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Odens knee not healed and wont play opening day, might be out even longer...
SMH
SMH
* Offiical NBA Off-Season Thread: I'll give one of my damn kidney's for these Melo rumors to stop *
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by jpzx,
- Start date
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With him, Yao and Andrew Bynum, you have to play by different rules. Even if he was healthy I still wouldn't mind sitting him the first few months. It's not like Portland needs him for regular season wins. LA same thing. Houston only playing Yao in limited minutes could be enough for them to make the playoffs.
Obviously you just want all three guys healthy when the playoffs come, or else you're going to get destroyed by LA without your center.
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I really want to see Yao dominate though; and on a consistent basis. I feel like his potential was so high, but he's never going to live up to any of that at all at this point with the injuries. How many games has Greg Oden played in his career thus far? I had a feeling injuries would get the best of him after watching him at Ohio State.
Spoiler [+]
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
How old is too old?
The Mavs are about to find out. All five projected starters are on the wrong side of 30, as is ace sixth man Jason Terry. It hasn't hurt them yet -- the Mavs won 55 games last season, an amazing 10th straight year with at least 50 wins -- but one has to wonder how long the Mavs can keep churning younger players into older ones before it all collapses in a heap.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 55-27 (Pythagorean W-L: 50-32)
Offensive Efficiency: 107.1 (10th)
Defensive Efficiency: 103.2 (12th)
Pace Factor: 94.8 (17th)
Highest PER: Dirk Nowitzki (23.01)
Last season the Mavs accelerated the "treadmill" approach, re-signing Jason Kidd, trading for Shawn Marion and then executing a midseason deal with Washington for Caron Butler and Brendan Haywood. That latter deal created some delusions of grandeur since (A) word of Butler's decline apparently had failed to reach Texas, and (B) the Mavs almost immediately ripped off a 13-game winning streak. Alas, it was a mirage; while the Mavs finished second in the Western Conference standings, they were only eighth in victory margin. For the third time in four seasons, Dallas lost in the first round of the playoffs.
Nonetheless, they'll bring back largely the same crew this season. Offensively, a couple of positives stand out. First, obviously, is the continued excellence of Dirk Nowitzki, who remains among the league's most efficient performers -- not only did he produce his usual 26.7 points per 40 minutes, but he uses remarkably few possessions to rack up his points.
Theoretically, that should have left plenty of opportunities for other players to thrive. In practice, it was incredibly disappointing that Dallas finished only 10th in offensive efficiency, and the team may need to rethink how some of the pieces fit. Two other starters (Kidd and Haywood) rarely shot the ball, while the other Mavs were mostly jump-shooters. The result was predictable: Dallas ranked just 26th in free throw attempts per field goal attempt, a major reason they failed to land higher in the offensive-efficiency tables.
Ironically, Dallas led the league in free throw percentage at 81.6 percent, an accomplishment that obviously would have been much more useful had it earned free throws in greater quantity. Not one Maverick finished in the top 15 at his position in free throw attempts per field goal attempt.
Defensively, Dallas placed 12th, with the main talent being a very low foul rate -- not surprising for such a veteran team. Dallas was fifth in opponent free throw attempts per field goal attempt, mirroring its greatest offensive weakness. Between those two items, in fact, only the Hornets' and Knicks' games featured fewer combined free throw attempts than Dallas.
Dallas' greatest skill last season wasn't offense or defense, actually -- it was pulling rabbits out of hats at the end of games. The Mavs went 18-7 in games decided by five points or less after going 18-5 in such games a year earlier; in fact, since 2004-05 the Mavs are 93-44 in these games.
The outlook for Dallas this season depends in part on whether one considers that luck or skill. On one hand, 93-44 is a pretty impressive mark -- if these games were truly random, we'd expect this to happen only one time in 50,000. That makes it difficult to ascribe to random chance.
However, as ESPN.com contributor Kevin Pelton has written, these aren't entirely random -- good teams will win slightly more often even in games this close. So if we use Dallas' record in non-close games in that period (.696) and modify by Pelton's formula to give them a probability of .565 in the close games, the odds of Dallas running up such an impressive record is more like 1 in 150.
One in 150 still sounds ironclad -- it's statistically significant. That takes us back to the old statistician's saw that if you go looking for significance, you'll find it. While the knee-jerk reaction is to attribute the Mavs' outperformance in close games to its many wily veterans, other studies have shown no correlation between age and close-game performance. Additionally, the Mavs' record in these contests dates back to a time when they weren't nearly as long in the tooth.
The better question to ask is, if this is a durable skill, what other things would we expect to see? For starters, we'd expect to see more year-to-year carryover in teams' records in these games. Historically, there is absolutely no correlation between a team's close-game record one season and its record the next. Even for Dallas, there was a 9-12 season mixed in with the 18-5 and 20-4 marks.
We'd also expect out-of-sample testing to show the trend holding up. But the Mavs went 8-14 in playoff games decided by five points or less in that stretch, dropping 11 of their past 12 -- including two this past spring in the first-round playoff loss to San Antonio. That explains why I didn't buy Dallas as a No. 2 seed last season, and why I suspect they'll be unlikely to stay at the 55-win level this time around.
A more valid reason to believe Dallas can keep up its string of 50 wins is the one good, young player they have in the pipeline -- Rodrigue Beaubois. In fact, the Butler trade may have inadvertently thrown a wrench in the Mavs' season by preventing them from starting Beaubois.
On a per-minute basis, he was the second-best Mav behind Nowitzki and led all rookies in PER -- but he rarely played. That was true even in the postseason; he played only 10 minutes in the first five games of the San Antonio series before nearly rallying the Mavs from 19 down in the concluding Game 6 … only to see the Spurs pull away while he sat the first 10 minutes of the final quarter.
Pistons fans will immediately note the parallels to another rookie, Tayshaun Prince, whom Rick Carlisle had to be prodded to use more in the postseason. (Carlisle, it should be noted, squeezed about all one possibly could from this roster otherwise.) Finding a role for Beaubois will remain a challenge going forward, not least because the obvious solution -- benching Butler and cutting Jason Terry's minutes -- is going to leave some key veterans unhappy.
If the Mavs are content with losing in the first round again, or perhaps the second if they get a good draw, then they can probably achieve it while leaving the 30-something quintet of veteran starters intact. They'll have a nice, safe season and no chance of winning anything important. To do anything more, however, depends on somebody like Beaubois emerging as a capable cohort to Nowitzki.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Dallas entered the offseason thinking it had a major card to play in the non-guaranteed contract of Erick Dampier, but it quickly became clear the team overplayed its hand. The Mavs would have been better off cashing in at the 2010 trade deadline, when they had already added Butler and Haywood but clearly needed another piece.
By the summer, so many teams had cap space and trade exceptions at least as large as Dampier's contract that the Mavs had little leverage; in fact, Utah outbid them for Al Jefferson with one of those exceptions.
Traded Matt Carroll, Eduardo Najera and Dampier to Charlotte for Tyson Chandler and Alexis Ajinca. The Mavs did the next-best thing with Dampier -- they used him to dump some unwanted salary flotsam and then gained another backup center with a huge expiring contract in Chandler, leaving open the possibility of using it in a blockbuster deal somewhere down the line. Chandler should be at least as good as Dampier; throw-in Ajinca is a failed first-rounder they'll see if they can get turned around.
Re-signed Dirk Nowitzki to a four-year, $80 million deal. Nowitzki gave the Mavs a bit of a hometown discount -- he could have signed for as much as $96 million. That should, theoretically, help the Mavs pursue other players, although Mark Cuban wasn't exactly shy about spending to upgrade the roster beforehand.
Re-signed Brendan Haywood to a six-year, $55 million deal. Dallas overpaid for Haywood, and probably knew they'd be doing this last February. The Mavs effectively purchased his Bird rights in the trade last year, with DeShawn Stevenson's burdensome contract representing the purchase price. While the last year is not guaranteed -- one of Dallas' favorite cap tricks -- the odds of Haywood being a $10 million player at age 35 are roughly on par with my chances of outrunning Usain Bolt.
Unfortunately for Dallas, the market for frontcourt talent quickly got out of hand this past summer, and they're highly unlikely to get full value from this deal. In the short term, however, they've locked up the center spot. They'll worry about the long-term later, but as long as Cuban is willing to pay luxury tax, this deal won't hurt the Mavericks.
Purchased No. 25 pick from Memphis, drafted Dominique Jones. This was less for an immediate need than a recognition that Dallas is awfully short on young talent right now. Buying a draft pick was a good way to prevent a potential crash two years down the road when the starters will go from being merely old to positively geriatric.
Signed Ian Mahinmi for one year, minimum. Mahinmi can't stay healthy, but he's been fairly productive in his limited minutes and could provide a solid fifth big man for Dallas. Also, he's 23 -- providing another inexpensive avenue to infuse the roster with some youth.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Size[/h3]
We don't think of the Mavs as bullies, but this year's team should be huge just about everywhere. It starts in the backcourt, where the 6-4 Kidd is nearly the biggest player at his position, and goes all the way to the center spot. Dallas now has two legit, productive 7-footers in Haywood and Chandler that they can rotate during games, tying down one opposing big man while the other tries to deal with the 7-foot Nowitzki on the perimeter.
Dallas's size is just as imposing on the wings. While I'm not fond of starting Butler at shooting guard, his 6-7 frame will allow him to shoot over most wings. Marion, meanwhile, has always played much taller than his own listed height of 6-7, allowing him to dominate opposing small forwards around the rim. Newcomer Jones fits this profile as well as a physical 6-5 guard.
Additionally, the Mavs have worked on adding more size on the bench with additions of players like Mahinmi and Ajinca. One other key cog, unfortunately, didn't work out when forward Tim Thomas left the team for a second straight season in order to tend to his ill wife.
There will still be times when Dallas plays small, especially in the backcourt where Kidd is likely to play a lot of mintues with either Brea, Terry or Beabouis joining him. But it appears Nowitzki wil see little or no action at center, and if so it follows that Marion's time at the four would also be limited. As a result, Dallas's frontcourt should consistently be as big or bigger than the opponents', even against the L.A.s, Portlands and Bostons off the league.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Age[/h3]
The Mavericks should be good again this year. But one must acknowledge the risk that this thing could go off the rails in a hurry. Dallas is old on paper, and it played like it too -- both the Mavs and their opponents were at or below the league average in free throws, turnovers and offensive rebounds, which are the classic signs of an older club.
Of particular concern is Dallas' age on the perimeter. While Beaubois is a glaring exception, Kidd is 37, Butler is 30 and Terry and Marion are 32. Kidd has aged extraordinarily well, but the other three all saw fairly large performance drops last season that could be the first stage of a steady decline. Kidd's numbers aren't red-flag-free either -- his rebound rate, though still impressive, has declined steadily over the past four seasons. He also could be a victim of the age around him -- while Kidd thrives in the open court, none of the other geezers will run with him.
