The Official NBA Collective Bargaining Thread vol Phased in Hard Cap

[sircharles2ol3]

This imminent lockout sounded so bad today on ESPN during the draft preview.. would be wack.. although the last time there was a lockout Knicks went to the finals

 

[sircharles2ol3]

This imminent lockout sounded so bad today on ESPN during the draft preview.. would be wack.. although the last time there was a lockout Knicks went to the finals

 

[pmatic]

@ChrisMannixSI Sources with knowledge of negotiations believe there are owners determined to lock players out just to get a 8-10 year, union crippling deal

 

[pmatic]

@ChrisMannixSI Sources with knowledge of negotiations believe there are owners determined to lock players out just to get a 8-10 year, union crippling deal

 

[pmatic]

@podcenter NBA Today: 6/27 : Ryen Russillo explores everything you need to know about the NBA labor situation with Russ Granik, Larry %**#, and Chris Sheridan. - http://es.pn/m2LXoQ
Edit:

Labor history stands as dire reminder of what could be again

David Stern finally exhaled. The lights and cameras had clicked off. Another update on the NBA's collective bargaining talks was done. Stern, the league's commissioner, gazed at the table top where he sat and to no one in particular said, "I'm tired."

Moments earlier, he had joked about the rigorous turnaround in his work schedule: Traveling over to Newark to emcee a global telecast of the 2011 NBA Draft on Thursday, working the "room" of the Prudential Center through the first round amid catcalls from some beery fans, then skedaddling home to prep for Friday's latest longish session of collective bargaining talks with the players association. It was the biggest meeting yet, with an estimated 40 additional players attending with the usual owners, lawyers and executives.

"I'm a little punchy," Stern said to reporters after Friday's five-hour session. "Is this the second round of the Draft or the third? ... I was asleep by the time Adam got to the names he couldn't pronounce." Deputy commissioner Adam Silver, as usual, handled the second-round chores, freeing Stern for the earlier ride home.

But here he was, a day later, speaking softly, looking tired and copping to it. The grind was enough to wear down men half his age, and the fact is, both Stern and National Basketball Players Association executive director Billy Hunter -- born 44 days apart in 1942 -- are 68 years old. If things get worse before they get better in these labor talks, and an NBA lockout stretches through autumn, they both could turn 69 with the matter still in dispute.

They were younger men, just 55, the last time the NBA peered into this particular abyss. But both added a disproportionate amount of grey to their haircuts back in 1998-99, wrangling over and through a lockout that lasted 191 days -- from no deal to deal -- and cost owners and players hundreds of millions of dollars, incalculable goodwill and 32 games off each team's schedule.

Beyond money, image and schedules issues, though, the league's worst lockout was a busy time. Nothing might have been happening in terms of progress toward a compromise during most of the six-plus months of darkness. But that doesn't mean nothing was happening.

If history is a guide -- and it sure ought to be, lest both parties repeat some of the mistakes from 13 years ago -- all sorts of things were happening during the last lockout. Hardly any of them, alas, had a thing to do with basketball.

Here is a timeline of some highlights and lowlights:

June 22, 1998: The ninth in-season bargaining session between the owners and the players stalls, with the players rejecting any discussion of a "hard" salary cap. (Sound familiar?).

June 30, 1998: The NBA announces that a lockout will begin the next day. Technically, it becomes the third one in league history, though the first two ended rather quickly with minimal impact.

July 1, 1998: Boston's Kenny Anderson becomes one of the first players to miss a paycheck (a reported $5.8 million). Most NBA players are paid during the season but a few have 12-month cycles or even lump-sum payments.

Aug. 6, 1998: The first bargaining session after talks stalled ends after just 90 minutes. Notice that date: The two sides went 45 days, from June 22, without formal talks.

Sept. 10, 1998: The NBA cancels an Oct. 12 exhibition game between Miami and Maccabi Elite of Israel. It is the first competition in league history to be lost for the lack of a CBA.

