of the standings is that it will only get better from here. The Nets didn't achieve the Plan A of nabbing LeBron James and starting a dramatic overnight recovery, but they should start returning to respectability this season. Harris is likely to play better than he did a year ago, Lopez is a rising star in the post and the forwards are about a thousand times better than last season's peanut gallery.
Plus, Johnson should prove helpful, at least on the sideline. He's coached Harris before, and while that relationship was rocky at times, he knows how to use him to good effect. Johnson also is likely to demand much more from Harris and Lopez at the defensive end -- since both of them loafed on D a year ago.
Nonetheless, this won't be an overnight recovery. The Nets can expect nightly beatings in front of puny crowds in their final season in the Swamp. However, the Nets can take solace in the fact that somebody else will be this year's NBA doormat, while they become one of the rare teams to double their win total from the year before.
[h3]Prediction: 26-56, 4th in Atlantic Division, 14th in Eastern Conference
[/h3]
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
After two long years of waiting for their cap space to arrive, the Knicks didn't blast the home run they were seeking. No, LeBron won't be coming to the Big Apple to save the day. Instead, the question of the day is whether the Knicks' other moves will finally make them respectable.
The clock is ticking on the Donnie Walsh-Mike D'Antoni partnership in New York now that their big summer splash in 2010 turned into more of a sprinkle. While Amare Stoudemire will help, he replicates a lot of the strengths and weaknesses of the departed David Lee. Other moves around the periphery should produce similar outcomes -- helpful, sure, but unlikely to translate into a dramatic U-turn in the standings.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 29-53 (Pythagorean W-L: 29-53)
Offensive Efficiency: 105.2 (15th)
Defensive Efficiency: 109.1 (27th)
Pace Factor: 96.1 (9th)
Highest PER: David Lee (22.2
The good news for New York is that it still has several cards to play. New York is on pace to have cap space to sign a big-ticket free agent in 2011 and again in 2012, so there's still time to significantly upgrade the Stoudemire-Gallinari-Randolph-Felton-Chandler core.
However, New York paid a huge ransom just to put itself in position to be a player in the Summer of LeBron, and it will pay the price for failure in the form of forfeited draft picks and other assets. In the final tally, New York may end up sacrificing three lottery picks -- 2009 first-rounder Jordan Hill and its 2011 and 2012 first-rounders -- just to create enough cap space to sign Raymond Felton. (The cap room to obtain Stoudemire was already there.) Needless to say, the Knicks were targeting bigger prey.
One also has to worry about the behind-the-scenes buffoonery of owner James Dolan. The news that he's still chummy with Isiah Thomas sent shockwaves through the Knicks' fan base, not to mention the rest of the front office. Few Knicks fans have forgotten that Thomas' ruinous rein earlier in the decade put the Knicks in this position in the first place, including trading New York's 2010 lottery pick in the disastrous Stephon Marbury trade.
Nonetheless, Dolan tried to hire Thomas as a consultant in the offseason, but the league quashed it as a conflict of interest since Thomas is coaching at Florida International. The terrifying possibility remains that Dolan will turn the team back over to Thomas once Walsh's contract ends in 2012, if not sooner.
As for the 2009-10 Knicks, at this point it hardly seems relevant to even mention them. It was, like the famous sitcom based in the Big Apple, a season about nothing. New York was planning on overhauling the roster after the season and pretty much everybody knew it.
Four players from last season's team mattered in the grand scheme. Three youngsters -- Danilo Gallinari, Wilson Chandler and Toney Douglas -- made solid if unexceptional progress and figure to be part of the team's rotation for the next several years … unless they need to be dangled in a trade for the elusive superstar that can put New York back into contention.
The fourth player was Bill Walker, quietly lifted from Boston in a trade-deadline deal for Nate Robinson. He played well enough late in the season to show potential as a high-scoring sixth man, especially if he can maintain his high shooting percentages from last season.
[h4]Opponent FG%, 2009-10's Worst[/h4]
| New York | 52.5 | 48.6 |
| Golden State | 51.5 | 48.5 |
| New Orleans | 52.0 | 48.3 |
| New Jersey | 50.9 | 48.1 |
| Detroit | 51.5 | 48.0 |
| NBA avg. | 49.2 | 46.1 |
The other story from New York's season was -- stop me if you've heard this before -- that D'Antoni's team didn't play any defense. Reportedly, he barely mentioned the word in practice, and it showed on the court. New York ranked last in opponent field goal percentage and opponent 2-point percentage (see chart), finishing 27th in defensive efficiency overall.
The old saying is that no man is an island, but on the Knicks' defense, everybody was. New York was the worst help-defending team in basketball, with Lee the biggest offender. A common occurrence during New York games was three Knicks players standing idly on the weak side while an opposing wing player blew by his man for an uncontested layup.
[h4]Fewest Opp. Assisted FGs, 2009-10[/h4]
| New York | 51.4 |
| San Antonio | 52.1 |
| Orlando | 52.5 |
| Sacramento | 52.6 |
| Phoenix | 52.7 |
| NBA avg. | 56.4 |
In a related story, Knicks foes didn't require fancy ball movement in order to score. New York opponents assisted on only 51.4 percent of their baskets, the lowest rate in the league (see chart). Often this is a sign of a good defense that doesn't need to double-team in the post, which is why San Antonio and Orlando placed second and third, respectively. In New York's case, it was a sign of how little regard the Knicks showed for the concept of team defense.
Offensively, the Knicks finished a respectable 15th despite a dreadful year from point guard Chris Duhon, thanks largely to Lee's breakout season. The Knicks shot tons of 3s in D'Antoni's space-it-and-shoot-it system, but not very effectively: New York came in second only to Orlando in 3-point attempts per field goal attempt, with nearly a third of its shots from long range, but it finished a mere 20th in accuracy.
The importance of those numbers, both offensively and defensively, is that those tendencies have stayed with D'Antoni regardless of personnel. One presumes future editions of the Knicks under his hand will remain heavily tilted toward offense and 3-point shooting and away from defense. Alas, his roster doesn't appear to be especially tilted toward the latter, which may limit how well the offense functions.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Acquired Amare Stoudemire, five-year, $100 million deal via sign-and-trade with Phoenix. New York was the only team who would guarantee Stoudemire five years given his uninsurable contract, although Dolan somehow thinks it was Thomas who sweet-talked Stoudemire into coming to New York.
Stoudemire will be worth the dough for as long as his knees and retina hold up, although oddly the main difference Knicks fans will see is on defense. Any improvement over Lee on the offensive end is minor, but Stoudemire's mediocre D should nonetheless be a major upgrade on Lee's awfulness at that end. New York also included a conditional second-round pick that the Suns won't receive unless the Knicks achieve a top-five record in 2011-12. Don't count on it.
Let Chris Duhon go, signed Raymond Felton for three years, $21 million. Felton was an unusual signing since he's not a great pick-and-roll player and D'Antoni loves to run the pick-and-roll -- especially with an elite dive man like Stoudemire. Felton is good value in every other respect, however. The dollars are reasonable and only the first two years are guaranteed, which is key to the Knicks being able to cycle back through the free-agent market in 2012. He's also a solid defender and scorer and can push the ball in transition, which D'Antoni likes to do.
Drafted Andy Rautins and Landry Fields. New York surprised observers by taking these two with picks 38 and 39, as many thought they were late second-rounders at best. One presumes the Knicks could have traded down and still procured their rights. Rautins is a shooting specialist while Fields is more of a pure scorer who relies on feel; both are in a good situation given the offensive bent of D'Antoni's tactics.
Purchased rights to Jerome Jordan from Milwaukee. The Knicks paid cash to Milwaukee for the 44th pick, one that changed hands more often in the weeks leading up to the draft than did 19th century New Orleans. Jordan is a solid big-man prospect but will play in Europe this season.
Signed and traded David Lee to Golden State for Anthony Randolph, Ronny Turiaf, Kelenna Azubuike and a 2011 second-round pick. This was an excellent move for the Knicks, allowing them to parlay Lee into a promising young player in Randolph and adding two other players with manageable contracts to preserve the Knicks' cap room in the next two summers.
Turiaf and Azubuike aren't without value. Turiaf is a shot-blocking center who will help one of the league's worst shot-blocking teams (the Knicks rated last in percentage of opponent shots blocked in 2008-09 and 29th last season). His presence should allow Stoudemire to play more minutes at his natural power forward spot. Azubuike is a solid offensive player, but he's coming off a bad knee injury and may not be ready for training camp.
Nonetheless, the plum here is Randolph. An erratic but talented young forward, he's potentially a star; he's also an extraordinary shot-blocker, so between him and Turiaf, the Knicks' deficiency in this department should be a thing of the past.
Signed Timofey Mozgov for three years, $10 million. The 7-foot-1 Russian center is this year's international man of mystery; nobody knew a lot about him entering the summer. His translated European stats aren't great, but his size alone should make him useful if he's willing to throw his body around -- New York has been desperate for a physical big man.
Let Al Harrington, Tracy McGrady, Eddie House and Sergio Rodriguez go. New York had to renounce the rights to several players in order to create its cap space. While Harrington in particular had his moments last season, none of these guys will be terribly missed.
Signed Roger Mason for one year, veteran's minimum. Mason turned in a terrible 2009-10 season but his shooting ability alone makes him a decent risk at this price. He'll provide some insurance for the guard rotation if Azubuike isn't ready.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Youth[/h3]
Don't look know, but New York has quietly built up a pretty good young core. Six Knicks aged 24 or younger should be in this season's rotation; while Randolph seems the only potential star in the group, they all have demonstrated enough ability to be starters someday. The Knicks don't have a key player above age 27 -- Stoudemire, who turns 28 in November, is the old man of the group.
By far the best prospect of the bunch is Randolph, who at just 21 has already proved to be an elite shot-blocker and possesses unusual ballhandling skill for a player his size. In some ways, he's the Knicks' most important performer this season -- his shot-blocking can negate Stoudemire's periodic lapses on D, while his "point forward" skills can offset the lack of passers up and down the roster.
But there's more. Gallinari, 22, had a very promising second season, considering he hardly played in the first one. While he was mainly a 3-point threat, he's hinted at the possibility of expanding his game into that of a true face-up scorer.
The 23-year-old Chandler played out of position last season and likely will have to again this season, which puts a damper on his output. He's not a good outside shooter and he's been forced to play shooting guard. His upside is as a running, athletic small forward, he can occasionally play as a smallball 4. He could prove lethal in such a role if he sharpens his accuracy from outside.
Although Walker, 23, and Douglas, 24, don't rate quite as highly on the prospects list, they put their names on the radar with strong performances late last season. Douglas showed promise as a two-way combo guard who might be ideal as the first guard off the pine, while Walker's natural scoring gifts seem to make him perfect as a go-to scorer with the second unit.
Finally, there's Mozgov, 24, who may not contribute much this season but offers intriguing potential in the middle with his ability to rebound.
The bad news for New York is that this young sextet is going to have to suffice for a long time. With no first-round picks in 2010 or 2012, a likely late first-rounder from Houston in 2011 and 2009 first-rounder Jordan Hill already traded to Houston, there will be no further infusions of youth for some time.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Shooting[/h3]
For a team built around a floor-spacing offense that generates a lot of 3-point attempts, it's jarring to see how few Knicks can actually shoot. Gallinari is an obvious exception, but last season he was more good than great (38.1 percent), and the other starters simply aren't up to snuff.
The starting shooting guard, for instance, shot 26.7 percent on 3-pointers last season. Newcomer Randolph replaces long-range bomber Harrington in the starting lineup, but Randolph is a shaky outside shooter whom opponents will dare to fire away. The only other halfway decent 3-point threat in the starting lineup is Felton, who shot 38.5 percent from distance last season -- but he did so on only two attempts per game and sits at only 32.7 percent for his career.
As a result, the starting lineup will have one lethal outside shooter and a bunch of players whom opponents will happily allow to launch away. So will D'Antoni, if history is any indication, and the worry is that the Knicks will mirror last season's offense by attempting a ton of 3s but making relatively few of them. If so, any offensive improvement produced by the offseason overhaul is likely to be negligible.
If there's hope to improve those numbers, it comes from the bench, although there are questions there too. Douglas hit 38.9 percent last season but had shaky numbers in college; he'll have to prove last season's performance is his real ability level and not an outlier. The same goes for Walker after his 43.1 percent mark a season ago blew away anything he'd accomplished at Kansas State. Azubuike, a 40.9 percent career shooter, is a question mark not because of performance but injury. Mason -- the likely fifth guard -- has a good career track record but struggled last season. In the frontcourt, there are no long-range floor spacers off the bench, although Turiaf can hit from 15.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Despite D'Antoni's inattention to defense, the Knicks are likely to be much better on that end strictly due to the personnel changes. A Stoudemire-Randolph frontcourt is far more imposing than last season's Lee-Harrington combo, and players like Turiaf and Mozgov can come off the pine and do the dirty work everyone shirked a season ago. Additionally, Felton is a quality defender at the point of attack and his likely backup, Douglas, also is very good.