The area of least concern is Nowitzki -- with his size and shooting ability, any age-related decline should be gradual as long as no injuries crop up. That said, if his play were to diminish, this whole house of cards would fall faster than you can say "Bennett Salvatore."
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
The biggest question in projecting the Mavs is how they'll use the roster. I project each team based on the idea that they'll play their best-rated players the most (provided those players are healthy), but in Dallas' case I feel less assured than in some others. I rated them with Beaubois playing nearly 2,000 minutes after returning from injury, which would require the Mavs to use Butler exclusively as a backup small forward and to reduce Terry's minutes. I'm not sure they're ready to do this, but if Beaubois plays as well as he did a year ago, I don't think they'll have a choice.
The projection for Beaubois is perhaps too optimistic; on the other hand, Kidd's looks far too negative. On balance, it evens out. The other factor to consider is the magic beans the Mavs have been using to spirit close games into the win column in recent seasons. I remain a non-believer, but if you want to give Dallas extra credit for this you should add about three wins to the total below.
The other factor to consider is the Mavs' willingness to spend along the way. If a deal crops up, they'll make it, even if it costs them even more in luxury tax. Considering they have $27 million in expiring contracts with Butler, Chandler and Stevenson, they'll probably do something between now and the trade deadline.
At the end of it all, however, it looks like more of the same. The Mavs are probably still another year or two away from their age catching up to them. In the meantime, they'll be the same middle-of-the-pack Western Conference playoff team they've been throughout the Carlisle era.
[h3]Prediction: 48-34, 2nd in Southwest Division, 5th in Western Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
When it comes to the Rockets, we know everything we need to about the strength of the supporting cast. Now they just need a leading man to step up.
The Rockets made an impression with a gritty crew that won 42 games despite losing star center Yao Ming for the entire season. Between Yao and Tracy McGrady, who never played a game before being traded to New York, Houston had $40 million in salary on the sideline last season. With $30 million worth of healthy players, the Rockets managed to post a winning record.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 42-40 (Pythagorean W-L: 40-42)
Offensive Efficiency: 104.6 (18th)
Defensive Efficiency: 105.5 (17th)
Pace Factor: 96.6 (6th)
Highest PER: Luis Scola (17.22)
More impressively, Houston pulled this off even though its main offseason acquisition, free-agent small forward Trevor Ariza, failed to deliver. Faced with increased offensive responsibility in the wake of Yao's absence, Ariza responded mostly by forcing ill-chosen shots, shooting 39.4 percent and earning a trade to New Orleans after the season.
The rest of the offense exceeded all expectations, nearly topping the performance of the Yao-led squad of a year earlier. Point guard Aaron Brooks won the league's Most Improved Player Award after bumping his scoring average to 19.6, while power forward Carl Landry delivered a monstrous half-season off the bench before going to Sacramento in a deft midseason trade. Luis Scola and Kyle Lowry also submitted their best pro seasons, Chuck Hayes showed drastic improvement as a makeshift starting center, and second-round draft pick Chase Budinger proved a steal.
Houston's defense also remained decent despite a shocking lack of height in the frontcourt. Scola and Landry, both generously listed at 6-foot-9, were what had to pass for height next to the 6-6 Hayes. The only genuinely tall player, 7-footer David Andersen, was pretty much terrified of physical contact and discarded to the Raptors after the season.
The height situation will change dramatically this season. Not only is Yao expected back in the lineup, but the Rockets drafted 6-9 bruiser Patrick Patterson, dealt for 6-10 Jordan Hill and 6-11 Jared Jeffries at the trade deadline, and signed 7-footer Brad Miller over the summer. They may have other limitations this season, but they're no longer the league's midgets.
One hopes, however, that Houston can retain one skill from last season's overachieving bunch: a passion for drawing offensive fouls. Houston led the league in drawing charges by a wide margin, with more than three a game (see chart). Lowry was third in the league and Hayes, Scola and Shane Battier all finished in the league's top 15. Jeffries, while worthless in most other respects, led the league with 62, although only 18 of them came with the Rockets.
[h4]2009-10: Most Off. Fouls Drawn[/h4]
| Houston | 252 |
| Milwaukee | 222 |
| Portland | 193 |
| Golden State | 190 |
| Indiana | 185 |
| New York | 185 |
| League average | 151.4 |
| Source: Hoopdata.com |
However, the Rockets had no choice but to try getting run over, because they were so vertically challenged. Not only were they short -- most of them couldn't jump, either. As a result, the Rockets were 27th in shot-blocking and 23rd in opponent 2-point field goal percentage. The defining moment, perhaps, came in Atlanta when five Rockets looked on helplessly as the Hawks' Josh Smith jumped over the rim for a game-winning tip-in -- a ball no Houston player had a prayer of reaching.
The revamped frontcourt, though not terribly athletic, should help alleviate that problem. Another big trade also should help -- the February deal with Sacramento for Kevin Martin. It cost them Landry, but the deal gave the Rockets a high-efficiency perimeter scorer who should punish defenses for doubling Yao.
Additionally, the Rockets turned this trade further in their favor by making it a three-way deal with the Knicks. Houston walked away with a solid frontcourt prospect in Hill, a first-rounder from New York in 2012 (top-5 protected), and the right to swap picks with New York in 2011. In the best-case scenario, Houston will enjoy three lottery picks (including Hill), all for the burden of taking on Jeffries' contract.
None of that will matter, however, if Yao doesn't come back as the Yao of old, or at least a reasonable facsimile. The Rockets will watch his minutes carefully, limiting him to 24 a game to start the season and likely resting him in back-to-backs. But he's still going to be 7-6 when he returns, so he's likely to remain extremely effective for as long as he stays on the court. Should he remain healthy, last season's solid play sans Yao portends very well for Houston's future.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Drafted Patrick Patterson. Houston chose a relatively safe option in the middle of the first round, adding some needed muscle inside with Patterson. He fits the general profile that Houston has targeted in the past -- he's a smart guy who defends -- and is likely to be Scola's primary backup at the 4. The Rockets had no second-round pick and, after purchasing three a year earlier, didn't buy any.
Matched Cleveland's offer sheet to Kyle Lowry for four years, $24 million. The fourth year on this deal isn't guaranteed, but it's still expensive for a backup point guard. However, Lowry is far more effective than most backup point guards, so keeping him in Houston made a lot of sense.
Signed Luis Scola for five years, $47 million. This is the classic conundrum with being over the cap and having a free agent: Overpaying makes sense because you can't replace him. Scola shouldn't be getting this kind of contract at age 30 (although Year 5 is only partially guaranteed), but with an overheated free-agent market, the Rockets had to shell out or lose him entirely. Houston's cap situation is otherwise in good enough shape that it could afford to take the plunge here. Additionally, as with Miller and Lowry the final season isn't guaranteed, limiting the exposure to four years, $36 million. With three fairly large non-guaranteed contracts coming due in three successive seasons, the Rockets have effectively built up a war chest of "confederate money" to use in trades with financially weaker teams.
Signed Brad Miller for three years, $15 million. Miller has a history with Rockets coach Rick Adelman and is familiar with the Rockets' system, but I wasn't crazy about this deal. Miller really struggled last season and at 35 doesn't hold a ton of promise going forward. The third year is partially guaranteed, but this was still a risk. It does, however, fit in the larger program of adding size to last season's lilliputian frontcourt.
Traded David Andersen and cash to Toronto for a conditional second-round pick. Houston basically paid the Raptors to take Andersen off their hands; the conditions on the draft pick are so tight that they'll never actually receive it.
Traded Trevor Ariza to New Orleans, received Courtney Lee from New Jersey in four-team deal. This was clever cap management by the Rockets on multiple fronts. First, they were able to generate a $6.5 million cap exception by taking Lee into the exception from the Andersen deal. Second, it should enable Houston to slide under the luxury tax at the trade deadline by paying another team to take on the remainder of Jeffries' contract.
Finally, it sets up the Rockets for a strong fallback position if Yao falters this season, because they should be far enough under the cap to re-sign Brooks as a restricted free agent and still add another player.
They did this while giving up very little on the court. Ariza is probably a better player than Lee, but it's not a huge difference, and adding Lee lets Shane Battier go back to playing his natural small forward spot. Lee also is a better outside shooter, which is important for the inside-outside style Houston wants to play; we all saw way too much of Ariza's perimeter game a year ago.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Inside-Out Offense[/h3]
Look at Houston's lineup right now and you'll see two kinds of players: They have two guys who can post up (Yao and Scola) who will be the focal points of the offense, and everybody else will spot up on the perimeter. Of the likely rotation players, all of them except Lowry can hit open jump shots.
This has long been the plan, but rarely has Houston had so many weapons. Brooks has emerged as one of the best young guards in the league and led the NBA in 3s last season. Martin is a devastating long-range shooter who made 41.5 percent and 40.2 percent from downtown in the two years before last season's slump. Lee (36.9 percent career), Battier (38.5 percent) and Budinger (36.9 percent) all are solid 3-point threats too.
The frontcourt has even more shooting capability. Yao and Miller are two of the best shooting big men in basketball. Scola, Patterson and Hill can knock down open 15-footers, permitting them to space the floor when they're not in the paint. Hayes, who is likely to be a deep reserve this year, is the one exception in the frontcourt.
As a result, Houston should improve on last year's 3-point performance, when they had a quantity-over-quality approach -- the Rockets achieved fourth in frequency but 16th in accuracy.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Speed[/h3]
This seems odd at first glance, because Brooks and Lowry are two of the fastest players in the league. The rest of the team? Not so much. Yao was one of the league's slowest players even before the foot injury and may come back slower; however, he still might be able to outrun Miller. Scola, Battier, Hayes and Patterson won't win any track meets either, leaving the Rockets with arguably the league's slowest frontcourt. Hill is the only one with decent speed.
That can be a problem in more than transition situations -- the lack of mobility among the centers in particular means they will face constant attack from opponent pick-and-rolls. It also limits the Rockets' ability to play up-tempo around Brooks and Lowry, something they did more often a year ago.
The perimeter players aren't exactly speed demons, either. Martin runs like he's trying to balance a bucket of water on his head, while Battier and Lee are almost entirely half-court players. Only Budinger and little-used Taylor are at their best in the open floor.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Well, we know what the floor is. Houston won 42 games without Yao a season ago, so it's hard to imagine the Rockets finishing much south of .500 regardless of how poorly his comeback goes.
It's the upper limit that's harder to define. Houston is among the deepest teams in basketball, and it has assembled pieces that fit together very well. Additionally, it's shown the willingness to use organizational resources (like cash, for instance) to make deals, and that could play heavily in its favor at the trade deadline.
However, the question I asked at the top is the big one. Houston has plenty of willing passengers, but it needs somebody to drive the bus. The two guys who can do it are Yao and Martin, but both come with question marks.