Sept. 24, 1998: Twenty-four preseason games are cancelled and the opening of training camps is postponed indefinitely.

Oct. 5, 1998: The balance of the 1998 preseason schedule is wiped clean.

Oct. 13, 1998: Five days after an unproductive session, the NBA loses its status as the only major U.S. sports league not to lose games to a labor dispute. The first two weeks of the regular season are canceled.

Oct. 26, 1998: A story in the New York Times reveals details of an unusually candid Kenny Anderson's finances. In it he notes that upkeep and insurance on his eight vehicles costs about $75,000 annually, and says, "I was thinking about selling one of my cars. I don't need all of them. You know, just get rid of the Mercedes." It becomes the second-most famous player quote of the lockout, right behind New York center Patrick Ewing's, "We make a lot of money but we spend a lot of money." No doubt those have been Exhibits A and B in players association huddles over what not to say if this year's talks unravel.

Oct. 28, 1998: The smell of sulfer is in the air after a meeting with full union membership. It stretches past midnight and features a pair of famous exchanges. In one, Chicago guard Steve Kerr calls parts of the owners' latest proposal "an insult," triggering a similar remark from Stern about the players' desired 63 percent split of revenues. More famously, the Bulls' Michael Jordan gets into it with Washington owner Abe Pollin (who later would hire him as a player and part-owner) and tells Pollin, "If you can't make a profit, you should sell your team." A young Stephon Marbury reportedly was amused, saying, "Get a load of the old dude."

Nov. 3, 1998: Arenas stay dark. Opening night of the 1998-99 season does not happen.

Nov. 20, 1998: The union and owners meet for 13 hours -- 13 hours! -- and report some significant progess. But five days later, the union clarifies that, saying it misunderstood a portion of the teams' proposal. The Nov. 25 session is cancelled.

Nov. 23, 1998: Bah, humbug! Now the Knicks-Bulls game scheduled for Christmas afternoon gets scuttled.

Dec. 1, 1998: One month out, a New Year's Day game between Seattle and Minnesota is cancelled, officially pushing the lockout into calendar 1999.

Dec. 4, 1998: After an 11-hour meeting, Stern says it is more likely there will not be an NBA season than the prospect of staging a curtailed one.

Dec. 7, 1998: Arranged by agents David Falk and Arm Tellem, the players announce an exhibition game to be played Dec. 19 in Atlantic City. Proceeds are earmarked both for charity and for locked-out players in "financial need."

Dec. 8, 1998: The 1999 All-Star Game, set for Philadelphia, is canceled. (No All-Star Game is played in the 50-game shortened season and Philadelphia has to wait until February 2001 to host the event.)

Dec. 19, 1998: Sixteen players participated in the exhibition game before a crowd of 9,512, with Ewing's team beating a squad headed by Alonzo Mourning 125-119. All proceeds were donated to charity after the "financial need" claim for a players' share earned public ridicule.

Dec. 23, 1998: Stern and Hunter meet in Los Angeles for five hours. The commissioner also sets a Jan. 7 deadline as the date he will recommend that the entire season be cancelled.

Dec. 27, 1998: Another session, this time in Denver, with the owners making what they say is their final proposal.

Dec. 30, 1998: The NBA sends the owners' latest version to all union members, asking that they put it to a vote. But the union's executive council rejects that idea and announces the next day that it will submit its last offer.

Jan. 4, 1998: Owners reject the union's final proposal in the first full negotiating session in nearly a month. Stern says the NBA might consider the use of replacement players for the 1999-2000 season, should the dispute linger that long.

Jan. 5 1998: Players converge on New York for a scheduled vote the next day on the union's decision to reject the owners' latest proposal. Unbeknownst to many, Stern and Hunter are meeting through the night to seek a compromise.

Jan. 6, 1998: With one day to spare before Stern's mandated deadline to salvage a season, after the principals' all-nighter of negotiating, the players vote on the final offer. It passes 179-5.