That said, there's a difference between "improved" and "good." New York still doesn't have a wing defender worth his salt and the endeavor remains a low priority organizationally, making it hard to imagine the Knicks climbing out of the league's bottom third in defensive efficiency.
Offensively, any improvement is likely to be marginal. Felton is an upgrade on Duhon, the bench is a little better and the kids will be one year further into their development, but the Stoudemire-Randolph frontcourt will struggle to match the Lee-Harrington combo's output. The offense will likely be better than league average, but not dramatically so.
Fortunately for the Knicks, they play in the East, and that fact alone should permit them to share their first wisp of good news in some time: A playoff berth. It won't be the dramatic renaissance they'd hoped for two years ago when they embarked upon the current strategy, but at this point they'll take moral victories wherever they can find them.
[h3]Prediction: 37-45, 3rd in Atlantic Division, 8th in Eastern Conference
Updated: September 27, 2010, 1:19 PM ET
[h1]2010-11 Forecast: Philadelphia 76ers[/h1]
ESPN.com
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Yes, things look pretty bad in Philly right now, but it's not quite as bad as it appears.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 27-55 (Pythagorean W-L: 28-54)
Offensive Efficiency: 103.4 (20th)
Defensive Efficiency: 107.6 (23rd)
Pace Factor: 93.8 (23rd)
Highest PER: Lou Williams (18.25)
That's easy for me to say; you'll pardon Sixers fans for not seeing the glass as half-full. The team won 27 games last season, is capped out this year and made no major alterations. Plus, it won't have significant cap space until 2013 thanks to Elton Brand's $90 million stinker of a contract. But cheer up: The Sixers just hired the builder of a 12-70 team to run the franchise.
In all seriousness, the Sixers have made only two bad mistakes in the post-Billy King era. The first, obviously, was Brand's contract, a deal that became worse when the Sixers' attendance crashed and management couldn't go into the luxury tax to round out the team.
The second mistake was hiring Eddie Jordan, an offensive innovator with one of the league's most advanced playbooks, but one whose teams in Washington never played a lick of D. Not surprisingly, last season's Sixers didn't play any defense either. This became more problematic when Jordan's arrival also failed to significantly improve the offense.
Philadelphia has some good individual defenders and had never been a bad defensive team prior to last season, which makes the team's performance under Jordan all the more perplexing. Philadelphia finished last in 3-point defense, scalded for 39.3 percent shooting as one confused rotation after another led to wide-open triples for opponents.
[h4]Worst 3-Point Defense, 2009-10[/h4]
| Philadelphia | 39.3 |
| Detroit | 37.5 |
| Golden State | 37.5 |
| New Jersey | 36.6 |
| Toronto | 36.6 |
| League average | 35.5 |
Because of the soft D and the Brand contract, it's easy to forget that the Sixers have some strong advantages in their favor. Most of their best players are quite young, including Andre Iguodala, Lou Williams, Marreese Speights, Thaddeus Young, Spencer Hawes and Jrue Holiday. Holiday, in fact, was the youngest player in the league last season. Adding rookies Evan Turner and Craig Brackins to that mix offers some promise for the years ahead.
Offensively, the Sixers were mediocre across the board, finishing below the league average in nearly every category but not dramatically below par in any. The one category in which they stood out was that it was difficult to block their shots -- only 5 percent of their attempts were rejected, largely because the big guys tended to shoot midrange jumpers rather than post up or go to the rim.
[h4]Fewest Shots Blocked, 2009-10[/h4]
| Orlando | 4.5 |
| Philadelphia | 5.0 |
| Dallas | 5.0 |
| Cleveland | 5.1 |
| Portland | 5.2 |
| League average | 5.9 |
Alas, the shot-happy ways of Brand and Speights typified the team's many problems last season. And I'm not sure the offense has an easy cure. Philly remains riddled by a lack of outside shooting, as none of its five best perimeter players are consistent long-range threats. The team's only good 3-point shooter, Jason Kapono, is so awful in every other respect, he's virtually unplayable. Philly's best hope is that Holiday, who made 39 percent of his 3s as a rookie, continues to evolve as a floor-spacing threat.
But Philly needs more than shooting -- it also needs a post threat. Big men Brand, Speights, Songaila, Brackins and Hawes all do the same thing, indiscriminately jacking up 18-footers off the pick-and-pop. As a result, the offense doesn't have a focal point and doesn't space the floor well. The hope is that Turner will serve as a go-to guy, but expecting that from him immediately may be asking too much.
Fortunately, the Sixers should play much better defensively thanks to the coaching change that ushered in Doug Collins. Collins is a compulsive nit-picker whose meticulous attention to detail will enable him to make a significant impact in the short term -- although that same quality will drive the team nuts in two years' time. It's possible that he's lightened up a bit in his older age, which would make this tenure much more bearable than his years in Washington and Detroit.
Certainly, he will bring a degree of accountability that didn't exist under Jordan. That alone should have a strong influence because the Sixers have some defensive talent on the roster. Iguodala and Holiday in particular are tremendously pesky, while players like Speights, Hawes, Young and Williams are capable of much more than they've shown.
The Sixers also demoted general manager Ed Stefanski over the summer, not by changing his title but by hiring Rod Thorn as team president above him. The two previously worked together with the Nets in similar roles, so this arrangement won't be as awkward as it appears on the surface. The more vexing question is why the Sixers felt Thorn was a desirable replacement. His reputation in New Jersey was that he was sharp on big-picture moves but middling on the smaller stuff, especially the draft.
http://[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
The Sixers made more personnel moves in the executive branch than they did on the court during an extremely quiet summer.
Drafted Evan Turner. This was a no-brainer choice with the second pick. DeMarcus Cousins arguably has more talent, but Turner looks about a thousand times safer from a personality and makeup standpoint. Turner probably will start on the wing alongside Andre Iguodala and likely fill a heavy offensive role from the word "go."
Traded Sam Dalembert to Sacramento for Andres Nocioni and Spencer Hawes. This deal slid the Sixers under the luxury tax, but only at the cost of taking on Nocioni's toxic $6.8 million obligation for next season. However, the Dalembert-Hawes swap isn't a bad one for a developing team like Philadelphia. Hawes is just 22, and while he was a frustrating player in Sacramento, he's also 7-foot-1 and skilled.
Additionally, Nocioni may provide some ancillary benefits as a floor-spacing 4 because the Sixers seem desperate for additional shooting. There's a caution flag here because Doug Collins can develop irrational attachments to limited veteran role players, but I suspect Nocioni will represent more than just dead money this season.
Signed Tony Battie for one year, veteran's minimum. Thorn had Battie in New Jersey last season, so one presumes Thorn has more knowledge than most about what's left in Battie's tank. Battie does provide something the Sixers lack as a big man with defensive instincts, but his knees are in such poor shape that it's questionable what, if anything, he's capable of contributing.
Traded Willie Green and Jason Smith to New Orleans for Darius Songaila and Craig Brackins. I love this trade for multiple reasons. First, Brackins is the only player in the deal with the potential to be anything more than a back-end rotation player two years down the road, so on upside it's a home run for the Sixers. Second, Philly is desperate for more shooting and both Songaila and Brackins can stroke it.
http://[h3]Biggest Strength: Penetration[/h3]
Philly may struggle in some other areas, but one thing the Sixers will excel at is getting to the basket. They have several of the best penetrators in basketball and will rely on them to produce offense either by scoring at the rim or dishing off.
In the backcourt, Holiday was a revelation toward the end of last season and should continue to develop at the ripe old age of 20. He needs to improve as a floor general and take better advantage of his size, but he should be a much more active participant in the offense this season.
Williams, the likely sixth man, is one of the quickest players in the league and has dramatically reduced what was once a shockingly high turnover rate. His handle and passing skills have improved enough for him to play the point, but instinctively he's still a 2. At either spot, however, he can dash to the bucket almost any time.
Iguodala is a similar threat on the wing. One of the league's most athletic players, he's a devastating finisher at the basket but also a tremendous passer with good instincts. Opponents usually lay off and dare him to shoot, but he's athletic enough to turn the corner even against sagging defenses.
Finally, there's Turner. A wild card as a rookie, Turner's smooth game at Ohio State reminded lots of observers of Portland's Brandon Roy. Turner will be another main offensive cog for Philly, likely as the starting wing alongside Iguodala.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Frontcourt defense[/h3]
A better team concept combined with several capable defenders on the perimeter should help insulate the Sixers' defense from some of the ravages it suffered a year ago. Minus the shot-blocking of Dalembert, however, Philly's frontcourt suddenly looks soft and unathletic.
Brand is undersized at 6-8 and athletically he's faded. In fact, it's possible he'll come off the bench and Young will move up to the 4 to start ahead of him. Of course, Young himself is undersized for the position and will be there more for his rotating and quickness than for defending the post or blocking shots. Nocioni, who will also play here in stretches, faces similar weaknesses.
The other bigs have the same problems. Hawes was derided for his soft play in Sacramento, although he does block shots. Speights has a large frame but gave little effort on D last season and is short for a center at 6-10. Finally, there are Brackins and Songaila at the back end of the rotation. Songaila is just 6-8 and not particularly mobile, while rookie Brackins needs to add strength while taking the usual rookie lumps. Since the other 4s are undersized too, their addition reinforces a weakness prevalent throughout Philly's frontcourt.
Somehow, Collins will have to cobble an effective defensive rotation from this group.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
I'm far more optimistic about the Sixers than most; in fact I, expect them to make the playoffs. Before you petition ESPN to have me committed, allow me to explain. Two factors in particular have me bullish on Philly. First, Collins will make the team dramatically better on defense than it was a year ago, simply by adding a level of accountability and preparation that didn't exist previously.
Second, the Sixers have an underrated store of young talent and I suspect they're capable of fairly rapid improvement. Holiday, in particular, should make strong progress from a year ago, but Young (22), Hawes (22), Speights (23), Williams (24), Brackins (23) and even Iguodala (26) all are capable of taking their games up another notch or two.
I made Philly's projection with fairly modest estimates for Turner and Holiday, but if Turner has a Rookie of the Year-caliber season, it would provide another reason to believe in a mini-renaissance by the Sixers. Brackins could be another positive, especially if he adds a desperately-needed shooter to the rotation.
I do worry a bit about Collins' interactions with young players, but most of Philly's are far enough into their careers to benefit from his message without having their confidence crushed. Turner and Holiday are the exceptions, so one must hope Collins has mellowed enough to handle them with some care. If so, Philly could make one of the league's biggest improvements this season.
[h3]Prediction: 43-39, 2nd in Atlantic Division, 7th in Eastern Conference
[/h3]
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Based purely on wins and losses, Toronto's 2009-10 campaign wasn't half bad: The Raptors won about as many as they lost and nearly made the playoffs after a 31-win campaign a year earlier.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 40-42 (Pythagorean W-L: 35-47)
Offensive Efficiency: 108.6 (6th)
Defensive Efficiency: 110.2 (30th)
Pace Factor: 95.4 (13th)
Highest PER: Chris Bosh (25.11)
By every other standard, however, the Raptors' season was a basketball Hindenberg, one that cost them the best player in franchise history and will likely relegate them to the nether regions of the Eastern Conference standings for some time to come.
The hope was that Toronto's offseason moves -- led by the addition of Hedo Turkoglu -- would convince star forward Chris Bosh of the robustness of his supporting cast so that he would stay in Toronto and lead the charge up the ranks of Eastern Conference contenders.
Suffice it to say Toronto's hopes were quickly dashed. Not only did the Raptors receive little bang for their buck from Turkoglu's massive contract -- as even rudimentary statistical analysis would have suggested before the season -- the supporting cast was laden with softies who were found wanting. The sad part is that this was probably the high-water mark for what this roster and coaching staff could achieve: Bosh enjoyed his best season as a pro, the rest of the squad was reasonably healthy and Toronto won five more games than expected based on its scoring margin. Despite all that, the Raptors still couldn't manage a winning record.
The main reason Toronto failed was an embarrassing defensive performance that briefly had the Raptors vying for the honor of the worst defensive team in history. While a lack of talent was an obvious problem -- center Andrea Bargnani was among the league's flimsiest interior defenders and point guard Jose Calderon a glorified traffic cone -- the Raptors' biggest issue was their sheer lack of preparation and accountability.
Things improved slightly after multiple players complained about the coaching staff's seeming indifference following a loss to Atlanta in which the Raptors gave up 146 points. But by the end of the season, Toronto's D was just as bad as ever. Clearly Bargnani, Calderon and the others had not been held accountable for their mistakes.
The lack of defensive mettle reflects poorly on coach Jay Triano, to whom management has remained steadfastly loyal despite evidence that he's in far over his head. One of the main indicators of coaching quality is defensive effort -- everybody tries on offense -- and last season the Raps failed miserably in that respect. While fellow coaches respect Triano's basketball knowledge, as a motivator he's about as effective as Muzak.