Martin can certainly stroke it, but he's also missed 88 games over the past three years and lost his shooting stroke a year ago. My projection is that he'll be a pretty good player this season … but that's all. If he can rehash his monstrous 2007-08 efficiency -- 26.0 points per 40 minutes with a 61.8 TS percentage -- then the Rockets become a much more potent offensive team. And if he actually guards somebody, they'll be more effective defensively than I've projected, too.
As for Yao, his size and shooting ability should allow him to score at a high rate even if he needs a walker to change ends. However, his availability to play is a greater question. He missed 91 games in the four seasons preceding the last one, and he's a good bet to miss 15-20 more this year. Additionally, the Rockets plan to limit him to 24 minutes a game, muting his impact even when he is healthy.
The best-case scenario then is a tantalizing one: an All-Star season from Martin and an all-league-caliber one, albeit in limited minutes, from Yao. I'm not banking on it, but it's possible, and if it happens Houston could finish as high as second in the West. More likely, however, both players will spend some time on the shelf and perform at or near their most recent performance levels. In that scenario, the Rockets will be a good team … just not anything more.
[h3]Prediction: 46-36, 3rd in Southwest Division, T-7th in Western Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
It says something about the Grizzlies' recent history that last season's 40-42 mark is considered a success. Unfortunately, the on-court success masked an ongoing problem that is only becoming more severe: This is one of the league's worst-managed franchises.
The season kicked off with a typical Grizzlies debacle, as they inexplicably signed Allen Iverson despite already having starters at both guard positions and no need whatsoever for yet another ball-dominating scorer (more on that in a minute). Memphis started 1-8, The Answer turned into The Cancer when he had the temerity to complain about minutes after his first game, and faster than you could say "Pau for Kwame," it sent Iverson packing.
This decision, like many during the past two seasons, was a call made by owner Michael Heisley rather than his basketball people. Heisley thinks he knows the game well enough to make most of the decisions and has basically emasculated his basketball staff -- as he was more than happy to indicate in a train wreck of an interview with a local radio station this offseason.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 40-42 (Pythagorean W-L: 36-46)
Offensive Efficiency: 104.8 (17th)
Defensive Efficiency: 107.6 (24th)
Pace Factor: 96.1 (8th)
Highest PER: Zach Randolph (21.21)
He also mentioned as a casual aside that he often consulted with former Grizzlies and Lakers GM Jerry West to form his decisions. I'm not sure who should be more insulted by that statement -- the Grizzlies' current front office or West.
Thus, the "one step forward, two steps back" nature of Memphis' NBA existence continues. The Grizzlies owned the league's worst bench thanks to various talent-wasting schemes of seasons past, including the botched selection of Hasheem Thabeet by Heisley with the second overall pick in the 2009 draft. Unexpectedly, Memphis stayed in the Western Conference playoff race thanks to the rapid development of Marc Gasol and an All-Star season from offseason addition Zach Randolph.
Heisley defenders will point out that the Randolph decision worked out, at least last season. The troubled forward went the entire season without his name turning up in the police blotter -- that would have to wait until summer, as it turned out -- and filled two glaring needs as a power forward and a go-to low-post scorer.
[h4]Lowest Pct. of Assisted FGs, 2009-10[/h4]
| Memphis | 47.9 |
| Washington | 51.8 |
| Miami | 51.9 |
| Minnesota | 52.4 |
| Sacramento | 53.4 |
| League avg. | 56.4 |
However, Randolph (and Iverson) also exacerbated a team-wide problem: Nobody on this team could pass. Or at least nobody seemed terribly interested in the concept. The Grizzlies assisted on only 47.9 percent of their made baskets last season, which was by far the lowest rate in basketball (see chart) and a big reason their offense was merely average. Randolph wasn't the worst offender, actually. Small forward Rudy Gay and sixth-man-by-default Sam Young were even worse, averaging less than two assists per 40 minutes despite constant gunning.
Memphis, in fact, wasn't a good offensive team at all until a shot went up. The Grizzlies placed just 22nd in "first shot" offensive efficiency, but led the NBA in offensive rebound rate (see chart). This, again, was where Randolph paid huge dividends. He was one of the best offensive rebounders at his position -- as were rookies Young and DeMarre Carroll. Those extra possessions, and the easy put-backs from them, helped the Grizzlies offset all the contested heaves they took otherwise.
[h4]Top Offensive Rebound Rate, 2009-10[/h4]
| Memphis | 31.3 |
| Detroit | 30.3 |
| Oklahoma City | 28.6 |
| Portland | 28.2 |
| Atlanta | 28.2 |
| League avg. | 26.3 |
Thanks to those second shots, the Grizzlies won enough to provide the first genuine bursts of hope in Memphis in some time. The young core of Gay, Mayo and Gasol is a solid foundation, while Randolph is 29 but has a huge expiring contract that could potentially be parlayed into more assets.
However, two weaknesses stand out. First, they didn't defend. A lot of young teams have this problem, but in Memphis it seems more ingrained. Both Gasol and Randolph are big, plodding post players whose limitations make it difficult for the Grizzlies to stuff opposing pick-and-roll plays. Instead, Memphis would rotate to cover them and leave the wings open -- only two teams allowed a higher rate of 3-point attempts per field goal attempt. It also didn't compete with particular zeal in any other phase of defense.
Again, the bench didn't help. However, the Grizzlies were actually fortunate in this regard -- until Gasol missed 13 of the final 15 games, their top six players missed only six games, allowing Memphis to paper over the horrors that awaited deeper on the pine. It's no accident that Memphis, 35-32 at the time, went 5-10 in that final stretch without Gasol. We'll point out for posterity that Ronnie Brewer, acquired at the trade deadline to address the bench woes, played only five games before tearing a hamstring and missing the rest of the season.
In summary, the roster story for 2010-11 doesn't seem radically different than it was a year ago -- a very competent starting five backed up mostly by air.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
It was another baffling offseason for the Heisley Express, as the Grizzlies made personnel decisions with no rhyme or reason while general manager Chris Wallace and coach Lionel Hollins searched for hard objects to bang their heads against. Let's review:
Did not extend qualifying offer to Ronnie Brewer, signed Tony Allen for three years, $9.7 million
Memphis gave up a lottery-protected first-round pick to Utah at last season's trade deadline to secure Brewer's rights, so one presumed the Grizzlies intended to keep him as a restricted free agent. Instead, he became a five-game rental when Heisley inexplicably decided not to make him a qualifying offer -- just as he'd done a year earlier with Hakim Warrick.
It appears Heisley doesn't understand the mechanics of a qualifying offer. Even if the Grizzlies had decided they didn't want Brewer, qualifying him was good business. With the threat of matching an offer sheet lingering, Memphis could have sign-and-traded him and received assets in return. Instead, Brewer is gone for nothing, and so is the first-round pick.
Signing Allen, on the other hand, was a solid move that should help upgrade the Grizzlies defensively. While he shares his new teammates' weakness for one-on-one offensive play, one hopes his defensive intensity will rub off on the likes of Gay.
Signed Rudy Gay to five-year, $81.6 million deal
In another episode of bad poker, Memphis jumped the gun and awarded Gay, a restricted free agent, a huge contract before anyone presented an offer sheet for them to match. What makes this deal particularly worrisome is that (A) the Grizzlies are a small-market team that has had to keep costs down, and (B) they're paying All-Star money for a player who isn't an All-Star. Inevitably, this is going to cost them down the road when they have to pare down payroll in other areas. The question isn't if, it's when.
Drafted Xavier Henry and Greivis Vasquez
These were solid picks, but the comedy didn't start until Heisley decided he'd negotiate the contracts and offer his rookies 20 percent less than the maximum stipulated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Teams normally offer the extra 20 percent as a matter of course, usually with some mild conditions -- say, showing up for offseason conditioning work.
Heisley admitted in a radio interview that he had just found out about the rule this past summer, offering a shocking insight into the naivete of an NBA owner. Armed with his new knowledge, he offered Henry conditions based on meeting a minutes-played threshold and making the All-Rookie team. Similarly harsh conditions were attached to Vasquez's deal. Heisley eventually relented, reportedly after a talking-to from the league, saving us from the first contract holdouts since the league's CBA implemented the current salary scale a decade ago.
Sold draft pick No. 25 to Dallas
It's hard for local fans to get excited about a franchise that so willingly sells off useful assets. The irony of Heisley making so many personnel decisions is that fans still don't think he's really trying to win because he cuts corners with moves like this. Or perhaps this was done to make fans feel better about trading a future first-round pick for five games of Ronnie Brewer -- they just would have sold it anyway.
Signed Acie Law for one year, veteran's minimum
I haven't completely given up on Law. He has decent size and quickness but lost all confidence in his jumper as a Hawk. If he gets his shot back, he might prove useful. Although one wishes the Griz would invest a bit more in the open sore that is their backup point guard position.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Frontcourt scoring[/h3]
When the Grizzlies win, it's usually because opponents can't deal with the size and skill combination offered by Gasol and Randolph. It's rare for NBA teams to have a big man who can reliably score in the post but also has the touch to splash down 17-footers. Memphis is blessed with two such players.
Randolph, for all his shortcomings, is an absolute beast on the low block. He has the size to get deep position, a sweet high-arcing shot and good hands and footwork. When he fails it's usually because he's his own worst enemy -- he'll force the action against double-teams. However, he provides an added threat when another teammate shoots, as his wide base and soft hands make him one of the game's most potent offensive rebounders.
Gasol is the yin to Randolph's yang, a 7-footer who relies more on touch than power and ably plays the high post while Randolph goes to the block. Gasol is the team's only good passer, and his preference for posting up on the left block pairs nicely with Randolph's residence on the right side. Gasol remains underutilized too, as he shoots a much higher percentage than his teammates.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Point guard[/h3]
One is tempted to say "the bench," but if Henry and Vasquez sign contracts and Thabeet shows improvement, it won't be the eyesore it was a year ago. Allen provides a reliable wing to back up Gay and Mayo, Darrell Arthur should be ready to contribute after missing most of last season, and Sam Young will be another year older and wiser.
But the point guard situation? Yeesh. One reason the Grizzlies have such pathetic assist numbers is that Mike Conley creates very little for teammates. While this is partially by design -- no point guard is asked to stand in the corner more than this one -- Conley also has done remarkably little to reassure Grizzlies fans of the considerable faith that's been put in him for the past three seasons.
It's not like they can replace him, either. The only other credible point guard on the roster is Law, who failed miserably in Atlanta. The Grizzlies sometimes talk about having Mayo play the point, but he can't get to the rim even against shooting guards and has poor passing numbers. Vasquez is another possibility, theoretically, but he's way too slow to defend the position.
Sum it up and if Conley stays healthy all year, the Griz rate merely below average at the point … but if he misses any time, this will be a full-blown disaster.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
The temptation is to view last season's improvement as a sign that the Grizzlies are on the rise. Based on a more critical view, however, it's obvious they benefited heavily from two events that are unlikely to repeat: (1) an insanely good run of health from the only six players that were any good, and (2) a career year from Randolph.