After the lockout came the fallout. Training camps were scrunched into a couple weeks' time and players scrambled to get into shape without hurting themselves (Shawn Kemp and Vin Baker didn't quite make it). Teams played just two hastily scheduled preseason games, limiting coaches' ability to install systems or adapt to new personnel. Free agency got rushed as well, teams were built on the fly (Joe Smith's illegal contracts in Minnesota were a direct result of the frenzy) and the season began on Feb. 5.

Jordan retired for the second time, and final time as a Bull, about a week after the lockout was lifted. Many players never earned back what they'd lost -- veteran forward Charles Oakley suffered mightily when his $10 million balloon payment vanished under the new rules -- and both sides suffered hits from negative publicity. Phil Jackson, sitting out that partial season, snarkily suggested that an asterisk be applied to the San Antonio Spurs' championship -- The Finals didn't end until June 25 -- but the fact is, the playoffs were the most unaffected part of the NBA's campaign.

Fans were courted back with open practices, public scrimmages, autograph signings and other promotions intended to salve the emotional wounds. That likely would be tried again and, in many ways, there is a new generation of NBA fans. But there also might be a fool-me-once, fool-me-twice reaction to it all.

"It took us about six or seven years to get back to where we were prior to the lockout in '98," Hunter said last week. "The detriment to the game is going to be significant. If there's a year-long lockout, the players stand to lose about $2 billion. The owners stand to lose just as much, in addition to diminishing the value of the franchise. ... There may be fans, particularly in this economy, that may walk away and never come back."

It was a long, painful, costly, grueling process, ultimately navigated by leaders -- Stern and Hunter -- who are committed, yes, but already tired too. And 13 years older.
Link

 

[pmatic]

@podcenter NBA Today: 6/27 : Ryen Russillo explores everything you need to know about the NBA labor situation with Russ Granik, Larry %**#, and Chris Sheridan. - http://es.pn/m2LXoQ
Edit:

Labor history stands as dire reminder of what could be again

David Stern finally exhaled. The lights and cameras had clicked off. Another update on the NBA's collective bargaining talks was done. Stern, the league's commissioner, gazed at the table top where he sat and to no one in particular said, "I'm tired."

Moments earlier, he had joked about the rigorous turnaround in his work schedule: Traveling over to Newark to emcee a global telecast of the 2011 NBA Draft on Thursday, working the "room" of the Prudential Center through the first round amid catcalls from some beery fans, then skedaddling home to prep for Friday's latest longish session of collective bargaining talks with the players association. It was the biggest meeting yet, with an estimated 40 additional players attending with the usual owners, lawyers and executives.

"I'm a little punchy," Stern said to reporters after Friday's five-hour session. "Is this the second round of the Draft or the third? ... I was asleep by the time Adam got to the names he couldn't pronounce." Deputy commissioner Adam Silver, as usual, handled the second-round chores, freeing Stern for the earlier ride home.

But here he was, a day later, speaking softly, looking tired and copping to it. The grind was enough to wear down men half his age, and the fact is, both Stern and National Basketball Players Association executive director Billy Hunter -- born 44 days apart in 1942 -- are 68 years old. If things get worse before they get better in these labor talks, and an NBA lockout stretches through autumn, they both could turn 69 with the matter still in dispute.

They were younger men, just 55, the last time the NBA peered into this particular abyss. But both added a disproportionate amount of grey to their haircuts back in 1998-99, wrangling over and through a lockout that lasted 191 days -- from no deal to deal -- and cost owners and players hundreds of millions of dollars, incalculable goodwill and 32 games off each team's schedule.

Beyond money, image and schedules issues, though, the league's worst lockout was a busy time. Nothing might have been happening in terms of progress toward a compromise during most of the six-plus months of darkness. But that doesn't mean nothing was happening.

If history is a guide -- and it sure ought to be, lest both parties repeat some of the mistakes from 13 years ago -- all sorts of things were happening during the last lockout. Hardly any of them, alas, had a thing to do with basketball.

