The Official NBA Collective Bargaining Thread vol Phased in Hard Cap

[scotty pimpin]

Originally Posted by grittyman20

From what I've heard about Sterling, is that he's more concerned with profitability than he is about winning...although he may have changed that stance in recent years. The Clippers have a built in fan base that's used to losing so he doesn't really have that urgency to build a winner. I don't even know why people would be fans of that team other than wanting to root for a local team but hating the Lakers and what they stand for...but that's an entirely different discussion

No disrespect to any die hard fans, but there are some cities that are just in weak markets and need to move on...Toronto, Sacramento, Minnesota, Indiana, etc. I'm sure those teams would do better financially if they were in Vegas, Seattle, Anaheim, or maybe even one of those foreign countries that were in discussions years ago like London or Barcelona. 

Better in Seattle? We all seen what happened. Better in Vegas? Yeah, for all the tourist to visit.
(Edit: personal attack removed and warning added to account.)

 

[grittyman20]

How you can lump the Craptors with financial minnows like the Kings, Wolves, Pacers is beyond me.

I said that based on the Raptor's past year's attendance, which wasn't very good just like those other teams I mentioned. Sure that franchise be making money, but are you going to sit here and tell me that the Raptors are a successful organization? I won't argue that Toronto isn't a great city, but we can argue that most American born players would prefer to stay and play in the United States. Eventually those fans are going to get tired of supporting a team that is in a continuous rebuilding mode...or maybe not, since I don't know what the hell I'm talking about. 
(Edit: removed name calling and added warning to account.)

 

[grittyman20]

How you can lump the Craptors with financial minnows like the Kings, Wolves, Pacers is beyond me.

I said that based on the Raptor's past year's attendance, which wasn't very good just like those other teams I mentioned. Sure that franchise be making money, but are you going to sit here and tell me that the Raptors are a successful organization? I won't argue that Toronto isn't a great city, but we can argue that most American born players would prefer to stay and play in the United States. Eventually those fans are going to get tired of supporting a team that is in a continuous rebuilding mode...or maybe not, since I don't know what the hell I'm talking about. 
(Edit: removed name calling and added warning to account.)

 

[pmatic]

Nah, Toronto has some of the most passionate and rabid fans in the NBA. They just have terrible management. But I do agree that despite Toronto being a top market, there is a stigma that American born players are hesitant to play there.

 

[pmatic]

Nah, Toronto has some of the most passionate and rabid fans in the NBA. They just have terrible management. But I do agree that despite Toronto being a top market, there is a stigma that American born players are hesitant to play there.

 

[aepps20]

I think the stigma has more to do with the Canadian tax structure than actually playing in Canada.

 

[aepps20]

I think the stigma has more to do with the Canadian tax structure than actually playing in Canada.

 

[everysingletime]

Originally Posted by JapanAir21


While an idiot like Sterling (he's the Clippers owner, right?) just doesn't know how to manage a team.

He knows exactly how to manage a team.  He just cares about the money though.  Not w/l.  I think I've read somewhere that the clips are one of the more profitable teams. 

*edit*

looked it up.  I stand corrected

*edited*

this is what I got according to forbes.com when I googled most profitable nba teams