The upside is that there are some positive trends in the making. The team's relative youth is a good sign going forward, and it should improve defensively with experience. Additionally, the bench is likely to be much better, especially if Vasquez and Henry sign contracts. If so, the impact of any injuries to the starters will be less than it would have been a year ago.
Nevertheless, there are too many weaknesses to project a playoff berth -- starting at the top, where Heisley's meddling has squandered countless assets already. Grizzlies fans can only wait in horror for his next bungle, while hoping to tread water at the not-half-bad level they achieved last season.
By mid-April, I'm sure the Grizzlies will note with pride that they were good enough to make the playoffs in the East for a second straight season. Unfortunately, that isn't where they play.
[h3]Prediction: 36-46, 5th in Southwest Division, 11th in Western Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
A team can take on bad contracts for only so long before doing irreparable damage to its product on the basketball court -- especially if the team doesn't have deep pockets. For the New Orleans Hornets, 2009-10 was the year the other shoe finally dropped.
Forced to sacrifice yet more talent in their annual quest to evade the luxury tax, the Hornets limped to a 37-45 mark and saw star point guard Chris Paul's frustration erupt in a trade demand after the season.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 37-45 (Pythagorean W-L: 33-49)
Offensive Efficiency: 105.1 (16th)
Defensive Efficiency: 107.3 (22nd)
Pace Factor: 94.8 (16th)
Highest PER: Chris Paul (23.74)
Before they played a single game, the Hornets shed players to wriggle under the tax line. The first casualty was Rasual Butler, a key starter the previous season, whom New Orleans donated to the Clippers for essentially nothing. Antonio Daniels went to Minnesota for Darius Songaila in a deal that robbed Peter to pay Paul -- it slid New Orleans under the 2010 luxury tax threshold but added a $4.9 million obligation for its annual tax dance in 2010-11.
That additional salary effectively cost the Hornets Cole Aldrich in the 2010 draft (more on that below). An equally short-term move traded Tyson Chandler for Emeka Okafor, although Okafor at least provided an upgrade on the court.
Saddled with massive obligations to second-tier players such as Peja Stojakovic, James Posey and Morris Peterson, the Hornets struggled early despite a brilliant start by Paul -- which started the wheels turning on his exit strategy. Coach Byron Scott was fired weeks into the season and general manager Jeff Bower thrust into the job -- the classic "We don't want to pay a second salary" response from a franchise short on cash, as well as a classic sign that a GM is on borrowed time.
Bower, to his credit, succeeded in one place where Scott had failed horribly: He played the young guys. Scott's inability to develop young talent had resulted in the Hornets' running talents such as J.R. Smith and Brandon Bass out of town; true to form, early in the season, Scott wouldn't play rookie guards Darren Collison and Marcus Thornton.
Bower immediately played both of them heavy minutes, and they were two of the best rookies in basketball last season (see chart). It's not an exaggeration to say they saved the Hornets' season, which is pretty amazing considering they were the 20th and 42nd picks in the draft. Whatever else one might say about Bower, the fact he had such a good draft with the league's most limited scouting resources borders on heroic.
[h4]Top Rookies by Esti. Wins Added, '09-10[/h4]
| Tyreke Evans | Sac | 18.28 | 9.7 |
| Stephen Curry | GS | 16.31 | 7.7 |
| M. Thornton | NO | 17.50 | 6.2 |
| D. Collison | NO | 16.55 | 5.8 |
| DeJuan Blair | SA | 17.79 | 5.2 |
With Paul missing half the year with ankle and knee problems, the rookies managed to keep the Hornets in the playoff race for much of the season. There was some luck involved, too -- New Orleans won 37 games with the scoring margin of a 33-win team -- but because of the kids, the Hornets were able to post a decent offensive season.
The one glaring weakness was an inability to draw fouls. Collison and Thornton were jump shooters, and frontcourt stalwart David West doesn't get to the line much, either. Plus, the other rotation players were a tired collection of overpaid vets, most of whom had their going-to-the-rim days well behind them.
[h4]Fewest FTAs per FGA, 2009-10[/h4]
| Milwaukee | .239 |
| New Orleans | .243 |
| New York | .256 |
| Philadelphia | .270 |
| Dallas | .277 |
As a result, the Hornets had the second-worst free throw rate in the league (see chart), averaging a meager .243 free throw attempts per field goal attempt. Okafor was the only Hornet with a rate above the league average. That's a shame because every key Hornet is an excellent foul shooter … except Okafor.
The real problems, however, came at the defensive end. Lacking athleticism on the wings and depth everywhere, the Hornets finished only 22nd in defensive efficiency. Of particular note was an inability to block shots: New Orleans rated just 28th, rejecting just 4.46 percent of opponent deliveries.
The truly sad part is that the Hornets had a good foundation in Okafor, who finished 15th in blocks; on a per-minute basis, only eight starting centers rejected more shots. Yet the other Hornets were utterly lacking in this respect. For some perspective, consider that Milwaukee's Andrew Bogut missed 13 games yet still blocked more shots than all those players put together.
The lack of a qualified backup center was certainly part of the problem. Hilton Armstrong continued to fail and was dealt at midseason in yet another luxury-tax-related salary purge, leaving 6-9 Songaila to man the middle. A trade for out-of-shape 7-footer Aaron Gray was far too little, too late.
The Hornets' other defensive metrics were basically OK, but between the short guards, unathletic wings and lack of shot-blocking, it was just too easy to get a clean look against them one-on-one. The Hornets placed 29th in opponent 2-point field goal percentage and 28th in overall field goal defense.
Despite all that went wrong, there were some positives in the course of the season. When Paul, Thornton and Collison were in the rotation at the same time, the Hornets went 18-10 and beat Portland, Utah and Oklahoma City on the road. West and Okafor were a pretty solid starting tandem up front, and obviously the play of Thornton bodes well for the future.
Collison, unfortunately, had to be sacrificed this past summer in yet another cap-related move, which takes us to the other major story: The Hornets are still paying for awful cap-management decisions from years past. No team has used the midlevel exception to more disastrous effect, with deals for Peterson, Posey and Bobby Jackson still haunting the team. (Willie Green is on the team, making $3.9 million, because the team signed Bobby Jackson to a full midlevel deal at the same time. Follow the trades and you'll see Jackson begat Mike James, who begat Daniels, who begat Songaila, who begat Green.) More obviously, Stojakovic's contract has been a millstone; for $70 million, New Orleans received one good season.
The end result is that the Hornets are in a precarious state going forward. Paul will be a free agent in two seasons, but vultures already are circling and his people are trying to spring him. The harsh truth is that one of the best point guards in history descended from the heavens into the Hornets' laps, and they've squandered the opportunity with a serious of outlandish contracts to second-rate veterans.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
The offseason tumult began with an April announcement that longtime owner George Shinn would sell the team to minority owner Gary Chouest. That seemed to mark a changing of the guard for the Hornets, but the sale has been stalled for months with no public statements why.
In July, the team fired Bower … something it just as easily could have done in April. I suspect the Hornets waited so long because they wanted Chouest to make the call, then finally reached a point where that couldn't be done. Regardless, it was an odd scenario that was handled badly -- Bower conducted the draft, hired the next coach and led the team's admittedly unenthusiastic foray into the free-agent market, only to be dismissed without warning in early July.
The other big news, of course, is Paul's interest in relocation. He still has two years before he can become a free agent, so his leverage isn't great at the moment, but the clock is ticking on the Hornets. Unless they show dramatic improvement this season, it appears they face a situation very similar to Kevin Garnett's endgame in Minnesota.
Hired Monty Williams. The Hornets committed to Williams before naming a new general manager, a classic cart-horse mistake that might come back to bite them. As for the choice itself, it's a solid one. Williams gained respect as an assistant in Portland, coaching the team for several games while Nate McMillan recovered from a ruptured Achilles tendon. Given the Hornets' financial constraints, a first-time coach was always going to make more sense; once Boston assistant Tom Thibodeau was off the market, Williams became the next-best choice.
Hired Dell Demps as general manager. This was basically a case of the Hornets letting the coach hire the GM: Although Demps is well regarded around the league, he also benefited significantly from his prior relationship with Williams. Additionally, Demps was fourth in command in San Antonio, so he's taking a fairly major step up in responsibility. He'll be judged largely on whether he can keep Paul in a Hornets uniform beyond 2012.
The underreported good news is that the Hornets appear to be investing a bit more in their front-office resources. The Hornets hired Tim Connelly from Washington as assistant general manager and Gerald Madkins from Cleveland as vice president of player personnel, giving Demps an actual staff to work with -- as opposed to last season, when Bower could address his front office merely by finding a mirror.
Traded Morris Peterson and No. 11 pick to Oklahoma City for Nos. 21 and 26 picks; drafted Craig Brackins and Quincy Pondexter. The luxury tax strikes again. This time, the Hornets got it out of the way early, at least, sending Peterson to the Thunder on draft day and moving down ten spots.
Given the Hornets' depth woes, the 2-for-1 nature of the deal wasn't bad, but they missed a great opportunity to plug a huge hole. Seven-footer Cole Aldrich, whom the Thunder took at No. 11, was the exact prescription needed for New Orleans' shot-blocking and backup center woes. I hope that year of Darius Songaila was worth it because that's basically what the Hornets have right now instead of Aldrich; they never would have had to make the Peterson deal if they hadn't done the Songaila trade a year earlier.
As for the draft, Pondexter was a really good value pick at No. 26; in fact, I would have taken him well ahead of Brackins. A young, athletic wing who can guard, he's exactly the type of energizer the Hornets' rotation desperately needs. Brackins is skilled enough to become a solid player, especially if he develops a 3-point shot, but was traded to Philadelphia later in the summer.
Signed Aaron Gray for two years, veteran's minimum. This wasn't a terrible gamble -- the Hornets need size, and Gray is huge. Alas, he's a bit too huge at the moment. If he gets in shape, he'll be the best backup center they've had in years, but he has offered few rays of hope on that front.
Traded Julian Wright to Toronto for Marco Belinelli. I liked this trade because New Orleans needs another backcourt player and Belinelli is a useful end-of-the-rotation player who can handle the ball and shoot. The deal was basically cap neutral -- both players are free agents after the season -- but it's much easier to imagine Belinelli having a future with the Hornets than Wright. The Hornets also created a $2.8 million trade exception with this deal, essentially recycling a previous exception from the Butler trade.
Traded Darren Collison and James Posey to Indiana, received Trevor Ariza from Houston in four-team deal. This trade hews to my theory that 75 percent of new general managers bungle the cap in their first year. Then they spend the rest of their tenure trying to scramble out of the mess they've created.
As promising as Collison was last season, linking him with Posey's dud of a contract was the kernel of a good idea. Collison wasn't going to play that much as long as Paul stays healthy, and he was clearly the team's most valuable trade chip.
Unfortunately, taking back Ariza was the definition of a bad idea. It gives the Hornets yet another iffy midlevel contract, obligating them to pay $28 million over the next four years for a fringe starter. It's hard to believe they cashed in their best trade chip for that, especially in light of recent cap-management history.