[h4]Defensive Efficiency, 2009-10'S Worst[/h4]
| Toronto | 110.2 |
| Golden State | 109.4 |
| Minnesota | 109.3 |
| New York | 109.1 |
| Detroit | 108.9 |
| League average | 104.9 |
Toronto ranked last in the NBA in defensive efficiency (see chart) with such an impressively bad performance that even a Golden State team whose coach openly mailed in the season couldn't match the Raptors' ineptitude. While Toronto finished below the league average in every defensive metric, the one that really stood out was its inability to force turnovers. Raptors opponents had miscues on only 13.2 percent of possessions, the lowest rate in basketball. Between the paucity of turnovers and a subpar defensive rebound rate, only one team permitted more shot attempts per possession.
In at least one respect, however, Toronto suffered from bad luck. For some reason, Raptors opponents were unflappable from the line; we can't fault the players and coaches for that. Toronto's 78.4 opponent free throw percentage was a full point better than any other team's (see chart), and compared to the league average it cost them about 54 points over the course of the season.
[h4]Opponent Free Throw %, 2009-10's Worst[/h4]
| Toronto | 78.4 |
| Minnesota | 77.4 |
| Sacramento | 77.4 |
| Denver | 76.8 |
| Detroit | 76.7 |
| League average | 75.9 |
Toronto's misfortune with opponent free throws added about 0.7 points to its defensive efficiency mark. Of course, even if the Raptors' opponents had just shot the league average, they still would have finished last. The foul shooting merely exacerbated an already awful situation.
The shame of it is that offensively, Toronto was really good. The Bosh-Bargnani frontcourt combo was difficult for opponents to defend, and with five shooters on the floor at most times, the Raptors always had an opening to probe in the opposing defense. Even with Turkoglu bombing and rookie DeMar DeRozan getting extended playing time for reasons that weren't entirely clear, Toronto finished sixth in offensive efficiency.
In the end, however, this was a team full of DHs built entirely to win shootouts, and it wasn't good enough to execute that plan consistently. With Bosh gone, now comes the reckoning.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
While Bosh's departure was obviously the big story, the other surprise in Toronto's offseason was the absence of any other big moves. Most notably, Triano somehow kept his job, but ownership also passed on an option to terminate the contract of general manager Bryan Colangelo. With one year left on his deal, he's come under fire for building a flawed roster around Bosh and hiring Triano, setting the stage for the star forward's departure. Yet smoke signals from the Toronto tepee indicate the Raps may extend his deal.
Two other un-made moves drew headlines. First, Colangelo put a spectacular trade in place with the Bobcats to liberate Tyson Chandler and Boris Diaw in return for Jose Calderon and Reggie Evans. However, Charlotte backed out at the last minute.
Second, during free agency the Raptors proudly leaked the news that they'd agreed to a two-year, $9 million sign-and-trade deal with Orlando for Matt Barnes. There was only one problem -- it wasn't legal under the salary cap, starting with the word "two" (sign-and-trade deals must be for at least three years) and extending to the dollars and the involvement of Orlando. It was shocking to see an NBA front office foul up something so rudimentary (although one could argue that would explain a lot about Toronto). In reality, the most the Raptors could have legally offered was just $6 million over three years, so Barnes eventually signed with the Lakers instead.
Drafted Ed Davis and Solomon Alabi. I'm not as high on Davis as most other scouts; he rated poorly in my Draft Rater after a fairly ordinary sophomore season. Plus, as a skinny guy who will get pushed around, he could have landed on a better roster since Toronto has nobody to protect him. However, his athleticism will help on a roster with a glaring lack of it and he should play immediately.
Alabi was a strong sleeper pick late in the second round. He's a good defensive center who had some health question marks and needs to improve offensively, but he could prove quite helpful given the Raps' woeful D.
Signed and traded Chris Bosh to Miami for a 2011 first-round pick and return of Toronto's 2011 first-round pick. This nets the Raptors something for Bosh's departure, although it's a pittance compared to what was lost. Toronto also landed a $16 million trade exception it could utilize during the season. However, the Raps may prefer to let it lie because they project to have roughly $20 million in cap space next summer.
Signed Amir Johnson to five-year, $34 million deal. On a per-minute basis, Johnson is a very solid player and merits his big payday. The problem is that he can't stay on the court because he fouls so often, so it's hard to imagine him being a long-term starter. And as a reserve, his five-year, $34 million deal is one of the most questionable of the offseason -- this summer's Exhibit A for those arguing that the free-agent market spun out of control.
Signed Linas Kleiza for four years, $20 million. Kleiza impressed with his play for Lithuania in the World Championship, but his translated Euroleague stats from last season weren't any different from what he'd accomplished as a Nugget. That player was a quality reserve but not worth anywhere near the money Toronto threw at him this summer. In Toronto's defense, at least it spent on younger players -- Kleiza seems like he's been around forever but is only 25, while Johnson is 23.
Traded Hedo Turkoglu to Phoenix for Leandro Barbosa and Dwayne Jones. Not only was this a figurative hand-washing of last season's biggest mistake, it also made sense on every level. Jones was cut on arrival, but Barbosa is younger, better and makes less money than Turkoglu, making this deal an absolute no-brainer for the Raps. Fortunately for Toronto, the Suns were roped into Turkoglu's "name" status the same way the Raps had been a year earlier.
Traded a conditional second-round pick to Houston for David Andersen and cash. A better way to read this is "paid by Rockets to take David Andersen off their hands." Yet another soft, jump-shooting foreigner, Andersen brings little to the table and will likely serve as a fifth big man. Anything he contributes is gravy: The conditions on the draft pick make it unlikely Toronto will ever need to surrender it.
Traded Marco Belinelli to New Orleans for Julian Wright. I liked Belinelli but he had no role after the Barbosa trade, so swapping him for a small forward who can defend was a solid move. Wright's development stalled in New Orleans but the surrounding shooters in Toronto may offer more opportunity for his slashing and passing skills. If not, they've risked little -- he's an expiring contract.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Shooting[/h3]
The Raptors will experience trouble in a lot of other areas, but they'll have nights when they shoot the lights out and win because of it. Toronto generated the league's sixth-best offense with Bosh last season and may finish around the league average even without him.
The Raps have several qualified long-range bombers, starting with the 7-foot Bargnani, who made 37.2 percent of his 3s while taking four a game from the center position. His size-skill combo makes him a very difficult cover, and with Bosh gone he's likely to move up to a leading man role. Andersen, while of limited use in other areas, offers another 7-footer with deep range.
At the point, Toronto owns two other marksmen in Calderon and Jack. Calderon boasts the better career track record, but last season it was Jack (41.4 percent) who was the superior long-range shooter.
On the wings, Barbosa endured a tough 2009-10 but has shot 39.8 percent for his career from 3, while Kleiza is another decent marksman. Those combos allow the Raps to play four shooters at once and space the floor, much as they've done the past few seasons. Additionally, all the players I mentioned are low-turnover types, which should add to Toronto's offensive efficiency.
Toronto also has a few good short-range shooters. Johnson is the best of the bunch, as he's a high-percentage finisher (63 percent on 2s last season) who can drive down the middle of a relatively open lane given the surrounding shooters. Weems is another player who finishes his business near the bucket, and rookie Davis should thrive in this area too.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Frontcourt defense[/h3]
Not breaking news here, but the Raptors are softer than chenille. The starting center shrinks from contact and spends most of the game camped out on the perimeter, while the starting power forward is 6-9, 210 pounds and about as strong as decaf.
Bargnani is the main problem, as at 7-0, 250 he should be a much more capable defender than he's shown. While he's had his moments as a shot-blocker and on-ball post defender, he's shown no inclination whatsoever to protect the basket or to help his teammates. The next time he uses his body to fight for position will be the first. The team's other 7-footer, meanwhile, is Andersen, one of the league's few players who is even more terrified of contact than Bargnani.
At power forward, Johnson gives a decent effort but simply can't compete strength-wise with NBA power forwards. The fact that his backup, Davis, has a similar build doesn't offer much encouragement for Toronto's ability to deal with muscular opponents inside.
For beef, the Raps can turn to Evans, but he offers a different conundrum -- while he's plenty physical and strong, he's no longer good enough to be part of an NBA rotation.
Finally, they'll get no help from the perimeter guys. With Toronto's other positions just as overmatched defensively as the frontcourt, the Raptors' bigs will spend most of their nights trying to stymie opposing drivers when they aren't getting their brains beat in by bigger post players. If they can't figure out how to make it work, they're likely to repeat as the league's worst defense.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Toronto was the league's worst defensive team and no player on its roster finished in the top 75 in PER last season. Other than that, everything should be great.
While the Raptors have several players who can score at a respectable clip, they're likely to struggle again on the defensive end. One hopes the effort will be less pathetic than it was a season ago, but with the same coaching staff and many of the same players, there isn't any compelling reason to suspect that will happen.
Instead, I expect Toronto to be on the tail end of numerous 128-110 shellackings. The Raptors have some shooters but lack star talent on offense, so minus Bosh it will be difficult for them to rank above the league average at that end. Meanwhile, they'll again place 29th or 30th in defensive efficiency.
Add it all up and it should be a long, bitter winter in Toronto. Raps fans straining for good news will note that Toronto has more rebuilding pieces in place than most teams in this situation, as the roster is fairly young, there's cap space in the future and the draft will begin pushing it forward in coming seasons.
But for 2010-11? This is going to be ugly; in fact, Toronto may finish with the league's worst record. I'd be shocked if the Raptors so much as challenged for the playoffs, let alone qualified for them.
[h3]Prediction: 22-60, 5th in Atlantic Division, 15th in Eastern Conference
Updated: September 27, 2010, 10:45 AM ET
[h1]2010-11 Forecast: Chicago Bulls[/h1]
By John HollingerESPN.com
Archive
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Given how directionless and dysfunctional the Bulls have looked for most of the past two seasons, it's unclear how they've managed to escape the lottery. Somhow, Chicago has emerged from the rubble poised to become one of the East's top teams for the next several years.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 41-41 (Pythagorean W-L: 35-47)
Offensive Efficiency: 100.8 (28th)
Defensive Efficiency: 102.6 (10th)
Pace Factor: 95.5 (12th)
Highest PER: Derrick Rose (18.69)
That prediction didn't exactly seem pre-ordained for much of last season. Second-year guard Derrick Rose struggled early with an ankle injury, and second-year coach Vinny Del Negro continued his bumpy introduction to the coaching profession. The team seemed on the verge of quitting on him at several junctures, most notably during a one-month stretch when they lost by 35, 32, 26, 24, 19, 19, and blew a 35-point lead against Sacramento for good measure.
To the credit of both Del Negro and the players, they never capitulated. Following the season, Del Negro was cut loose after squabbling with the front office, but the second half of the year illustrated why Chicago retains so much promise going forward. Even with the Bulls trimming salaries and forsaking roster additions, dumping starters John Salmons and Tyrus Thomas at the trade deadline, a healthy Rose and a stout defense provided enough fuel for the Bulls to sneak into the playoffs.
That said, good fortune played a role, too. The Bulls compiled the scoring margin of a 35-win team, which is an important consideration to remember moving forward because the floor from which they built during free agency this past summer was lower than many assumed.
Offensively, Chicago had two glaring weaknesses. The first was a lack of low-post scoring. Neither Joakim Noah nor Thomas was a threat with his back to the basket. That left Chicago reliant on a Rose-heavy offense that, in theory, could space the floor for Rose to attack off the dribble. In practice, however, the second obvious weakness, their inablity to shoot, prevented such a goal from becoming reality.
[h4]Fewest 3-Point Att. Per FGA, '09-10[/h4]
| Memphis | .148 |
| Chicago | .156 |
| Minnesota | .171 |
| Detroit | .180 |
| New Jersey | .181 |
| League average | .222 |
With Ben Gordon's departure in free agency and Kirk Hinrich continuing to struggle, Chicago landed 29th in 3-point attempts per field-goal attempt (see chart) and 28th in 3-point percentage. Even the Bulls that could shoot, including Rose, second-leading scorer Luol Deng, power forward Thomas and Taj Gibson, were mostly mid-range specialists.
Although the Bulls signed Kyle Korver in the offseason to address the 3-point shortage, shooting still looms as a major weakness. Their top four 3-point shooters a year ago were Salmons, Hinrich, Jannero Pargo and Brad Miller, none of whom remain on the roster. Rose and Deng made only 48 triples among them, and that's two-thirds of the starting perimeter group.
While the Bulls were limited offensively, defense was a different story. Noah filled out physically and turned into a beast at the center position, and late first-round pick Gibson proved a steal as a long-armed stopper at power forward. With perimeter defenders like Hinrich, Salmons and Deng on hand, too, the Bulls ranked 10th in defensive efficiency, even with Rose turning in a mostly disinterested performance and the team's limited roster beyond the top seven players.