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[table][tr][th=""]
Rank
[/th][th=""]
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[/th][th=""]
Current Value ($mil)
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1-Yr Value Change (%)
[/th][th=""]
Debt/Value (%)
[/th][th=""]
Revenue ($mil)
[/th][th=""]
Operating Income ($mil)
[/th][/tr][tr][td]1[/td][td][h3]New York Knicks[/h3][/td][td]655[/td][td]12[/td][td]0[/td][td]226[/td][td]64.0[/td][/tr][tr][td]2[/td][td][h3]Los Angeles Lakers[/h3][/td][td]643[/td][td]6[/td][td]19[/td][td]214[/td][td]33.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]3[/td][td][h3]Chicago Bulls[/h3][/td][td]511[/td][td]0[/td][td]11[/td][td]169[/td][td]51.3[/td][/tr][tr][td]4[/td][td][h3]Boston Celtics[/h3][/td][td]452[/td][td]5[/td][td]40[/td][td]151[/td][td]4.2[/td][/tr][tr][td]5[/td][td][h3]Houston Rockets[/h3][/td][td]443[/td][td]-6[/td][td]16[/td][td]153[/td][td]35.9[/td][/tr][tr][td]6[/td][td][h3]Dallas Mavericks[/h3][/td][td]438[/td][td]-2[/td][td]46[/td][td]146[/td][td]-7.8[/td][/tr][tr][td]7[/td][td][h3]Miami Heat[/h3][/td][td]425[/td][td]17[/td][td]38[/td][td]124[/td][td]-5.9[/td][/tr][tr][td]8[/td][td][h3]Phoenix Suns[/h3][/td][td]411[/td][td]-4[/td][td]45[/td][td]147[/td][td]20.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]9[/td][td][h3]San Antonio Spurs[/h3][/td][td]404[/td][td]1[/td][td]10[/td][td]135[/td][td]-4.7[/td][/tr][tr][td]10[/td][td][h3]Toronto Raptors[/h3][/td][td]399[/td][td]3[/td][td]34[/td][td]138[/td][td]25.3[/td][/tr][/table]For anyone who cares

 

[everysingletime]

Originally Posted by JapanAir21


While an idiot like Sterling (he's the Clippers owner, right?) just doesn't know how to manage a team.

He knows exactly how to manage a team.  He just cares about the money though.  Not w/l.  I think I've read somewhere that the clips are one of the more profitable teams. 

*edit*

looked it up.  I stand corrected

*edited*

this is what I got according to forbes.com when I googled most profitable nba teams


Other Lists

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Search:
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Debt/Value (%)
[/th][th=""]
Revenue ($mil)
[/th][th=""]
Operating Income ($mil)
[/th][/tr][tr][td]1[/td][td][h3]New York Knicks[/h3][/td][td]655[/td][td]12[/td][td]0[/td][td]226[/td][td]64.0[/td][/tr][tr][td]2[/td][td][h3]Los Angeles Lakers[/h3][/td][td]643[/td][td]6[/td][td]19[/td][td]214[/td][td]33.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]3[/td][td][h3]Chicago Bulls[/h3][/td][td]511[/td][td]0[/td][td]11[/td][td]169[/td][td]51.3[/td][/tr][tr][td]4[/td][td][h3]Boston Celtics[/h3][/td][td]452[/td][td]5[/td][td]40[/td][td]151[/td][td]4.2[/td][/tr][tr][td]5[/td][td][h3]Houston Rockets[/h3][/td][td]443[/td][td]-6[/td][td]16[/td][td]153[/td][td]35.9[/td][/tr][tr][td]6[/td][td][h3]Dallas Mavericks[/h3][/td][td]438[/td][td]-2[/td][td]46[/td][td]146[/td][td]-7.8[/td][/tr][tr][td]7[/td][td][h3]Miami Heat[/h3][/td][td]425[/td][td]17[/td][td]38[/td][td]124[/td][td]-5.9[/td][/tr][tr][td]8[/td][td][h3]Phoenix Suns[/h3][/td][td]411[/td][td]-4[/td][td]45[/td][td]147[/td][td]20.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]9[/td][td][h3]San Antonio Spurs[/h3][/td][td]404[/td][td]1[/td][td]10[/td][td]135[/td][td]-4.7[/td][/tr][tr][td]10[/td][td][h3]Toronto Raptors[/h3][/td][td]399[/td][td]3[/td][td]34[/td][td]138[/td][td]25.3[/td][/tr][/table]For anyone who cares

 

[duba169]

i wonder how valuable the knicks would be if they had as many championships as the lakers or celtics do. probably close to a billion dollars

 

[duba169]

i wonder how valuable the knicks would be if they had as many championships as the lakers or celtics do. probably close to a billion dollars

 

[grittyman20]

Just because a team is making money, doesn't mean that franchise is successful...the Phoenix Suns and the Toronto Raptors are both really good examples of losing teams that still generate positive cash flow.