Additionally, the Hornets effectively traded Courtney Lee for Ariza in this deal -- Lee went from New Jersey to Houston in a direct swap for Ariza as part of the deal. Lee is about 98 percent of the player Ariza is and makes $4.7 million less next season, a differential that could have (A) allowed the Hornets to use the $6.2 million exception from the Peterson trade in another deal while staying under the luxury tax and (B) put the Hornets far enough under the cap to pursue a star free agent next summer.
Adding Ariza will make the Hornets better this season, but short-term thinking has been the Hornets' problem ever since they signed Stojakovic. One hoped that approach would have changed under new management.
Signed Mustafa Shakur for one year, minimum. I liked this deal a lot, as the Hornets needed a low-cost backup point guard once Collison was dealt and Shakur was arguably the best one in the D-League a year ago.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Starting Linuep[/h3]
Starting lineup. Take a look around and try to find a quintet with an advantage on New Orleans' opening five. Paul is the league's best point guard; West and Okafor are near star-caliber players up front; and Ariza and Thornton are fairly solid wingmen.
In the best-case scenario, the Hornets could have one of the best units in basketball. That would happen if Thornton builds on the progress of a strong rookie season, Ariza recovers from his shooting woes of a year ago and the other three stay healthy. The unit is also solid defensively, with Ariza alleviating the need for a defensive stopper, which should allow the Hornets to improve on last season's poor standing in defensive efficiency.
In projecting each team's performance for this season, I had the Hornets with the league's seventh-best starting lineup in terms of average PER. Obviously, Paul is a big reason for that, but so is the fact that he has four viable starters surrounding him for the first time in eons. New Orleans has always had at least one gaping hole in the starting five in the Paul era -- Devin Brown, who is out of the league, started 37 times last season -- but it no longer will if the starters stay healthy.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: The Bench[/h3]
I projected New Orleans to have a strong starting lineup. Unfortunately, the Hornets also project to have the league's worst bench. Yes, the worst -- even below Miami's and Golden State's. Behind Paul they're relying on D-League import Shakur and a converted, barely adequate shooting guard in Green; Belinelli may also see himself pressed into service in this role. They have no viable backup center either, unless Gray can get in passable shape; otherwise they're relying on players like Smith and West, who aren't particularly large even for 4s, and fringe players like Mensa-Bonsu.
From 2 through 4 it's nearly as bad. Pondexter is a late first-round pick and Smith a thus-far failed first-round pick; while I like Pondexter, it's unrealistic to expect major contributions from either player right away. Green and Stojakovic both have seen much better days and are strictly end-of-the-rotation fodder at this point. Belinelli is about the lone rotation player who truly looks the part, and even he is hardly a star.
Worse yet, it's hard to envision the Hornets making any moves to address their weaknesses considering their current financial plight. New Orleans once again finds itself barely under the luxury tax line and with limited trade resources; Collison was their one playable card and they already cashed it in for Ariza.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Chris Paul's frustration might only grow after this season because I'm projecting the Hornets to be just good enough to tantalize him with the prospect of the playoffs before falling short. As skeptical as I am about the long-term benefits of the Ariza trade, it does improve New Orleans' prospects for this season, and the development of Thornton should give the Hornets a decent shooting guard for the first time in the Paul era. If the starting five stays healthy, New Orleans could be quite good.
The problem is that organizationally, the team is bringing a gun to a knife fight, and once any injuries hit, the second unit's weaknesses will be laid bare. The Hornets' chief competitors for the playoffs in the West all have more resources, deeper benches and, I suspect, a deeper will to spend their way over the hump if push comes to shove. The Hornets don't, so even if Paul returns to his brilliant ways, New Orleans might land a whisker short of the postseason.
[h3]Prediction: 45-37, 4th in Southwest Division, 9th in Western Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
Amazingly, the window remains open.
It sure didn't look like it for most of last season. At times, in fact, the Spurs looked a little desperate, spending far beyond their usual means to try to keep the Duncan-Ginobili-Parker crew's championship window open a bit longer. The most notable example came when San Antonio brought in exactly the kind of player it had spent a dozen years avoiding: Richard Jefferson, a declining second-tier star with a huge contract.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 50-32 (Pythagorean W-L: 57-25)
Offensive Efficiency: 107.2 (9th)
Defensive Efficiency: 102.0 (9th)
Pace Factor: 94.0 (20th)
Highest PER: Tim Duncan (24.79)
Seven other new players joined the roster, and for much of the season the result was that the Spurs never quite looked like the Spurs. Tony Parker missed 26 games and struggled with a plantar fascia injury, Tim Duncan's loss of mobility made a once-impregnable defense a bit more porous and newly arrived starters Jefferson and Antonio McDyess underwhelmed.
However, everything came together in March, even with Parker still hobbled. Manu Ginobili played some of his best basketball, second-year pro George Hill established himself as a fearsome combo guard and the new pieces started clicking. The Spurs went 18-8 against a brutal season-closing schedule (15 of 26 on the road, 17 of 26 against winning teams) and knocked off Dallas in the first round of the playoffs before finally succumbing to Phoenix.
Phoenix's guards repeatedly took advantage of the Spurs' aging frontcourt by catching them in switches and flying to the basket, and there's a lesson in there. While San Antonio overall was a good defensive team, the Spurs were also the masters of "old guy" defense. They never took themselves out of position and never missed a rotation, but they also never gambled and aimed merely to keep everything in front of them.
The result was a defense that was easily the best at cutting off the 3-point line -- only 17.9 percent of opponent field goals originated from beyond the arc (see chart). However, they couldn't stop talented opponents from getting their shots. San Antonio forced the third-fewest turnovers, at 13.3 percent of opponent possessions, which meant Spurs' opponents launched many more shot attempts than average. Against potent shooting teams like the Suns, that spelled trouble.
Fortunately, the Spurs are in the process of injecting more youth, which is why I maintain that their championship window remains open. Hill and rookie DeJuan Blair added some juice to last season's bench, but this summer's addition -- Brazilian big man Tiago Splitter -- could prove even more dangerous. Drafting higher than usual, the Spurs also secured themselves a solid wing man (James Anderson) to address another weak link in the rotation.
And the Spurs weren't that bad a year ago. While they won only 50 games, they had the scoring margin of a 57-win team and played dramatically better in the latter half of the season. The Spurs' seven-game margin between their expected and real win-loss record was the league's largest last season, and historically this type of phenomenon is unlikely to repeat itself.
The Spurs, as usual, also handled all the big-picture stuff incredibly smoothly. With Ginobili going gangbusters in the spring, they read the summer tea leaves correctly and inked him to a three-year, $39 million extension -- likely saving themselves a much greater expense in the overheated free-agent market that followed.
So on paper, it may look like the window slammed shut last season -- San Antonio slipped to seventh in the West and was swept in the second round, while its two big offseason pickups flopped. Look a little closer, however, and it's clear that by the end of last season, this was one of the best teams in basketball. With a few tweaks, it's still possible for it to ascend the mountain.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Drafted James Anderson and Ryan Richards. Anderson offers little star potential but fills a need for shooting and youth on the wings, where the Spurs had relied on an ongoing procession of tired 30-somethings the past few seasons. Richards, a second-rounder from England, is a classic Spurs European project who will stay overseas and develop.
Signed Gary Neal for three years, minimum. A veteran of the European leagues, Neal wasn't on anybody's list of desirable free agents. But he played so well for the Spurs' summer league team that they quickly inked him to a deal. Neal shot the lights out in the summer, and if he can do that for a full season, San Antonio will have another young-#$! (he's 26) long-range ace off the bench.
Richard Jefferson opted out. Re-signed for four years, $38.8 million. There are two possibilities here. The first is that Jefferson naively opted out of a $15 million walk year in the blind belief that he could do better in free agency, and that the Spurs agreed to sign Jefferson to a horrible contract when every other competitor was out of cap space, and that his deal just happened to have a first-year figure that's exactly enough to keep the Spurs out of the luxury tax after they use the rest of their midlevel exception …
The other possibility is that this was the shadiest free-agent deal of the summer outside of the three amigos in Miami. Jefferson's opt-out -- followed by an unusually rich payday for an older player coming off a bad year -- had all the markings of a pre-arranged deal … even if you ignore the fact that Jefferson alluded strongly to this possibility, including the exact years and dollar amount, as early as April.
That said, I'm not sure what the league could do about it even if it wanted to. Was it cap circumvention? Not really -- the Spurs were already over the cap. Was the deal above market value? To the sane, yes, but I'm not sure it's anything you could prove given the insanity of this year's free-agent market. Was it tampering? Not with their own player.
Whatever it was, it saved the Spurs the threat of luxury tax and allowed them to make two other moves to fill out their frontcourt. They essentially handed Jefferson $23 million over the final three years of his deal to take his $15 million salary for this season down to $8 million. Throw in another $7 million in luxury tax and it means they spent a reasonable $9 million for the final three years of Jefferson's company. Sure, it would have been better if they'd never acquired him in the first place, but this was the best way to make lemonade.
Signed Tiago Splitter for three years, $10 million. Splitter's deal was one of the offseason's biggest bargains, aided by a European recession and the fact that the Spurs owned his NBA rights exclusively. Players of similar quality were snatching three times as much in the open market. Splitter will prove useful immediately as perhaps the league's best backup center, but the big-picture value is that he provides an obvious succession strategy behind Duncan at the center position.
Signed Matt Bonner for four years, $16 million. Bonner often outplayed McDyess last season and may take his starting gig this year. Regardless of his role, his floor-spacing adds an important dimension for the Spurs since he's their only big man who can connect consistently from beyond the arc.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: The organization[/h3]
Yes, they're still the best-run team in sports, and yes, they remain remarkably low-key about it. Last season provided another example, even in the wake of a rare Spurs move that didn't work out with Jefferson. Head coach Gregg Popovich held the team together long enough for the Spurs to make their late-season run, and individually some key decisions helped along. Most notably, Pop's ability to squeeze the most out of shoot-first point guards has been important. A lot of other coaches would have thrown up their hands with Parker and Hill, but he puts them in situations where they can thrive.
The organization also is a key reason that players like Duncan and Ginobili have remained effective well into their 30s. No team plays its stars fewer minutes; Popovich is a rarity among coaches in that he always has the big picture in mind. In a related story, his ironclad job security is another rarity among coaches.
The same security extends to GM R.C. Buford, making it easier for both to pull the trigger on far-sighted draft choices like Ginobili and Splitter that had multi-year waits before garnering a return. Richards, an athletic 19-year-old, is potentially the next one.
Amazingly, San Antonio has been able to win 50-plus games every year without either the wild spending orgies or slow-motion accumulation of toxic contracts that mark most other long-term contenders. As a result, this team has always been far more flexible than its peers when it comes to reshaping the roster -- the Spurs have shifted on the fly twice in the past two seasons. Even now, they're positioned to head in one of several directions over the next three seasons depending on how Parker, Duncan and the rest of the gang hold up this season.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Age[/h3]
Yes, they got a bit younger in the offseason with the additions of Splitter and Anderson, but if the Spurs disappoint this season, it's almost certainly going to be because Father Time catches up to their best players.