They can do even better this season because new coach Tim Thibodeau is a masterful defensive coach and Rose is almost certain to improve, given his impressive physical skills. One way they could get better would be to apply more pressure. Despite their athleticism, the Bulls were among the league's worst teams at forcing turnovers, ranking 24th at 13.8 percent of opponents possessions.
That was a double-edged sword, as it prevented the team from getting out and running -- the obvious antidote to Chicago's inability to stretch opposing defenses in the halfcourt. The Bulls placed 17th in fastbreak points per game. With the greyhounds they have this season, they should race into the top 10.
Nonetheless, the most important part of Chicago's season transpired at the trading deadline. By shipping out Thomas and Salmons, the team cleared enough cap room to set the stage for a fruitful summer. Incidentally, the Bulls still have just over $2 million in cap room, which could prove helpful in facilitating a trade during the course of the season.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Despite their funds, the Bulls didn't get either of their top two target,: Dwyane Wade and LeBron James. Nevertheless, the Bulls had a hugely successful offseason that puts them in great shape for the next few seasons. Chicago ended up with no draft picks after swapping away their first-rounder on draft day and giving up their second-rounder in a 2008 deal for Omer Asik's rights.
Traded Hinrich, cash and the 17th pick to Washington for Vladimir Veeremenko. The Bulls essentially paid Washington to take Hinrich's $9 million salary off their books. That was final step in clearing enough cap space to take a major plunge in free agency. The 17th pick was part of the bribe. Veeremenko has a better chance of discovering cold fusion than he does of suiting up for the Bulls. He was merely included because league rules required some asset, however meaningless, be sent to the other team to complete a trade.
Fired Del Negro, hired Thibodeau. This was a huge development, as Del Negro's inexperience and simplified offensive schemes seemed to be holding the team back. Thibodeau arrives with a reputation as a defensive mastermind, but he'll have to show that he can be equally creative at the offensive end and that he can manage a season effectively. The latter point is in some question. Some wonder if Thibodeau is too intense to keep his eye on the big picture. As an example, in his one chance to coach the Celtics last season (after a Doc Rivers ejection), he went the entire second half without making a substitution.
Signed Carlos Boozer for five years, $75 million. Technically this was a sign-and-trade with Utah and one that also netted the Bulls the 2011 second-rounder that belonged to the Jazz. Nothing of value went to Utah except a trade exception. Short of landing one of the Miami trio, the Bulls could not have fared better here. They needed both a low-post scorer and a pick-and-pop weapon, and got both in one shot. Boozer has missed a ton of games over the past five years, but at 28 he should be able to produce at a high level over the life of the contract.
Signed Kyle Korver for three years, $15 million. Korver set an NBA record by hitting 53.6 percent of his 3-pointers last season, so the attraction to the shooting-starved Bulls was obvious. While Korver isn't good enough to start, he'll provide a nice option to change up games when opponents are packing the paint against Chicago.
Signed J.J. Redick to a three-year, $20 million offer sheet. Redick's outside shooting and ability to play the two spot would have been a perfect fit on this squad, but unfortunately the Magic matched the offer.
Signed Ronnie Brewer for three years, $12.5 million. It may seem like the Bulls are hell bent on reassembling the 2008 Utah Jazz, but Brewer's addition was simply a case of it being too good a value to pass up. The Bulls would rather have their starting shooting guard be a better shooter than Brewer, who can't make 3s at all and is shaky even from mid-range, exacerbating a pre-existing weakness. Additionally, his defense hasn't matched up to his physical skills. Nonetheless, getting a solid player with only two guaranteed years at this price provided an easy way for the Bulls to fill their hole at the two.
Signed-and-traded Hakim Warrick to Phoenix for a 2011 second-round pick. Chicago had no use for Warrick, but at least gets a draft pick for its troubles. The Bulls won't get a trade exception since they were under the cap at the time.
Let Miller go, signed Asik for three years, $4 million deal. I liked this move. Miller struggled as the backup center last year while Asik is a 2008 second-round pick that played in Turkey last year. His translated numbers from last season were OK, but his work from previous seasons suggests he's an NBA player that can contribute immediately. He'll have to because he's the only center besides Noah on the roster.
Traded second-round pick to Golden State in sign-and-trade for C.J. Watson. Chicago rounded out its guard rotation by giving Watson a three-year, $10.2 million deal. This was a good deal overall. Watson didn't shoot the ball well last year, but he's been a good 3-point shooter for his career. While he'll primarily serve as the backup point guard, he can pair with Rose occasionally in the backcourt.
Signed Kurt Thomas for one year, $1.8 million. Chicago was desperate for some additional size, and nabbed the veteran to fill out the roster. We shouldn't expect much from him, but he'll at least defend a bit and can hit an open jumper.
Signed Keith Bogans for two years, $3.2 million. Bogans' deal is only partially guaranteed for the second season, which makes sense because he hasn't been good in a long time. Theoretically, he fits the Bulls' needs -- he's a two who can defend and make 3s -- but his production has been so anemic of late that it's tough to justify keeping him on the floor.
Signed Brian Scalabrine for one year, veteran's minimum. This confused me, because I thought they already had a mascot. The deal isn't guaranteed but there appears little doubt Scal will stick -- Thibodeau wanted to bring Scalabrine with him from Boston as an end-of-the-bench and locker-room guy, and I allow that he could have value in that capacity. As a player, however, he has none.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Speed[/h3]
Look at that starting lineup. It's a track meet waiting to happen. While Boozer isn't known for his speed, the other four starters blaze up and down the floor and figure to play more of an open-court game than the Bulls displayed a year ago. Rose obviously is the focal point, as his jets and finishing skills make him an ideal catalyst in transition.
The difference this season is his running mates. Brewer can get up and down, and is a great finisher at the rim. A healthy Deng and Noah would provide two more athletic running mates for Rose. Noah in particular runs the floor as well as any player at his position.
Chicago's reserves aren't slouches in this department either. Watson and Gibson can run the floor, and while Korver won't be throwing down highlight-reel dunks he's among the best at trailing the break and hitting a 3-pointer on the run.
As a result, Chicago should make a big improvement on last year's middle standing in fast-break points, bolstering an offense that may continue to struggle in the halfcourt.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Floor spacing[/h3]
Despite the additions of Boozer, Korver and Watson, there will be many nights when the Bulls' opponents seemingly have five defenders with a foot in the paint. This is particularly true at the beginning of games. Chicago's five projected starters hit 56 3-pointersas a team last season, which is going to make it awfully difficult for the Rose-Boozer pick-and-roll combo to find seams in the opposing defense. Additionally, neither Brewer nor Noah is a threat, even on long 2s, providing further impetus for opponents to pack it in.
Things won't be as bad when they go to the bench because Korver, Watson and Bogans all are 3-point threats. If everyone matches last year's totals, the Bulls will make only 245 3-pointers this season, which would put them nearly a hundred behind every other team and barely half of the league average. Somehow, the Bulls will have to make up what projects to be a giant 3-point deficit.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
There's no question things are looking up in Chicago. Thibodeau is just the guy to take an already talented defensive group and turn it into a force of nature, and Rose is blossoming into one of the game's top point guards. The easily forgotten Deng remains one of the best small forwards in the conference. Throw in the emerging Noah-Boozer frontcourt and the promising Gibson-Asik pairing to back them up, and the Bulls should be a top-five team in the East for years to come.
Unfortunately, I don't think the Bulls' offense is going to match its defense. Rose, for all his gifts, is not a good long-range shooter, and that replicates a weakness found up and down the roster. The wing players as a group are a grade below what's found on most contending teams, and any injuries to the historically fragile Noah-Boozer combo will blow open a crater in the frontcourt rotation.
I expect the Bulls to be a good team, but not anything more. They could easily be a top-five defense and could place two players into the All-Star Game, but I have a hard time seeing them moving above the league average in offensive efficiency. Until or unless they do, 50 wins is their ceiling.
[h3]Prediction: 48-34, 2nd in Central Division, 5th in Eastern Conference
Originally Published: September 27, 2010
[h1]2010-11 Forecast: Cleveland Cavaliers[/h1]
By John HollingerESPN.com
Archive
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
One fine week in early May, everything seemed just peachy for the Cavs. http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=1966LeBron James had just delivered a masterful performance in a 124-95 rout of Boston in Game 3 of the Eastern Conference semifinals, the Cavs had a 2-1 lead and home-court advantage for the remainder of the postseason, and it seemed another showdown with Orlando was all that stood between them and the Finals.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 61-21 (Pythagorean W-L: 61-21)
Offensive Efficiency: 108.8 (4th)
Defensive Efficiency: 101.5 (7th)
Pace Factor: 93.5 (25th)
Highest PER: LeBron James (31.19)
Within a week, all hell broke loose. James gained a head start on free agency by checking out of the final three games, eventually leaving the team in about the most tactless way possible following the season. Both the coach and general manager were fired, the owner posted a crazed letter on the team's website that seemed to be written in crayon, and an entire city was left in shock.
Let's try to piece together where it went right, and then where it all went wrong.
The Cavaliers, during the regular season and the first three weeks of the playoffs, were a team of many strengths, but almost all of those strengths hinged on the superlative talents of a single player. Cleveland won 61 games, with estimated wins added crediting James with roughly 30 of them; you can quibble about whether that figure should be 25 or 35, but the basic, undeniable takeaway is that this was a sub-.500 team without its star.
That same fact had bitten the Cavs in the 2009 conference finals against the Magic; their solution this time around was to build a team that could better match up against Orlando. In a lot of ways, in fact, this Cavs team was better balanced than the team that had won 66 games the previous season, especially after adding http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=385Antawn Jamison at midseason. They were good enough that they didn't miss a beat after losing Shaquille O'Neal after the All-Star break, while also surviving the off-court struggles of http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2422Delonte West and Zydrunas Ilgauskas' sudden decline.
Cleveland finished fourth in offensive efficiency and seventh in defensive efficiency (the fact that their scrubs played over the final five games softened both numbers). Offensively, the Cavs dazzled around the basket. Cleveland boasted three of the top five shooters in the basket area (see chart); amazingly, none of the three were named Shaquille. As a team, the Cavs shot .623 at the rim; the league average was .560. Alas, the player most responsible for those shots is now gone, and the Cavs are likely to regress to the league average or worse in this department.
[h4]Top Shooting Percentage In Basket Area, 2009-10[/h4]
| LeBron James | Cle | 428 | 601 | .712 |
| Amir Johnson | Tor | 182 | 1274 | .664 |
| J.J. Hickson | Cle | 259 | 394 | .657 |
| Steve Nash | Phx | 134 | 204 | .657 |
| Anderson Varejao | Cle | 233 | 355 | .656 |
Fortunately, the Cavs also were lights-out on 3s. Cleveland made 38.1 percent from downtown to finish second in the league, with starting guards http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=635Anthony Parker and http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2178Mo Williams both converting over 40 percent. It's easy to say that losing LeBron will take away this advantage because of all the attention he drew, but James actually brought down the average -- he led the team in 3-point attempts and made only 33.3 percent. It's possible the Cavs will remain a top-five team from distance this season.
The only thing they couldn't do was make free throws. Cleveland hit just 72 percent from the line, ranking last in the NBA. The good news here is that the two players most responsible for this dubious distinction, James and O'Neal, are both gone.
In the big picture, Cleveland may not have as much of a problem making shots in the post-LeBron era as simply getting free for them in the first place. Jamison is the only player remaining on the roster who placed in the top 20 at his position in usage rate last season. Four key rotation players (http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2419Anderson Varejao, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3006Daniel Gibson, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3249Jamario Moon and Anthony Parker) landed in the bottom 10.
Cleveland's defense displayed similar potency, ranking third in opponent field goal percentage and cleaning up all the misses -- the Cavs grabbed second place in defensive rebound rate. With a huge lineup, the Cavs could play a low-risk style and force opponents to shoot over them; they ranked only 28th in forcing turnovers, and only James gambled much on defense.
[h4]Top Def. Reb. Teams, 2009-10[/h4]
| Orlando | 77.4 |
| Cleveland | 77.2 |
| Milwaukee | 76.4 |
| San Antonio | 76.3 |
| Utah | 75.6 |
| League average | 73.7 |
This was the greatest feather in Mike Brown's cap. Cleveland's superlative D was much more than just LeBron -- Varejao, in particular, was a monster -- and Brown's ability to squeeze so much defensively from the supporting cast would have been the Cavs' best hope of staying relevant in the post-James era.
However, the Cavs dismissed Brown after the season because his Achilles heel -- an inability to make quick adjustments in playoff series -- flared up again. After sitting on his hands during the Orlando series a year earlier, Brown unleashed the opposite tact against Boston: Midway through the series he started grasping at straws, accelerating his team's shocking descent. Examples include inexplicably leaning on Ilgauskas for heavy minutes, benching emerging second-year pro http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3437J.J. Hickson, and making the baffling insertion of little-used Gibson just as Game 5 was going irretrievably to the dogs.
Hickson's disappearance, in particular, was a head-scratcher. He averaged double figures over the final three months and scored 24 points in 31 minutes in the first two games of the Boston series. He played nine minutes in the final three games.