Here is a timeline of some highlights and lowlights:

June 22, 1998: The ninth in-season bargaining session between the owners and the players stalls, with the players rejecting any discussion of a "hard" salary cap. (Sound familiar?).

June 30, 1998: The NBA announces that a lockout will begin the next day. Technically, it becomes the third one in league history, though the first two ended rather quickly with minimal impact.

July 1, 1998: Boston's Kenny Anderson becomes one of the first players to miss a paycheck (a reported $5.8 million). Most NBA players are paid during the season but a few have 12-month cycles or even lump-sum payments.

Aug. 6, 1998: The first bargaining session after talks stalled ends after just 90 minutes. Notice that date: The two sides went 45 days, from June 22, without formal talks.

Sept. 10, 1998: The NBA cancels an Oct. 12 exhibition game between Miami and Maccabi Elite of Israel. It is the first competition in league history to be lost for the lack of a CBA.

Sept. 24, 1998: Twenty-four preseason games are cancelled and the opening of training camps is postponed indefinitely.

Oct. 5, 1998: The balance of the 1998 preseason schedule is wiped clean.

Oct. 13, 1998: Five days after an unproductive session, the NBA loses its status as the only major U.S. sports league not to lose games to a labor dispute. The first two weeks of the regular season are canceled.

Oct. 26, 1998: A story in the New York Times reveals details of an unusually candid Kenny Anderson's finances. In it he notes that upkeep and insurance on his eight vehicles costs about $75,000 annually, and says, "I was thinking about selling one of my cars. I don't need all of them. You know, just get rid of the Mercedes." It becomes the second-most famous player quote of the lockout, right behind New York center Patrick Ewing's, "We make a lot of money but we spend a lot of money." No doubt those have been Exhibits A and B in players association huddles over what not to say if this year's talks unravel.

Oct. 28, 1998: The smell of sulfer is in the air after a meeting with full union membership. It stretches past midnight and features a pair of famous exchanges. In one, Chicago guard Steve Kerr calls parts of the owners' latest proposal "an insult," triggering a similar remark from Stern about the players' desired 63 percent split of revenues. More famously, the Bulls' Michael Jordan gets into it with Washington owner Abe Pollin (who later would hire him as a player and part-owner) and tells Pollin, "If you can't make a profit, you should sell your team." A young Stephon Marbury reportedly was amused, saying, "Get a load of the old dude."

Nov. 3, 1998: Arenas stay dark. Opening night of the 1998-99 season does not happen.

Nov. 20, 1998: The union and owners meet for 13 hours -- 13 hours! -- and report some significant progess. But five days later, the union clarifies that, saying it misunderstood a portion of the teams' proposal. The Nov. 25 session is cancelled.

Nov. 23, 1998: Bah, humbug! Now the Knicks-Bulls game scheduled for Christmas afternoon gets scuttled.

Dec. 1, 1998: One month out, a New Year's Day game between Seattle and Minnesota is cancelled, officially pushing the lockout into calendar 1999.

Dec. 4, 1998: After an 11-hour meeting, Stern says it is more likely there will not be an NBA season than the prospect of staging a curtailed one.

Dec. 7, 1998: Arranged by agents David Falk and Arm Tellem, the players announce an exhibition game to be played Dec. 19 in Atlantic City. Proceeds are earmarked both for charity and for locked-out players in "financial need."

Dec. 8, 1998: The 1999 All-Star Game, set for Philadelphia, is canceled. (No All-Star Game is played in the 50-game shortened season and Philadelphia has to wait until February 2001 to host the event.)

Dec. 19, 1998: Sixteen players participated in the exhibition game before a crowd of 9,512, with Ewing's team beating a squad headed by Alonzo Mourning 125-119. All proceeds were donated to charity after the "financial need" claim for a players' share earned public ridicule.

Dec. 23, 1998: Stern and Hunter meet in Los Angeles for five hours. The commissioner also sets a Jan. 7 deadline as the date he will recommend that the entire season be cancelled.