Duncan is 34 and Ginobili is 33; those were their two best players a year ago. The third-best, Parker, is 28, but that's an age when speedy guards often start losing their mojo. Additionally, Jefferson (30), McDyess (35) and Bonner (30) aren't spring chickens.
In any case, it's mainly the Spurs' three stars that are the worry, because all three have had injury problems. Duncan's knees are playing under protest, and while his length and skill still allow him to operate close to his former peak, it's notable that his defensive mobility has been compromised. Ginobili's full-contact style saddles him with countless bumps and bruises; he managed to play 75 games last season only by laboring through a good chunk of the middle. Parker, meanwhile, comes off last season's foot problems facing questions about whether he can regain the speedy burst that made him such a solid scorer.
Regardless of how well San Antonio's younger players come along, the whole idea behind "keeping the window open" is that the new guys support the three stars. The system still depends on Duncan, Ginobili and Parker starring.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
The Spurs' gangbusters performance over the final two months of the 2009-10 regular season confirmed they still have something left in the tank, and they should have enough help from the cavalry this season to build on last season's performance. Between a likely uptick in output from a healthier Parker, the continued development of Hill and Blair and the additions of Splitter and Anderson, San Antonio has a lot of rotation spots that appear to be major upgrades.
As a result, it should be more than able to offset any moderate declines from Duncan and Ginobili this season. I emphasize "moderate," because if one of them collapses, San Antonio's title hopes are toast. But the Spurs have managed those players' minutes so well that one has to think they can age fairly gracefully.
Additionally, we can count on the Spurs' front office to make the right moves in-season as needs arise. San Antonio has won at least 50 games for 11 straight seasons; if you prorate the 1998-99 lockout year, the streak is at 13. That run appears to have at least one more year in it. While I don't see the Spurs as championship favorites, let's not write them off as contenders just yet.
[h3]Prediction: 54-28, 1st in Southwest Division, 3rd in Western Conference
GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Every season, we have a couple of "crossroads" teams, ones that seem set to make or break their futures with key decisions in the coming months. The Nuggets are perhaps the most salient example in 2010-11.
Denver reached the conference finals in 2009 and seemed primed for a return trip in 2010 before falling apart down the stretch. A knee injury to http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=515Kenyon Martin and coach George Karl's departure for cancer treatments left the Nuggets short one big man and a great deal of wisdom, and Denver lacked a capable replacement for either.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 53-29 (Pythagorean W-L: 54-2
Offensive Efficiency: 108.7 (5th)
Defensive Efficiency: 104.7 (16th)
Pace Factor: 97.3 (5th)
Highest PER: Carmelo Anthony (22.29)
With their hands tied by a luxury-tax roster in a small market, the Nuggets haven't been able to make dramatic moves to push themselves over the top and remain hamstrung -- this season's team is $13 million over the tax line at present.
Yet the one player Denver is furiously trying to lavish money on won't take it. So far, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=1975Carmelo Anthony has spurned the Nuggets' efforts to award him a contract extension and instead is pushing for a trade, which is only the latest bit of drama to come from Denver. Between Karl and Nene fighting cancer, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2444J.R. Smith's struggles with the law and a feuding front office in flux, the Nuggets have always kept things interesting.
Despite the minor circus on the periphery, Denver remains a solid team as long as it holds on to Anthony -- but one that is increasingly held together with rubber bands and duct tape.
Big men http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=1135Chris Andersen and Martin are dealing with serious knee problems that could knock each out for a chunk of the season. Erratic shooting guard Smith is on the trading block after a disappointing 2009-10 campaign, and the frontcourt depth (http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3040Shelden Williams, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2986Renaldo Balkman) looks as dubious as ever.
The situation on the sidelines is equally fluid. Karl left the team late last season to undergo treatment for throat cancer, and his absence revealed that nobody else on the staff was remotely qualified to run the team. Adrian Dantley tried and failed miserably, to the point that the Nuggets lost in the first round in six games to Utah. Mind you, this was a Utah team that lacked home-court advantage and had two of its four best players on the sidelines. Karl plans to return this season, but the Nuggets haven't taken any steps to add a qualified assistant who can replace Karl in an emergency.
On the court, the Nuggets thrived largely because of their mastery of drawing fouls. They really did nothing else at an elite level, although they were ninth in 2-point shooting percentage and eighth in turnover ratio. The Nuggets were in most respects a slightly above-average offensive team and in every respect a middling defensive club.
But man, could they draw fouls. Denver averaged .376 free throw attempts per field goal attempt, a figure that easily led the league (see chart). That fact pushed the Nuggets into the league's top five in Offensive Efficiency. Anthony was a big factor, especially early in the season when he played some of the best basketball of his career. But the biggest factor was http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=63Chauncey Billups, who averaged more than one free throw attempt for every two field goal tries -- a phenomenal rate for a point guard. Andersen also helped with one of the league's highest rates (0.94), albeit in far fewer tries.
[h4]Most FTAs Per FGAs, 2009-10[/h4]
| Denver | .376 |
| Charlotte | .346 |
| Cleveland | .341 |
| Orlando | .340 |
| Utah | .340 |
| League average | .300 |
One quirk, however, was the Nuggets' sudden crash in free throw rate when Karl left the bench. With Karl coaching, Denver's .392 free throw attempts per field goal attempt reflected one of the best marks in league history; in 19 games under Dantley, its .323 mark was far more ordinary. There are countless possible reasons why this could have happened, but if Karl's return to the sideline can restore Denver's ability to draw whistles, it will go a long way toward keeping Denver among the West's elite.
Karl also might have considerable work to do at the defensive end. The Nuggets were average across the board on defense last season, despite adding a solid stopper on the wing in http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=3187Arron Afflalo. With the injuries to two defensive aces in the frontcourt, Andersen and Martin, Denver will be hard-pressed just to stay in the middle of the pack this season.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
Denver opened its offseason by nuking the front office, not offering contracts to Mark Warkentien or Rex Chapman. Those two had essentially acted as co-general managers under Bret Bearup, who has no official title but performs many of the functions of a team president. The decisions came as a bit of a surprise, since Denver's front office had a solid track record despite some dysfunction (Warkentien and Chapman didn't get along).
Adding further intrigue, owner Stan Kroenke surrendered the team to his 30-year-old son, Josh, so the elder Kroenke could purchase the St. Louis Rams. Josh Kroenke played collegiately at Missouri and figures to take a much more active role in running the team -- so much so that the Nuggets replaced the Warkentien/Chapman duo with a "general manager" position that paid about half the league's going rate. Former Suns executive David Griffin turned down the gig when he learned what it paid, with the Nuggets eventually hiring Raptors personnel chief Masai Ujiri.
Offered a three-year contract extension to Carmelo Anthony. Notice I said "offered" -- we're still waiting for Anthony's response, and the longer it drags, the more strongly we can presume he intends to opt out of his contract and flee after the season.
This, obviously, creates the secondary dilemma of whether Denver would be better off dealing Anthony before the trade deadline and getting something in return. However, given the large trade exceptions teams were able to generate this past summer with departing max-level free agents, it seems the Nuggets can afford to be patient. Plus, the Nuggets have considerable leverage, because a new collective bargaining agreement likely will provide Anthony much less favorable contract terms. Incidentally, Anthony has until June 30, 2011, to sign an extension.
Signed http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=308Al Harrington for five years, $34 million. This was a full midlevel deal, but the last two years are only half-guaranteed; thus, if Harrington plays horribly, the maximum exposure for the Nuggets is three years, $27 million. In this market, that wasn't a ridiculous number for a productive power forward, especially given the Nuggets' glaring need at the position. Additionally, he provides Denver with an entirely new dimension as a floor-spacing big man who can offer Anthony some breathing room on the block.
It also puts Denver in position to make secondary moves with Martin's contract at the trade deadline. His expiring $16 million deal can be a huge carrot; alternatively, the Nuggets can pay a team to take it and maneuver under the luxury tax. The path they choose depends largely on how chilly things get with Anthony and how well they play in the first half of the season.
Declined to match Toronto's offer sheet for http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=2770Linas Kleiza. With the Nuggets $13 million into the luxury tax, there was never a serious threat of them matching Toronto's offer. Kleiza had played in Europe the season before and was never going to see much daylight backing up Anthony anyway.
Signed Shelden Williams and http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=137Anthony Carter for one year, veteran's minimum. Sure, these are end-of-roster pickups, but both players are good values at this price. Williams can't score, but he rebounds and will bang in the post, making him a decent fifth big man. He'll have to be a rotation player until Martin and Andersen are healthy, which is a bit of a stretch.
Carter, meanwhile, is a useful third point guard because he defends and distributes. The biggest drawback is that Karl loves the guy and tends to lean on him a bit too much at the expense of more talented players -- most notably http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerId=4000Ty Lawson.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Shooting[/h3]
This is where the addition of Harrington really changes things for the Nuggets -- they're going to be able to fill it up from outside. He's a much better offensive player than Martin, and more importantly, he can play much farther away from the basket.
This augments what was already a solid outside shooting crew. The backcourt has three deadly shooters with Billups (38.6 percent on 3s), Afflalo (43.4 percent) and Lawson (41 percent), plus Smith -- who had shot better than 39 percent for three straight seasons before misplacing his jumper last season. Throw in Harrington, and at any given time the Nuggets should have three capable long-range bombers around Anthony.
That should make Anthony more effective in the paint, and it should tempt him to drift outside less. One reason Denver's overall 3-point numbers weren't great was that Anthony made only 31.6 percent on nearly three attempts per game. With more room to operate inside, his long-range tries should decrease.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: Interior defense[/h3]
The Nuggets will be better once Martin and Andersen return, but until then they're going to be very vulnerable up front. A starting forward combo of Anthony and Harrington won't scare any scorers, while the lack of shot-blocking should give opposing guards a field day on drives to the rim.
The depth picture also gets shaky without the two injured stalwarts. Shelden Williams moves up to backup center, where he'll be adequate but nothing more, while Anthony is likely to shift to power forward behind Harrington and play as a smallball 4.
The Nuggets also have to fret about the frontcourt because that was formerly what helped a limited perimeter group. Only Afflalo and Carter are qualified to handle most opponents one-on-one, and Carter is unlikely to play much. Smith is a disinterested defender, Billups can't stay in front of quick guards, Lawson is vulnerable to size and Anthony tends to coast on D. Denver also has a gap in the wing rotation behind Anthony -- Joey Graham's departure means there isn't a qualified small forward on the roster, and it's not clear how the Nuggets will fill those minutes.