Of course, James' play over those final three games of the Celtics series will be a topic of future examination. James connected on less than 40 percent of his shots in each of the final three games, something that happened only twice in his previous 36 contests, and he seemed notably less aggressive on offense. Whether it was a bad week, a bad elbow or something worse, it was the beginning of the Great Unraveling.
A better question, however, may be all the roads not taken by the Cavs -- dating back to the organization's inability to establish a closer bond with its star over the past seven years, and going up to the unwillingness to include Hickson in a potential deal for http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=1727Amare Stoudemire at the 2010 trade deadline. Any one of those paths might have led to James staying in a Cleveland uniform and perhaps to a title as well. Instead, the Cavs' spring of 2010 rivals the Cleveland Browns' departure as the most lamented chapter in Ohio sports history.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Short of moving the team to another city, it's hard to imagine a more disastrous offseason for a franchise. Obviously, James' departure dwarfs everything, but even if he had stayed, this was going to be an active summer in Cleveland.
Fired Danny Ferry, hired Chris Grant. Ferry gets a mixed grade for his work in Cleveland -- unable to find a second star to pair with James, but a capable drafter and effective in stacking the roster with quality depth. What makes the decision to fire him so interesting is that the Cavs turned around and appointed his top lieutenant, Grant. Grant has a solid reputation around the league, but one gets the impression owner Dan Gilbert is going to take a much more active role in personnel issues. If so, this could get rocky real fast.
Fired Mike Brown, hired Byron Scott. Gilbert wanted to hire Michigan State coach Tom Izzo, a move that didn't make a ton of sense -- the track record of college-to-pro coaching transitions is terrible, he was going to cost a ton, and it wasn't exactly the kind of name that would lure James into changing his mind in free agency. It's probably best for everyone that Izzo turned him down.
Scott has his warts -- he was almost irrationally hostile toward playing young players in New Orleans, he's more of a CEO-type delegator than an active game-planner, and he's definitely packing his golf clubs for the games in Florida. But he gets results from veterans, and his teams had a feisty toughness that helped them overachieve at the start of his tenure in both New Jersey and New Orleans. Since this team has almost no young players of consequence, he could turn out to be a nice fit.
Signed-and-traded LeBron James to Miami for first-round picks in 2013 and 2015, a 2012 second-round pick (from New Orleans), a future second-round pick (from Oklahoma City), and the right to exchange first-round picks in 2012. The Cavs decided to take the Heat's blood money rather than pursue tampering charges in the wake of James's departure. This may have been good business on their part; we'll never know how strong a case they had. Nevertheless, they received pennies on the dollar in return for the two-time MVP. The picks from Miami will likely be at the very end of the first round, and Cleveland's right to exchange picks in 2012 only has value if the Cavs finish ahead of Miami in the standings -- something with roughly the same probability as a blizzard in the Sahara.
Let http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=362Zydrunas Ilgauskas and Shaquille O'Neal go. Once LeBron departed, these veteran free agents were as good as gone too, taking much of Cleveland's frontcourt depth with them. And with the Cavs thrust overnight into rebuilding mode, keeping them didn't make much sense anyway.
Signed http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3012Kyle Lowry to a four-year, $24 million offer sheet. This was a good, aggressive move for a young point guard that unfortunately failed when the Rockets matched it.
Signed http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3984Christian Eyenga. This should excite fans of the Erie Nighthawks more than Cavs followers. Cleveland's first-round draft pick in 2009 likely will spend the season at the end of the bench in between trips to the D-League. However, he's a potential impact player at the defensive end.
Traded Delonte West and http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2417Sebastian Telfair to Minnesota for http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3231Ramon Sessions, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3008Ryan Hollins and a second-round pick. This was a fantastic deal that dropped West's baggage and added a very underrated guard in Sessions. He's a crafty pick-and-roll point guard who was miscast in Minnesota's system but could thrive in Cleveland. He's big enough to play some 2 and let Mo Williams play off the ball; alternatively, he allows the Cavs to listen to offers for Williams with a backup plan already in place.
Hollins is a high-energy frontcourt player who is likely to be crowded out of the mix in Cleveland's deep rotation. The second-round pick from the Wolves, however, was a nice throw-in -- Minnesota should be choosing in the low 30s.
Signed http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2759Joey Graham for two years, veteran's minimum. I'm not a huge Graham fan, but at this price who am I to quibble? Cleveland needed cheap wing help after none of the prime targets would take their money, so he will suffice.
Signed Jawad Williams for one year, minimum. Williams had his moments last season but remains a raw project as a tweener between a 3 and a 4. With Cleveland having several similar players and needing more offensive punch, he may find playing time more scarce this season.
Signed http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=4304Samardo Samuels for three years, minimum. The deal for the undrafted Samuels isn't fully guaranteed, but the combination of a solid summer league performance and Cleveland's iffy frontcourt depth should help him earn a roster spot.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Size[/h3]
The Cavs were so big last year that even after subtracting two 7-footers and the league's buffest small forward, they're still as big as anyone. The frontcourt of Jamison, Varejao and Hickson should be able to hold its own on the boards, and Varejao is among the best defenders in basketball.
Hickson's emergence as a physical frontcourt force should allow Jamison to see extended time at the 3, where he can overwhelm smaller opponents with his skills around the bucket. Even when Jamison moves up to the 4, the Cavs will be big -- Moon, Jawad Williams and Joey Graham are among the league's biggest small forwards.
If there's a difference this time around, it's that the quality doesn't run as deep. Hollins is a marginal rotation player, while Powe has been extremely effective but is a health question given his myriad knee problems.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Star power[/h3]
The Cavs have several decent players, but they don't have anybody they can give the ball to, clear one side of the floor and say, "Get me a basket." Jamison is the most accomplished scorer of the group, but he tends to get his points in the flow of the offense -- 75 percent of his baskets were assisted last season, and 70 percent the year before when he played the whole season with Washington.
The other facsimile to a star is Williams, who can shoot off the dribble if he gets a screen but is limited as a go-to scorer. He'll have to resist the urge to dominate the ball the way he did in Milwaukee, the last time he was in a similar situation.
In fact, the best player on this team may be Varejao, simply because of his exquisite defense. His D will help the Cavs stay competent on that side of the floor, but he's not going to do much to help them replace LeBron's scoring output. Cleveland has enough decent shooters, but the inability to create open looks is likely to haunt them all season. That was the difference-making skill James provided.
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[h3]2009-10 Outlook[/h3]
OK, this is gonna hurt. Clearly, the Cavs are not what they once were. But in the short term, at least, the Cavs won't be terrible. In fact, they could contend for a playoff spot. Cleveland is solid at all five starting positions and has a coach with a track record of convincing ragtag groups like this one to punch above their weights. Additionally, ownership has shown its willing to spend if the Cavs need an extra piece or two later in the season.
Cleveland has a couple of remaining strengths that Scott would do well to highlight. First, his guards can make 3s, and that will space the floor for scoring forwards like Jamison, Hickson and Powe. Second, this still should be a decent defensive team, especially with Varejao anchoring the middle.
The key players are Sessions and Powe. Sessions was one of the league's most underrated players in Milwaukee but didn't play nearly as well for the Timberwolves last year. In Cleveland, his pick-and-roll skills are going to be needed because the Cavs don't have one-on-one scorers. He'll be particularly valuable if he can defend 2s well enough to pair with Williams for extended minutes in the backcourt, as that would take the Cavs' shakiest offensive player (Parker) out of the mix.
As for Powe, Cleveland's frontcourt depth is a major question mark, but if he can come back healthy and play the way he did for Boston, he'll make a huge difference.
With all that said, they'll need everything to break right in order to make the postseason. More likely, they won't have the offensive firepower to do it. If it plays out that way, it's possible they'll cut bait and start shopping assets like Williams and Jamison somewhere along the way.
[h3]Prediction: 29-53, 5th in Central Division, 13th in Eastern Conference
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
If you can't make shots and can't stop the other guys from making theirs, that's usually a bad sign.
If you can't make shots even after spending nearly $100 million on shooters in the offseason, well, that's even worse.
Detroit's overnight implosion from perennial contender to conference doormat continued apace in 2009-10, with its free agents unable to shore up a declining veteran core and general manager Joe Dumars -- the architect of the Pistons' 2005 championship -- increasingly under fire for a series of questionable moves in the years since.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 27-55 (Pythagorean W-L: 25-57)
Offensive Efficiency: 102.4 (21st)
Defensive Efficiency: 108.9 (26th)
Pace Factor: 91.0 (29th)
Highest PER: Charlie Villanueva (16.09)
In Dumars' defense, his big free agents were hurt most of the season. Ben Gordon struggled mightily with an ankle problem and probably shouldn't have been playing, while the same goes for Charlie Villanueva and his battle with plantar fasciitis.
Nonetheless, it was shocking how little Dumars gained from his investment in shooting. Detroit slid to 29th in the NBA in true shooting percentage -- only the sad-sack Nets were worse -- including a pathetic, league-worst 31.4 percent on 3-pointers. That was partly attributable to Gordon's shooting a disappointing 32.1 percent, but that mark still raised the team average.
What hurt more was that the starting backcourt of Richard Hamilton and Rodney Stuckey both shot worse than 30 percent from distance, which takes us back to the fateful decision that pretty much sealed Detroit's current fate: Dumars' November 2008 decision to trade Chauncey Billups, promote Stuckey to the starting lineup and award Hamilton a baffling three-year, $37 million extension. Although Billups has continued to put up All-Star numbers in Denver, Hamilton has slipped badly and Stuckey has seemed out of position at the 1.
With all that said, the Pistons started decently last season before getting bushwhacked by injuries. Tayshaun Prince played only 49 games while Hamilton played just 46; previously, they had been two of the league's most durable players. Gordon, Stuckey, Will Bynum and Ben Wallace also missed big chunks of time; Villanueva should have but elected to soldier on.
In the wake of those problems, the only thing Detroit did well offensively was retrieving all those bricks. Wallace's return from obscurity was a major reason, helping the Pistons recover 30.3 percent of their misses. That figure ranked second in the league, keeping them a quasi-respectable 21st in offensive efficiency.
A bigger surprise, however, was the implosion of the Pistons' defense. The rugged D that had been a staple of their title teams degenerated into Wallace and not much else last season. The guards were routinely beaten, Villanueva ran like a mummy on his bad foot, and the Pistons' quest for offensive boards too often left them exposed in transition. The Pistons gave up 14.1 fast-break points per game, which ranked 18th in the league … and was atrocious considering they played the league's second-slowest pace overall.
Detroit couldn't stop fouling, either, ranking 28th in opponent free throw attempts per field goal attempt. It also raced to the bottom in "first-touch" defensive efficiency -- i.e., if you subtract rebounding. The only thing the Pistons did well was force turnovers. However, the end result was the league's worst opponent TS percent at 57.2.
The Pistons' turnovers usually resulted from double-teams and traps that forced opponents to move the ball. Detroit's opponents led the league in assisted baskets, with 64.2 percent of their field goals coming as a result of an assist.
Detroit's primary question mark is coach John Kuester, who's in his first year on the job and was the offensive assistant in Cleveland before he came to the Pistons. I'm sure the offense will be better this time around with a healthier lineup and the addition of promising forward Greg Monroe, but Kuester needs to coax a better defensive performance. Even with the injuries, the Pistons shouldn't have been this bad last season.
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[h3]Offseason moves[/h3]
It was a quiet summer in terms of the roster, but the death of longtime owner William Davidson in 2009 led his widow to put the team up for sale. New ownership would face tough decisions because the Palace is one of the league's older buildings, but the local economy is in the dumps.
Moreover, the cap situation makes the team tough to maneuver. Hamilton's contract is a millstone that will prevent the Pistons from having appreciable cap space until 2012. They appear reluctant to make other financial commitments until the team is sold -- for instance, the Pistons didn't use their midlevel exception this summer to sign one more player to put them over the salary cap. A trade appears to be the only way out of contract troubles, but that's easier said than done. For much of the past two years the team clung to the fantasy that Prince could be traded for a star player. That was a pipe dream, but Detroit may have better luck now that he's a large, expiring contract.
Drafted Greg Monroe and Terrico White. The one area in which Dumars has kept up his reputation of late is in the draft. Last season he swiped Jonas Jerebko in the second round, and this time he selected a potential star in first-round in Monroe. The power forward's impressive skill level for his size should allow him to thrive, even though his defense is likely to be a few steps behind. I wasn't as high on White, a big guard with some point guard skills; he'll likely spend this season in the D-League anyway given Detroit's guard depth.
Re-signed Ben Wallace for two years, $3.8 million. Wallace's homecoming last season was the only thing that prevented a bad year from being much worse. He'll solidify the center spot again this season, and he's obviously an incredibly bargain at what amounts to a hometown-discount price.