Dec. 27, 1998: Another session, this time in Denver, with the owners making what they say is their final proposal.

Dec. 30, 1998: The NBA sends the owners' latest version to all union members, asking that they put it to a vote. But the union's executive council rejects that idea and announces the next day that it will submit its last offer.

Jan. 4, 1998: Owners reject the union's final proposal in the first full negotiating session in nearly a month. Stern says the NBA might consider the use of replacement players for the 1999-2000 season, should the dispute linger that long.

Jan. 5 1998: Players converge on New York for a scheduled vote the next day on the union's decision to reject the owners' latest proposal. Unbeknownst to many, Stern and Hunter are meeting through the night to seek a compromise.

Jan. 6, 1998: With one day to spare before Stern's mandated deadline to salvage a season, after the principals' all-nighter of negotiating, the players vote on the final offer. It passes 179-5.

After the lockout came the fallout. Training camps were scrunched into a couple weeks' time and players scrambled to get into shape without hurting themselves (Shawn Kemp and Vin Baker didn't quite make it). Teams played just two hastily scheduled preseason games, limiting coaches' ability to install systems or adapt to new personnel. Free agency got rushed as well, teams were built on the fly (Joe Smith's illegal contracts in Minnesota were a direct result of the frenzy) and the season began on Feb. 5.

Jordan retired for the second time, and final time as a Bull, about a week after the lockout was lifted. Many players never earned back what they'd lost -- veteran forward Charles Oakley suffered mightily when his $10 million balloon payment vanished under the new rules -- and both sides suffered hits from negative publicity. Phil Jackson, sitting out that partial season, snarkily suggested that an asterisk be applied to the San Antonio Spurs' championship -- The Finals didn't end until June 25 -- but the fact is, the playoffs were the most unaffected part of the NBA's campaign.

Fans were courted back with open practices, public scrimmages, autograph signings and other promotions intended to salve the emotional wounds. That likely would be tried again and, in many ways, there is a new generation of NBA fans. But there also might be a fool-me-once, fool-me-twice reaction to it all.

"It took us about six or seven years to get back to where we were prior to the lockout in '98," Hunter said last week. "The detriment to the game is going to be significant. If there's a year-long lockout, the players stand to lose about $2 billion. The owners stand to lose just as much, in addition to diminishing the value of the franchise. ... There may be fans, particularly in this economy, that may walk away and never come back."

It was a long, painful, costly, grueling process, ultimately navigated by leaders -- Stern and Hunter -- who are committed, yes, but already tired too. And 13 years older.
Link

 

[pmatic]

Hill: Players learned from lockout

Thirteen years ago, Grant Hill was one of the NBA’s big stars with a rèsumè already decorated with four All-Star appearances and an All-NBA first team selection. At just 26 years old, the Detroit Pistons forward was in the prime of his career.

And then the NBA entered a lockout that delayed the start of the 1998-99 season by more than three months.

After the season was shortened from 82 to 50 games, Hill lost a big chunk of the $6.6 million he was scheduled to make that season. With the NBA now on the verge of entering another lockout – the current collective bargaining agreement expires Thursday – Hill has no regrets about the players’ last extended labor battle.

“It’s always worth it. I think you learn a lot,

 

[pmatic]

Hill: Players learned from lockout

Thirteen years ago, Grant Hill was one of the NBA’s big stars with a rèsumè already decorated with four All-Star appearances and an All-NBA first team selection. At just 26 years old, the Detroit Pistons forward was in the prime of his career.

And then the NBA entered a lockout that delayed the start of the 1998-99 season by more than three months.

After the season was shortened from 82 to 50 games, Hill lost a big chunk of the $6.6 million he was scheduled to make that season. With the NBA now on the verge of entering another lockout – the current collective bargaining agreement expires Thursday – Hill has no regrets about the players’ last extended labor battle.

“It’s always worth it. I think you learn a lot,

 

[statis22]

Here's to hoping Derek Fisher is a better union president than Patrick Ewing was.