Finally, there's no guarantee that Martin and Andersen will play like their old selves once they return. Martin in particular has had a lot of work done on his knees and might have trouble regaining his former level.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
Things seem to be snowballing downhill for the Nuggets since late last season, when Martin hurt his knee and Karl had to leave the team for cancer treatments. It's pretty much been a nonstop torrent of bad news ever since, and even the addition of Harrington was only a Band-Aid to stem the bleeding from the Martin injury.
In spite of those problems, the Nuggets have talent. The trio of Anthony, Billups, and Nene is a potent one, and that crew alone should go a long way toward ensuring a return trip to the playoffs. Lawson is a wild card as a potential breakout player, although Smith is an equally iffy variable in the other direction.
Perhaps the most important consideration, however, is Karl's health. It's a players' league, but last season illustrated how important Karl is to keeping the Nuggets' volatile personalities on the same page … and how unqualified his assistants were to do the same. On paper, the Nuggets are a poor defensive team, and the frontcourt is held together with paper clips and dental floss. But Karl has worked with less. This projection obviously assumes Anthony will stay in Denver all season, which is a risky proposition at the moment. But as long as Karl stays on the sideline and the stars, stay on the court, he should be able to navigate them to the playoffs.
[h3]Final record: 46-36, fourth in Northwest Division, tied for seventh in Western Conference
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GO TO: 2009-10 Recap Offseason Moves Strength/Weakness Outlook
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[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
It was tough for the Wolves to sell the idea that the bad old days of the Kevin McHale era were over when the team on the floor was worse than ever. In a campaign in which the New Jersey Nets nearly broke the league record for losses in a season, it slipped under the radar that many objective measures showed Minnesota to be even worse.
En route to a 15-win disaster of its own, Minnesota had a worse point differential than the Nets (or any other team in captivity), a worse defense and a much worse ending -- the Wolves won only twice after the All-Star break. Say that again slowly: They won twice after the All-Star break. In a league in which several teams had openly given up on the season in order to pursue free-agent dreams, the Wolves managed to decline despite harboring no fantasies of offseason grandeur.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 15-67 (Pythagorean W-L: 14-6
Offensive Efficiency: 98.9 (29th)
Defensive Efficiency: 109.3 (28th)
Pace Factor: 98.5 (3rd)
Highest PER: Kevin Love (20.72)
Minnesota put together the league's third-worst offense and its second-worst defense; finding categories in which the team was merely average required some serious sleuthing. (It turns out there were three in which the Wolves ever-so-barely eked past the league average: offensive rebounding, 2-point field goal percentage and opponent free throw attempts per field goal attempt. They weren't good in these categories, mind you; they were just non-bad.)
While fans expected a long rebuilding project after McHale's series of cap-killing mistakes, the medicine proved much harsher than expected. The regime of new general manager David Kahn and new coach Kurt Rambis hasn't displayed a single truly horrifying lapse of judgment yet, but the two have experienced enough plods and stumbles along the way to leave everyone frightened of what's next.
Let's start with the big stuff. Kahn got off to a rocky start with the consecutive selections of point guards Ricky Rubio and Jonny Flynn in the 2009 draft. Rubio opted to stay in Spain and has shown little enthusiasm for the idea of becoming a Wolf, while Flynn struggled mightily as virtually every other rookie point guard bloomed.
Kahn's choice for coach, Rambis, got a fairly generous four-year deal to bring the Lakers' system up to Minnesota, and the first read was that he employed it a bit too religiously. The Wolves ran the triangle just as if they had Kobe Bryant or Michael Jordan, with slightly different results due to the fact that they didn't.
It seemed a classic example of forcing the talent to fit the system rather than vice versa. Flynn and free-agent pickup Ramon Sessions both are born pick-and-roll specialists; asking them to space the floor in a triple-post offense hardly seemed an ideal use of their skills, and each struggled to carry out the assignment. Instead, the offense degenerated into midpost face-ups for the likes of Ryan Hollins or Ryan Gomes.
Roster redundancy made Rambis' project more difficult. The Wolves infamously selected three point guards in the 2009 draft and signed another as a free agent; while only two of them were on the team last season, those choices prevented other gaps from being filled. The team had a glaring lack of wing scorers all season, filling out the roster with assorted veteran flotsam like Damien Wilkins and Sasha Pavlovic, and their inability to create offense became particularly noticeable at the end of the shot clock.
As a result of those shortcomings and Al Jefferson's gimpy return from a torn ACL, the Wolves rated among the league's least effective offensive teams. Perhaps the most damning stat, for both the offense and Rambis' triangle, was this one: The Wolves didn't have a single player with a 10-assist game until Sessions finally accomplished the feat in Game 81. Flynn, in fact, finished dead last among point guards in pure point rating (see chart) -- a bit of a concern considering he was the first U.S. point guard taken in the 2009 draft. One presumes that he'd move to a third-guard role if and when Rubio arrives.
[h4]Pure Point Rating -- '09-10's Worst For PGs[/h4]
| Jonny Flynn | Min | 0.19 |
| Eddie House | Bos-NY | 0.79 |
| Jordan Farmar | LAL | 0.86 |
| Daniel Gibson | Cle | 1.00 |
| Jannero Pargo | Chi | 1.13 |
| Pure Point Rating = 100 x (League Pace / Team Pace) x ([(Assists x 2/3) - Turnovers] / Minutes) Min. 500 minutes |
Defensively, the Wolves' redundancies were equally problematic. While most teams are fond of adding "length," Minnesota might have led the league in "width" with Jefferson, Love and Nathan Jawai. Jawai fell out of the rotation as the season wore on, but Love and Jefferson were a big problem because both were too good to sit.
Inevitably, one of them had to, however, because they proved wholly incompatible defensively. Neither was capable of guarding the perimeter, and both were equally useless protecting the rim. While the Wolves were nearly the league's worst team in a laundry list of statistical categories, there was only one in which they were the absolute worst: shot blocking. That spoke directly to the land-locked nature of their two feature frontcourt players.
Jefferson and Love blocked only 121 shots between them the entire season. As a result, the Wolves sent back only 4.4 percent of opponent deliveries, the worst percentage in the league (see chart).
[h4]Pct. Of Opp. Shots Blocked, '09-10 Worst[/h4]
| Minnesota | 4.40 |
| New York | 4.42 |
| New Orleans | 4.46 |
| Houston | 4.67 |
| Golden State | 4.83 |
Additionally, each was slow enough in transition to give any opponent interested in the opportunity a good shot at a five-on-three break. Minnesota ended up third in the league in pace factor despite not playing with any particular urgency at the offensive end. Its opponents just scored so much in transition -- Minnesota was 28th in opponent fast-break points per game -- that it skewed the numbers to make the Wolves look like a run-and-gun outfit.
Rambis responded at midseason by bringing Love off the bench, which was a baffling decision given that Love was the team's best player. Not surprisingly, this just exposed other holes in the dike -- a lack of quality frontcourt depth, a shortage of shooters to penalize opponents for doubling Jefferson and of course Jefferson's fondness for keeping the ball to himself even when he was in the corner surrounded by three opponents.
The one solid move Kahn made was swapping Brian Cardinal's expiring contract for Darko Milicic at the trade deadline. I don't want to oversell the benefits here -- the team went 2-25 after the trade. But Milicic played some of the most motivated basketball of his career (this, of course, is damning with the faintest of praise), and provided the defensive complement to Love and Jefferson that Minnesota desperately needed. Since it cost the Wolves essentially nothing, it was a worthwhile risk.
Had a few other gambles -- drafting Flynn with the fifth overall pick, say, or signing Hollins -- worked out as well, the Wolves might have pulled together a quasi-respectable season. Instead, only the Nets prevented them from being a laughingstock. New Jersey is in far better shape this time around, so the Wolves have some work to do to avoid becoming the league's punchline.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
One big piece of Minnesota's future remains overseas. Rubio will play at least one more season in Spain and hasn't indicated any particular desire to join the Wolves at a future date.
However, Minnesota widened its European imprint in the offseason by hiring former Pistons European scout Tony Ronzone to be its new assistant general manager. Considered among the best talent evaluators -- if not the best -- working overseas, Ronzone added instant respect for a front office that has received little to date.
Unfortunately, Kahn went right about losing it with a series of moves that completely overhauled the roster without revealing a hint of an overarching plan:
Drafted Wesley Johnson. The Wolves were in a bit of a quandary with the fourth overall pick. On talent, the obvious choice was to take DeMarcus Cousins of Kentucky -- another big, plodding post player who would have paired terribly with Love. I don't think Johnson is in the same orbit talent-wise and don't see him as a star, but he unquestionably fills a glaring need at the 3. Given that every player on the board besides Cousins had similar question marks (and Cousins, it should be said, came with a few red flags of his own), it's hard for me to get too down on the Wolves about this pick. It's just a lower ceiling than you'd like to see when a 15-win team picks fourth in the draft.
Traded Ryan Gomes and 16th pick to Portland for Martell Webster. This was an absolutely baffling trade that sent the 16th pick out for a backup at a position where they already were covered and were about to draft two more players. Gomes' nonguaranteed contract could have been waived and eventually was by the Blazers, so Minnesota essentially traded the 16th overall pick (Luke Babbitt) for Webster.
Traded 23rd and 56th picks for 30th and 35th picks; selected Lazar Hayward and Nemanja Bjelica. This was a good arbitrage trade with Washington, which overpaid to move up to No. 23 and allowed the Wolves to get two solid prospects in Hayward and Bjelica. While one can fairly question whether Hayward can stick in the league as something more than a Michael Curry-esque role player, Ronzone's track record and the ability to stash Bjelica in Europe free of charge combine to make that selection seem promising.
Drafted Paulao Prestes. Ronzone had one other international stash pick with Prestes, a skilled Brazilian big man of modest athleticism who is somewhere between a 4 and a 5 in the NBA. He won't arrive for at least another year, if ever.
Signed Nikola Pekovic for three years, $13 million. This was my favorite Wolves move of the past year. They took Pekovic with the first pick of the second round in 2008 -- one of the few things McHale did right in recent drafts -- and locked him up as soon as his contract expired overseas. Pekovic is a paint-area beast who somewhat overlaps with Love as a productive scorer around the basket and who will have some defensive limitations; nonetheless, this was too great a value to pass up. If the Wolves can get over their Milicic fantasies, Pekovic could end up starting and challenging for rookie of the year.
Signed Darko Milicic for four years, $20 million. This year's Beno Udrih Award -- for a team overly congratulating itself on the previous year's scrap-heap find -- goes to the Wolves and the outsized deal they bestowed on Milicic. While Milicic had his moments last season, he's a below-average offensive player whose motivation and focus have been questioned at every stop despite repeated opportunities. Players like that typically don't engender bidding wars, which is a nice way of saying Minnesota could have offered half as much and still been free and clear. The final year isn't guaranteed, at least, but this was a bad idea.
