Why Vote ?

[True Blues]

According to rational choice theory (RCT), voting is irrational behavior.

 

[futuremd]

According to rational choice theory (RCT), voting is irrational behavior.

Walk me through this. 

 

[True Blues]

According to rational choice theory (RCT), voting is irrational behavior.

Walk me through this. 

First, a five important assumptions of parametric RCT:

• Self-interest: Individuals have preferences and act so as to achieve what they prefer most from a set of known alternatives.
• Alternatives are connected or ordered; that is, they can be ordered in such a way that each is preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other. This is normally achieved by assigning expected values to alternatives.
• Preferences are transitive; i.e. If X=Y, Y>Z, then X>Y.
• Individuals always choose from the alternative that ranks the highest in his preference ranking. Actors seek to reach goal in a manner that uses the least possible input of scarce resource per unit of valued output. Simply, they seek to maximize utility.
• The same decision is always made each time an actor is confronted with the same alternatives.

So given these assumptions, we can perform a cost-benefit analysis of voting. The Downsian (see An Economic Theory of Democracy) model looks like this:

R = pB - C

where R is Reward actor receives from voting; B is the differential benefit that a voter receives from the success of his/her preferred candidate carrying the election against the other candidates; p is the probably that the vote will bring about benefit; and c is the cost to the individual in voting.

When the CBA yields a positive result, the actor votes; when it is negative or zero, the actor abstains.

So there are a whole bunch of benefits and costs-- monetary and opportunity-- that could be included in the above model. Some obvious ones are: proposed tax benefit (B), time to register and go to the poll (C), and time to obtain information about the candidates (C).

However, yielding a reward from voting becomes difficult when p is accounted for. If the actor's candidate is sure to win, the expected benefit is nil, as his/her candidate will win regardless of whether he/she votes. If the actor's preferred candidate is sure to lose, the outcome of the election is the same no matter what he/she does. Since a voter's chance of casting the decisive vote in a large-scale nation election is almost infinitesimal, p is VERY small (almost zero). Thus, expected benefit is also very low.

In the rational model of voting costs almost always outweigh expected benefit.

Several other models have been developed since Downs, but none have really overcome this problem without violating the principles of RCT.

This is why voting has been called the paradox that ate rational choice. Rational theorists cannot figure out why people vote.

 

[futuremd]

According to rational choice theory (RCT), voting is irrational behavior.

Walk me through this. 

First, a five important assumptions of parametric RCT:

• Self-interest: Individuals have preferences and act so as to achieve what they prefer most from a set of known alternatives.
• Alternatives are connected or ordered; that is, they can be ordered in such a way that each is preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other. This is normally achieved by assigning expected values to alternatives.
• Preferences are transitive; i.e. If X=Y, Y>Z, then X>Y.
• Individuals always choose from the alternative that ranks the highest in his preference ranking. Actors seek to reach goal in a manner that uses the least possible input of scarce resource per unit of valued output. Simply, they seek to maximize utility.
• The same decision is always made each time an actor is confronted with the same alternatives.

So given these assumptions, we can perform a cost-benefit analysis of voting. The Downsian (see An Economic Theory of Democracy) model looks like this:

R = pB - C

where R is Reward actor receives from voting; B is the differential benefit that a voter receives from the success of his/her preferred candidate carrying the election against the other candidates; p is the probably that the vote will bring about benefit; and c is the cost to the individual in voting.

When the CBA yields a positive result, the actor votes; when it is negative or zero, the actor abstains.

So there are a whole bunch of benefits and costs-- monetary and opportunity-- that could be included in the above model. Some obvious ones are: proposed tax benefit (B), time to register and go to the poll (C), and time to obtain information about the candidates (C).

However, yielding a reward from voting becomes difficult when p is accounted for. If the actor's candidate is sure to win, the expected benefit is nil, as his/her candidate will win regardless of whether he/she votes. If the actor's preferred candidate is sure to lose, the outcome of the election is the same no matter what he/she does. Since a voter's chance of casting the decisive vote in a large-scale nation election is almost infinitesimal, p is VERY small (almost zero). Thus, expected benefit is also very low.

In the rational model of voting costs almost always outweigh expected benefit.

Several other models have been developed since Downs, but none have really overcome this problem without violating the principles of RCT.

This is why voting has been called the paradox that ate rational choice. Rational theorists cannot figure out why people vote.

How does relate to measures on the local and state level that often pass with very slim margins? 

Whats the effect of 1 vote? 10 votes? 100 votes?

At what point does this extrapolation fail?

 

[gus fring]

"Naturally the common people don't want war: Neither in Russia, nor in England, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, It is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can a

lways be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. it works the same in any country."
- Hermann Goering, President of the Reichstag, Nazi Party, and Luftwaffe Commander in Chief

 

[True Blues]

According to rational choice theory (RCT), voting is irrational behavior.

Walk me through this. 

First, a five important assumptions of parametric RCT:

• Self-interest: Individuals have preferences and act so as to achieve what they prefer most from a set of known alternatives.
• Alternatives are connected or ordered; that is, they can be ordered in such a way that each is preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other. This is normally achieved by assigning expected values to alternatives.
• Preferences are transitive; i.e. If X=Y, Y>Z, then X>Y.
• Individuals always choose from the alternative that ranks the highest in his preference ranking. Actors seek to reach goal in a manner that uses the least possible input of scarce resource per unit of valued output. Simply, they seek to maximize utility.
• The same decision is always made each time an actor is confronted with the same alternatives.

So given these assumptions, we can perform a cost-benefit analysis of voting. The Downsian (see An Economic Theory of Democracy) model looks like this:


R = pB - C


where R is Reward actor receives from voting; B is the differential benefit that a voter receives from the success of his/her preferred candidate carrying the election against the other candidates; p is the probably that the vote will bring about benefit; and c is the cost to the individual in voting.


When the CBA yields a positive result, the actor votes; when it is negative or zero, the actor abstains.


So there are a whole bunch of benefits and costs-- monetary and opportunity-- that could be included in the above model. Some obvious ones are: proposed tax benefit (B), time to register and go to the poll (C), and time to obtain information about the candidates (C).


However, yielding a reward from voting becomes difficult when p is accounted for. If the actor's candidate is sure to win, the expected benefit is nil, as his/her candidate will win regardless of whether he/she votes. If the actor's preferred candidate is sure to lose, the outcome of the election is the same no matter what he/she does. Since a voter's chance of casting the decisive vote in a large-scale nation election is almost infinitesimal, p is VERY small (almost zero). Thus, expected benefit is also very low.


In the rational model of voting costs almost always outweigh expected benefit.


Several other models have been developed since Downs, but none have really overcome this problem without violating the principles of RCT.


This is why voting has been called the paradox that ate rational choice. Rational theorists cannot figure out why people vote.

How does relate to measures on the local and state level that often pass with very slim margins? 

Whats the effect of 1 vote? 10 votes? 100 votes?

At what point does this extrapolation fail?

In contests where the probability of an actor's vote mattering is high, the Downsian model works very well. It is rational to vote in these situations. At the local and state level, you could also argue that benefits are a lot more tangible, and thus carry a greater expected value.

There's considerably less utility voting in federal elections, particularly if, using the USA as an example, an actor resides in a state where the EC vote is a foregone conclusion. Citizens in swing states derive greater benefit from voting.

There's a ton of literature on the topic, starting with Economic Theory. It gets complicated, but it's really interesting stuff nonetheless.