 

[statis22]

Here's to hoping Derek Fisher is a better union president than Patrick Ewing was.

 

[pmatic]

Good run down:

With that, here are summaries of the recent proposals and issues for each side in this negotiation that appears to be going nowhere.
[h3]Owners' proposal:[/h3]
• "Flex cap" of $62 million: This would raise the cap from the current $58 million, thus allowing teams to exceed the cap subject to certain (undefined) restrictions. The exact levels of the salary floor and ceiling, as well as which exceptions would be part of the new system, have not been detailed. However, the basic idea is that the flex cap is similar to the current system but incorporates a firm upper limit (and thereby eliminates the luxury tax).

• $2 billion-a-year guarantee: Owners are proposing to guarantee players $2 billion a year in salary and benefits for the duration of a proposed 10-year CBA. This represents a modest decline from the current $2.17 billion but allows owners to capture most of the gains from a growth in income expected over the course of the next 10 years, especially when new television rights deals are signed in the next five years. This would net the players a declining share of basketball-related income (BRI), estimated (by the players) to go from the current level of 57 percent to about 40 percent in 10 years.

• Keep escrow money: Owners want to keep 8 percent of 2010-11 salaries that has been escrowed in case the players' BRI share went over the 57 percent limit. Players view this as unreasonable, since they consider it money already earned.

• Reduced contract length: Owners are proposing a maximum contract length of three years for players signing with new teams (reduced from five today) and four years for players remaining with their current teams (down from six today). This might be more palatable to the players now that the owners have backed off their demand for unguaranteed deals; the deals will be less crippling with fewer years.

• Removal of sign-and-trades: This is another measure aimed at keeping players on their current teams. Presently, players can take advantage of "Bird rights" by signing with their current team and leveraging a trade, allowing them to receive the six-year deal with 10.5 percent increase from their current team.

Furthermore, the team losing the player usually receives some sort of compensation. For example, both Toronto and Cleveland received late first-round picks and large trade exceptions from Miami for Chris Bosh and LeBron James, respectively. And New York received three players, a second-round pick and a trade exception from Golden State in David Lee's sign-and-trade. With a hard cap, there is no use for this.

• Reducing rookie contracts: This is a lower priority for the owners and certainly not the issue that it has become in the NFL. Owners will seek lower rookie contracts, most notably for first-round picks, but probably not push this too hard.

• The expensing of franchise acquisition costs in teams' operating budgets: The dispute over the fundamental state of the league is principally over how much of the league's claimed $380 million loss is a result of acquisition costs, debt service, etc.

• Length of the agreement: The owners want a 10-year deal, while the players want only five -- which would coincide with the league's new TV deals.
[h3]Players' proposal:[/h3]
•$500 million pay cut: Players are proposing a reduction of their income by $100 million a year for the next five years. They have made this concession to reduce the percentage of BRI that is guaranteed to them. However, they do not want change to the fundamental features of the current system: a soft cap, long contracts and fully guaranteed deals.

• Enhanced revenue sharing: The players believe the owners' concerns about competitive balance can be addressed by reforming the revenue-sharing system. This is the age-old issue in labor disputes: Players believe that looking within, not at themselves, can solve a lot of the owners' issues.

Currently, big-market teams (such as the Knicks, Lakers, etc.) keep all the revenue from their ticket sales and local broadcast deals. The gap between the big and small markets is so large that players believe it undermines the stability of the league and the competitiveness of many of the teams.

• Enhance sign-trade flexibility: Currently, teams over the cap can trade players only when their salaries are within 125 percent and $100,000 of each other. Players want this amended to a range of 250 percent to make player movement easier. To ease this transition, the players are proposing a change to base-year compensation (BYC), a designation awarded to players who receive large raises after their rookie deals. BYC players' value in trades is halved, which makes trading them more difficult. As with the 125 percent rule, players are pushing to eliminate this rule because it impedes trades.

• Reduce the age limit to 18: Players want to revert back to the pre-2005 rules, where players only had to be 18 years old to declare for the draft. As of now, they must be 19 years old and one year removed from high school graduation.