Re-signed Will Bynum for three years, $10.5 million. I like Bynum, but this is a fairly large commitment to a fourth guard -- especially one who mostly replicates the weaknesses of the others. Bynum had a decent assist rate last season, but the Pistons don't have any perimeter players who are truly good passers, contributing to the low teamwide shooting percentages. Thus, I wonder whether this money might have been better spent on a Chris Duhon/Luke Ridnour type, even though Bynum is a good value at this price.
Signed Tracy McGrady for one year at the veteran's minimum. McGrady's underrated passing skills could help the Pistons' other scorers, but I doubt his knee will be in good enough shape for him to make much of a contribution. At this price, however, it's hard to complain.
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[h3]Biggest strength: One-on-one scoring[/h3]
One thing we know about the Pistons is they'll be able to find matchups they like and isolate for shots. Detroit's lineup will be chock full of scoring at positions 1 through 4, with Wallace in the middle to clean up any misses.
Moreover, Stuckey and Prince are two of the better post-up players at their positions, allowing them to exploit size mismatches for close-in shots. Hamilton and Gordon can score in isolation as well, although they prefer to do their work off the ball and score off the catch. Bynum adds similar skills as an energizer off the bench. One other player to watch in this regard is second-year pro Daye, who is 6-11 with a sweet J that he can release over most defenders.
At the 4, Monroe and Villanueva can provide a different threat against opposing big men unaccustomed to playing on the perimeter. Moreover, their outside skills will help provide some space for the others to do their damage.
Kuester probably will have to run the offense this way, even if it's a tad boring. (And man, these guys were hard on the eyes last season.) With no skilled passers in the backcourt, no outright stars and four players of roughly equal offensive skill on the court at most times, Kuester will do best to focus on attacking the opponent's weak link.
[h3]Biggest weakness: Star power[/h3]
The needless exit of Billups directly relates to Detroit's biggest shortcoming at the moment: the complete and utter lack of star power. Prince generated the team's highest PER at just 16.06, which ranked 103rd leaguewide. Every other team had at least two players with a better PER than Prince … even the Nets. The Hornets had five -- and they won only 37 games.
Having a healthy Gordon or Villanueva wouldn't have cured this problem, nor will they in 2010-11 -- they're important weapons, but they aren't go-to stars. The idea behind trading Billups was that Stuckey would emerge as a star, but he's leveled off as merely a fairly good combo guard. The highest projected PER for next season is Villanueva's 16.58 -- which, again, would be the worst of any team except Cleveland and the Clippers.
Pistons fans will point out that the team won a title in 2005 without any superstars, but the current situation is on a completely different level. That Detroit club had several All-Star or near-All-Star caliber players; this one has a bunch of half-good players of nearly indistinguishable production.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Detroit will be better because Gordon and Villanueva will play better and the others are likely to spend less time on the injured list. Additionally, I expect Monroe to pay dividends right away.
All those changes may help make the Pistons a halfway decent offensive team, albeit a well-nigh unwatchable one that continues to play a sleep-inducing pace while running mid-90s style isolations. Gordon should revert to hitting 40 percent of his 3s and raise the team's overall percentages to something more respectable. And for all its flaws, this team rarely turns the ball over.
Defense is another matter. Wallace had a Fluke Rule season and could easily decline this season, and the Pistons are only a year older otherwise. Having Prince healthy could reap rewards because he was an elite defender before his back started bothering him, but Monroe's addition is a likely negative, and the frontcourt depth is shaky at best.
In the big picture, Detroit's perimeter depth makes a playoff appearance possible if everyone has a good season and stays healthy. That's a best-case scenario, though. More likely, the Pistons should fall several games short while staying in roster limbo until the sale of the franchise goes through.
[h3]Prediction: 32-50, 4th in Central Division, 10th in Eastern Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 recap[/h3]
It was a case of the cure being as bad as the disease. The Pacers labored through the 2009 offseason to make themselves a better defensive team, and on that level their season was a success -- Indy moved up from 19th to 15th in defensive efficiency despite several injuries to key defenders in the frontcourt.
Offensively, however, they tanked, and the two phenomena were related. In free agency, Indiana had invested in defenders with limited offensive games, such as Earl Watson and Dahntay Jones, and drafted Tyler Hansbrough to shore up the frontcourt rather than nabbing one of the several productive point guards from last season's rookie class.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 32-50 (Pythagorean W-L: 31-51)
Offensive efficiency: 101.3 (26th)
Defensive efficiency: 104.2 (15th)
Pace factor: 99.4 (2nd)
Highest PER: Danny Granger (19.85)
Things might have worked out better if Danny Granger hadn't missed 20 games, or if T.J. Ford hadn't gone off the rails (again), or if Mike Dunleavy had made a more robust comeback from his knee troubles. But none of those things happened, and the net result was a Pacers offense in shambles.
Indiana plummeted to 26th in offensive efficiency after finishing in the middle of the pack a year earlier, a performance that directly led the Pacers to once again fall just shy of the playoffs. That continues a frustrating trend of near misses: In the past three seasons they've finished ninth, ninth, and 10th in the Eastern Conference.
Despite their scoring woes, the Pacers played very fast. In fact, they operated as a mini-Golden State in several respects, finishing either second from the top or second from the bottom in several categories in which the Warriors represented the extreme.
Most obviously, the Pacers played the league's second-fastest pace, which isn't necessarily what you'd expect from a team that started plodders Roy Hibbert and Troy Murphy in the frontcourt.
Considering the production of that duo, another unexpected issue was the Pacers' lousy performance on the offensive glass. Golden State was the league's worst offensive rebounding team, but the Pacers pushed them for the honor, grabbing only 21.6 percent of their misses.
[h4]Off. Rebound Rate: 2009-10's Worst[/h4]
| Golden State | 20.9 |
| Indiana | 21.6 |
| Boston | 22.8 |
| New York | 23.5 |
| Dallas | 24.3 |
| NBA average | 26.3 |
There were a lot of misses to grab, too: The Pacers landed 28th in field goal percentage at 44.3 percent. This was partly due to their preference for shooting 3s. Indiana ranked third in the league in 3-point attempts per field goal attempt but made only 34.8 percent of them; alas, this was still a better proposition than their 24th-ranked mark on 2-pointers (47.9 percent).
The Pacers' other problem was a shot distribution that was far too democratic given the limited number of talented offensive players. Granger led the team in usage rate, as one would expect, but how could Jones and Luther Head have more touches per minute than Murphy? The sharing spirit extended everywhere except to puzzling second-year pro Brandon Rush, who finished last in usage rate despite appearing more skilled than several of his more assertive teammates. Somehow he led the team in minutes despite a 9.61 player efficiency rating.
There was good news if you looked hard enough for it -- Hibbert emerged as a solid post scorer, and second-round pick A.J. Price looks like a keeper -- but in the big picture, Indy's offensive performance was a crushing disappointment.
At the other end, the Pacers generated the league's fifth-best defense against 2-point field goals (47.6 percent), but that was the only thing they did well. In particular, they fouled with abandon. Indiana's .341 opponent free throw attempts per field goal attempt ranked 27th. (Golden State was 26th, natch.) All the frontcourt players except Murphy had monumental foul rates, with Hibbert's high rate being particularly vexing because it often took his scoring off the floor. On the perimeter, Jones also fouled far too often, leading to his ceding the defensive stopper role to Rush.
Indiana's other big weakness was defensive rebounding. Although the Pacers weren't as bad as they were on the offensive glass, they ranked only 22nd at 73 percent. Combined with the poor offensive rebounding numbers, Indiana's 47.1 rebound rate ranked 29th in the NBA. Only Golden State, of course, was worse.
This makes the offseason trade of Murphy a particular concern. He led the team in defensive rebound rate by a wide margin, nearly doubling the stat of the next-closest rotation player. Indiana has to hope Hansbrough and Josh McRoberts can ramp up their rebounding numbers enough to offset Murphy's departure; otherwise, the Pacers will face a deluge of second shots.
However, the Pacers' biggest problem is a structural one: The organization finds itself handcuffed as it tries to repair the roster, because the team is near the luxury-tax limit and doesn't have the financial wherewithal to go beyond it. Indiana has spent the past two seasons playing a waiting game, signing second-tier players to inexpensive, short-term contracts until it slips under the cap in 2011 and can undertake more aggressive measures. Watson worked out halfway decently; Dahntay Jones, Solomon Jones and Luther Head did not.
The team's only playable card, Murphy's expiring contract, has already been used (see below). Indiana is desperate to move T.J. Ford's $8.5 million expiring deal as well, but it faces slim odds of getting anything of value out of it. Should Dunleavy's knee prove to be at full strength, he'll represent the only other marketable commodity who isn't in the team's long-term plans.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Suffice it to say it was a fairly quiet summer in the Corn Belt. The entire management team -- president Larry Bird, general manager David Morway and coach Jim O'Brien -- are on the final years of their contracts, which could create some activity late in the season if the Pacers' lottery streak looks headed toward five. For now, it's all quiet on this front.
They drafted Paul George, Lance Stephenson and Magnum Rolle. I really like the George pick, as I think he was one of the draft's more underrated players and should thrive in the Pacers' space-it-and-shoot-it system. I understand the concern that he's a bit redundant with Granger, but each is big enough that both can play at the same time against many opponents. I suspect that pairing will be much more troublesome for opponents to guard than the other way around.
Stephenson was a defensible pick basketball-wise and a god-awful one PR-wise. Indiana had just finished fumigating its roster of all the players with rap sheets, an important consideration in the straitlaced Hoosier State, but Stephenson had considerable baggage in college and was arrested during the summer for domestic violence. He already had signed a contract by that point, but it's possible Indy will cut its losses and tell him to stay away, as it did with Jamaal Tinsley two years ago.
Rolle doesn't have a contract but will be at training camp, and given that he's a 6-foot-11 power forward and the team desperately needs help at the 4, he probably will make the squad.
Let Earl Watson go. Traded Troy Murphy to New Jersey, received Darren Collison and James Posey from New Orleans in four-team deal. Price's development made Watson expendable as the backup point guard, while Indiana gave itself a major upgrade in the starting group by getting Collison from New Orleans for Murphy.
Effectively, Collison is the first free agent Indiana acquired with its upcoming 2011 cap space; it just made the move a year early. New Orleans stuck the Pacers with Posey's toxic contract, taking $7 million in 2011 cap room, and that's why they were willing to cut the deal for such a promising young player.
Collison has a bit of T.J. Ford in his game -- a small, shoot-first speedster -- but he's also a good defensive player. Although he's not a high-assist player, he's much more in tune than Ford with the general idea that the other four guys should get the ball once in a while.
That makes this deal a win for the Pacers long term, but in 2010-11 it may not pay great dividends -- Indiana had to open a giant hole at power forward to close the one at point guard. Hansbrough and Josh McRoberts will get first crack at closing it.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: "First shot" defense [/h3]
I have little faith in Indiana's ability to retrieve the ball when it forces a miss, but the Pacers should be able to force quite a few misses. The Pacers were pretty good in this respect a year ago, ranking fifth in 2-point field goal defense, and all the indicators are that they'll be better this time around.
For starters, the addition of Collison is a major plus. Although he's very small, he's also a good defender with great fundamentals, and his ability to stop the ball at the point of attack should make life easier for the Pacers' frontcourt. Of course, the departed Watson also was good in this respect, but Ford wasn't and played a big chunk of Indiana's point guard minutes last season.
On the wing, both Rush and Jones are solid defenders, and while Dunleavy isn't great one-on-one, he's an excellent team defender. Granger is a decent defensive player, too, and George's length should make him somewhat competent while he cuts his teeth as a rookie.
Up front, however, is where the greatest upgrade is likely. Murphy was a great rebounder, but didn't do diddly before the ball went up. Hansbrough, presuming he can overcome a baffling inner-ear infection, is a far more active defensive player and will be considerably better against pick-and-rolls. Even Granger and McRoberts are likely to be upgrades.
At center, Hibbert is learning how to use his size to affect shots in the paint, and his sharp drop in fouls last season was a good omen. Additionally, anything the Pacers get from Foster -- a very good defensive player when healthy -- will be a huge improvement on the zilch Solomon Jones gave them a season ago.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Rebounding[/h3]
There's no way to sugarcoat this -- the Pacers are going to get absolutely pounded on the glass. Even if Hansbrough turns out to be a monster, they'll linger among the league's bottom two or three teams in rebound rate; if he does anything short of that, they'll challenge Phoenix for dead last.
[h4]Pacers' rebound rates, 2009-10[/h4]
| Murphy | 17.2 |
| Hansbrough | 14.7 |
| McRoberts | 13.2 |
| Hibbert | 12.4 |
| S. Jones | 11.6 |
| Posey | 11.2* |
| Dunleavy | 8.7 |
| Granger | 8.2 |
| *Played for New Orleans |
The chart shows the math: Last season Murphy was far and away the team's best rebounder, and he isn't around anymore. Hansbrough and McRoberts, the two probable replacements, grab about 4 percent fewer rebounds between them. That's a large difference, but it becomes a staggering gap if the Pacers go small and use somebody like Posey or Granger as the power forward.