 

[grittyman20]

Just because a team is making money, doesn't mean that franchise is successful...the Phoenix Suns and the Toronto Raptors are both really good examples of losing teams that still generate positive cash flow.

 

[air max 87]

Originally Posted by grittyman20

Just because a team is making money, doesn't mean that franchise is successful...the Phoenix Suns and the Toronto Raptors are both really good examples of losing teams that still generate positive cash flow.

capt obvious is obvious

the teams upset are the teams with bad franchises and not making money.

if everyone made money none of this would be an issue.

its not about the fans, its not about the teams, its about the money.

 

[air max 87]

Originally Posted by grittyman20

Just because a team is making money, doesn't mean that franchise is successful...the Phoenix Suns and the Toronto Raptors are both really good examples of losing teams that still generate positive cash flow.

capt obvious is obvious

the teams upset are the teams with bad franchises and not making money.

if everyone made money none of this would be an issue.

its not about the fans, its not about the teams, its about the money.

 

[grittyman20]

air max 87 wrote: 
Son %@$ are you talking about? Try reading more than the last page of thread before you start making idiotic statements ok... 

 

[grittyman20]

air max 87 wrote: 
Son %@$ are you talking about? Try reading more than the last page of thread before you start making idiotic statements ok... 

 

[pmatic]

Calling Foul on N.B.A.’s Claims of Financial Distress
At midnight on Thursday, the N.B.A. locked out its players in what could be the start of a long labor dispute. Some observers, like ESPN’s Michael Wilbon, believe the entire 2011-12 season could be threatened.

Such a move would not be without precedent: the N.H.L. canceled its 2004-5 season. But the N.B.A.’s current financial condition is different than the N.H.L.’s in one important respect. Whereas there was almost no doubt that the N.H.L. was in fact losing money in advance of its lockout — player salaries had mushroomed by more than 400 percent from 1994 to 2004, according to independent estimates — the N.B.A.’s claims of financial hardship should be viewed more skeptically.

Instead, independent estimates of the N.B.A. financial condition reflect a league that has grown at a somewhat tepid rate compared to other sports, and which has an uneven distribution of revenues between teams — but which is fundamentally a healthy and profitable business. In addition, it is not clear that growth in player salaries, which has been modest compared to other sports and which is strictly pegged to league revenue, is responsible for the league’s difficulties.

The table below reflects the N.B.A.’s financial condition from its 1989-90 through 2009-10 seasons, as according to estimates prepared by Forbes and Financial World magazines. (All figures are adjusted for inflation. Some data was not published by Forbes in some years and is therefore left blank.)

The first column is league’s gate receipts or ticket revenues; the Forbes data suggest this is one area of legitimate concern. Adjusted for inflation, ticket revenues are down 6 percent compared to five years ago, although they are up 22 percent compared to the 1999-2000 season.

Other revenues, like licensing and media rights, have increased at a healthier clip, because the N.B.A. is locked into long and lucrative television contracts. They have grown by 11 percent over five years, adjusted for inflation, or by 30 percent over 10 years.

The league’s primary expense is player salaries. They have followed a nearly identical trajectory to league revenues, having grown at a 24 percent rate over 10 years, but with growth having flattened out since the recession. This is not a coincidence: under the league’s current collective bargaining agreement, player salaries are strictly tied to league revenues. In fact, because of a little-known provision in the labor agreement, players must return a portion of their salaries if they exceed 57 percent of league revenues, as has happened in several recent seasons. As I will discuss at more length later, the portion of revenues earned by N.B.A. players is similar to that of the other major sports leagues and has been stable over the past decade.

Growth in non-player expenses has outpaced that of salaries, having increased by 13 percent over five years and 43 percent over 10 years. Although some of this undoubtedly reflects sound business ventures, like the league’s investments in digital media or efforts to expand the game internationally, they have nevertheless had a reasonably large effect on the league’s bottom line. Had nonplayer expenses been the same in 2009-10 as they were in 1999-2000 (adjusted for inflation), the league would have made a record profit that year.