• Restructure restricted free agency (RFA): Teams currently have one week to decide whether to match RFA offer sheets. Players believe this length paralyzes bidders during a frenzied free-agency period and provides disincentives to pursuing RFAs.

• Change/create exceptions: Players will not support a hard cap, but they are willing to make changes to various exceptions. They will shorten the length of the mid-level exception (MLE), the source of many misguided deals, from five years to four, in exchange for adding a second MLE for each team.

• Deduct arena/construction expenses from BRI pool: This is another concession by the players, who agree that they should take some part in the expenses of building and maintaining state-of-the-art arenas. This is also a key issue in the NFL labor negotiations.

• Provide a neutral arbitrator for all on-court discipline matters: Currently, players can appeal to a neutral arbitrator only when they have received suspensions longer than 12 games.

Notable topics not being discussed by either side: length of season/training camp/playoffs; retired player benefits; draft order; playing rules.


Link

 

[pmatic]

Good run down:

With that, here are summaries of the recent proposals and issues for each side in this negotiation that appears to be going nowhere.
[h3]Owners' proposal:[/h3]
• "Flex cap" of $62 million: This would raise the cap from the current $58 million, thus allowing teams to exceed the cap subject to certain (undefined) restrictions. The exact levels of the salary floor and ceiling, as well as which exceptions would be part of the new system, have not been detailed. However, the basic idea is that the flex cap is similar to the current system but incorporates a firm upper limit (and thereby eliminates the luxury tax).

• $2 billion-a-year guarantee: Owners are proposing to guarantee players $2 billion a year in salary and benefits for the duration of a proposed 10-year CBA. This represents a modest decline from the current $2.17 billion but allows owners to capture most of the gains from a growth in income expected over the course of the next 10 years, especially when new television rights deals are signed in the next five years. This would net the players a declining share of basketball-related income (BRI), estimated (by the players) to go from the current level of 57 percent to about 40 percent in 10 years.

• Keep escrow money: Owners want to keep 8 percent of 2010-11 salaries that has been escrowed in case the players' BRI share went over the 57 percent limit. Players view this as unreasonable, since they consider it money already earned.

• Reduced contract length: Owners are proposing a maximum contract length of three years for players signing with new teams (reduced from five today) and four years for players remaining with their current teams (down from six today). This might be more palatable to the players now that the owners have backed off their demand for unguaranteed deals; the deals will be less crippling with fewer years.

• Removal of sign-and-trades: This is another measure aimed at keeping players on their current teams. Presently, players can take advantage of "Bird rights" by signing with their current team and leveraging a trade, allowing them to receive the six-year deal with 10.5 percent increase from their current team.

Furthermore, the team losing the player usually receives some sort of compensation. For example, both Toronto and Cleveland received late first-round picks and large trade exceptions from Miami for Chris Bosh and LeBron James, respectively. And New York received three players, a second-round pick and a trade exception from Golden State in David Lee's sign-and-trade. With a hard cap, there is no use for this.

• Reducing rookie contracts: This is a lower priority for the owners and certainly not the issue that it has become in the NFL. Owners will seek lower rookie contracts, most notably for first-round picks, but probably not push this too hard.

• The expensing of franchise acquisition costs in teams' operating budgets: The dispute over the fundamental state of the league is principally over how much of the league's claimed $380 million loss is a result of acquisition costs, debt service, etc.

• Length of the agreement: The owners want a 10-year deal, while the players want only five -- which would coincide with the league's new TV deals.
[h3]Players' proposal:[/h3]
•$500 million pay cut: Players are proposing a reduction of their income by $100 million a year for the next five years. They have made this concession to reduce the percentage of BRI that is guaranteed to them. However, they do not want change to the fundamental features of the current system: a soft cap, long contracts and fully guaranteed deals.

• Enhanced revenue sharing: The players believe the owners' concerns about competitive balance can be addressed by reforming the revenue-sharing system. This is the age-old issue in labor disputes: Players believe that looking within, not at themselves, can solve a lot of the owners' issues.