Murphy played nearly 60 percent of the Pacers' minutes last season; the resulting decline in the team's rebound rate would be on the order of 2½ percent if all his minutes went to Hansbrough/McRoberts, and considerably more if they went to smaller players.
Indiana's 71.4 rebound rate a year ago was 29th in the league; Golden State, at 68.0, was the worst rebounding team in history last season. Take off 2½ percent to 3 percent based on the Murphy calculation above, and my back-of-the-envelope numbers project Indy's rebound rate to land between 68.5 and 69.0, depending on how often the Pacers play small. That wouldn't quite make them the worst rebounding team in history, but it would almost certainly make them the worst in the league.
The one possible antidote would be a return to health from Foster. He missed nearly all of last season to undergo back surgery and has been plagued by health problems for the past several years, but when he plays he's a freak on the glass. Just 15-20 minutes a night from him as a backup center would provide considerable improvement.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Stop me if you've heard this before. The Pacers, with one star player (Granger), one second-tier star (Collison this time, replacing Murphy and Dunleavy from past seasons) and a bunch of half-good players will be good enough to compete for a playoff spot … but not good enough to actually earn one.
The upgrade at point guard should be roughly offset by a decline in production at power forward -- I talked a lot about Murphy's rebounding, but he's also a whale of an outside shooter, so the trade may not improve the Pacers' offense much. Meanwhile, the general mediocrity of the supporting crew should mostly offset the offensive output of the Collison-Granger-Hibbert core.
The bar for making the playoffs in the East hasn't been set real high, so with a comeback season by Foster and good health from the others, Indy may squeeze through. That's especially true if the Pacers cash in their expiring contracts early to try to upgrade the roster at the trade deadline. More likely, however, they'll end up in an all-too-familiar position for the fifth straight season.
[h3]Prediction: 34-48, 3rd in Central Division, 9th in Eastern Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Just a year ago, Milwaukee looked like the NBA's Siberia: a cold, depressing place with an old arena, a bad team and a bad cap situation. Not anymore. After a 46-win season, a near-upset in the first round of the playoffs and an influx of talent in the offseason, the Bucks appear to be a rising force in the East.
Twelve months ago, Milwaukee was coming off a 34-win campaign, and had jettisoned Charlie Villanueva, Richard Jefferson and Ramon Sessions. A turnaround seemed even more improbable because Michael Redd, although technically on the roster, was battling back from knee problems; ultimately, he'd play only 18 games. With that, the top four scorers from the previous season were gone.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 46-36 (Pythagorean W-L: 47-35)
Offensive Efficiency: 102.0 (23rd)
Defensive Efficiency: 100.9 (3rd)
Pace Factor: 94.0 (21st)
Highest PER: Andrew Bogut (20.81)
Yet the Bucks persevered thanks to a variety of factors: clever signings, breakout seasons from Luke Ridnour and Andrew Bogut, a strong rookie campaign from Brandon Jennings, and a midseason deal for John Salmons. But most of all, there was a ferocious defensive effort throughout. The Bucks overachieved their way to the playoffs and, despite losing Bogut in early April to a gruesome elbow injury, nearly stunned the Hawks in the first round.
General manager John Hammond won executive of the year honors for his work, and two moves in particular deserve credit. The first was letting Villanueva walk and signing Ersan Ilyasova in his place. Ilyasova was at least as good as Villanueva and cost a third as much, holding together a tenuous frontcourt rotation.
Later in the season, Hammond grabbed Salmons in a salary dump by the Bulls. Salmons was perfect for the Bucks -- they desperately needed a one-on-one scorer at the end of the shot clock, and he fit the bill, averaging 19.8 points a game in March and April. The Bucks also moved up in the draft as a result of that trade and relinquished nothing of consequence to Chicago.
Any discussion of Milwaukee's improvement has to start with the defense. Milwaukee won thanks mainly to a gritty defensive style that was a near-perfect embodiment of coach Scott Skiles; in fact, his teams in Chicago won in a very similar fashion. The worry is that his motivational methods ran out of steam in Chicago after his third season -- he's entering his third year in Milwaukee.
[h4]Fewest Shots* Per 100 Opp. Possessions[/h4]
| Milwaukee | 94.05 |
| Boston | 94.65 |
| Utah | 94.91 |
| Charlotte | 94.95 |
| Detroit | 95.18 |
| *shots = FGA + (FTA * 0.44) |
The Bucks were physical, tough and often reckless. They finished second in the league in drawing offensive fouls and third in defensive rebound rate; however, the drawback was all the fouls. Milwaukee opponents averaged .348 free throw attempts per field goal attempt; only Utah fared worse in that category.
However, the Bucks did one thing better than any other team in basketball: prevent shot attempts. Milwaukee opponents averaged only 94.05 shots per 100 possessions, with "shots" here including prorated free throw attempts. So even though the Bucks didn't force particularly low shooting percentages -- they defended the 3-point line very well but offset it with the myriad opponent trips to the foul line -- they finished the season tied for third in defensive efficiency because opponents took so few shots.
Milwaukee's aggressive defense made up for a pretty lackluster offense. Despite Bogut's breakout season and Ridnour's utterly unexpected shooting accuracy, Milwaukee ranked only 23rd in offensive efficiency. The playoff series against Atlanta showcased the Bucks' lack of shot-creators and shooters; they scored 69 and 74 points in losing Games 6 and 7, respectively.
That the Bucks were even that good owes, again, to their volume strategy. Milwaukee was nearly as good at rebounding and avoiding turnovers on offense as it was at forcing turnovers and grabbing boards on defense. As a result, the Bucks rated fourth in shots per 100 possessions.
[h4]Worst Shooting, 2009-10[/h4]
| New Jersey | 45.4 | 42.9 |
| Milwaukee | 46.4 | 43.6 |
| Washington | 47.1 | 44.9 |
| Minnesota | 47.1 | 44.9 |
| Chicago | 47.4 | 45.1 |
What they did with those shots is another matter. The Bucks fell to 29th in both 2-point shooting percentage and overall shooting percentage; only the woebegone Nets were worse in those categories. Jennings, as helpful as he was overall, was the second-worst 2-point shooter in basketball at 37 percent. Since only Bogut took more 2-point shots, this had some negative consequences for the team shooting numbers.
However, it took more than just Jennings to drag Milwaukee down. Only two Bucks -- Bogut and Ridnour -- sunk more than half their 2-point shots, something that eight teams accomplished last season. The Celtics, who shot 52.2 percent as a team on 2-pointers, outranked every single Buck.
But wait, it gets worse. The inaccurate 2-point shooting was aggravated by the team's near-total inability to draw fouls. The Bucks earned only .239 free throw attempts per field goal attempt, placing them dead last among the league's 30 teams. This, again, pointed to the club's lack of a true one-on-one scorer, which is why adding Salmons at the end of last season was so helpful despite his flaws.
[h4]Worst Free Throw Disparity, '09-10[/h4]
| Milwaukee | 1,675 | 2,211 | -536 |
| Indiana | 2,019 | 2,346 | -327 |
| Golden St. | 2,085 | 2,390 | -305 |
| Washington | 1,895 | 2,088 | -193 |
| Sacramento | 1,969 | 2,149 | -180 |
| New Orleans | 1,661 | 1,841 | -180 |
Combined with their hack-prone defensive ways, the Bucks' inability to get to the stripe produced a staggering free throw disparity. Milwaukee took 536 fewer free throws than its opponents did, or nearly seven a game, and that's a tough disadvantage to overcome night after night. The Bucks often made up the deficit through sheer scrappiness, but last season was about the ceiling. As reflected in the chart, all the other teams with negative free throw differentials fared quite poorly.
Skiles, amazingly, didn't win coach of the year honors, despite winning about 20 games more than anybody expected. His squad overachieved as much as any in recent memory, setting the stage for Milwaukee to rebuild more quickly than anyone could have foreseen a year ago.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
It was another busy summer for Milwaukee, which went about shoring up the lack of scoring that plagued it last season. The Bucks' other big offseason concern was Bogut's recovery from a dislocated elbow -- he still wasn't at full strength by late summer.
Let Luke Ridnour go, signed Keyon Dooling for two years, $4.1 million. Milwaukee made the right move in letting Ridnour walk, as he was coming off a Fluke Rule season and would have required a long-term commitment to keep as an expensive backup to Jennings. Dooling isn't risk free -- he has had some injury issues the past two years and isn't great at running an offense -- but he defends and will make enough shots to keep opposing defenses honest.
Traded Charlie Bell and Dan Gadzuric to Golden State for Corey Maggette and No. 44 pick; sold pick to New York. This was one of my favorite moves of the summer, adding precisely what the Bucks need -- a proven, high-efficiency scorer who gets to the line -- in return for two dead-weight contracts. Maggette will miss 20 games with injuries and doesn't defend or pass much, but he's such a devastating scorer that he's still tremendously valuable. Financially, the deal saves the Bucks some money in 2010-11, and while Maggette is well compensated (owed $31 million over the next three years), Milwaukee has such a strong cap position right now that the Bucks can easily swallow it.
Drafted Larry Sanders, Darington Hobson and Keith Gallon. Sanders was a good grab in the middle of the first round as a running center who can provide some athleticism for the second unit. Basically, he should give the Bucks a less spastic version of Gadzuric and has some upside going forward. Hobson and Gallon were good value picks in the second round; Gallon is unlikely to play much while he tries to get in shape, but Hobson should see some action and could crack the rotation.
Signed Drew Gooden to a five-year, $34 million deal. A lot of folks didn't like this deal, and I understand why. Historically, full midlevel deals for second-tier players have worked out horribly. I think this one might be an exception. Gooden played very well the past two seasons and has filled out enough that he can steal minutes at center. He's been good enough, in fact, that even if he declines in the coming years, he'll justify most of his contract. In a free-agent market that quickly grew overheated, this might turn out to be one of the more reasonable contracts.
Re-signed John Salmons to a five-year, $40 million deal. The last year isn't fully guaranteed, but this is still a bad contract. The difference is the Bucks didn't have much choice. Once a team is over the cap, it has incredible incentive to overpay its free agents, because it has no means of replacing them. With Salmons, the Bucks' only realistic alternative was a sign-and-trade for a cap exception, and I'm not sure the exception would have been big enough for them to do anything notable. Salmons played great this past spring, but he turns 31 in December and never was all that good to begin with. One suspects the third and fourth years of this deal might get ugly.
Traded 2012 second-round pick to New Jersey for Chris Douglas-Roberts. Again, the Bucks sought out scoring over the summer and got it with Douglas-Roberts, whose skills as a one-on-one creator should prove particularly helpful during the 20 games Maggette sits out with hamstring pulls and ankle sprains.
Acquired Jon Brockman in a sign-and-trade for Darnell Jackson and a second-round pick. Brockman received three guaranteed years at $1 million apiece from the Bucks, locking up the league's top offensive rebounder (as measured by offensive rebound rate) from last season at a bargain price. Considering the deal cost the Bucks virtually nothing, this was a steal. He'll probably battle Sanders for the fourth big man role after Bogut, Gooden and Ilyasova.
Let Royal Ivey go, signed Earl Boykins for one year, veteran's minimum. Boykins is an insurance proposition as the team's third point guard.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: The Bench[/h3]
With so many additions this offseason, the Bucks legitimately go 12 deep. If Hobson makes an impact, you can make it 13, meaning the Bucks will have some serious competition just to don a uniform if everyone stays healthy. I have Milwaukee's bench rated fourth in the league in my preseason rankings, and that was with Maggette as a starter; if he comes off the pine, Milwaukee will have the best second unit in basketball.
It could get better, as backup point guard looms as the one weakness -- Dooling was an inexpensive pickup but is a question mark for this season, while Boykins also represents a liability. If Dooling struggles, we might see the Bucks use a big backcourt when Jennings checks out, sharing the ballhandling among Salmons, Delfino and Hobson. The good news is that backup point guard is the easiest position to fill in-season.
Otherwise, few teams have more options off the pine. The Bucks have an ace defender (Mbah a Moute), a spectacular rebounder (Brockman), a frontcourt greyhound (Sanders) and a long-range shooter (Ilyasova). Douglas-Roberts can provide scoring on the wings, Hobson another ballhandler and Delfino -- if he isn't starting -- the glue at both ends. If it's Maggette who comes off the bench, the Bucks also might have the league's sixth-man winner.
Finally, they have the perfect coach to take advantage of this strength. Few coaches like to go deep into the bench as early or as often as Skiles does, so he'll make use of his entire complement of players.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Long-Range Shooting [/h3]
The Bucks worked diligently in the offseason to address the lack of one-on-one scoring and the pitifully few free throw attempts that plagued their offense in 2009-10. Maggette's addition alone should bring them up to the league average in free throw attempts. Combining him with Salmons and Douglas-Roberts provides the Bucks with more shot-creating capability.