Even as it stands, however, the Forbes data suggests that the league is still profitable. Its operating income — revenues less expenses (but before interest payments and taxes) — is estimated to have been $183 million in 2009-10, or about $6 million per team. The N.B.A.’s operating margin (operating income divided by revenues) was about 5 percent in 2009-10 and has been about 7 percent during the life of the current labor deal.

A 5 percent or 7 percent profit is not dissimilar to what other businesses have experienced recently. Fortune 500 companies, for instance, collectively turned a 4.0 percent profit in 2009 and a 6.6 percent profit in 2010 (both figures after taxes). Profit margins in the entertainment industry, in which the N.B.A. should probably be classified, have generally been a bit lower than that.

So why are N.B.A. owners seeking such significant reductions in player salaries, reportedly to about 45 percent of league revenues? The simple reason is that they think they can — and this reflects an awful lot of money. If salaries were reduced to 45 percent of revenues, this would save the owners roughly $500 million per year, or about $3 billion over the course of a six-year labor contract. It is hard to estimate either the near or the long-term cost of cancelling a season, but the potential gain from a more favorable contract is large enough that it is something the owners might be willing to risk.

What the owners may be thinking about is their position compared to that of the other sports leagues. Baseball and football are cash cows, with the N.F.L. having brought in more than a billion in profits (before taxes) in 2009, and Major League Baseball about $500 million in its most recent season.

By contrast, the N.B.A.’s position is more comparable to that of the N.H.L. Several N.B.A. owners also own N.H.L. teams, and they may be looking to that league’s lockout as having been successful, because it recovered from $228 million in operating losses in the three seasons preceding its lockout (according to the Forbes data) to a state of profitability comparable to the N.B.A.’s.

It is not clear, however, how much player salaries are to blame for the N.B.A.’s having failed to achieve an N.F.L.-like level of profit. Between 2000 and 2009, player salaries in the N.F.L. represented an average of 56 percent of league revenues, and that total averaged 58 percent in Major League Baseball — both close to the 57 percent target enshrined under the N.B.A.’s current deal. By contrast, when the N.H.L. locked out its players and was losing money, player salaries made up 66 of league revenue. (They have since fallen to about 54 percent.)

The other factor is the distribution of revenue from team to team: 17 of the 30 N.B.A. teams lost money in 2009-10, according to the Forbes data. Most of the losses were small, and the league was still profitable as a whole because of profits made by successful franchises like the New York Knicks, Chicago Bulls and Los Angeles Lakers, who together netted about $150 million by themselves. But there are a sizable number of owners who have reason to be unhappy.

In some ways, the N.B.A.’s present condition closely resembles that of Major League baseball before its 1994-95 strike. Baseball was still profitable as a whole in advance of the strike, but about one-third of its teams had lost money in 1993, according to Forbes, while just four teams accounted for almost half of all league profits.

The solution that baseball has since adopted — greater revenue sharing in lieu of a salary cap — could also be a natural one for the N.B.A.: the profits made by the Knicks, Bulls and Lakers alone would be enough to cover the losses of all 17 unprofitable teams. (Players might have some reason to object to revenue sharing — some versions of it are the economic equivalent of a tax on player salaries — but they would probably prefer it to the more draconian measures that the league will try to impose.)

Another way in which the N.B.A. resembles baseball, unfortunately, is by having circulated financial data that doesn’t necessarily hold up to scrutiny. In 2001, Major League Baseball issued figures suggesting that it had incurred losses of $232 million before interest and taxes; Forbes’s independent estimates instead suggested that the league had made a profit of $127 million. But that year’s labor dispute, and the next in 2006, were resolved amiably and with few changes to baseball’s economic structure, and years of profits have followed since.

A similar discrepancy exists today between Forbes’s estimates — a $183 million profit for the N.B.A. in 2009-10, and those issued by the league, which claim a $370 million loss. The difference between the two numbers is roughly of the same size on an annual basis as the salary concessions the N.B.A. is seeking.