Currently, big-market teams (such as the Knicks, Lakers, etc.) keep all the revenue from their ticket sales and local broadcast deals. The gap between the big and small markets is so large that players believe it undermines the stability of the league and the competitiveness of many of the teams.

• Enhance sign-trade flexibility: Currently, teams over the cap can trade players only when their salaries are within 125 percent and $100,000 of each other. Players want this amended to a range of 250 percent to make player movement easier. To ease this transition, the players are proposing a change to base-year compensation (BYC), a designation awarded to players who receive large raises after their rookie deals. BYC players' value in trades is halved, which makes trading them more difficult. As with the 125 percent rule, players are pushing to eliminate this rule because it impedes trades.

• Reduce the age limit to 18: Players want to revert back to the pre-2005 rules, where players only had to be 18 years old to declare for the draft. As of now, they must be 19 years old and one year removed from high school graduation.

• Restructure restricted free agency (RFA): Teams currently have one week to decide whether to match RFA offer sheets. Players believe this length paralyzes bidders during a frenzied free-agency period and provides disincentives to pursuing RFAs.

• Change/create exceptions: Players will not support a hard cap, but they are willing to make changes to various exceptions. They will shorten the length of the mid-level exception (MLE), the source of many misguided deals, from five years to four, in exchange for adding a second MLE for each team.

• Deduct arena/construction expenses from BRI pool: This is another concession by the players, who agree that they should take some part in the expenses of building and maintaining state-of-the-art arenas. This is also a key issue in the NFL labor negotiations.

• Provide a neutral arbitrator for all on-court discipline matters: Currently, players can appeal to a neutral arbitrator only when they have received suspensions longer than 12 games.

Notable topics not being discussed by either side: length of season/training camp/playoffs; retired player benefits; draft order; playing rules.


Link

 

[kingjay718]

62 million cap seems fair. But by God I hope the players don't cave in.

 

[kingjay718]

62 million cap seems fair. But by God I hope the players don't cave in.

 

[MVP]

I'm thinking a cap round 70 million is more fair, only 8 teams were under 62 mil this year while 6 were over, 70 seems like a perfect medium to me.

 

[MVP]

I'm thinking a cap round 70 million is more fair, only 8 teams were under 62 mil this year while 6 were over, 70 seems like a perfect medium to me.

 

[duba169]

this *$%* gonna be BAD

 

[duba169]

this *$%* gonna be BAD

 

[statis22]

70 is still too high.

 

[statis22]

70 is still too high.

 

[MVP]

Its 8 million more a year, and with the concessions that the players are going to have to give into I think it's more than fair to start out at that number and then decrease it over time to the 62 mil number as the newer contracts get phased in.

What I want to know is if the cap is at 62 mil or whatever number less than it is now, will the teams that are over it now be forced to get under or closer to that number?

 

[MVP]

Its 8 million more a year, and with the concessions that the players are going to have to give into I think it's more than fair to start out at that number and then decrease it over time to the 62 mil number as the newer contracts get phased in.

What I want to know is if the cap is at 62 mil or whatever number less than it is now, will the teams that are over it now be forced to get under or closer to that number?

 

[pmatic]

I wonder what the small market owners think. Particularly Memphis and Oklahoma City because they're two of the smallest makets (only New Orleans is smaller) but have up and coming teams that's payrolls will increase within the next year or two.

 

[pmatic]

I wonder what the small market owners think. Particularly Memphis and Oklahoma City because they're two of the smallest makets (only New Orleans is smaller) but have up and coming teams that's payrolls will increase within the next year or two.

 

[MVP]

I really believe it's the scorned owners from the 2010 fiasco ( ie. Gilbert) pushing most of the clown stuff going on here.

I imagine OKC and MEM would like to keep there teams intact but at the smallest numbers possible. I would believe some type of revenue sharing model would help alleviate some of the financial strain.