Now they face a different challenge: creating enough space for all their scorers to operate. Milwaukee has lots of players who can create shots, but opponents will be able to collapse against the likes of Bogut and Maggette unless somebody emerges to stretch opposing defenses.
The most likely suspect is Jennings, who notched a respectable 37.4 percent of his 3s last season and will need to continue doing so -- he's the one who will always be available for a kickout at the top of the key. Salmons (36.7 percent career) and Delfino (36.1 percent) are the next-best threats, giving Milwaukee a few average perimeter marksmen … and that's about it.
Maggete (32.1 percent career) and Douglas-Roberts (25.8 percent) aren't 3-point threats. Ilyasova likes to take 3s but made only 33.6 percent last season. Dooling had a good year shooting the ball last season but is at a modest 35.1 percent for his career. Mbah a Moute, Gooden, Bogut and Brockman don't shoot 3s at all.
As a result, Milwaukee is likely to shoot in the low 30s on 3s as a team. And without a 40 percent 3-point threat on the outside, teams will collapse and dare the likes of Jennings and Salmons to beat them from distance, making life much harder in the paint for Maggette and Bogut. The one player who could change that is Redd, but he's unlikely to be a participant this season.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Fear the deer. The Bucks won 46 games last season with numerous flaws, and they spent the offseason aggressively addressing most of those weaknesses. The only real decline will come at backup point guard, where the Dooling-Boykins combo is unlikely to approach Ridnour's career year.
Nonetheless, there is plenty of room for optimism. The Bucks have a pair of second-tier stars in Bogut and Maggette, and the hope that Jennings and even Salmons might join them in that category. Moreover, they are one of the deepest teams in basketball and should be able to match up in any way needed.
In projecting the Bucks' record, I had two big questions. The obvious one is health. Bogut's elbow is one concern, but the oft-injured Maggette's availability is another. Both players have enough of an injury history that I was conservative with minutes estimates for each; if they can stay healthy for 75 games, the Bucks will achieve beyond what I've written here.
The other confounding prospect is the defense. It's a credit to Skiles that the Bucks played so hard last season and finished third in defensive efficiency, but it also begs the question of whether they're doomed to regress. Most of the new players aren't accomplished defenders, most notably Maggette, so this is another source of potential slippage.
Nonetheless, it's hard to imagine this team missing out on the playoffs. If the D holds up, the Bucks should be in the mix for one of the top seeds in the East. If so, Milwaukee will continue a remarkable and unexpected shift to prominence from what seemed a hopeless situation two seasons ago.
[h3]Prediction: 49-33, 1st in Central Division, 4th in Eastern Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Since the Hawks have virtually the same roster as they did a year ago, the logical place to start for this season is to first look at last season -- a campaign that turned out to be your basic good-news, bad-news proposition.
The good news was that they won 53 games, earned the Eastern Conference's third seed, and made it back to the second round of the playoffs.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 53-29 (Pythagorean W-L: 56-26)
Offensive Efficiency: 108.9 (3rd)
Defensive Efficiency: 104.0 (14th)
Pace Factor: 92.5 (27th)
Highest PER: Josh Smith (21.04)
The bad news was all the other stuff. For one, Atlanta was completely exposed in the playoffs, barely limping past a wounded Milwaukee team in seven games before suffering a four-game, second-round demolition at the hands of Orlando.
That takes us to the second problem -- the Hawks were at the absolute limits of their powers during an overachieving regular season. Atlanta didn't hit the slightest whiff of adversity the entire campaign, gliding through with virtually pristine health and getting a career year from Jamal Crawford. The Hawks demonstrated they could be a good team if everything fell into place, but they also revealed themselves to be utterly incapable of anything more. That's hardly a great omen going into 2010-11.
The Hawks' success largely came at the offensive end, where Atlanta ranked a surprising third in offensive efficiency. Theirs was a pure volume strategy. The ability of Joe Johnson and Crawford to create a huge quantity of shots without making turnovers allowed the other Hawks to crash the boards, and crash they did. Atlanta ranked fifth in offensive rebound rate, and at the same time, had by far the lowest turnover ratio in basketball (see chart).
[h4]Lowest Turnover Rate, 2009-10[/h4]
| Atlanta | 12.8 |
| Dallas | 13.6 |
| Portland | 13.6 |
| L.A. Lakers | 13.8 |
| Milwaukee | 13.9 |
| League average | 15.4 |
Combining those two factors, Atlanta launched more shots per possession than any other team (with "shots" here defined to include free-throw attempts multiplied by 0.44). In fact, the Hawks got a lot more shots -- nearly four more than the league average. That, in turn, accounted for nearly the entire difference between Atlanta's scintillating offense and a league-average outfit (see chart).
The somewhat ugly part was that Atlanta's offense depended so heavily on Johnson and Crawford initiating offense by going one-on-one, or by running a pick-and-roll and then going one-on-one after the switch. Lamented locally as the "Iso-Joe" offense, any team that prevented Atlanta from running in the open court and could control the defensive boards had a great shot at stopping Atlanta.
[h4]Most Shots* Per Poss., 2009-10[/h4]
| Atlanta | 99.9 |
| Dallas | 99.7 |
| Portland | 99.5 |
| L.A. Lakers | 99.4 |
| Milwaukee | 99.4 |
| League average | 95.9 |
| * Shots = FGA + (FTA * 0.44) |
That latter point was another interesting development -- the Hawks ranked fourth in the NBA with 15.6 fast-break points per game, despite finishing 27th in pace factor. That should give you some indication of just how methodical they were in the half court.
Defensively, the Hawks were almost completely average. Josh Smith's shot-blocking helped them hold opponents to a slightly below-average true shooting mark, but Atlanta's lack of height also hurt on the defensive glass. In fact, the same volume game they played so well on offense plagued them on defense, where they rated just 25th in opponent shot attempts per possession.
It was particularly entertaining to watch the histrionics they went through to avoid having point guard Mike Bibby defend anybody good. Atlanta often had Johnson defending the opponent's point guard while Bibby hid in the corner against the opponents' fifth option.
An even bigger problem was Atlanta's horrific transition defense. Despite outstanding team speed, the Hawks were 25th in fast-break points allowed per game at 15.8, an inexcusable state of affairs. The five teams behind them were all poor defensive teams that barely tried (Memphis, Toronto, Minnesota, Golden State and New Jersey); the Hawks landed in that disreputable group for less obvious reasons.
Undoubtedly, much of this resulted from their willingness to crash the offensive boards. If Johnson or Crawford shot and the three other players crashed the boards, it left only the overmatched Bibby on the back line if the opponent was able to generate a quick outlet.
In the final analysis, this was about all what could be expected from a roster with such shortcomings. The Hawks had four very good players, none of whom were superstars, and four other average ones filling out the rotation. For as badly as "Iso-Joe" was exposed in the playoffs by opponents prepared for a relatively primitive offensive tactic, it gave the Hawks their best chance to win throughout the regular season. If the opponent didn't really have its act together defensively, the Hawks usually did.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Here's Atlanta's offseason in one phrase: penny-wise, pound-foolish. The Hawks hired the cheapest coach available and then inexplicably broke the bank to keep Joe Johnson with a deal that will likely hamstring them in any future deals.
Didn't offer Mike Woodson a contract, hired Larry Drew as head coach. Atlanta's max-out season was both the best and worst thing that could have happened to Woodson. On the one hand, he received a lot of credit for winning 53 games and improving the team's record for the fifth straight season. On the other hand, the resounding feeling that the team had reached its ceiling with the Iso-Joe show provided an impetus to seek change.
What the Hawks did next was bizarre, hiring assistant Larry Drew mainly because he would come cheaper than any of the other candidates. Spies in Hotlanta say that ownership made this call despite general manager Rick Sund's preference for Mavs assistant Dwane Casey, adding another layer of intrigue to the proceedings.
While Drew is a well-regarded assistant with whom the players are comfortable, this adds a third puzzling aspect to the decision: If you're firing the coach to change directions, how much really changed if you hired his top assistant?
Signed Joe Johnson to a six-year, $123.7 million deal. This is the worst contract of free agency. I've said in several other places that the rules of the salary cap give teams a huge incentive to overpay to keep their own free agents, and clearly the Hawks followed that line of thinking.
But when you get into mega-contracts of this size, more alternatives are on the table. Atlanta easily could have signed-and-traded Johnson and earned a huge trade exception, much as Utah did with Carlos Boozer. In fact, with the Hawks' other assets, they likely could have outbid the Jazz for Al Jefferson in such a scenario. At the very least, they would have been well-positioned to add pieces around their young core of Al Horford, Marvin Williams and Josh Smith.
Additionally, the reality of Atlanta's financial position is that they can't afford to have an albatross contract, which is exactly what Johnson is likely to become by about the third year of the deal. The team is losing money and can't possibly afford to go into the luxury tax, making his salary a much bigger burden than it would be for, say, New York or even Houston. If you believe that the team had hit its ceiling with this group, then there was nothing to fear from the change, even if it resulted in a step back in 2010-11.
Traded 24th overall pick for picks No. 27 and 31; drafted Jordan Crawford and sold 31st pick to Oklahoma City. I like what Atlanta did getting two picks for one while still getting the player they wanted in Crawford. While he almost perfectly replicates the skills of Atlanta's other Crawford, his namesake is also a free agent after the season. Selling the 31st pick could end up being a mistake, given that they could have used the player the Thunder selected (German Eurostash choice Tibor Pleiss), but it's another example of the Hawks' current financial straits and another example of why the overexuberant deal for Johnson was a huge mistake.
Drafted Pape Sy. The second-round pick is a project who, surprisingly, will be on the Hawks' roster this season. He's regarded as having defensive potential but needing to improve his offensive skills. Atlanta has made shockingly little use of its D-League team but Sy seems an ideal candidate for an extended trip to Utah.
Signed Josh Powell to a one-year deal for the veteran minimum. Powell was awful with the Lakers last season, but it's hard to argue with the price. What's easier to dispute is the Hawks' choice in size. Atlanta still has only one frontcourt player taller than 6-foot-9, which is going to leave it in a world of hurt against the league's elite frontcourts.
Signed-and-traded Josh Childress to Phoenix for a second-round pick. Childress was never going to play in Atlanta at the price he was asking, so the Hawks at least landed a 2012 second-rounder from the Suns for the trouble of relinquishing his rights. The Hawks also received a $3.6 million trade exception, although that's unlikely to see the light of the day until the 2011 draft (if ever) due to luxury tax considerations.
Signed Etan Thomas for one year, veteran's minimum. Atlanta has needed a decent third center for some time, and having Thomas certainly will be preferable to the Randolph Morris cameos Hawks fans suffered through the past two seasons. That said, he's old, injury-prone and undersized, and will spend the year encased in a glass box labeled "break only in case of emergency."
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Durability[/h3]
And let's hope it stays that way. Atlanta's greatest attribute the past three seasons has been that it has a bunch of decent players who never get hurt. Four starters skipped the meaningless final game, but up to that point the five starters and Crawford missed only nine games between them. Evans and Pachulia missed another seven, meaning the entire eight-man rotation had only 16 unwanted absences among them.
And that's really important, because Atlanta's "deep depth" is pretty shaky -- especially in the frontcourt, where Powell is a D-League talent posing as the Hawks' fourth big man. Atlanta's best move, in fact, might be to use Williams as the backup power forward this year and play more often with Johnson at the 3. Such a maneuver would take some skillful rotation juggling on Drew's part, but it also would clear more time for Jordan Crawford and Jeff Teague in the backcourt.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Money[/h3]
Re-signing Johnson only exacerbates what is likely to be the Hawks' greatest issue going forward: the fact that keeping this group together is going to be increasingly expensive, and they don't have the coin to foot the bill. We saw the early stages of that problem in the skinflint offseason that followed the Johnson singing. Atlanta's lone moves were signing the least expensive coach available and a minimum-salary big man who is unlikely to provide any useful solution to the lack of frontcourt depth.
It only gets worse from here. The Hawks could use the Childress trade exception to get a frontcourt body, but that would put them right against the luxury tax. With Jamal Crawford becoming a free agent next year and Horford due to at least double his salary as a restricted free agent, the Hawks will likely perform the luxury tax tap dance for the next few summers.
This wouldn't be a big issue for a team that drew better or had deeper-pocketed owners, but the Hawks are losing money hand over fist already. At some point, pocketbook concerns are likely to spill over into the on-court product, and this past summer was likely the first wave. And I'll state once again for posterity that the Johnson contract only exacerbates this problem.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
It's hard to be too dismissive of the Hawks' chances
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- 24,717
- 436
Melo + Ellis would necessitate for there to be more than one basketball used.
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anyone have pics of the new set? i forgot to watch today
- 16,514
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anyone have pics of the new set? i forgot to watch today
do be doo
Banned
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do be doo
Banned
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- 377
nuggetsnews
A source confirmed what yahoo had today... every Nugget but Melo was part of filming of promotional shots for the TV games
A source confirmed what yahoo had today... every Nugget but Melo was part of filming of promotional shots for the TV games