There are several reasons to be skeptical of the N.B.A.’s figures. First, many of the purported losses — perhaps about $250 million — result from an unusual accounting treatment related to depreciation and amortization when a team is sold. While the accounting treatment is legal, these paper losses would have no impact on a team’s cash flow. Another potential (and usually within-the-law) trick: moving income from the basketball team’s balance sheet to that of a related business like a cable network, or losses in the opposite direction.

Second, the leaked financial statements for one team, the New Orleans Hornets, closely matched the Forbes data. And the sale prices for some teams have exceeded their figures. The Golden State Warriors were purchased for $450 million in 2010 — more than the $363 million that Forbes estimates they are worth. The Detroit Pistons were recently sold for a price reported to be about $420 million, more than Forbes’s estimated value of $363 million. The Washington Wizards were bought for $551 million last year, a 70 percent premium over Forbes’s estimated price of $322 million. Comparing actual to theoretical sale prices is not always safe because other assets are sometimes packaged with the teams, but the market for N.B.A. franchises is clearly quite healthy and inconsistent with what the league claims to be a failing business model.

The third reason for skepticism: the N.B.A.’s data has not been made public, although it has been shared with the players’ union. If the league expects their figures to be viewed credibly, they should open up their books to journalists, economists and fans.

Fourth, the current labor deal — which was signed in 1999 and renewed with relatively few changes in 2005 — was initially considered favorable to the league. Although revenue growth may have been more tepid than the league might like, especially in the past few recessionary years, player salaries are tied to revenues and have grown at no faster a rate. The claims made by sports owners on the occasion of a labor dispute — smart and successful capitalists who suddenly become enamored of restrictions on the free market and their own wherewithal to make decisions — often stretch credulity. But to hear the N.B.A. owners complain about the current deal now, when none of the fundamentals have changed, reminds one of the old Woody Allen joke about two women kvetching at a restaurant: “Boy, the food at this place is really terrible,

 

[pmatic]

Calling Foul on N.B.A.’s Claims of Financial Distress
At midnight on Thursday, the N.B.A. locked out its players in what could be the start of a long labor dispute. Some observers, like ESPN’s Michael Wilbon, believe the entire 2011-12 season could be threatened.

Such a move would not be without precedent: the N.H.L. canceled its 2004-5 season. But the N.B.A.’s current financial condition is different than the N.H.L.’s in one important respect. Whereas there was almost no doubt that the N.H.L. was in fact losing money in advance of its lockout — player salaries had mushroomed by more than 400 percent from 1994 to 2004, according to independent estimates — the N.B.A.’s claims of financial hardship should be viewed more skeptically.

Instead, independent estimates of the N.B.A. financial condition reflect a league that has grown at a somewhat tepid rate compared to other sports, and which has an uneven distribution of revenues between teams — but which is fundamentally a healthy and profitable business. In addition, it is not clear that growth in player salaries, which has been modest compared to other sports and which is strictly pegged to league revenue, is responsible for the league’s difficulties.

The table below reflects the N.B.A.’s financial condition from its 1989-90 through 2009-10 seasons, as according to estimates prepared by Forbes and Financial World magazines. (All figures are adjusted for inflation. Some data was not published by Forbes in some years and is therefore left blank.)

The first column is league’s gate receipts or ticket revenues; the Forbes data suggest this is one area of legitimate concern. Adjusted for inflation, ticket revenues are down 6 percent compared to five years ago, although they are up 22 percent compared to the 1999-2000 season.

Other revenues, like licensing and media rights, have increased at a healthier clip, because the N.B.A. is locked into long and lucrative television contracts. They have grown by 11 percent over five years, adjusted for inflation, or by 30 percent over 10 years.

The league’s primary expense is player salaries. They have followed a nearly identical trajectory to league revenues, having grown at a 24 percent rate over 10 years, but with growth having flattened out since the recession. This is not a coincidence: under the league’s current collective bargaining agreement, player salaries are strictly tied to league revenues. In fact, because of a little-known provision in the labor agreement, players must return a portion of their salaries if they exceed 57 percent of league revenues, as has happened in several recent seasons. As I will discuss at more length later, the portion of revenues earned by N.B.A. players is similar to that of the other major sports leagues and has been stable over the past decade.