Traded second-round picks in 2011 and 2014 to Miami for Michael Beasley. This was a good move in the sense that the Wolves received a talented player for nothing; I think Beasley could be a beast in the right environment. That said, I'm not sure this is the right environment. He's likely to see a lot of minutes at the 3, but he's been far more effective as a 4 his entire career. Additionally, he's not a defender, exacerbating a weakness that already persists throughout the frontcourt. It's hard to criticize the deal given how little it cost, but this might not be the right landing spot for Beasley to break out.
Signed Luke Ridnour for four years, $16 million. There's no way to sugarcoat this: This was a horrible decision. Ridnour turns 30 in February, comes off a Fluke Rule season he has no chance of repeating, and, as with Flynn and Sessions, he's a pick-and-roll specialist who will be a fish out of water in Rambis' system. Bravo to Ridnour for cashing in on a career season, but it's hard to comprehend how this advances the rebuilding effort one inch.
Signed Anthony Tolliver for two years, $4 million. This deal can become $4.8 million with incentives; either way, it was reasonable value for a fifth big man who showed some promise for Golden State last season.
Traded Al Jefferson to Utah for Kosta Koufos and two first-round picks. Perhaps the most contentious move of the summer was the salary dump of Jefferson to the Jazz. The idea of trading him was defensible given his inability to coexist with Love, but the Wolves traded Jefferson right when his value was lowest and got 50 cents on the dollar in return. The first-round pick from Utah is likely to be a late first-rounder; the other pick is from Memphis and is top-nine protected through 2015. In other words, Minnesota is left with two picks that are unlikely to produce a player of Jefferson's caliber.
Traded Ramon Sessions, Ryan Hollins and a 2013 second-round pick to Cleveland for Delonte West and Sebastian Telfair. Minnesota's two free-agent signings from the summer of 2009 went into the discard pile in this trade, as the Wolves immediately cut West and will have only Telfair around as an emergency point guard. One would congratulate them on admitting their mistake so quickly were it not part of the larger what-is-the-plan-here-anyway theme emanating from the Kahn administration thus far.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: The Bench[/h3]
Rarely has such a bad team been blessed with such a good bench. Minnesota's projected second unit this season is Jonny Flynn, Martell Webster, Michael Beasley, Anthony Tolliver and Nikola Pekovic. Webster and Beasley started for playoff teams last season, Flynn was the Wolves' third-leading scorer as a rookie, and Pekovic was arguably the best player in Europe.
I didn't even include Wayne Ellington in that list, but with just slight improvement, he'll be a rotation-worthy player as well. If so, he could bump Beasley to the backup 4 spot and Tolliver out of the mix entirely. Lazar Hayward also could factor into the mix, although he seems likely to be the 12th man on most nights. I'm also partial to Kosta Koufos, who will begin the season as the third center but will force his way into the rotation if he ever gets a spine.
I've been hard on Kahn, but this speaks to one thing he's done right: accumulating a bunch of assets, most of them young, whom the Wolves can develop and barter at some point farther down the road.
[h3]Biggest Weakness: The Management[/h3]
I'm including the gamut from top to bottom here. Glen Taylor is widely considered one of the league's least competent owners, and Rambis made several head-scratching moves in his first campaign on the sideline. Nonetheless, Kahn is the focal point here. He's yet to provide any convincing evidence that Rubio will ever suit up for the Wolves, he made three highly questionable offseason moves (signing Ridnour and Milicic, and trading Jefferson), and his public comments -- most notably the ones about Beasley that got him fined by the league -- make one wonder whether he's out of his league in this job.
In fact, if you look at his personnel moves in his first two offseasons at the helm, it's hard to find a single one that bore any permanent fruit for Minnesota. First-round picks Flynn and Ellington struggled last season, Rubio didn't play, and Ty Lawson was traded to the Nuggets. Sessions and Hollins bombed as free agents, and Milicic's contract is, at best, a premature declaration of victory.
Similarly, it's not clear what he got out of this summer. Converting the 16th pick into Webster is a break-even move at best, and the two first-rounders for Jefferson are likely to provide two more second-tier players. I'm more enthused about the acquisitions of Beasley, Tolliver and Pekovic, but Kahn's administration is long overdue for a victory. In the big picture, the only player on the roster who would appear to have high long-term value is Love … who is one of only two current Wolves inherited by Kahn when he arrived.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
The Wolves are likely to improve in spite of themselves; most teams don't stay at rock bottom for long, because the combination of draft picks and cap space gives them a powerful forward boost no matter how inefficiently the resources are used.
That should be the case for Minnesota. Despite giving away Jefferson, cutting salary to the bone and making several other puzzling personnel decisions, the Wolves will be hard pressed to match the misery of last season. The improvement of the wing positions alone should give them a powerful shove forward -- it's difficult to emphasize enough how awful Minnesota was at these spots last season, but adding Johnson, Webster and Beasley should improve the situation significantly.
Additionally, this team has much more quality depth than it did last season. As noted above, the second unit looks downright solid. Love provides another opportunity -- the mere act of starting him should add a few wins even if he doesn't improve at all, and he's likely to keep progressing.
Unfortunately, much work remains to be done. Right now the team is basically Love and a mismatched collection of half-good players; while that's a dramatic improvement on what the Wolves had last season, it's a long way from contending for anything important.
[h3]Prediciton: 27-55, 5th in Northwest Division, 14th in Western Conference
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GO TO: 2010-11 Recap Offseason Moves Biggest Strength/Weakness Outlook
http://[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Every team makes plans, but few have seen theirs come together as quickly or as successfully as the Thunder's blueprint under Sam Presti over the past three seasons.
An Oklahoma City team that was just 3-27 after 30 games of the 2008-09 season transformed into a 50-win juggernaut a season later, with a superstar scorer in Kevin Durant, a supporting cast brimming with talented 20-somethings, and enviable cap space to add to the impressive foundation. Other than Miami, no team seems better situated for the next half-decade.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '10-11 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 50-32 (Pythagorean W-L: 53-29)
Offensive Efficiency: 105.8 (12th)
Defensive Efficiency: 101.6 (8th)
Pace Factor: 95.6 (11th)
Highest PER: Kevin Durant (26.23)
Last season, two factors accelerated what was already a speedy rise to prominence. First, the Thunder enjoyed pristine health. While this generally is an advantage for younger teams, in the Thunder's case it was ridiculous: Four of the five starters played all 82 games, and all nine rotation players played at least 73. The Thunder's nine-man rotation averaged 79 games apiece last season, which is an amazing figure. By comparison, six different teams had only one player appear in that many contests.
Second, Oklahoma City's defense came together much more quickly than expected. The Thunder were as young as any team in the league, and most young teams are poor defensively. Even if they have individual skill, they normally lack the experience in team defense to operate as a cohesive unit. The Thunder were an exception; despite the lack of an imposing center, they finished eighth in defensive efficiency.
Amazingly, the window remains open.
the Spurs are in the process of injecting more youth, which is why I maintain that their championship window remains open.
it's clear that by the end of last season, this was one of the best teams in basketball.
Well, so far I am 1 for 1, now we'll see what he says about the Suns and Blazers.
This guy....
I bet 5 billion dollars that sometime next year he's going to say the Lakers window is closed for ever and ever and ever, yet he's kept the Spurs window open for goin on 5 years here pretty quick. Come on ESPN, fire this dude already.
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*sighs* basically. If John Hollinger, who's being surgical with statistical facts to back his statements, calls you worthless...
jpzx
Supporter
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SMH at ESPN for having a lil set on the base outside of the Heats practice....i guess i need to prepare for the massive D riding nation wide
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What the hell...
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MeloDrama: Houston out, Nets need two new teams
Most thought a deal for Carmelo Anthony would've been done by now. Not often do four-team deals hang in limbo like this without someone finally pressing the button or it completely falling apart.
And while yesterday the Nuggets leaped a big hurdle by getting Anthony to media day and training camp, there was a small twist.
He didn't partake in any of the promotional video, picture or radio shoots. All together now: hmmmmm. If you were looking for a sign that things were still alive in the trade department, I think you got one.
It's obvious that the trade discussions are still happening and as Adrian Wojnarowski of Yahoo! reported the Nets are working on a new deal. Why the wait-out by the Nuggets? Because they're concerned about taking back more money than they're sending out.
A source told ESPN's Chris Broussard, "Stan Kroenke is not going to pay that much money to take a step backwards," the source said of the Nuggets' owner. "They'll have to find a way for Denver to take on less money for that deal to happen."
In the current proposed deal, the Nuggets would receive Andrei Kirilenko ($17.8 million), New Jersey rookie Derrick Favors ($4.1 million) and two future first-round draft picks for Carmelo, who makes right at $17.1 million. The Nuggets' payroll would increase by $4.8 million and since they are over the luxury tax, they'd pay another $4.8 million, meaning Denver would pay an extra $9.6 million this season to become a worse team. Yeah, that doesn't sound so awesome.
While Denver has not totally put the kibosh on the deal, the source told Broussard the financial complications make it "very unlikely" to happen within its current structure. That sort of explains Denver's hesitancy regarding the deal. Broussard also said that Bret Bearup, a longtime consultant to Kroenke and his son Josh, has wanted to trade Anthony for quite some time, but the money aspect of this deal has kept even him from signing off on the move.
Wojnarowski said the Nets are trying to find two new teams to get involved in the deal. Ken Berger of CBSSports.com said that the Nuggets have tried to grab Gerald Wallace but the Bobcats won't budge unless they get Anthony and Carmelo said he won't go there. Same issue with Philly and Andre Iguodala.
But Berger also notes that current deal isn't necessarily dead, but potentially is just being re-worked. On Sunday, a person connected to the talks told CBSSports.com that there was a "more than 50 percent chance" Anthony is traded in the next 24-48 hours.
One contender for Anthony that might be able to be crossed off is Houston, Chris Mannix of Sports Illustrated reports. He said he's hearing the Rockets are out of the Carmelo sweepstakes, but does note that the longer this goes, there's a chance they could get involved again.
Posted by Royce Young
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I'm really so sick of this Anthony trade talk...NBA is turning into WWF SMH
do be doo
Banned
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Thanks to
Paul Is On Tilt
For the AVY.
TIMMY with the 1st of MANY.
Here's to sending TD out the right way....with another TWO RINGS.
Paul Is On Tilt
For the AVY.
TIMMY with the 1st of MANY.
Here's to sending TD out the right way....with another TWO RINGS.
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That has to be one of the creepiest gifs I have ever seen.
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Anthony to the Nets is dead per Netsdaily.com
Thank god this over. Waste of time.
Thank god this over. Waste of time.
do be doo
Banned
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Why you mad tho?
I think its NIIICCCEEE.
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Word, I was hoping it was over the limit so I could tell him to change it.
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Why do you think that's very far off?Originally Posted by bhzmafia14
@ 36 games for the Grizz.
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Didn't the Lakers win it the yr after? Didn't most of the team kiss on it? After Timmy did God knows what to it........
do be doo
Banned
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Originally Posted by Blazers21NTNP
Word, I was hoping it was over the limit so I could tell him to change it.