Growth in non-player expenses has outpaced that of salaries, having increased by 13 percent over five years and 43 percent over 10 years. Although some of this undoubtedly reflects sound business ventures, like the league’s investments in digital media or efforts to expand the game internationally, they have nevertheless had a reasonably large effect on the league’s bottom line. Had nonplayer expenses been the same in 2009-10 as they were in 1999-2000 (adjusted for inflation), the league would have made a record profit that year.

Even as it stands, however, the Forbes data suggests that the league is still profitable. Its operating income — revenues less expenses (but before interest payments and taxes) — is estimated to have been $183 million in 2009-10, or about $6 million per team. The N.B.A.’s operating margin (operating income divided by revenues) was about 5 percent in 2009-10 and has been about 7 percent during the life of the current labor deal.

A 5 percent or 7 percent profit is not dissimilar to what other businesses have experienced recently. Fortune 500 companies, for instance, collectively turned a 4.0 percent profit in 2009 and a 6.6 percent profit in 2010 (both figures after taxes). Profit margins in the entertainment industry, in which the N.B.A. should probably be classified, have generally been a bit lower than that.

So why are N.B.A. owners seeking such significant reductions in player salaries, reportedly to about 45 percent of league revenues? The simple reason is that they think they can — and this reflects an awful lot of money. If salaries were reduced to 45 percent of revenues, this would save the owners roughly $500 million per year, or about $3 billion over the course of a six-year labor contract. It is hard to estimate either the near or the long-term cost of cancelling a season, but the potential gain from a more favorable contract is large enough that it is something the owners might be willing to risk.

What the owners may be thinking about is their position compared to that of the other sports leagues. Baseball and football are cash cows, with the N.F.L. having brought in more than a billion in profits (before taxes) in 2009, and Major League Baseball about $500 million in its most recent season.

By contrast, the N.B.A.’s position is more comparable to that of the N.H.L. Several N.B.A. owners also own N.H.L. teams, and they may be looking to that league’s lockout as having been successful, because it recovered from $228 million in operating losses in the three seasons preceding its lockout (according to the Forbes data) to a state of profitability comparable to the N.B.A.’s.

It is not clear, however, how much player salaries are to blame for the N.B.A.’s having failed to achieve an N.F.L.-like level of profit. Between 2000 and 2009, player salaries in the N.F.L. represented an average of 56 percent of league revenues, and that total averaged 58 percent in Major League Baseball — both close to the 57 percent target enshrined under the N.B.A.’s current deal. By contrast, when the N.H.L. locked out its players and was losing money, player salaries made up 66 of league revenue. (They have since fallen to about 54 percent.)

The other factor is the distribution of revenue from team to team: 17 of the 30 N.B.A. teams lost money in 2009-10, according to the Forbes data. Most of the losses were small, and the league was still profitable as a whole because of profits made by successful franchises like the New York Knicks, Chicago Bulls and Los Angeles Lakers, who together netted about $150 million by themselves. But there are a sizable number of owners who have reason to be unhappy.

In some ways, the N.B.A.’s present condition closely resembles that of Major League baseball before its 1994-95 strike. Baseball was still profitable as a whole in advance of the strike, but about one-third of its teams had lost money in 1993, according to Forbes, while just four teams accounted for almost half of all league profits.

The solution that baseball has since adopted — greater revenue sharing in lieu of a salary cap — could also be a natural one for the N.B.A.: the profits made by the Knicks, Bulls and Lakers alone would be enough to cover the losses of all 17 unprofitable teams. (Players might have some reason to object to revenue sharing — some versions of it are the economic equivalent of a tax on player salaries — but they would probably prefer it to the more draconian measures that the league will try to impose.)

Another way in which the N.B.A. resembles baseball, unfortunately, is by having circulated financial data that doesn’t necessarily hold up to scrutiny. In 2001, Major League Baseball issued figures suggesting that it had incurred losses of $232 million before interest and taxes; Forbes’s independent estimates instead suggested that the league had made a profit of $127 million. But that year’s labor dispute, and the next in 2006, were resolved amiably and with few changes to baseball’s economic structure, and years of profits have followed since.

A similar discrepancy exists today between Forbes’s estimates — a $183 million profit for the N.B.A. in 2009-10, and those issued by the league, which claim a $370 million loss. The difference between the two numbers is roughly of the same size on an annual basis as the salary concessions the N.B.A. is seeking.

There are several reasons to be skeptical of the N.B.A.’s figures. First, many of the purported losses — perhaps about $250 million — result from an unusual accounting treatment related to depreciation and amortization when a team is sold. While the accounting treatment is legal, these paper losses would have no impact on a team’s cash flow. Another potential (and usually within-the-law) trick: moving income from the basketball team’s balance sheet to that of a related business like a cable network, or losses in the opposite direction.

Second, the leaked financial statements for one team, the New Orleans Hornets, closely matched the Forbes data. And the sale prices for some teams have exceeded their figures. The Golden State Warriors were purchased for $450 million in 2010 — more than the $363 million that Forbes estimates they are worth. The Detroit Pistons were recently sold for a price reported to be about $420 million, more than Forbes’s estimated value of $363 million. The Washington Wizards were bought for $551 million last year, a 70 percent premium over Forbes’s estimated price of $322 million. Comparing actual to theoretical sale prices is not always safe because other assets are sometimes packaged with the teams, but the market for N.B.A. franchises is clearly quite healthy and inconsistent with what the league claims to be a failing business model.

The third reason for skepticism: the N.B.A.’s data has not been made public, although it has been shared with the players’ union. If the league expects their figures to be viewed credibly, they should open up their books to journalists, economists and fans.

Fourth, the current labor deal — which was signed in 1999 and renewed with relatively few changes in 2005 — was initially considered favorable to the league. Although revenue growth may have been more tepid than the league might like, especially in the past few recessionary years, player salaries are tied to revenues and have grown at no faster a rate. The claims made by sports owners on the occasion of a labor dispute — smart and successful capitalists who suddenly become enamored of restrictions on the free market and their own wherewithal to make decisions — often stretch credulity. But to hear the N.B.A. owners complain about the current deal now, when none of the fundamentals have changed, reminds one of the old Woody Allen joke about two women kvetching at a restaurant: “Boy, the food at this place is really terrible,

 

[duba169]

the accounting trick is what stands out the most. NBA lying through it's teeth but somehow stern gets people to side with the owners. crafty piece of #@**

 

[duba169]

the accounting trick is what stands out the most. NBA lying through it's teeth but somehow stern gets people to side with the owners. crafty piece of #@**

 

[User 15002]

I see no point siding with either party. Even if the league gets the share it wants it won't affect the vast majority of current players' contracts. Too many players are being overpaid anyway. It does make sense for there to be more revenue sharing so smaller market teams have more cash flow.

Really want owners to have to hit a minimum threshold on salaries. Something like a $6-7 million range from the minimum threshold and the max hard cap. Force owners to fill rosters with quality players and have competitive teams.

 

[User 15002]

I see no point siding with either party. Even if the league gets the share it wants it won't affect the vast majority of current players' contracts. Too many players are being overpaid anyway. It does make sense for there to be more revenue sharing so smaller market teams have more cash flow.

Really want owners to have to hit a minimum threshold on salaries. Something like a $6-7 million range from the minimum threshold and the max hard cap. Force owners to fill rosters with quality players and have competitive teams.

 

[grittyman20]

I know they existed in the previous CBA, but how about more performance bonuses/incentive pay and fewer fully guaranteed contracts for players in the next CBA? Seems to me most fans don't have a problem with players salaries in general, but more of an issue when players are receiving these enormous salaries and being unproductive at the same time.

 

[grittyman20]

I know they existed in the previous CBA, but how about more performance bonuses/incentive pay and fewer fully guaranteed contracts for players in the next CBA? Seems to me most fans don't have a problem with players salaries in general, but more of an issue when players are receiving these enormous salaries and being unproductive at the same time.